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ABSTRACT
Between 1880 and the depression of the 1930s 
the governments of Victoria and New South Wales framed 
a great deal of legislation intended to deal with the 
growing rabbit menace, the spread of noxious weeds and 
the problems attributed to some native animals. The 
environmental perceptions and attitudes of the landholders 
in both states had been shaped by a common heritage, 
similar experiences and the same ambitions. Initially both 
governments shared an almost identical approach: the two
main branches of pest control were handled separately and 
it was intended that both would remain the responsibility 
of landholders and would be administered on a local, 
decentralized basis. However, during the 1880s Victoria 
began a slow movement towards the formation of a centralized, 
integrated policy, whereas New South Wales, despite a brief 
experiment with centrally directed rabbit extermination in 
1883, has retained a divided, locally administered vermin 
and weed control policy. The main reasons for the 
differences in development lie in the effects of broader 
land policy decisions and the nature of the available 
administrative structures.
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1CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
In law words change their meaning far more 
slowly than they do in popular usage, because the law is 
built on precedents. As a result legal terms sometimes 
provide information on the attitudes underlying the 
original statutes. In nineteenth century England vermin 
was still loosely considered to consist of those animals 
which preyed upon preserved game. The Gun Licence Act of 
1870 and the Ground Game Act of 1880 made it clear that, 
although rabbits were known to damage crops and pasture, 
they were not to be classed as vermin, nor were any birds. 
Foxes were technically vermin, but often they were 
informally protected, despite their forays into the coverts, 
and the 1919 Forestry Act placed squirrels in the vermin 
category.'*' Both these apparent exceptions retained a 
tenuous connection with the traditional definition: in
many areas foxes were as highly valued as game for the sport 
that they provided, and squirrels damaged trees, which were 
a sporting as well as an economic asset. In other words, 
until well into the twentieth century the English definition 
remained based on a social assumption about the privileges 
and life-style of a particular class. The term 'vermin' in
1 Earl Jowitt, Dictionary of English Law,1930; Stroud's 
Judicial Dictionary, 1974.
2English land law was not primarily related to economic 
considerations.
An Australian definition of vermin developed 
slowly during the early years of settlement. Obviously the 
English definition was inappropriate to a new society. 
Nevertheless it influenced the way newcomers regarded some 
animals. Legal tradition had not fostered the habit of 
assessing animals from a purely economic point of view. The 
dingo, with his scalp tightening wail and predatory look, 
was quickly recognized as a menace to livestock, and became 
one of the first targets for vermin laws. It therefore seems 
contradictory that, at the same time, a smaller animal but 
one with similar tastes, was deliberately introduced and 
protected. However, the fox was assessed under different 
criteria. Similarly, the rabbit, one of the widely acknow­
ledged banes of nineteenth century English farming, was 
encouraged in Australia, as much for sporting reasons as for 
food. Those who aspired to recreate English social struct­
ures in Australia looked on these animals as targets for 
gentleman shooters. This was not measured against the known 
economic damage that they could do. The two ways of looking 
at such animals coexisted in the minds of many landholders 
in England and Australia, without producing any apparent 
awareness of their basic incompatibility.
Possibly the last echoes of this divided approach 
can be seen in the way the emu in late nineteenth century 
New South Wales moved uneasily back and forth between the
3vermin lists of the pastures and stock protection boards 
and the protected schedule of the 1893 Native Birds Protect­
ion Act, which was basically a game law, intended to secure 
adequate closed seasons for sportsmen.
Another lingering remnant of the original English
concept of vermin is the usual restriction of the term to
animals and a few hunting birds. Only the Public Health Acts
treat insects as vermin. In 1956 a South Australian judge
explained that 'vermin implies something in the nature of an
infestation or infection of the land - a pest that will
2breed and injure the land' but this was not taken to include 
pests like locusts. Although some non-hunting birds were at 
times included under Australian vermin laws before 1930, 
with the exception of the large, flightless emu, which thus 
behaves more like an animal than a bird, they have been 
included as after-thoughts. They have not influenced the 
formulation of policy and therefore will not be considered 
in this thesis. For the same reason I have not discussed 
domestic stock that ran wild and was included in some vermin 
lists. A full catalogue of the vermin statutes would be 
long and dull; attention will be given to the animals 
which prompted major decisions which touched on other aspects 
of government policy and required thoughtful assessment.
By the 1890s all the colonial governments had 
drawn up vermin statutes that were based on economic criteria,
2 Sellars v Gill (1956), South Australian State Reports I.
4but this did not lead to straightf6rward decisions about 
which creatures ought to be proclaimed. Clashes of interest 
emerged that could not be settled by simple accounting 
procedures. The early settlers had created conflicts of 
interest when some persisted in seeing a few animals in 
terms of their social utility rather than their economic 
impact. New conflicts arose when animals that harmed many 
landholders proved to be of economic worth to others, or when 
the costs of eradication were believed to be as crippling 
as the damage actually done by the vermin. A third source 
of dissension emerged when some people again moved away 
from the strictly economic assessment of an animal's value, 
not because they assigned it a role in their social aspirat­
ions, but because they believed that the animal had 
intrinsic worth as a unique creature. At this point the 
vermin debate merges into the conservation issue, so it will 
not be followed very far.
If there were perplexing conceptual problems in 
laying an acceptable basis for vermin laws, there were many 
more hazards obstructing the creation of a noxious weed 
control policy. 'Weed' is only a loose description of a 
plant that grows where it is unwanted. A 'noxious weed' is 
a plant that is perceived to have certain undesirable
3characteristics and takes the place of more desirable species. 
This need not mean that it is poisonous. Noxious weeds may 
contaminate wool or grain with their seeds, or taint the milk
3 W.T. Parsons, Noxious Weeds of Victoria, Melbourne, 
1973, p. 3.
5of dairy herds. They may simply be inedible to certain 
stock. Once again the assessment criteria are economic, 
but the possibilities of conflicts of interest are enormous.
A plant which adversely affects a jersey cow may be a 
nourishing staple for a sheep. Saffron thistle seeds 
discolour flour but some graziers believe that the thistle 
is good drought feed. The extent to which individual 
landholders should be compelled to take expensive action in 
order to prevent harm to distant neighbours is a contentious 
point. Well maintained fences provide protection against 
most vermin but are no defence against wind, water and bird 
carried seeds.
It appears that there should be strong links 
between vermin and weed legislation. They affect the same 
groups; they involve similar conflicts of interest and 
expensive counter-measures; they imply a similar need for 
external supervision and coercion. There is also a biological 
connection. Uncontrolled weed growth provides impenetrable, 
undisturbed harbour for vermin: to a lesser extent the
uncontrolled movement of vermin, like the movement of stock, 
can spread weeds. However, attempts to control the two 
problems developed separately and it was a long time before 
circumstances began to draw them close. In Victoria the 
two branches of pest control were eventually combined. The 
reasons why this did not occur in New South Wales require 
explanation.
Most Australian history books have paid little
6attention to the impact of vermin and weeds on the economic
and political development of the nation, although by the
early twentieth century the scale of both problems was
unique in contemporary world history. Innumerable wild
guesses have been made as to how much the rabbit plagues
cost Australia. As early as 1883 Victoria estimated it had
4lost about £5,000,000 in revenue. By the 1920s New South 
Wales estimates of its loss ranged from £10,000,000 to 
£20,000,000 p.a.^ These figures were based on the drop in 
stock numbers in infested districts and are unreliable and 
incomplete. The western division had been devasted by the 
1895-1902 drought and the earlier years of overstocking. 
Rabbits had played a big part in destroying the saltbush 
and scrub trees that previously held the friable soil 
together, but they had not been the only factor. On the 
other hand, estimates based solely on stock figures took 
no account of the huge cost of erosion and silting due to 
rabbits, or the crop losses. Nor did they allow for the 
loss of productivity due to the massive amount of time, 
labour and capital invested in vermin fencing and other 
expensive control measures.
After myxomatosis took hold in 1950 and reduced 
the rabbit population by about 90 per cent for a few years, 
CSIRO calculated the simple increase in the value of the
4 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 292.
5 CPD, 1924, 108, 292; 303.
7Australian wool clip alone at about £100,000,000 p.a.6 78
By 1950 Australia had been struggling to deal with rabbits 
for over 70 years. The cost must have been literally 
incalculable. To this unimaginable figure should be added 
a guess at the loss caused by just one noxious weed, prickly 
pear. By the 1920s prickly pear had taken over at least 25 
million acres of Queensland and New South Wales, rendering 
it almost totally useless. The general lack of lasting 
impression caused by these phenomena is one of the themes 
that will be investigated.
Although there has been little specific historical 
writing on the vermin and weed problem, a great deal of 
work has been done in recent years by historical geographers 
and some regional historians on the broad factors that 
influenced the way settlers perceived their environment.^ 
R.L. Heathcote has summarized the three major components 
behind this process as the actual area being examined, the 
kinds of people and organizations doing the observing and 
the way in which information was conveyed to them.9 He has
6 CSIROA, Myxomatosis files, 1952, Fenner and Douglas, E. 
Rolls, They All Ran Wild - The Story of Pests on the Land 
in Australia, Sydney, 1969, p. 184.
7 CSIROA, Correspondence File 81, Noxious Weeds, Prickly 
Pear 1920.
8 G. Bolton, 'The Historian as Artist and Interpreter of 
the Environment', in G. Seddon & M. Davis, Man and Land- 
scape in Australia - Towards an Ecological Vision,
Canberra, 1976, pp. 113-124. A very useful summary article
9 R.L. Heathcote, "Early European Perceptions of the 
Australian Environment", Ibid., p. 29-40. Also expanded
Australia, London, 1975, pp. 204-217 & A. Rapoport (ed.) 
Australia as Human Setting - Approaches to the Designed 
Environment, Sydney, 1972, pp. 76-84.
8described how the country posed difficulties for those 
trying to form impressions of its potential because of the 
distances encompassed and the difficulties of transport.
The seasonal patterns were as unfamiliar as the flora and 
fauna. Those who came to the new land also brought with 
them a range of preconceptions based on their earlier 
experiences and education and they naturally tended to look 
at their surroundings from the perspective of their own 
hopes and fears. The wealthy man searching for ample cattle 
pastures assessed the situation very differently from the 
scientist, the forced emigrant or the would-be small farmer, 
but in their varying efforts to create the kind of life that 
they wanted, all settlers caused changes in the environment. 
They were not willing to live like the aboriginal inhabitants, 
and even aboriginals had produced considerable changes 
through their hunting techniques and use of fire.
The way Heathcote's three features inter-reacted 
to help create what became the vermin and weed menace can 
be illustrated by the story of Dr Cox' visit to Mudgee, west 
of the dividing range and inland from Newcastle, in 1865.
He went to see some successfully acclimatized peacocks on 
his cousin's property. He found hundreds of the birds in 
a large paddock covered with introduced thistles, which he 
praised as good drought feed. He went on to observe with 
pleasure:
9On the other side of the river was a 
rabbit warren in which there were rabbits 
in thousands. In addition the pigs had run 
wild in the same property and so increased 
as to fairly become a nuisance. They had been 
shot down in regular battues.10
Cox was scientifically trained and a member of the 
Acclimatization Society, therefore he was eager to spread 
what he believed were useful, interesting or beautiful 
plants and animals over the continent. Most cattlemen 
would not have spent time and money on peacocks. Experienced 
grain farmers would not have praised the thistles. A former 
English tenant farmer would have been very worried about 
the thousands of rabbits. Yet as an amateur naturalist Cox 
saw things differently, and as a colonial gentleman the 
passing reference to the nuisance of wild pigs was of small 
consequence compared with the pleasure given by the 
possibility of indulging in the esteemed English social 
activity of mass animal slaughter, the battue.
One of the most fruitful areas of study opened up 
by the attention paid to the creation of environmental 
perceptions had been a re-examination of the relationship 
between the way administrators approached the process of
10 Acclimatization Society of New South Wales, Annual 
Report, 1865 ML.
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land settlement and what the settlers themselves decided.'*''*' 
J.M. Powell has drawn up a useful schematic model of the 
way the process worked in Victoria. The officials made 
their assessment of the economic and physical environment 
which was passed through the filter of individual bureau­
cratic reactions and current policy theories to the 
legislature. Popular appraisal began with the individual 
landholders and was developed by individuals and groups
12and reviewed by the actual process of working the land.
The same general pattern can be applied to vermin and
weed policy formation, and although vermin and weed control
might seem to be a problem in practical biology rather
than a subject for theoretical and ideological formulation,
both officials and settlers saw the matter through the
13'distorting lens' of their commitment to certain concepts 
of government responsibility and theories on how land should 
be utilized.
There are many theories on the way policy 
initiatives develop but recent writers on nineteenth century
11 R.L. Heathcote, Back of Bourke, A Study of Land Apprais­
al and Settlement in Semi-Arid Australia, Melbourne 1965. 
D.N. Jeans, 'The impress of central authority upon the 
Landscape: south-eastern Australia 1788-1850', in
J.M. Powell and M. Williams, Australian Space, Australian 
Time, Melbourne, 1975, pp. 1-15.
J.M. Powell, The Public Lands of Australia Felix: Settle­
ment and Land Appraisal in Victoria 1834-91, with 
Special Reference to the Western Plains, Melbourne, 1970.
12 Ibid., p. XXI
13 Heathcote, 'Early European Perceptions of the Australian 
Landscape', p. 32.
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administrative history have tended to fall into two camps: 
those who see the spread of ideas, such as those of 
Bentham or the economic theorists, as the main motivation 
behind new, official responses, and those who emphasise 
the role of ’pragmatic, tidy-minded men, pressing towards 
solutions inherent in social problems as they arose1 
Because of the effect on land utilization and tenure agree­
ments, and also because of the expense of counter-measures, 
vermin and weed legislation involved many social problems.
Of course it is easy to over-emphasize the dichotomy between 
the two types of explanation. Those framing legislation 
have to begin from some conceptual basis. Slum clearance 
legislation cannot be expected from those who do not think 
in terms of a reasonable standard of housing; landmark 
preservation acts cannot be drawn up until officials have 
begun to see their environment in terms of its historical 
significance, and vermin and weed legislation implies a 
whole network of concepts relating to the rights and duties 
of landholding, which were among the most discussed ideas in 
nineteenth century English law. The reverse side of this
14 G. Sutherland (ed.), Studies in the Growth of Nineteenth 
Century Government, London, 1972, p. 3.
This quotation is her summary of the general position 
adopted by O.M. MacDonagh, A Pattern of Government 
Growth 1800-1860: The Passenger Acts and Their Enforce­
ment, London, 1961.
It is an oversimplification but illustrates the main 
point of division.
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basic proposition can also be illustrated by the way 
vermin and weed legislation developed, in this case by 
drawing attention to a feature that is noticeably lacking, 
namely anxiety about one of the main control methods 
advocated, poisoning.
In these days of considerable public interest in 
substances that pollute the environment and endanger life 
and health Australian law may still be classed as lax, but 
in the nineteenth century the kind of awareness necessary 
to promote the formation of laws on the subject rarely 
existed. Just because there were statutes concerning food 
adulteration and some noxious trades does not mean that the 
same health concepts were applied to a wider range of 
activities. The way categories of legislation change and 
merge is in itself an indication of the way perceptions and 
attitudes change. In later chapters it will be pointed out 
that there were men in the 1890s who argued against the 
widespread use of poison because of the harm done to birds. 
Although such changes in environmental attitudes were 
slight, it is worth remembering that they pre-date the 
growth of similar anxiety about the hazards to human life.
Part of the popular image of the North American 
frontier is of a society that was remarkably free with its 
guns. Australia was just as free with its poisons, but 
they have not left an equivalent mark on the Australian 
legend, despite the known impact of their use against native 
animals and sometimes against aboriginals. The role of
13
poison in the as yet only partly explored social history
of early Australia can only be speculated upon. Because
people did not think of poisons in the way we are learning
to do today the law and official policy provides no
information. Coroners were often not medical men and
15autopsies were rare in the bush. Station owners regularly
bought arsenic, strychnine and phosphorus by the pound and
cyanide by the ounce. Although Mrs Beaton never penned the
immortal 'first catch your hare' recipe, the New South Wales
Agricultural Gazette often included rabbit eradication
articles that sounded like a perverted Mrs Beaton: Mix 30
pounds of green chaff with 3 pounds of sugar, one gallon of
water and shake in one pound of arsenic 'pepperbox fashion';
take two pounds of arsenic (powdered), 10 pounds of pollard,
2 pounds of bran, 2 pints of treacle or honey and mix, then
drop small handfuls into water until a thick dough forms
and knead it well.^ Rabbits love jam but the department
warned that, because they are 'fussy feeders', only good,
unburnt jam should be used. One ounce of strychnine to 25
17pounds of good jam was considered a reliable mixture.
Even the least imaginative man must have seen the 
possibilities of ridding himself of a nagging wife or 
aggravating partner. Most recipes ended with the instruction
15 P. Hasluck, Mucking About, Melbourne, 1977, pp. 100, 
116-17. Even in the 1920s rural inquests were often 
perfunctory.
16 New South Wales Agricultural Gazette, 1902 (2), p. 757.
17 Ibid., p. 758-9.
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to 'knead well', but no advice to wash the hands afterwards. 
Arsenic in small doses is notoriously wrongly diagnosed as 
stomach trouble, and both arsenic and phosphorus, the other 
common rabbit killer, are accumulative poisons. Whereas 
the Agricultural Gazette frequently warned about the fire 
risk involved in handling insufficiently dissolved and 
mixed phosphorus, only occasional mention was made of the 
dangers of phosphorus fumes, and then with the rider that 
'a little of it will not hurt'.^
Debates in New South Wales in the early twentieth 
century over restricting the sale of poisons in rural areas 
to authorized chemists were the result of pharmacy board 
pressure to protect a lucrative side of chemists* business, 
and some anxiety over a suspected increase in deliberate 
abortions. The authorities were aware of the dangers of the 
substances used but apparently had faith in the good sense, 
hygiene and probity of the users. Nowadays this may be 
doubted and modern vermin and weed control policies are 
being influenced by concepts that did not affect the 
thinking of nineteenth century administrators and therefore 
could not be reflected in their legislation.
However, although legislation cannot emerge from 
a conceptual vacuum, neither can it emerge from a legal 
vacuum, because law is accumulative. Once an act is 
proclaimed it influences future acts in related fields. It
18 Ibid., p. 756.
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need not pre-determine the course that will be followed, 
but it sets a direction. Deviations can be made but only 
if the original step is revived. This becomes very import­
ant in terms of the practical features of policy 
implementation, particularly the nature of the available 
administrative structure and the sources of finance. It 
is at this point that the pragmatic rather than the 
ideological approach to policy formulation becomes 
important. New South Wales and Victoria provide excellent 
case material on the two strands of the argument. They 
were neighbours and encountered similar problems at 
approximately the same time. Their settlers were drawn 
from the same background and there was free and frequent 
movement between the colonies. They also shared a common 
legal and political heritage. However, Victoria eventually 
opted for a centralized, integrated system of vermin and 
weed control while New South Wales continued to follow a 
decentralized and divided approach. This is the main 
point of the thesis.
As the writers on land policy appraisal have 
pointed out, official policy cannot be divorced from the 
effect of individual practices. The two continually work 
to modify each other but, because of the large area and 
the long time span covered, this thesis will take its 
direction from the official side of policy formation. 
Commonwealth legislation has also been included, but only 
in so far as it relates to the two states. It reveals some
16
of the effects of constitutional factors on the develop­
ment and expression of attitudes and it had direct effects 
on state policies.
Because of the extensive publications issued by 
CSIRO there is a great deal of literature available on 
the technical and biological features of vermin and weed 
control. Very little of it is referred to in later 
chapters. It has been excellently used by Eric Rolls in 
his account of the way in which various pests were intro­
duced and the kind of methods that were employed against 
19them. They All Ran Wild is a carefully researched, 
beautifully written book and I have tried to avoid 
overlapping the ground it so ably covers. I have been 
primarily interested in investigating the way changing 
attitudes and perceptions relate to policy formation and 
the factors that influence the actual passage of legislation.
E. Rolls, They All Ran Wild - The Story of Pests on the 
Land in Australia, Sydney, 1969.
19
17
CHAPTER 2
Making a Rabbit Control Policy - Victoria
to 1890
In 1861 a gentleman wrote to the Yeoman and 
Australian Acclimatiser about a pleasant afternoon he had 
spent shooting rabbits. In one hour he had killed seven 
pairs:
I mention the above to show what can be done 
in this country in providing sport: our friend
established his warren (not six miles from 
Melbourne) only three or four years ago, and now 
the rabbits are all over the place and positively 
require thinning ... I have no doubt that there 
are many places in the colony which might be 
turned to advantage in this way.1
There are many places and the idea was popular. Although 
the name of Thomas Austin of Barwon Park, Geelong, has 
become firmly linked with the introduction of rabbits to 
Australia, he was a late-comer to the project. Governor 
Phillip included five domestic rabbits in his 1788 list of 
livestock brought out by the First Fleet. Had they proved 
more hardy the pastoral history of Australia might have 
been very different. Over the next eighty years numerous 
warrens were established in the colonies and on off-shore 
islands as emergency food for sailors. Another correspond­
ent to the Acclimatiser described how he trained dogs to 
protect the warren he began at Mt. Alexander, Victoria, in
Yeoman and Australian Acclimatiser, 14 December 1861, 
p"! 13. The paper was published by the Argus office 
1861-1864. -----
18
1845. He successfully countered the dingoes and was
delighted that 'in two years from the time when they were
first turned out, the whole neighbourhood was stocked with 
2rabbits ' . Then a new manager took over and killed them 
all. Austin did not bring in his 24 wild rabbits until 
1859.2 3 45
After such a long, slow introduction it is not 
surprising that the first reports in the late 1860s of 
enormous damage being done in the western district by 
rabbits raised little alarm. When Francis Longmore, the 
vehement anti-squatter and an Assembly member for the 
western district, opposed the annual budget grant to the 
Acclimatization Society in 1866 on the grounds that rabbits
4had become 'a perfect curse to the agriculturalists', his 
charge was immediately disputed. Another member pointed 
out that rabbits had not been brought in by the society 
but by Austin:
and surely if that gentleman chose to let 
rabbits run free on his private property 
he had a perfect right to do so ... He 
only wished that other large proprietors 
would do their duty in this direction.5
The Australian Acclimatization Societies, which were part
2 Ibid., 21 December 1861, p. 38.
3 The most interesting account of the introduction of 
the rabbit is given in Rolls, They All Ran Wild. 
Chapter 1.
4 VPD, 1866, 2, 367.
5 Ibid., 368.
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of a world-wide movement, were at the height of their 
popularity in the early 1860s. Membership included trained 
scientists and enthusiastic amateurs. The Victorian 
government initially made generous annual grants of between 
£2,000 and £3,000 to the local branch but by 1868 the 
amount had been reduced to £500 and after that funds were 
directed to the Bureau of Agriculture instead. From the 
1870s the societies increasingly concentrated on the form­
ation of zoological gardens rather than establishing new 
species. However, the original aims of the movement were 
well summarized by Dr George Bennett in an address in 1863: 
'stocking our waste waters, woods and plains with choice 
animals, making that which was dull and lifeless become 
animated by creatures in the full enjoyment of existence,
and lands before useless, become fertile with rare and
7valuable trees and plants *.
It is easy to be scornful of the narrow view taken 
of the unfamiliar Australian environment, but newcomers 
to the Australian landscape were dissatisfied not just 
because they saw it with eyes and expectations conditioned 
by the European scene; Australia lacked draught, milk and 
wool producing animals and had no prolific edible grain or 
fibre plants. European settlement had to be based on the 
introduction of animals and plants for food, clothing and
6 Ibid., 1868, 6, 755.
7 Annual Reports of the Acclimatization Society of New 
South Wales, 1863, p. 13, ML 590.6A.
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transport. A few acclimatizers had become aware that this 
could create problems. Naturally they sought solutions in 
terms of their experience of the European environment, so 
they urged more introductions. As Dr Madden explained to 
a meeting of the Acclimatization Society in Victoria in 
1864, closer settlement and foxes had driven away native 
birds and had led to an increase in harmful insects: there
owas a need to restore the balance of nature.
The balance of nature, a concept described by 
Madden as 'a favoured and most interesting study', was a
Qdeeply held part of popular nineteenth century belief.
There was also growing interest in Charles Darwin's idea 
of natural selection."*"^ In many instances his work found 
private acceptance while it was still being publically 
condemned, but Madden was prepared to be bolder. Speaking 
five years after the Origin of Species was published he 
declared that 'although perhaps very few will adopt his 
t Darwin's 1 peculiar views in their entirety, we must all 
feel deeply indebted to him for much that he has written'.^  
Scientifically the idea of the balance of nature was 
incompatible with evolutionary theory, but in practice, the
8 Yeoman and Australian Acclimatizer, 27 Auqust 1864, 
p. 762.
9 J.C. le Souef, 'Acclimatization in Victoria', Victorian 
Historical Magazine, 1965, Vol. 36, pp. 8-29.
10 Argus, 25 November 1862 (early history of the Acclimat­
ization Society); A. Mozley, 'Evolution and The Climate 
of Opinion in Australia 1840-1876', Victorian Studies, 
1966, Vol. 10, pp. 411-430; C.D. Goodwin, 'Evolution in 
Australian Social Thought', Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 1964, Vol. 25, pp. 393-416.
11 Yeoman and Australian Acclimatizer, 27 August 1864, p.762.
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theoretically static notion of a balance led the less
philosophically inclined to see their environment in terms
of a changing adjustment of forces that could be manipulated
at will to their own advantage. This soon merged with a
crude concept of survival of the fittest that justified the
destruction of some species to the benefit of others. From
the 1380s onward both ideas became firmly linked to an
unquenchable rural optimism about the ability of scientists
to find simple solutions to all vermin and weed problems
12if only they were not deliberately thwarted.
Like the first settlers later nineteenth century
landholders saw a land waiting to be made productive. They
did not distinguish between encouraging the spread of cattle,
sheep, horses and pigs and attempting to breed rabbits.
When the rabbits started to become a pest it took a long
while for people to grasp that they were not easy to control.
After all, in England they were still protected under the
game laws. English farmers complained about the damage
done by rabbits but managed to live with it, even though on
most farms only the landlord and those he specifically
13authorised were allowed to kill rabbits. In 1869 a 
western district farmer from Colac, Joseph Connor, proposed 
an amendment in parliament to the Local Government Act to
12 See Chapter 6.
13 Rabbits were not strictly speaking 'game', but they 
were specifically named in most English Game Acts.
Although the 1831 Game Law 1 & 2 Wm. IV, c. 32 vested 
ownership of game in the occupier of the land, nearly 
all tenancy agreements continued to reserve all game 
rights to the landlord until the 1880 Ground Game Act 
gave tenants an inalienable right to kill hares and rabbits.
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make the destruction of rabbits compulsory, because the
'rabbit nuisance promised to be as great as that of the
14locusts in the land of Egypt'. James Casey, the Minister 
for Justice, who became Lands Minister in 1872, agreed that 
rabbits were causing consternation but added that 'owners 
and occupiers could kill them now if they so desired'. It 
was nearly another ten years before a serious parliamentary 
debate on the subject took place, and there was no legislat­
ion until the end of 1880. Yet Tasmania passed a rabbit 
destruction act in 1871 and South Australia in 1875.
The late 1870s was not a propitious time for 
introducing a rabbit bill in Victoria. There was a serious 
drought from 1876 to 1879. Some graziers saw a connection 
between the decline in carrying capacity in the Mallee and 
Wimmera and the destruction of hardy scrub feed by rabbits, 
but drought is also a rabbit killer and drought-affected 
landholders are rarely eager to take on new financial 
burdens. Pastoral licences granted under the 1862 Duffy 
Act were due to expire in 1880 and there was great uncertain­
ty about future policy and reluctance to invest. The Lands 
Department itself was in a state of turmoil following the 
'Black Wednesday' dismissals of 9 January 1878, when the
14 VPD, 1869, 7, 311.
Unless otherwise stated all minor biographical detail 
on politicians is taken by the following sources:
K. Thomson & G. Serie, A Biographical Register of the 
Victorian Parliament 1859-1900, Canberra 1972; A.W. 
Martin & P. Wardle, Members of the Legislative Assembly 
of New South Wales 1856-1901, ANU, 1959; J. Rydon, A 
Biographical Register of the Commonwealth Parliament 
1901-1972, Canberra, 1975.
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refusal of the Legislative Council to pass the appropriat­
ions bill became an excuse to sack the 'curled darlings', 
the sons of civic officials, businessmen, squatters and 
heads of ministries, who had held so many positions, and 
replace them with officials appointed by the Lands Depart­
ment.^ However, in October 1878 Francis Longmore, 
Commissioner for Crown Lands and Survey, introduced a 
Rabbit Nuisance bill.^
According to the bill's opponents it was primarily 
a measure designed to attack squatters. As even the man 
appointed to introduce the legislation in the Council, Henry 
Cuthbert, said: 'Perhaps it will be thought that the bill
as passed by the Assembly presses too harshly upon the 
pastoral tenants of the Crown, inasmuch as their licences 
have only two years to run ... It seems to me there is some
17justification for such an argument'. Others put the 
matter more bluntly: 'In the eyes of the government the
15 D.R. Mossman, 'The Victorian Lands Department in the 
Seventies', Victorian Historical Magazine, 1936, Vol.
16, p. 67.
16 The Board of Crown Lands and Survey was combined with 
the Board of Public Works in 1851 and called the Board
of Lands and Works. The two were separated the following 
year but the Board of Lands and Works remained the 
statutory authority in all land matters until 1964. It 
had no staff and all land functions were carried out by 
the Board of Crown Lands and Survey under the Commission­
er for Crown Lands, commonly known as the Minister for 
Lands. The Board (or Lands Department) had two permanent 
heads: the Surveyor General and the Assistant Commiss­
ioner. In 1872 a branch Department of Agriculture was 
established which became independent in 1890. See 
Victorian Year Book, 1968, p. 100; 1971, p. 105.
17 VPD, 1878, 29, 1677.
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rabbits are by no means a nuisance, but a wonderful 
blessing. Certainly they will afford a means of extirpating 
altogether a large number of pastoral tenants and worrying 
and harrassing freeholders'.^ There were grounds for 
these suspicions. The year before the Council had been 
forced to accept a Land Tax Act and Longmore's hostility 
to the squatting interest was notorious. However, closer 
examination does not support a vindictive interpretation.
Longmore's concern about rabbits was of some years
standing, as seen by his speech in 1866, and the government
19received a number of petitions calling for action. There
was little point in continuing to fight for more free
selection legislation if settlers were soon to be eaten off
the land. The minister had recently toured the Wimmera in
connection with the 1878 Lands Commission and so had first-
20hand knowledge of the damage being done. There was also
ample evidence from Tasmania, South Australia and New
Zealand that it was unlikely to be an isolated or short- 
21term problem. Had Longmore been mainly interested in 
attacking the squatters he would have accepted Duncan Gillies' 
amendment and raised the proposed vermin levy from a maximum 
of 2d per acre to Is. Instead, during the debate he reduced
18 Ibid., 1681. William Hearn.
19 W & P , 1879-80 , I.
20 VPD, 1878, 29, 1686.
21 Ibid., 1514.
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it to a maximum of Id and announced that two acres under
pastoral licence would count as one acre for rating 
22purposes.
Although the Premier, Graham Berry, answered some 
criticisms of the bill by reminding members that 'novel
23legislation' could not hope to be perfect from the first,
the proposals owed much to the precedents of the thistle
laws. During the 1870s the enforcement of thistle control
measures had devolved on the shires but, because of
inadequate funding, an ill-defined administrative structure
24and lack of zeal, little had been done. The Rabbit 
Nuisance bill sought to make rabbit control work better, 
without changing the basic premises of the Thistle Acts, 
namely that eradication was the responsibility of the land­
holder and government financial involvement should be as 
small as possible.
Under the new measure municipalities could proclaim 
any district rabbit infested and then raise a vermin levy 
to pay for inspectors. If a council proved dilatory ten 
rate-payers could petition the government to have their 
district proclaimed. When owners or occupiers failed to 
act on an official warning to destroy rabbits, the council 
could arrange for men to enter the land, do the work, and
22 Ibid., 1514-6; 1541.
23 Ibid., 1521.
24 Noxious weed legislation is discussed in Chapter 3.
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then sue for the return of costs. There would be a £10 
penalty for deliberately releasing rabbits and the govern­
ment offered councils a 10s subsidy for every pound raised 
by the vermin rate. This money was to be spent by the 
councils on dealing with unoccupied crown lands. Councils 
could also order the destruction of brush, timber or stone 
fences that harboured rabbits.
Predictably the strongest opposition came from
the Legislative Council where plural voting and a property
qualification for members ensured pastoral dominance. Charles
Sladen rejected all the principles of the bill 'except as to
the one which says that the owner or landlord of land shall
25be responsible for clearing it of rabbits'. Under
pastoral licences the government was the landlord. His view
was endorsed by the equally influential western district
pastoralist, Neil Black, who claimed that passage of the
2 6legislation would be 'a national calamity'. Both men 
argued that the only landlord who was not working to destroy 
rabbits was the colonial government, and that there would 
be no need to set up an elaborate structure to coerce 
individual landholders if the government did its duty. On 
the other hand, William Hearn inadvertently illustrated the 
weakness of their case by arguing that 'a man is not 
answerable for the nuisance of rabbits any more than he is
25 VPD, 1878, 29, 1678.
26 Ibid., 1681.
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answerable for the nuisance of any other troublesome
creature which may happen by some unfortunate means to
27come upon his property'. He was a firm advocate of 
voluntaryism, but he would not volunteer. Instead he 
preferred to rely on cats or some other natural enemy of 
rabbits, like the weasel, to clear his land. The legis­
lation was not read a third time.
Despite its failure the 1878 bill is significant
for what it shows about contemporary attitudes. Most members
of both Houses admitted some sort of legislation was
necessary to achieve co-ordinated action in infested regions,
and all looked to local rather than central administration.
It was also apparent to all participants that there was
a fundamental relationship between land legislation and
vermin control. Rather surprisingly the idea of dealing
with the rabbit by utilizing it was not developed. Longmore
told two members, David Gaunson and John McIntyre, who
asked about this possibility, that rabbit skins were too
cheap and were not worth saving in summer, and that few
2 8people in infested districts ate rabbit flesh. Yet in
1863 the Castlemaine Advertiser had praised a large warren
established near Guildford, which was supplying Castlemaine
29and Daylesford with fresh rabbits, and there was a rabbit
27 Ibid., 1685.
28 Ibid., 1518; 1522.
29 Victorian Lands Department, Stock History file.
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preserving company operating successfully in Kapunda,
South Australia from 1877 to 1879 .^ The commercial 
potential of the rabbit trade was soon to become a content­
ious issue. As regards practical points of administration 
the bill did not provide a forecast of the way Victorian 
legislation was to develop over the next decade as successive 
governments fumbled to create a workable policy.
In 1880 Richard Richardson introduced another bill
on behalf of the new Berry ministry. Again it was claimed
that Victoria was following the example of South Australia,
but the legislation was much milder than that colony's,
31or than Longmore's. It excluded all pastoral tenants 
pending a settlement of the Mallee lands question and made 
no provision for any vermin levy. Local councils could hire 
inspectors who would have right of entry to all occupied 
land. When a landholder did not respond to the formal 
warning the inspector could hire men to clear the property 
and then sue for costs. An occupier with less than five 
years of his lease to run was entitled to a rebate from his 
landlord. As in 18 78 it was proposed to destroy fences which 
sheltered rabbits. The Board of Land and Works could 
appoint bailiffs to oversee the clearance of unoccupied crown 
lands', but although the Legislative Council changed the 
phrase 'may appoint' to 'shall appoint' bailiffs, the
30 Information by courtesy of Dr K. Farrer, Kraft Foods 
Ltd., who is writing a book on the history of food 
technology.
31 VPD, 1880-81 , 34 , 541 ff. Rabbit Suppression Act, 
Vic. DCLXXXIII.
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effectiveness of the measure would hinge on the finance
32allocated from consolidated revenue. Both Houses
recognized this weakness but no-one advocated the imposition
of a special tax. Council members wanted a large sum,
perhaps £20,000, placed on the estimates to be spent on
crown lands and they recommitted the bill in the hope of
33getting such an assurance. It was not forthcoming.
Although it was late in the session and the legislation 
could have been delayed until it lapsed, it was pushed 
through on condition that it operated only until December 
1882.
There were no clear lines of division in the debates. 
Rabbits affected large and small holders alike, farmers as 
well as graziers. In the eyes of all groups the crucial 
problem was how to deal with unoccupied and occupied crown 
land. The Mallee Lands Act was intended to cope with the 
second but only hesitant steps had been taken towards the 
first. As Powell has pointed out in his analysis of the 
land debates in the 1880s, the rabbit problem did not lead 
to special land legislation but it reinforced the need 
for careful re-assessment of land policy, as well as taking 
up valuable parliamentary time.^
32 Ibid., 1206.
33 Ibid., 1256.
34 J.M. Powell, The Public Lands of Australia Felix - 
Settlement and Land Appraisal in Victoria 1834-91
with Special Reference to the Western Plains, Melbourne, 
1970, p. 203.
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The 1883 Mallee Lands Act made destruction of 
vermin within three years one of the lease covenants on 
Mallee blocks and allotments. The area was also divided 
into vermin districts under five-man elected local 
committees. Voting was based on a graduated franchise and 
those elected had to hold 1,000 sheep or 250 cattle, or 
manage 5,000 sheep or 1,000 cattle, or pay flO p.a. rent.
It was expected that self-interest would keep these men 
from ignoring the covenant or, conversely, setting too 
high a vermin levy (which could be based on acreage or 
stock holding). The local committee could declare scalp 
bounties on any declared vermin and could authorize 
eradication work if lessees were negligent, and then sue 
for reimbursement.
The next year seven boards were created to cover 
llh million acres. The northern, north-eastern and north­
western boards covered the large interior Mallee blocks 
while the four other districts on the fringe consisted of 
Mallee allotments. Each board included one member who 
lived near Melbourne. It was hoped that this would make it
easy to hold joint conferences with Lands Department
35officials and to arrange united action. The first 
conference was called for 30 January 1885. All boards had 
set a rate of 2s 6d per square mile and the department
35 Australasian, 24 January 1885, p. 159. This paper was 
produced by the Argus for rural readers in particular. 
It incorporated the Yeoman and Australian Acclimatizer 
in 1864.
All the information in this paragraph comes from the 
one article.
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expressed satisfaction at the kind of men elected, 
particularly for the Mallee blocks. The northern board 
(South Australia to Euston on the Murray) was headed by A.H. 
Pegler, a member of a pioneer family. Edward Lascelles, 
who leased a considerable area and was an active, innovative 
pastoralist very interested in dry farming techniques, was 
chairman of the north-eastern district (near Swan Hill) and 
William McDonald of Nhill, another pioneer with a record of 
intelligent property development led the north-western 
board. Once the boards began to function all of Victoria 
was covered by locally administered vermin control author­
ities. Rabbit-free areas did not invoke their new powers 
but, theoretically, Victoria should have been ready to begin 
concerted destruction campaigns. They did not take place.
By 1884 it was clear that rabbits were still 
spreading. The 1880 act (and its slight 1881 amendments) 
had been re-adopted but was not working successfully. 
Representatives of shires and agricultural societies met 
at Kirks Bazaar, the Melbourne horse sale yard, in September 
1884 and petitioned the minister to raise the government 
subsidy to the shires, to lift the 25 per cent duty on 
wire netting and to pass a land bill similar to the Mallee 
Lands Act. Albert Tucker, the Lands Minister in the 
conservative Service government, promised a bill but he 
said that he believed that conditions were only bad in the 
Mallee and Wimmera. In his opinion 'local bodies combined, 
or some other body apart from the government would constitute
32
3 6the most effective administrative agency'. The shires
received draft copies of the proposed bill but some took
so long to respond that the legislation was not presented
37until the end of the session. It is an indication of the
lack of serious divisions within parliament over the rabbit
problem that the legislation moved quickly through all
3 8stages and was proclaimed in less than two weeks. It 
may also be taken as in indication that, as yet, the law 
was not biting deeply.
Apart from the Mallee all crown tenants were 
included. The Lands Department could appoint inspectors 
for crown lands and could contract with the municipalites 
for the destruction of rabbits on unoccupied crown land.
Some legal problems associated with the recovery of costs 
on behalf of councils were removed and the government could 
order councils to arrange to act together against rabbits. 
Where a council proved reluctant to implement the act ten 
rate-payers could petition for the establishment of a local 
committee of five to take over vermin eradication. Destruct­
ion of any animal declared a natural enemy of the rabbit 
was punishable by a fine of £2 to £10. Other clauses were 
the same as in the 1880 act.
Several voices were raised against the principle 
of handing over the clearance of crown lands to the shires
36 Ibid., 6 September 1884, p. 442.
37 VPD, 1884, 47, 2493.
38 Rabbit Suppression Act 1884 Vic. No. DCCXIII. 12 December.
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39but the matter was not pursued. Nor was attention given
to the plea from the Ballarat stud sheep breeder, Philip
Russell, in the Legislative Council that the sale of rabbits
should be forbidden because in some areas, notably around
Camperdown, rabbits were being reared rather than 
40exterminated. On the other hand, as in the 1880 debate, 
anxiety was expressed over the clauses empowering councils 
to destroy fences which harboured rabbits. However, no 
changes were made.
The steady procession of rabbit bills during the 
1880s suggests that all was not going well, but the debates 
only hint at the problems. Comparable debates taking place 
in New South Wales at this time were much longer and far 
more bitter and divisive. This says more about the social 
composition of the two parliaments and the stage they had 
reached in their land development policies than it does 
about the relative seriousness of the rabbit problems. In 
Victoria the period of struggle between selectors and 
squatters was nearly over. In New South Wales the movement 
to 'unlock the lands' was reaching its peak. Possibly 
Victoria was fortunate that the areas most favoured by the 
rabbits in the early 1880s included both the prime, well 
settled land of the western district, and the newly opened 
Mallee and Wimmera. A wide range of interests were
39 VPD, 1884 , 47 , 2474-75. Henry Wrixon (a lawyer) and 
Thomas Langdon (grain merchant and Mallee farmer).
40 Ibid., 2491.
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affected and as many small landholders on the Mallee 
fringes hoped to take up grazing land in the central 
Mallee, old divisions of interest were becoming blurred.
This smoothed the way for legislation and only the news­
papers show the extent of local disagreements over vermin 
control policies.
Understandably the fencing destruction provisions 
aroused the most rural anxiety. As one selector pointed 
out in 1885, he and his neighbours had gone into debt to
41build brush fences which they were now ordered to replace. 
Those who had erected stone fences faced even greater loss. 
There is little information about how many fences were 
pulled down but brush and log fences were still common in 
the 1890s. A family history of the Kimbolton sheep station, 
now under Lake Eppalock, records that rabbits were a serious 
pest in the 1890s, and notes that they could be heard 
squealing in the brush fences during bush fires.^ This 
was a prosperous station but the owners had obviously not 
been forced to destroy rabbit harbours.
Many shires were divided over how much effort they 
should put into rabbit destruction. The Hampden shire, near 
badly infested Camperdown, was one. A councillor described 
the conference held in Melbourne in 1884 as 'perfect farce 
. . . people in the north had got the matter up to extract a
41 Australasian, 30 October, 1880, p. 510.
42 J.O. Randell, Kimbolton, Carlton, Victoria, 1976, p. 66.
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4 3little more money from the Treasury'. Perhaps the
proximity of large rabbit canning works had something to
do with his attitude. On the same page of the Australasian
it was reported that 1,000 Wimmera farmers on a combined
agricultural and spring shopping visit to Melbourne had
taken time off from their sight-seeing to arrange a
delegation of 150 men to petition the Minister for Lands
for rigorous application of the Rabbit Nuisance Act. In
December 1884 100 farmers met at Nhill and thanked the
Lowan shire for its efforts against the rabbits but decided
to ask the government to take full control of all vermin 
44eradication. However, in the same month a correspondent
repeated a frequently heard plea for the formation of
local rabbit leagues to take charge of rabbit exterminat- 
45ion.
During the 1880s the government was reluctantly
drawn into a more active role. South Australia requested
collaboration over the erection of vermin-proof border 
46fencing. The barrier was begun in 1885 and by 1887
£23,642 had been spent on 87 miles of border fence and on
a 213 mile fence between the Mallee blocks and the Mallee 
47allotments. Expenditure on unoccupied crown land also
43 Australasian, 6 September 1884, p. 447.
44 Ibid., 6 December 1884, p. 1067.
45 Ibid., 20 December 1884, p. 1163.
46 Town and Country Journal (Melb), 1 August 1885.
47 W & P , 1887 , I, 1051. Return on rabbit destruction 
costs.
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4 8rose. By 1889 it averaged £20,000 p.a. In addition there
were the subsidies paid to the shires for their vermin work.
The amount was not specified in the act but in 1885
Wimmera shire was told that the minister would pay 10s for 
4 9every pound. Total government vermin expenditure over 
ten years came to between £145,000 and £160,000, most of it 
spent after 1884.^ This was much less than the New South 
Wales government laid out between 1883 and 1887, but during 
those years the larger colony was paying at least three- 
quarters of all vermin control costs. During the 1890s 
the New South Wales picture was very different. Private 
expenditure on rabbit control in Victoria during the 1880s 
was reported to be high.^ Individual property accounts
48
49
50
51
VPD, 1889; Victorian Year Book , 1895-98, p. 924. 
rabbits on crown landsExpenditure for destruction of
1879-80 £ 1,280 1889-90 £24,860
81 2,600 91 37,913
82 12,890 92 39,535
83 9,883 93 30,595
84 10,063 94 12,514
85 22,177 95 8,909
86 24,833 96 11,831
87 21,065 97 13,425
88 20,551 98 14,303
89 17,621 99 14,753
Australasian, 10 January 1885, p. 79.
VPD, 1889, 60, 694; 699.
Ibid., 695; 1841; Victorian Year Book, 1893, p. 311.
One owner had spent over £6,000 clearing his estate;
M. Kiddle, Men of Yesterday: A Social History of the
Western District of Victoria 1834-1890, Melbourne, 1961, 
p. 321, some Western District landowners spent up to 
£40,000 in a few years to bring the rabbits under 
control.
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may be misleading but the value of imported wire netting
52indicates growing investment. As well as buying the wire 
landholders had to erect it and also employ men to trap or 
poison on their land. The amount of private and public 
capital tied up in vermin control work was already 
considerable.
Many settlers and members of parliament had come
to see wire netting as the necessary first step to solving
the rabbit problem. Because Victoria had long established
fencing laws regulating cost sharing between neighbours
there were firm legal precedents on which to act. This
gave Victoria a decided advantage over New South Wales.
The fencing compensation arrangements in the Mallee Lands
Act aroused no dissension, but in New South Wales similar
proposals were hotly debated because they would make future
53selection more expensive. The more rapid acceptance of
52 Victorian Year Books, 1879-1894.
Tables of Imports. Value of imported wire netting.
Year Value £ Year Value £
1880 1,251 1887 12,805
1881 2,085 1888 28,247
1882 2,428 1889 29,915
1883 5,035 1890 110,423
1884 6,413 1891 134,597
1885 12,671 1892 64,797
1886 12,215
The average cost was £18 to £20 per mile.
NSW policy is discussed in Chapters 5 and 7.53
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wire netting in Victoria was due more to these factors
than to the smaller size of the properties. In New South
Wales it was actually the holders of the massive western
stations who led the call for fencing legislation, whereas
in the south selectors were prominent, if not leaders, in
54the agitation to rabbit-proof boundaries.
In September 1887 two important rabbit conferences 
were held. At a preliminary meeting of delegates from 
rabbit-infested shires on 7 June at Bacchus Marsh, nine 
councils discussed a number of issues. They decided to 
ask for a uniform bounty rate on rabbit skins, to be sub­
sidized by the government at up to half the cost. They also 
wanted increased power for government inspectors, the 
grouping of properties for the erection of netted boundary 
fences, and an easier way of getting back the money spent on 
the compulsory clearing of private property by inspectors. 
When these motions were passed on to the main meeting of 
Shires at Kirk's Bazaar on 24 August the shires voted by a 
two-thirds majority to ask the government to take full
charge of rabbit control, because it was proving too
55expensive and time consuming. On 9 May 1888 a deputation
of country members of parliament and the representatives of
25 shires, led by Walter Madden, the member for the Wimmera,
5 6presented a petition to this effect to the Premier, Gillies.
54 VPD, 1889, 62, 1923.
55 Australasian, 3 September 1887, p. 445 (both meetings).
56 Argus, 9 May 18 8 8 .
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In July of the following year the legislation was intro­
duced .
The 68 clause bill had been circulated to all
57shires and had received wide approval. This cut the
ground from under those members of the Legislative Council
who saw it as ‘another step in the direction of centraliz- 
5 8ation'. Considerable diplomacy seems to have been
employed to present the measure in a favourable light.
Although Madden referred to it as 'simply a consolidating
59bill with two new principles grafted onto it', it was a 
strikingly new departure in Victorian vermin policy. New 
South Wales had just ended its attempt at centralized vermin 
control with a debt of about £500,000, but Victoria was 
undeterred. Although the work of the so-called Inter­
colonial Rabbit Conference arranged by New South Wales in 
1888 was widely commented upon in the rural and city press, 
there was no call to delay action in Victoria while the 
commission discovered if there was a way of wiping out 
rabbits by using some disease. The commission was headed 
by a Victorian, Dr Harry Allen, and the Lands Department
was kept well informed, but the long, expensive inquiry was
6 0not made a pretext for official inactivity.
Under the 1889 Rabbit Destruction bill (later
57 Australasian, 13 July 1889, p. 67.
58 VPD, 1889, 62, 1917.
59 Ibid., 1889, 60, 697.
60 Discussed in Chapter 6.
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61renamed the Vermin Destruction Act) government
inspectors became responsible for the whole state. The
Mallee vermin boards remained but the inspectors were
departmental employees. Shires could legally offer bonuses
for other declared vermin, including foxes, dingoes and
wallabies but there was no provision for a government subsidy.
In most years partial reimbursement was made, but it was a
discretionary action and so Victoria never accumulated the
enormous debts that had crippled the administration of the
6 21883 Rabbit Nuisance Act in New South Wales. The financing 
of the clearance of crown lands remained vague, depending on 
how much money was set aside in the budget. Fencing was 
greatly encouraged. After receiving a petition from a 
majority of landholders occupying at least half the land in 
a designated area, the shire could apply for an interest- 
free loan from which advances could be made. Landholders 
had ten years in which to repay the capital and eight per 
cent interest. The debt became a first charge on the land.
It was expected that the interest would cover the costs 
incurred by the shires. The shires were also expected to 
organize group fencing for adjacent small blocks.
An attempt had been made to initiate a similar 
project by regulation some months before. The original 
proposal had been to make the shires directly responsible
61 Vermin Destruction Act 1889, 53 Viet. No. 1028, 
replaced by Vermin Destruction Act 1890, 54 Viet. No. 
1153.
62 See Chapter 8. Also the Year Books for the 1890s.
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for guaranteeing the loans to settlers, but the Crown
Solicitor had ruled that no shire could legally offer
security for such a loan. Nevertheless, two councils went
6 3ahead and took the interest-free loans. There had been 
no outcry against this rather radical move on the part of 
the conservative Gillies government. Nor had there been any 
objection from the protectionists when the 25 per cent duty 
on imported netting was dropped in 1887. There were many 
calls for the officially free-trade government in New South 
Wales to take the same step, but the bounty remained until 
1896. Perhaps the fact that Lysaght, the only Australian 
netting manufacturer, was a New South Wales company, 
influenced the Victorian decision, but both cases also show 
the lack of sectional political rigidity in the Victorian 
parliament as regards rabbit policy. The rest of the 
legislation related to the rights of inspectors, fines, 
prohibitions on the keeping of live vermin, destruction of 
fences which harboured vermin, the recovery of money spent 
on compulsory clearance work, protection of animals which 
destroyed vermin and cost sharing between landlords and 
short-term tenants. All these matters had been set out in 
earlier legislation.
The diplomatic approach adopted is shown by three
new features of the act. Rabbits were still scarce in
Gippsland, so for the sake of these regions wallabies were
64included as vermin. Because many shires had been paying
63 Ibid., 1889, 60, 697.
64 Ibid., 1889, 62, 1919-20.
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for fox scalps councils retained the right to use their 
funds for bounty payments. Most importantly, the shires 
were not totally excluded from the operation of the new 
legislation as some members of parliament wished. This 
helped to soothe those members of the Legislative Council 
who strongly opposed centralized control, and also made it 
easier for the Lands Department, which was spared direct 
responsibility for assessing mortgage security. The debate 
took longer than for previous measures but revealed remark­
able unaminity. City members were praised for 'the
handsome manner in which they have expressed their readiness
6 5to assist in the speedy passage of this Bill*. After a 
few legal technicalities were resolved the following year 
by the 1890 Vermin Destruction Act, vermin control in 
Victoria became the responsibility of the Lands Department, 
and has remained so.
Despite its easy passage the new act soon ran
into criticism and difficulties. A meeting of municipal
representatives in 1890 asked for a royal commission. Their
main objection seems to have been to the increased destruction
6 6of brush fences. In 1890 £150,000 was provided for fencing 
loans. It was rapidly exhausted and some shires were held 
to have been rash in their requests and negligent about 
trying to organize group fencing. The quality of the fence
65 Ibid., 699.
66 Ibid., 1890, 65, 2137; 2570.
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6 7construction was also criticized. In 1893 the House
rejected a further £50,000 advance, because it was proposed
to make it interest-free but in 1896 another £50,000 was
6 8allocated at three per cent interest. A much increased 
market for rabbit carcasses opened in the early 1890s with 
the introduction of freezer ships and John MacIntyre, a 
former minister, blamed the increased commercial value of 
the trade for the higher level of complaints about the act 
in the mid-1890s. The chief vermin inspector, Francis 
Allan, was a strong believer in the use of poison and, as 
McIntyre pointed out, this meant that 'rabbit could not 
be treated as vermin and as food at the same time'.^  
Unoccupied crown lands remained a source of annoyance to 
landholders. Expenditure on vermin eradication increased, 
but, because of abandoned holdings, so did the area of 
unoccupied crown land."^ However, the most serious threat 
to the running of a centralized vermin control system was 
produced by the financial crisis of the 1890s. In 1893 
McIntyre decided to cut the £33,000 vermin vote by £16,000, 
largely by dismissing all 64 inspectors and handing over 
their functions to the 264 mounted police throughout 
Victoria. Some police received an extra £12 p.a. to help
67 Ibid., 1895-96, 79, 4525, Adjournment debate; Victorian 
Year Book, 1893, p. 311.
68 Victorian Year Book, 1895-98, p. 925.
69 VPD, 1895-96, 79, 4524.
70 See footnote 48.
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pay for another horse; most received nothing. Some 
proved efficient inspectors; most were too busy or were 
reluctant to take on such an unpopular role. It was not 
an arrangement that pleased the vermin branch of the Lands 
Department. Clearly much re-organization remained to be 
done before Victoria had a co-ordinated, effective policy.
New South Wales commentators often claimed that 
the Victorian system was a product of its more compact 
size. In practice this seems to have had little to do with 
policy formation. The pressure for centralized control 
came from the shires and the settlers, not from the govern­
ment. Whereas New South Wales had a network of specialized 
rural bodies, the pastures and stock boards, in Victoria 
local government functions had been concentrated in the 
shire councils. Once the councils proved reluctant and 
inefficient the government had a choice between setting up 
new local organizations or taking charge itself. New South 
Wales had no compulsory local government act until 1905 and 
the strictly pastoral local bodies were naturally much more 
jealous of their right to regulate matters to do with 
property management than were town-based councils.
Although the Victorian Lands Department has lost 
or destroyed most of its early records on vermin control
71
71 VPD, 1895-96, 79, 4524; PR, 15 May 1893, p. 124. The 
Vermin & Noxious Weeds Board has a ledger and file on 
mounted constables who took on vermin inspection 
functions. Most correspondence relates to official 
confusion over names and allowances.
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two press letter books recording the outgoing correspond-
72ence of a vermin inspector in the Mallee have survived.
These provide an insight into the functioning of the vermin 
branch of the Lands Department in the crucial early years 
of centralization. They illustrate the considerable degree 
of independence retained by the man on the spot and illustrate 
how few decisions were greatly influenced by the fact that 
reports had to go back to Melbourne. Apart from surveyors' 
note books, which are entirely technical jottings, no 
similar records seem to have survived in New South Wales for 
the period when rabbit inspectors were responsible to the 
Department of Mines stock branch. The annual reports and 
special reports printed in the New South Wales Votes and 
Proceedings are referred to in later chapters, but they lack 
the detail and the sense of personality which is conveyed 
through the letter books.
J.M. McLeod Jr. was the inspector for the northern 
vermin board from 1891 to 1911. At various times during 
this period he was also thistle inspector, member of the 
northern vermin board, border fence inspector, stock 
inspector, census collector, fowl inspector and assessor for 
the closer settlement board and possibly held other minor 
posts. He owned several Mallee holdings worked by a manager. 
Judging by the few surviving department files and conversat­
ions with men now working for the Vermin and Noxious Weeds
72 MUA, J.M. McLeod Jr., Press Letter Books, Northern
Vermin Board, BURR I.
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Board, McLeod seems to have been typical of the local 
temporary officials who were employed by the Lands Depart­
ment and the Agriculture Department in the early part of
the century. He travelled extensively in the area and
73claimed to know it well; none of his official positions
74paid highly, but they added up to a good income; despite 
occasional grammatical lapses he handled the large amount 
of paper-work very competently.
He worked in an interesting area. His district 
ran from the South Australian border to east of Mildura and 
included the Chaffey irrigated holdings, small Mallee 
leaseholds and three large stations. Dingoes were still 
prevalent, foxes appeared occasionally, thistles abounded 
and of course there was the ubiquitous rabbit. Until his 
dismissal in 1893 as part of the economy drive he 
conscientiously wrote monthly reports. Even after he lost 
the post of vermin inspector he continued to make pertinent 
general comments on vermin in his border fence inspection 
reports, which were submitted at least quarterly. By 1904 
he was again signing himself 'vermin inspector' and 
initiating prosecutions. Despite the many positions he held, 
he kept up to date with his vermin rate assessment calls, 
inspection warning notices, accounts and the numerous
73 McLeod to J. Hayes, 17 October 1899. He claimed to 
be the oldest Mallee resident.
74 McLeod to Black (Chief Vermin Inspector) 10 April 1893. 
As vermin inspector he received £150 p.a. By 1910 he 
was receiving £206 p.a. including travelling and all 
expenses. Victorian Government Gazette, 1911, p. 842. 
Persons temporarily employed.
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official reports. A great deal of steady work was involved 
and it is likely that some men in his position would have 
fallen badly behind.
In March 1891 McLeod agreed to a request from his 
fellow vermin board members to apply for the position of 
thistle inspector, advertised by the shire. These assign­
ments were a local matter and, as with similar pastures and 
stock board appointments in New South Wales, were often 
advertised with a particular candidate in mind. McLeod 
informed Chief Inspector Black of the Lands Department that 
he had accepted the post at £10 p.a. and half the taxes 
collected. He hoped that Black would not object: ’When I
am inspecting for rabbits I can also see if there are any
75thistles or dogs about'. He said that as the notice 
appeared on 9 February and applications closed on 12 
February, there had been no time to consult the department.
In one of the few incoming letters pressed Black replied:
'I certainly do object to your holding so many appointments. 
In my opinion you ought not to have applied ... but should
7have been satisfied with what you held under the government'.
However, McLeod was not a full-time, permanent public servant
and although he expressed his regret, he did not offer to
77resign either job.
The most suspect aspect of a locally administered
75 McLeod to Black, 18 March 1891.
76 Black to McLeod, 25 March 1891.
77 McLeod to Black, 14 April 1891.
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system is revealed by McLeod's lists of those warned
and summonsed. The members of the vermin board were Messrs
Crozier (Kulmine Station), Pegler (Ned's Corner Station),
Robertson (Kuttyne Station), Mathers and B. Chaffey.
Pegler and Chaffey both received a number of warnings about
their vermin and thistles, and between 1905 and 1910 (after
the end of the vermin board), Pegler was summonsed and fined
at least three times under the Vermin Destruction Act. Such
a situation could be embarrassing for a government employee,
like a vermin inspector, but impossible for a shire
employee, like a thistle inspector. In 1905 the Shire
Secretary, Frank Egg, settled a vermin destruction summons
7 8out of court for 23s 6d. It may be coincidence but 
there are no records of summonses under the locally 
administered thistle acts, despite the number of warnings 
sent out.
In 1892 McLeod responded firmly to a Chaffey
Brothers' decision to reduce the number of men that they
employed on vermin eradication: 'I gave them instructions
today to put on more men at once as I informed them that
one rabbit killed now meant hundreds less in the future'.
With his local background he knew that the company was 'hard
79pressed for money', but zeal won over sympathy. On the
78 McLeod to F. Egg, 26 October 1905; McLeod to Allen 
(Chief Inspector of Vermin) 6 November 1905.
79 McLeod to Black, 1 July 1892.
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other hand, in 1905 he offered to drop one of two 
summonses against Pegler in return for a guilty plea.
Pegler refused and was fined £4 and 2s 6d costs. McLeod
8 0then let the other case lapse in return for 10s 6d costs.
This may have been the sensible decision but it raises
speculation about the kind of social and economic pressures
that could be applied to the man in the field. As McLeod
explained to Black, any man summonsed thought that he was
being victimised and 'people that have spite against others
81always think that others have spite against them'. Shires 
that arranged to have vermin and weed control under the same 
man obviously found it convenient but the divided authority 
could create problems. It depended on the attitude of the 
shire officials whether a man who had proved his keeness as 
a vermin inspector would be welcome to turn the same 
attention against thistles. Once a man accepted the second 
post he was vulnerable to local pressure in both positions. 
There were also financial problems. As vermin inspector he 
was paid by the Lands Department; as thistle inspector he 
was paid through the rates. In McLeod's district there was 
an additional problem in that the Chaffey Brothers held 
their 250,000 acres under the Chaffey Agreement and were 
technically not under the local vermin board. McLeod 
continued his inspections and praised the brothers for
80 McLeod to Allan, 6 November 1905.
81 McLeod to Black, 14 August 1891.
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employing five to seven men on full-time pest destruction. 82
There were many routine administrative problems.
For several months McLeod was vexed by the failure of the 
department to send him the correct forms for dingo bounty 
payments. Later he was even more annoyed because the pay­
master insisted that he get the counter signature of the
chairman, not that of the acting chairman, which meant a
8 3trip of 45 miles. However, even in the early 1890s, before
the rail link with Melbourne, vermin control directed by the
Lands Department worked remarkably smoothly. Distance
could even be an asset to the enthusiastic officer. In
1892 Black sent out a general notice that expenditure had
to be kept down for the next three months. McLeod replied
that at present he was employing no men, but if he found
84badly infested areas he would have to hire labour. By the 
time he got a reply he could have done the work. In practice 
McLeod had far less trouble getting prompt answers from his 
superiors than he did in getting his neighbours to pay their 
rates.
82 McLeod to Allan, 1 May 1905. Referring back to the 
early 1890s.
Rabbits had done much to ruin the old Mildura Station, 
which made it possible for the Chaffey Brothers to 
acquire the land. (J.P. Fogarty, George Chaffey - Great 
Australians, Melbourne, 1967, p. 9).
The Chaffeys and McLeod had worked to reduce the 
rabbit plague to manageable proportions but this did 
not save either of them when the land boom ended and 
the colony entered the depression of the 1890s.
83 McLeod to Black, 26 August 1895; 29 October 1894 
telegram
McLeod to Black, 30 March 1892.84
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The few matters that required urgent departmental
answers were handled expeditiously by telegram. The longest
delays were caused by travel problems within the district,
and when McLeod’s horse kicked in the side of the buggy all
the reports were late. On the other hand, having a regular
channel of communication to a central office could save time.
McLeod wrote in 1891: 'there is a great difficulty here in
getting the correct address of landholders. Buyers of
Mildura lands live I think in any part of the Globe, and
as a number of people only bought to sell again the allot-
8 5ments are continually changing hands'. This was a 
common problem in eastern Australia. It was usual for more 
than half the men summonsed by McLeod to have addresses 
outside the district.
It is hard to assess attitudes to the rabbit
problem from official correspondence because it is not
spontaneous. The writer has to indicate both his successes
and the need for his continued employment. In McLeod's
letters overtones of resignation soon become apparent.
While noting that rabbits were not numerous in August he
added that the young 'seem to grow like the grass', and
8 6he was voicing similar comments over a decade later. A 
degree of sophistication developed in handling the pest. 
Different poisons were used for different times of the year, 
as well as fumigation of burrows in the spring. Trapping 
was regarded as rather suspect because the squeals of
85 McLeod to Black, 22 June 1891.
86 McLeod to Black, 14 August 1891; to Allan, 11 July 1903.
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trapped rabbits warned the rest and were thought to be one 
of the reasons rabbits had migrated in huge numbers from 
their original warrens. The stations near Mildura employed 
20 to 40 men full-time to destroy rabbits and dingoes and 
when McLeod sent men to clear a property it cost just over 
fl per day.
Judging by the tone of the letters, rabbits were
treated as an unpleasant fact of life, not a potential
source of ruin. McLeod thought that he had the situation
in hand but he did not expect to eradicate the pest. There
was an established routine, just as there was a routine for
dealing with the border fence, which always needed an extra
8 8panel of netting when the river level dropped. The 
sense of crisis was gone. This is one of the main reasons 
that the later stages of vermin policy formation moved so 
slowly.
87 McLeod to Black, 11 February 1892.
88 McLeod to Allan, 11 October 1902.
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CHAPTER 3
The Triumph of Centralization - Victoria
1890-1930
When rabbits emerged from their harbours at 
dusk and covered the paddocks with a moving, munching 
blanket of grey fur it was easy to tell that there were 
too many. When counter-measures reduced their numbers to 
10 or 20 per acre the inexperienced and the careless could 
be misled into thinking that the matter was no longer 
serious. Reduced carrying capacity, the destruction of 
the choicest new growth and the erosion of topsoil are not 
always apparent to the casual observer, or to the poorly 
informed man who has become accustomed to seeing his land 
and stock in such a condition. By the turn of the century 
many Victorian landholders could not remember a time before 
rabbits.
While familiarity did not necessarily breed 
contempt, it frequently destroyed a sense of the urgency of 
the problem. This is common where difficult situations have 
to be tackled year after year. A study of a recent major 
campaign in Queensland to eradicate pleuropneumonia, one of 
the world's great plague decimators of cattle, which has 
been present in Australia since 1858, emphasised the point:
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Not all cattlemen could see any material 
advantage in eradicating pleuropneumonia. 
While it was generally not difficult to 
convince them of the economic benefit 
resulting from control, to proceed beyond 
this to eradication, especially when this, 
at least to some, appeared an impossible 
dream, was an entirely different matter ... 
They had become familiar with the disease 
and had learned to live with it.1
Similar results emerged from another modern study. 
In 1962 the Victorian Vermin and Noxious Weeds Board launched 
a big rabbit eradication campaign in the Mallee and
2accompanied it by a sociological survey to assess reactions. 
Before the campaign began farmers had complained that rabbits 
were increasing alarmingly and would probably eat up to 15 
per cent of the sown acreage. Obviously the landholders were 
aware that they were losing money and they wanted action, 
but when the investigating team questioned the 120 farmers in 
the sociological sample it was clear that only 47 were in 
favour of the rigorous eradication procedures suggested, and 
73 believed that they would not do much good. After an 
intensive campaign conducted throught the press, local radio, 
public meetings and individual visits by departmental 
research officers and local vermin inspectors the work began.
1 C.G. Newton, 'Historical and Administrative Aspects of 
Pleuropneumonia Eradication in Australia with Particular 
Reference to Queensland', Public Administration, 1974,
Vol. 33, p. 57.
2. H.A. Presser and H.M. Russell, 'Acceptance of Research
Results by Farmers', Review of Marketing and Agricultural 
Economics, 1965, Vol. 33 (3), pp. 147-165.
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Only four men in the sample did not follow the official 
instructions and their properties were already classed as 
rabbit-free. At the end of the time 104 of the original 
survey declared that they were in favour of what had been 
done and only 16 remained sceptical. The two points that 
can be related back to the situation confronting late 
nineteenth century policy makers were the degree of initial 
rural doubt and the amount and range of official encourage­
ment and coercion that was needed to produce a change in 
attitudes among farmers, even comparatively well educated 
farmers living in an era of swift communications.
The modern conclusions would not have surprised the
men concerned with the control of vermin in the 1890s. The
Pastoralists' Review, a journal ever wary of the involvement
of government officials in property management, regretted
the dismissal of the Victorian vermin inspectors in 1893 and
doubted the efficiency of the voluntary rabbit leagues
formed in many shires, which were supposed to inspect and
to help clear each others' land. The new head of the vermin
branch in 1896, Francis Allan, was sure that more inspectors
were needed to keep landholders up to the mark and to spread
4expert knowledge about poisoning techniques. However, very 
few inspectors were re-employed until 1902.
If it was hard to show landholders that self- 
interest should make them ardent rabbit exterminators, it was
3 PR, 15 May 1893, p. 124-5; 15 June 1896, p.193.
4 Ibid., 15 June 1896, p. 168.
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many times more difficult to convince them that some plants 
should be destroyed at considerable cost. All vermin can 
be seen to damage either pasture, crops, property or stock.
It was common knowledge that seven rabbits ate about as 
much as a sheep, that wombats made holes in fences, that 
wild dogs killed stock and that opossums spoiled crops and 
fruit. It was not as easy to say what a thistle did. Land­
holders who had a passion for ring-barking trees in the 
expectation that it would promote better pasture often had 
neither the capital, the equipment or the time, let alone 
the knowledge and inclination to encourage some plants and 
discourage others. 'Weed' is just a vague term for a plant 
growing in an inappropriate place. A noxious weed need not 
be poisonous. As was pointed out in the introduction, it 
is a plant that displaced more economically advantageous 
species. In well-watered parts of Victoria, Echium lycopsis, 
a two to three feet tall biennial with little purple trumpet­
shaped flowers, is known as Paterson's Curse. It was 
proclaimed noxious around Tallangatta in 1904 and for the
whole state in 1911. In arid South Australia it is called
5Salvation Jane and is valued as drought stock feed.
Before the coming of Europeans native Australian 
grasses had not been subjected to the demands of large herds 
of hard hoofed, close cropping herbivores. Some could not 
regenerate quickly enough to survive. Both by accident and 
design new species were introduced. Many spread rapidly,
5 Parsons, Noxious Weeds, p.32.
57
and, because of some adverse quality, a few aroused great 
concern. The first weed legislation was passed in the 
eastern colonies in the 1850s. It was intended to control 
the spread of certain thistles and Bathurst burr. The 
former were indigestible to many stock and the latter 
reduced the value of the wool clip. Few settlers foundg
anything good to say about the burrs but opinion was much
divided over the value of thistles. Margaret Kiddle recounts
how the influential Western District landowner, William
Clarke, halted a Legislative Council debate on the topic
7by asserting that thistles were good drought feed. In 1891 
J. Wallace told the Council that he had recently cut 20 tons 
of thistles on his property and that stock had eaten the
glot, and it is common today to hear farmers confidently 
say that there is plenty of good feed in their paddocks 
full of thistles. Undoubtedly most thistles, apart from 
the flat varieties, can be eaten by mature stock, if they 
are sufficiently hungry. This is not the same thing as 
saying that they are economically advantageous or should be 
allowed to spread. The argument is still going on, and it 
is not surprising that, in the days before the development 
of hormone sprays and deep motor driven ploughs, when the 
only common counter-measures were slashing, burning and
6 For one exception see Chapter 7, p. 242.
7 Kiddle, Men of Yesterday, p. 292.
8 VPD, 1891, 68, 3256.
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12on the subject*. In other words, it was intended to make
13weed control a purely local matter. The 1865 Thistle Act 
incorporated the change but unoccupied crown lands outside 
shire boundaries remained the responsibility of the Board 
of Lands and Works and little money was allocated for their 
clearance.
In 1891 another amendment made it possible for the
Governor-in-Council to proclaim any plant to be a thistle
14without passing a new act. A further amendment to place 
the onus on the defendant to prove that the plants on his 
land were not proclaimed weeds was rejected in the Legislative 
C o u n c i l . B y  this time the list included eight thistles and 
Bathurst burr and there were many calls for its extension. 
However, there was also a strong body of opinion that the 
law was being taken too far. The 1893 Thistle Act was 
intended to be a compromise. It declared that if a plant 
was a localized nuisance it need not be declared noxious for 
the whole state.^
The first weed named under the new arrangement was 
St John's Wort. It had taken over large tracts of grazing 
land around Bright in the Ovens Valley. Stock that tried to 
eat it tended to become sensitive to sunlight and develop
12 Ibid., 1861-62, 8, 642.
13 Thistle Prevention Act 1865, 28 Viet. No. 250. It 
named five Thistles and Bathurst burr.
14 Thistle Act 1891, No. 1244.
15 VPD, 1891, 67 , 3227; 3257.
16 Thistle Amendment Act 1893, No. 1337.
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severe dermatitis that sometimes became fatally infected.
The animals also suffered central nervous system damage,
aborted easily and lost condition. However, although
consistent grazing could lead to St John’s Wort completely
taking over the pasture, regular cultivation readily 
17controlled it. Therefore the plant was not regarded as 
a problem in agricultural areas. Partial proclamation was 
expected to resolve the conflict of interest, but the 
transmission of seeds from waste land in non-proclaimed 
areas to pasture in vulnerable districts remained a problem.^
Because of the depression of the 1890s shire and 
government expenditure on weed control was severely curtailed, 
and the weeds flourished. Closer settlement schemes added 
a new dimension to the controversy. The voluntary surrender 
of large estates for subdivision began in 1898 and the first 
Closer Settlement Act was passed in 1904. Crop contamination 
and the tainting of milk were not matters that had concerned 
large graziers but they were very worrying to small farmers, 
and the encouragement of farming was a consistent feature of 
Victorian land policy.
Alfred Outtrim, a former Lands Minister who had 
just joined the Labor party, introduced an adjournment debate 
on the Thistle Act in 1904. He pointed out that many
17 Parsons, Noxious Weeds, p. 163.
18 The specific problem of dealing with St John's Wort 
is discussed in Chapter 10, p. 366.
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petitions calling for stricter enforcement of the act
had been received but that some shires were unwilling to
initiate prosecutions or to request extensions to the list
of noxious plants. He blamed the situation on large land-
19holders who, he said, dominated many councils. When the
Municipal Conference met in October attention was paid to
the losses caused by the spread of blackberries, sweet
briar, stink wort, water hyacinth and cape tulip, and the
20neglect of crown lands was condemned. The same complaints
were voiced year after year but positive suggestions were
scarce. Instead there was immediate opposition to a vague
proposal advanced by Dr S. Cameron, Director of Agriculture,
that the government should become the co-ordinating body
21for weed control. The idea was dropped.
Late in 1914 what appeared to be the final step in
the establishment of a decentralized, locally administered
weed control system was taken. Municipal officers were
authorized to issue notices for the destruction of weeds.
Justices of the Peace retained the same right but were no
2 2longer the sole enforcement agents. It was hoped that 
this would increase efficiency and raise the status of the 
inspectors. The legislation aroused some debate in the 
Assembly, particularly over whether thistles were always a 
bad thing and whether the power to declare a plant to be a
19 VPD, 1904 , 108 , 2139 ff.
20 Age, 20 October 1904.
21 Argus, 22 April 1914; VPD, 1914, 136, 12613.
22 Thistle Act of 1890 Amendment Act 1914, No. 2555.
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? 3thistle should be vested in the shires.“ However, as 
there was no legislation compelling shires to enforce the 
law the disagreement was not important and did not delay 
proceedings.
Despite the frequency with which thistle laws 
were mentioned critically in parliament and local meetings, 
there were few signs that any organized body wanted to 
initiate a new system. Not even the Department of Agricult­
ure was anxious to become involved. After 1912 the policy 
pursued during the 1890s of conducting most research on 
experimental plots on private land was largely discontinued 
in favour of work on the three main experimental farms at 
Werribee, Rutherglen and Longerenong. Pasture improvement 
was one of the projects undertaken, but as weed control was 
a local responsibility, and in 1916 the annual budget of 
the department was still only £36,252, very little money 
was put into experiments on weeds.^ According to popular
report, until the 1950s the Lands Department did not even
25own a microscope, and collaboration between the two 
departments varied, depending on the personalities involved.
23 VPD, 1914, 136, 1263.
24 Victorian Year Book, 1920-21, p. 532; The 1915-16 Year 
Book, p. 702 listed the experimental projects as plant 
breeding, soil renovation, cropping practices, pasture 
experiments, stock breeding, plant nutrition and 
meteorological observations.
Rolls, They All Ran Wild, p. 186. However, in 1934 
the Lands Department established its first experimental 
weed plots. Victorian Lands Department, History file.
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By the time war broke out there was much evidence 
of growing dissatisfaction at the way vermin and weed 
problems were handled. By 1915 4,500 men had been settled
2 gon 570,000 acres and most were financially ill-prepared 
to cope with flourishing rabbits and weeds. In 1907 
Thomas Langdon, a Mallee farmer and grain merchant, had 
moved for the establishment of a select committee to 
investigate the rabbit problem. The government rejected 
the move on the grounds that it would constitute self­
censure and indicate a lack of confidence in Francis Allan. 
Allan issued a statement that, since his department had 
moderated its policy so that fewer men were prosecuted and 
more compulsory clearance work was done, far fewer complaints 
had been received than ten years before. Country members 
were in rather a quandary over what they should advocate.
Most were supporters of the Kyabram movement, a massive 
rural protest against drift and extravagance in government.
They had been elected on the resulting economy ticket and
2 8were advocates of government retrenchment. It was hard to 
see how vermin and weed policy could be made more rigorous 
without an increase in expenditure.
Despite regular challenges made during almost 
every supply debate from 1902 to 1915, the official
26 Victorian Lands Department, History file.
27 VPD, 1907, 116, 514 ff.
28 J. Rickard, Class and Politics: New South Wales,
Victoria and the Early Commonwealth, 1890-1910, 
Canberra, 1976, pp. 197-8.
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expenditure on vermin and weed control slowly rose. In 
1914 a pound for pound subsidy for St John's Wort eradicat­
ion work was offered to the shires, but in 1917 it was 
noted that the £500 placed on the estimates had never been 
claimed in any one year.^ On the other hand, fencing
advances were eagerly taken up and had become the largest
31single item of expenditure on agriculture. As this money 
had to be repaid with interest to cover administrative 
costs and because the shires were responsible for arranging
29
30
31
Victorian Year Book, 1915-16, p. 764.
Expenditure on destruction of vermin, including shire 
subsidies:
Year Amount in £ Year Amount in £
1899-1900 14,801 1908 17,585
1901 15,817 1909 22,756
1902 17,250 1910 23,005
1903 16,489 1911 23,123
1904 15,759 1912 29,524
1905 16,603 1913 27,309
1906 16,477 1914 29,596
1907 16,513 1915 32,211
Argus, 22 April 1914; VPD, 1917 , 166, 141.
Victorian Year Book, 1920-21, p . 531.
Money allocated for fencing:
Year Amount m  £ Year Amount in £
1890 150,000 1914 62,428
1896 50,000 1915 19,731
1909 45,850 1916 3,078
1910 10,734 1917 3,203
1911 43,648 1918 9,472
1912 21,116 1919 3,766
1913 54,061 1920 20,985
The amounts increased during the 1920s •
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security, the ultimate loss to the Treasury was small, but 
as the allocations figured on the debit side of the budget 
they could have become a political issue, except that all 
parties believed they were necessary. There was not even 
any objection to the investment in 1907 by the Bent Reform 
Ministry in the purchase of six wire weaving machines to 
be installed at Pentridge gaol. In the early years of 
operation a small profit was made to set against capital 
outlay. The wire was dearer than the contract price for 
British netting but it was better quality and the gaol
A O "t* ^  2
could keep up with the demand. By 1916, when production
had temporarily stopped because of war-time shortages,
33Pentridge had supplied 12,000 miles for £300,000. Even 
conservative members did not protest at this form of state 
enterprise and Labor regarded it with glee.
Similarly, when the 1909 Wire Netting Act was
debated no controversy was aroused by the change from the
allocation of funds to the shires to the supply of netting,
34bought in bulk by the state. A similar proposal on behalf
of the Bruce-Page coalition in federal parliament in 1923
35met a very different response and had to be dropped. The
32 Argus, 23 March 1912, English netting £21 per mile, 
Pentridge £23 per mile, normal retail £28 per mile; 
Argus, 27 April 1914, English £23 15s, Pentridge 
£25 2s 6d.
33 Argus, 26 April 1916.
34 VPD, 1909, 123, 335.
35 See Chapter 10 p.382.
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only serious point of disagreement in 1909 was whether 
shires should be compelled to contract for the supply of 
netting if the correct local petitions were received.
Members were reluctant to make the shires take on debts 
which might not be repaid, and unwilling to put the state 
in the position of becoming the direct supplier of netting 
to individuals. In the end fear of the Treasury losing 
money because of inadequately secured advances, and object­
ions to creating a new bureaucracy to arrange proper mortgage 
security led the Assembly to vote 31 to 21 against allowing 
direct government advances to landholders. However, as a 
compromise direct advances were permitted where there were 
no shires, such as on French Island, or to landholders 
netting a boundary adjacent to unoccupied crown land. In
a last minute amendment, announced during the third reading,
37the latter also received their wire at 80 per cent of cost. 
Little by little government financial involvement was 
increasing and there were no distinct factional or party 
objections.
Despite the growth of the rabbit trade, commercial
rabbit interests never aroused the depth of hostility that
became a feature of New South Wales rabbit debates from the
3 8late 1880s onwards. Rabbit canning was well established
36 VPD, 1909, 123, 338.
37 Ibid., 588.
33 See Chapters 5 and 9.
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at Colac and Camperdown in the Western District by the
early 1880s, and during the 1890s exports of canned
rabbits averaged over 1,500 tons p.a., with a peak of 2,277
39tons in 1897. These exports were worth about £25,000 p.a.
By 1894 the Department of Agriculture was experimenting with
the export of frozen rabbits and a British correspondent to
the Pastoralists1 Review congratulated the department 'on
40exercising so much care in opening up this trade'. The
Age pointed out that a large rabbit cannery employed about
350 men for at least six months of the year and the monthly
wage sheet would come to about £3,000, a useful boost to
the economy of small towns. Skilled men could earn £6 per
week. The paper also concluded that 'it is by no means
improbable that the extension of the frozen meat trade will
provide a more economical method of keeping the rabbits down
41than by merely poisoning them'.
At a Royal Agricultural Society dinner in 1896 a
speaker regretted the poisoning of rabbits and speculated
that they might soon become 'one of our most valuable assets',
and the Agriculture Department was again praised for sending
packaging experts to Portland to stimulate the export of 
42rabbits. On the other hand, there were general complaints 
about the increase in rabbits and many suggested that this
39 Victorian Statistical Registers; PR, 15 June 1894, 
p. 164.
40 PR, 15 December 1894, pp. 504-5.
41 Age 10 February 1894; 20 February 1894.
42 PR, 15 May 1896, p. 111.
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was due to 'an appreciable interest in their maintenance1
In 1898 some Romsey farmers petitioned unsuccessfully to
be excused from using poison, on the grounds that 'rabbit
4 4farming is becoming a considerable industry'. Every day
during the winter about 40,000 rabbits were brought into
45Melbourne for local and domestic use. However, as the 
Year Books pointed out, the value of exports was small 
compensation for the millions of pounds damage done. 
Nevertheless, the divergence of opinion continued and some 
influential men defended the trade. Professor Cherry, a 
noted bacteriologist and foundation Professor of 
Agriculture at Melbourne University, wrote an article on 
agricultural problems for the 1914 British Association for 
the Advancement of Science Conference in Melbourne, in which 
he referred to rabbits:
Destruction by poison is absolute waste, and 
extermination by disease is running counter 
to the law by which the virulence of the micro­
organism and the resistance of the host always 
tend to assume a position of equilibrium.
What is required is a plan by which rabbits 
may be exported, even at a small loss. 4 6
Francis Allan never wavered from a rigorous policy 
of rabbit poisoning. When the running debate over rabbit
43
44
45
46
Ibid., 15 January 1896, p. 590 quoting The Weekly 
Times; p. 568, general comments on Victoria.
Ibid., 15 February 1898, p. 620.
Ibid., 15 February 1897, p. 599.
A.M. Laughton, T.S. Hall (eds.), Handbook to Victoria, 
Melbourne, 1914, p. 55.
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utilization surfaced in the press he was quick to send
in letters arguing his case and condemning the selfishness
of farmers who thought that rabbits would bring them in
47some easy money. After his death a Labor member of the
Assembly, Hogan, condemned him as a 'faddist', claiming
that 'it is a crime that animals which are fit for human
48consumption should be destroyed in this way', but Allan
had been supported by his ministers and had won the praise
of the Victorian editorial writers for the Pastoral Review
because he ensured that the act was 'uniformly vigorously
administered' and did not become the plaything of a 'hand-
49ful of incompetents'.
When poisoning was temporarily banned within a 20
mile radius of rabbit processing works, in order to supply
the war-time British demand for cheap meat, there were
50great protests and the ban only lasted a few months. 
Immediately afterwards the Lands Department organized a big 
poisoning campaign in the Mallee and Wimmera. Despite the 
shortage of poison 8,000 ounces of strychnine were spread
47 Argus, 18 February 1913; 24 February 1913.
48 VPD, 1917, 166, 138.
49 PR, 16 March 1916, p. 194.
50 Ibid., 16 February 1918, p. 106. The details of 
commonwealth policy during the war are given in 
Chapter 10.
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during March and April and satisfactory results were soon 
reported.^  For all its inadequacies the Lands Department 
had won a considerable degree of approval for its wide-scale 
rabbit destruction projects that usually took place at 
least once a year. They stimulated landholders to act at 
the best time, reawoke general awareness of the rabbit 
problem and were not ruinously expensive. This helps to 
accourt for the lack of organized rural opposition to 
centralized administration, and the strong departmental 
stand taken against pressure from the rabbit industry helped 
to prevent the growth of suspicion and bitterness that beset 
the New South Wales debates.
There were also social and political reasons why 
the New South Wales response was more hostile and fragmented. 
These will be discussed in chapter nine, but briefly, the 
radicalism of small settlers in Victoria found expression 
through distinctively rural movements that also drew in
large landholders and some associated manufacturing
52interests. The Victorian Labor party did not have the 
support among farmers that the New South Wales party enjoyed. 
Many Victorian landholders, large and small, allowed trappers 
on their land, so there was no clear division of interests.
In 1916-17 representatives of voluntary Gippsland rabbit 
destruction leagues met in Traralgon for a conference. A
51 Ibid., 16 March 1918, p. 208; 16 April 1918, p. 310.
52 Rickard, Class and Politics, pp. 177-80;
B.D. Graham, The Formation of the Australian Country 
Parties, Canberra, 1966, pp. 65-80.
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vocal section of the meeting advocated banning the rabbit
53trade, but the motion was defeated. However, neither
faction would have had much sympathy for the 60 rabbit
trappers who joined the Australian Workers' Union in
Korumburra, Gippsland, and promptly went on strike over the
54low prices paid for rabbits. Trappers were seen to be 
aligned with the Labor party and thus with suspect city 
interests.
Another difference between the rabbit controvers­
ies in Victoria and New South Wales was the lack of time 
and money the former spent on the search for a disease that 
would wipe out rabbits. This is not to say that a great 
many farmers did not share the belief of their northern 
colleagues that science would find a cheap solution. The 
investigation of various rabbit diseases by the 1888-89 
New South Wales royal commission was widely reported, as 
was the attempt by Dr Jean Danysz in the early twentieth 
century to spread a severe rabbit disease, but there were 
no parallel Victorian inquiries.^ The reason probably lies 
in the nature of the administrative structure that had 
evolved. It is one thing to share an attitude or faith and 
another to organize and finance ways of implementing it.
The 1888-89 Intercolonial Rabbit Commission had
53 Argus, 22 April 1916.
54 PR, 16 February 1918, p. 106.
55 The investigations are discussed in chapters 6 and 9.
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been formed when New South Wales was forced by the expensive 
failure of its initial system to try something else. The 
Danysz experiments were privately funded through the 
pastures protection boards, local bodies which had just be­
come responsible for rabbit control in New South Wales.
There were no comparable bodies in Victoria. The Lands 
Department was in a strong position to resist calls for 
expensive research work, because it had a clear policy, 
based firmly on landowner responsibility and the encourage­
ment of fencing, and because the political and financial 
climate favoured strict economy. Allan responded to a 
request from the New South Wales authorities to share some 
of the costs of the Danysz experiments by pointing out to 
his minister, John Murray, that the work would be expensive 
and, in the light of the 1888-89 commission's findings, 
unlikely to succeed. If it did work it would bring such 
financial benefits that New South Wales would not need any 
financial assistance, and Victoria would inevitably benefit 
from the natural spread of infected rabbits.^ This 
pragmatic approach must have appealed to Murray, who reject­
ed the New South Wales request.
The Agriculture Department did not have the funds 
to undertake microbiological research, and anyway, rabbits 
were the responsibility of the Lands Department. The 
municipalities could have functioned as a pressure group,
56 Victorian Lands Department, Danysz file, 27 April 1905. 
Also referred to in the Herald, 28 April 1905. Press 
cutting in file.
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but, because they represented diverse interests, they
tended to accept the negative verdicts of the New South
Wales experts who investigated the various disease
proposals, whereas New South Wales rural bodies clung to
their faith, despite the evidence. In 1906 the Municipal
Association of Victoria stated its position: 'Whilst
recognizing the importance of fully investigating any
suggestion ... E the association ] is strongly of the
opinion that, in view of the possible danger to other forms
of animal life, experiments ... should only be approved by
a Committee of scientists representative of each of the
57states of Australia'. Rabbit infestation quickly prompted 
some useful technological innovations, such as poison carts, 
exploding cartridges of fumigants and a multitude of metal 
traps. These inventions, if well marketed, soon paid for 
their development, but scientific research was a more 
expensive and risky venture. There were no wealthy, 
influential rural organizations in Victoria that were 
sufficiently disgruntled to take on the task themselves.
In 1915 yet another Vermin Destruction Act was 
passed. It consolidated the legislation relating to the 
powers and duties of inspectors, bonus payments for foxes, 
wild dogs and wombats, the vermin fencing regulations and 
the supply of netting. There was no parliamentary debate.
57 Ibid., 23 February 1906.
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The advance of the rabbits into East Gippsland was 
complete but complaints about the failure to contain the 
problem had not produced a movement to hand over control 
to another authority. On the surface it seemed that the 
undisputed passage of both vermin and weed consolidating 
legislation in 1915 showed that policy for the two branches 
of pest control was established along divergent lines, but 
this was not to be the case. Although governments had 
shown great reluctance to increase their direct involvement, 
and although the sounds of dissatisfaction were far more 
muted than in New South Wales, the war years were to 
intensify the factors that had already led the state to 
accept a little more of the financial and administrative 
burden.
By 1916 the cost of half inch mesh netting (when
5 8still obtainable) had risen from about £23 per mile to £51. 
Rural labour was hard to get and poison was scarce. 
Predictably, rabbits increased. However, the loudest 
complaints were made about the spread of weeds, particularly 
St John's Wort. In 1917 soldier settlement schemes were 
announced. The Ovens Valley was one of the chosen areas.
New approaches to the problem were obviously essential. In 
1916 the Victorian Farmers' Union held its first annual 
conference. It already had 130 branches and 2,836 members,
58 Argus, 26 April 1916.
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59many drawn from the marginal wheat lands of the Mallee.
As a result it was a more radical organization than the
New South Wales Farmers and Settlers’ Association had
become. The platform included the ideals of the Kyabram
movement, public service retrenchment, less and cheaper
government and decentralization. It also specifically
mentioned better methods of inspection by the Department
of Agriculture and, one of the most important matters
6 0discussed was the spread of noxious weeds. Despite its 
loudly professed objections to government expenditure 
and interference, ideological considerations did not prevent 
it being a staunch supporter of the wheat pool. The Farmers' 
Union was a clear indication of the growing level of 
political organization in the Victorian rural community and 
of the willingness of a potentially powerful pressure group 
to favour radical initiatives on the part of government.
Throughout 1917 a series of well attended 
municipal meetings and conferences were held about weeds.
In March delegates at Bright recommended 'vigorous policy 
of closer settlement, going so far as forfeiture of affected 
lands that tenants declined to clean up'.^  Forty shire 
representatives met at Wangaratta in May and discussed 
St John's Wort eradication with Frederick Hagelthorn, the 
Minister for Agriculture, and Thomas Livingston, Vice-
59 Graham, Australian Country Parties, p. 110.
60 PR, 16 October 1916, p. 913.
61 Ibid., 16 March 1917, p. 204.
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6 2President of the Board of Lands and Works. In July an 
executive committee, appointed by the Wangaratta conference, 
made a series of recommendations to the government. They 
wanted the shires to be compelled to enforce the law, the 
state to take full responsibility for clearing all unoccup­
ied crown land and a two pound subsidy for every pound 
spent on badly infested private land. William Hutchinson, 
Minister for Lands, promised to consider the first point but 
said that no government had or could promise to deal with
6 3all crown land, and the last point was withdrawn as unfair.
Rather reluctantly the Lands Department drafted a 
bill to amalgamate vermin and weed control under its super­
vision. The proposal suggested an advisory council of 
twelve shire representatives, a departmental staff of 140 
inspectors (instead of the present 65) and government
funding of £40,000 to be supplemented by a contribution of
64£12,000 p.a. from the shires. Although the Pastoral
Review opposed centralized control in New South Wales, the
journal praised the scheme, but it met strong opposition
from the shires. The minister asked the councils to comment
in writing and it took over a year for all municipalities to 
65reply. Many shires referred to 'unfair taxation' or, like
62 Ibid., 16 May 1917, p. 418.
63 Ibid., 16 July 1917, p. 625.
64 Ibid., 16 November 1918, p. 1023.
65 Victorian Lands Department, Correspondence from the 
Shires, 1918, File Sp. 854.
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Ballan, insisted that 'we cannot approve of a scheme
providing for a new government department and an army of
inspectors, as at present there are in our shire officers
who can do the work of inspection at little extra cost'.
A group of shires in the Ovens Valley and part of Gippsland,
where St John's Wort was rife, were in favour, but the
Gippsland Development Conference opposed the draft and
suggested a 'self supporting and reproductive scheme'
based on long term loans. In July 1919 the minister wrote
to the Chamber of Agriculture: 'as there is not the
slightest chance of getting the approval of the country
members of Parliament to a scheme condemned by the Shires,
6 6I am at a loss to know how to proceed'.
During 1919 parliamentary discussion about vermin
and weeds was divided between country members' demands
that something be done to destroy both, and discussion of
a petition from a Collingwood hat manufacturer, requesting
price control on rabbit skins to protect his industry from
American buyers who were 'rigging the market', his term for
inflating prices. While Martin Hannah defended the hatters,
arguing that 'the skins have been held by speculators ...
6 7the rabbit trappers have not benefited', J. Cameron of 
East Gippsland fulminated that 'first the rabbit skins will 
be commandeered, then the wool, then the butter, then the 
beef, and eventually the wheat. The community will become
66 Ibid., 16 July 1919.
67 VPD, 1919, 152, 803. He was the Labor member for 
Collingwood.
78
6 8the serfs of the Trades Hall'. Tempers were not 
soothed by the fact that the commonwealth had acquired all 
rabbits skins during the war and had made a £200,000 
profit, which was not returned to the rural sector. It 
was rumoured to have been used to pay retirement pensions 
to High Court judges.^
Another draft bill was prepared. The new plan
was to divide the state into four districts based on
municipal groupings. The Shires would elect five members
to each district board and the government would provide
a senior inspector. There would be joint financing. The
Municipal Conference again rejected the proposals on the
grounds that the department should take full charge of
crown lands and leave the rest of the state to be managed
by the municipalities under the leadership of a supervisory 
70board. The legislation was not presented before the end 
of the session.
In 1920 the Lawson Ministry promised another 
vermin and noxious weed bill. There was considerable 
scepticism about whether either the 1919 or 1920 legislation 
had been intended to pass. Several members of the Legislat­
ive Council speculated that Lawson was primarily anxious to 
preserve his close ties with the Victorian Farmers' Union
68 Ibid., 793.
69 Ibid.
70 VPD, 1919 , 152 , 423; 435 .
71 VPD, 1919, 154, 4045; 4057. The government blamed 
pressure of other business.
79
without actually committing the government to expensive
72new responsibilities. The 1920 bill was basically the 
same as its predecessor and it also lapsed.
Early the next year a deputation of shire 
representatives saw the minister and asked that yet another 
attempt be made to frame new legislation:
We are here as landowners and taxpayers 
... asking you to compel us to mind our 
own business. We desire that the new Act 
be drawn up in such a way that it would be 
absolutely and clearly compulsory for every 
Shire to destroy noxious weeds. And above 
all we want uniform C ity 1. 73
They also wanted a cost sharing arrangement and believed 
that the shires should remain the basic unit .of administrat­
ion. Although they were talking about a joint vermin and 
noxious weed act it was the weeds that were causing the 
most concern.
The reference to uniformity is key. Everyone 
wanted legislation for his neighbour but not necessarily for 
himself. Graziers and farmers differed in their interpret­
ation of what was noxious, and both groups also differed 
among themselves. Some graziers argued that only aged ewes
could cope with thistles, while others continued to praise
74the thistle as 'the friend of the grazier'. Some men
72 VPD, 1920, 155, 175-76.
73 Victorian Lands Department, Sp. 854, 20 April 1921.
74 VPD, 1922, 163, 719.
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believed that the simple solution was rabbit destruction:
get rid of the rabbits and the improved pasture would
75mean that the weeds would take care of themselves. If 
individual shires were left to declare their own lists of 
pests then surrounding areas would be subject to constant 
reinfestation. If blanket proscriptions were laid down, 
some areas would be obliged to undertake unprofitable 
clearing operations. Weed proclamation also decreased the 
value of land, an important consideration in a society where 
land frequently changed hands.
In March 1921 the minister told the shires that
it was intended to divide the state into five divisions,
each controlled by a board and that, if the boards failed
in their duty, the government would commission labourers
7 6to do the work, and then make the shires pay. The shires
did not like the idea. The minister warned the delegates,
'if we beat the wind and try to get all we think necessary,
we will get nothing. We have to get a workable measure that
7 7will give us a starting point'.
Although the Country party sided with Labor in 
July 1921 to defeat the government over wheat pool policy, 
the two parties could find no other common ground. The
75 VPD, 1919, 154, 4045. They had a case, but most could 
not afford the initial expense or the intensive 
cultivation necessary.
76 PR, 16 March 1921, p. 176; p. 260.
77 Victorian Lands Department, Sp. 854, 20 April 1921.
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government elected in September was very similar in 
composition to its predecessor. However, perhaps aided 
by the fright that the Country party had given the govern­
ment and itself over the possibility of a radical alliance, 
there seems to have been greater determination to resolve 
the vermin and weed issue. In October the Lands Department 
told the Municipal Association that the principle applied
to vermin would in future be applied to weeds: the
7 8Department of Lands would take full control. The shires 
expressed no pleasure at the idea, but they did not voice 
the kind of opposition that had killed a similar proposal 
four years before.
The 1922 bill was a non-party measure, and country
members denied that they had decided to support it just
because it would make city land liable to contribute to
79the cost of weed control. Continued anxiety on the part 
of farmers and graziers seems to have worn down the 
opposition to centralization. Had not the shires in 1888 
admitted their inability to control rabbits? And since 
then had not state inspectors proved to be more efficient 
vermin controllers than the councils? While warning his 
fellow country members to be vigilant about the intruding 
arm of government in rural matters, M. Wettenhall, speak­
ing on behalf of his Mallee electors, rallied support for 
the bill on the grounds that it was 'an honest attempt' and
78 PR, 16 October 1921, p. 850.
79 VPD, 1922, 160, 693.
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8 0'an experiment on the part of the state'. Similar 
phrases had been used to justify support for state financed 
wire netting schemes.
The legislation originally proposed departmental 
control of vermin and noxious weeds; utilization of 
existing rabbit inspectors and augmentation of their ranks; 
government responsibility for clearing the fringes of 
crown land; state instrumentalities to be responsible for 
clearing their own areas, and fringe clearance provisions 
to apply to badly affected private property, so that owners 
would not be beggared. It was well debated in a spirit of 
remarkable accord. The most important amendments were 
reinstatement of the idea of divisions composed of shires, 
to decide what plants should be declared noxious, and the 
establishment of an investigatory committee in the 
Department of Agriculture. The scheme was financed from 
consolidated revenue. It soon won over most of the 
opposition.
There were a few modifications in the next few
years but I have only found one petition requesting a
81return to shire management. In February 1826 the Victorian 
Farmers' Union Conference at Ballarat said that the act was 
not adequately enforced and asked the government to set up 
an independent commission to administer vermin and weed
80 Ibid.
81 PR, 16 April 1925, pp. 372-73. North-eastern delegates 
to the Municipal Conference. They received no 
encouragement.
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policy and to arrange scientific collaboration with the 
8 2commonwealth. However, a large meeting at Nhill in
April, arranged by the Chamber of Agriculture, withdrew
a similar motion and instead recommended the appointment
of a bright young scientist to do special research into
weeds. A Victorian Farmers' Union deputation in May to
the minister, Alfred Downard, withdrew the original proposal
8 3after discussion. Significantly, neither the Chamber or 
the Union had requested a return to local administration.
The act is supposed to have worked reasonably well until 
the mid-1930s, when shortages of money and equipment and a 
great increase in the amount of abandoned land began to 
take effect.^
From 1923 Victoria had a workable vermin and 
noxious weed policy. The inter-relatedness of the two 
problems was recognized and the government did not claim 
that it had a quick solution. A little research had begun 
and efforts were at last being made to tackle the problem 
of unoccupied land. The Minister for Lands, David Oman,
82 Ibid., 16 April 1926, p. 292.
83 Ibid., 15 May 1926, p. 390.
84 Victorian Year Books. Annual budget allocations under
the Vermin and Noxious Weeds Act, 1922.
1922-23 £54,000 1928 £86,000
1924 85,000 1929 82,000
1925 83,000 1930 71,000
1926 90,000 1931 58,000
1927 91,000 1932 51,000
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gave the official view of the act: 'It does not aim at
the eradication of all noxious weeds in the state, but it
is an honest attempt to meet the position. No such attempt
has been made within the past twenty years ... If the move
8 5is delayed country members must take the responsibility'. 
Expenditure rose rapidly to meet the new demands.
Vermin and noxious weed legislation had taken up 
a great deal of parliamentary time since the 1850s (although 
compared with New South Wales the discussions between 1890 
and 1919 were fairly short) but the 1922 act was not simply 
a culmination of legislative trends extending back over 
fifty years. The solution arrived at between 1918 and 1922 
was not easy for country members to accept or economy-minded 
governments to propose. Manifest need for new initiatives 
prompted the call for legislation, but did not necessarily 
mean a movement towards centralization. Although that had 
been the pattern in rabbit legislation, it had not been 
applied to wire netting policy. Nor did similar problems 
in New South Wales lead to the same kind of legislation. 
Probably the most important factor was the lack of an 
established administrative body accustomed to speaking for 
a strong, unified rural interest group. The Chamber of 
Agriculture was a non-political, co-ordinating organization 
and the Farmers' Union, the Graziers' Association and the 
Municipal Association all held differing views on vermin and
85 VPD, 1922, 160, 947.
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and weed control.
Shire concerns were very broad, and members had
many calls on their time. Most of the responses to the
original Lands Department survey of shire opinion in 1918
were accompanied by notes explaining that the matter could
not be considered for some time, mainly because of the
8 6wheat harvest or pressure of other business. The Chamber 
of Agriculture and the Graziers' Association both tended 
to oppose shire management but there were no alternative 
rural bodies to which they could turn. Victoria had 
developed a powerful system of local government in the 1850s 
and 1860s. It accumulated functions, so groups similar to 
the New South Wales pastures protection boards were not 
encouraged to emerge. District councils to handle purely 
rural matters could have been created but this would have 
meant additional expense and the problems of overlapping 
jurisdiction.
The Lands Department was well placed to take on 
the function of noxious weed control. The rabbit inspectors 
were usually also Crown Lands Bailiffs and they were 
accustomed to dealing with the vagaries of rural titles and 
the intricacies of Lands Department files. As Oman pointed 
out, slightly increasing the number of already overworked 
rabbit inspectors, and then giving them the additional job 
of noxious weed inspection, would end duplication and mean
86 Victorian Lands Department, Sp. 854.
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8 7less expenditure on wages. The known difficulties of
getting local men to police their neighbours1 properties 
also made the centralized solution look more desirable.
The local government alternative had failed, so the tendency 
of bureaucracies to expand to take in related problem areas 
was not checked, even though the politicians of the period 
were usually opposed to such moves. A similar phenomenon 
on a smaller scale occurred in Queensland and caused some 
amusement. The Queensland Marsupial Boards were found to 
be reasonably efficient agents of control, so when the 
dingo was classed as vermin it was also declared to be 
an honorary marsupial. Finally an attempt was made to have 
the blowfly classed as a marsupial, 'for the purposes of 
the act'.  ^^
The 1922 act did not mean the end of criticism 
but it did mark the end of any serious attempt to divide the 
two areas of pest control, or to place their administration 
on a decentralized basis. The shires retained only the power 
to recommend the proclamation of any animal or plant and to 
arrange bonus payments. In 1925 the last step was taken to 
fully centralize the system. The distribution of wire 
netting became the responsibility of the Closer Settlement 
Board, not the municipalities. The original legislation 
was drafted by the short lived Prendergast Labor ministry 
in 1924, partly because some shires were reluctant to lend
87 VPD, 1922, 160, 2430.
88 PR, 16 January 1917, p. 32.
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to scrub farmers but also because commonwealth money for
netting, which was supposedly reserved for the most needy,
8 9was going to be adminstered through the board. The 
Country-National coalition of John Allan and Alexander 
Peacock, which began in November, presented the bill in 
December, with the additional concession that wire for 
netting boundaries adjacent to crown land would be sold 
at half price.
The Labor party gave full support. The former 
Labor Minister for Lands, Henry Bailey, would have liked 
to see the act coupled with some encouragement of rabbit 
trapping, through a system of price control for skins, but 
his speech showed that he was not an extremist:
Whilst rabbit-trapping is not considered 
an effective method of destroying the pest 
there is no doubt that, if they are thinned 
out by this method, the completion of the 
destruction of the rabbit by the landowners 
could be rendered much easier.90
There was far more disagreement in the Council than the
Assembly. A number of Council members argued that the
Closer Settlement Board already had too many functions and
that the inexperienced Country party ministers had been
misled by the heads of departments into further expanding
91the bureaucracy. However, they were not prepared to
89 VPD, 1924, 168, 1834-35. Commonwealth policy is 
discussed in Chapter 10, p.386.
90 Ibid., 1836.
91 Ibid., 2033.
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oppose a measure advocated by the Country party for the 
benefit of landowners.
There is no evidence that the succession of 
governments from 1890 to 1930 consciously worked towards the 
creation of a centralized, integrated policy of vermin and 
weed control. On the contrary, they took small steps when 
the need for action made continued inactivity too unpopular* 
The big step, the 1922 Vermin and Noxious Weed Act, was the 
product of four years of indecision, but like most laws, 
once it was passed it acquired at least the strength of 
inertia. Only concerted pressure could change the direction 
that it gave to policy, and there were no organizations able 
or eager to take up the challenge. In both New South Wales 
and Victoria there was a close connection between land 
policy and vermin and weed legislation but, unlike New South 
Wales, Victoria had resolved its basic problems of land 
tenure policy before the vermin and weed issue became acute. 
This gave an entirely different social complexion to the 
political scene. The Victorian pest debates did not become 
enmeshed in sectional and party politics and thus it was 
much easier to pass effective legislation than in New
South Wales.
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CHAPTER 4
The Advance of Rabbits into New South Wales
Rabbits drastically affected the economy and 
ecology of Australia and for at least eighty years vehement 
arguments waged among farmers, rural experts and 
politicans about proper counter-measures, but the only 
marks left are the scars on the landscape and the near 
extinction of the bilby, the so-called 'rabbit bandicoot', 
and who remembers the bilby?^ As the price of rabbit 
soars in the shops the once nation-wide prejudice against 
admitting to a taste for rabbit is fading. He would be a 
foolhardy grazier who served it up for the shearers but, 
in the cities, rabbit is regaining its European status as 
game.
Not even the Australian vernacular has been
noticeably affected. The 'dark horse' may turn out to be
a 'fair cow' or a 'flaming galah' but never a 'dangerous
rabbit'. A delightful book about childhood in northern
Victoria was called Mad as Rabbits but the phrase has net
2slipped into general usage. The fecundity of the rabbit 
was blatantly obvious, but the slighting reference to
1 Rolls, They All Ran Wild, pp. 41-2.
2 E. Lane, Mad as Rabbits, Adelaide, 1962.
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'breeding like rabbits' is now far less frequently heard 
than the equally derogatory 'breeding like flies!'. 
Conversely the ravages of myxomatosis have not led 
Australians to describe mass mortality as 'dying like 
rabbits'. More significantly, the voracious rabbit 
appetite has not produced one common Australian simile. 
'As hungry as a rabbit' has a somewhat ludicrous ring.
'As devastating as rabbits' sounds down-right ridiculous.
It has long been recognized that the Australian
reaction to the rabbit menace was initially conditioned
3by the European image of the rabbit. What is often 
ignored is that three generations, that is nearly ninety 
years, of bitter experience failed to create a lasting 
new image and did not really shatter the old. When 
Queensland graziers realized that what Eric Rolls aptly 
calls 'the grey tide' was inexorably headed their way, a 
small group persuaded the Brisbane Courier to send a 
special correspondent to travel up the Darling in 1892 
reporting on what he saw. The man selected, G.W. Keith, 
described his commission as follows:
to stir up the people of this colony to the 
destroyer that is at their gates, and to 
warn the country that the enemy is not to be 
trifled with, and that devastation follows 
the march of the rabbits just as surely as 
Death overtakes us one and all. 4
3 See Introduction.
4 G.W. Keith, Across the Rabbit Warrens of New South Wales, 
Brisbane, 1892, p. 3. The book was a compilation of the 
articles written for the Brisbane Courier and 
Queenslander.
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This was strong stuff and the articles which followed 
gave dramatic glimpses of the scope of the problem, but 
the urgent tone of the writing was often undercut by 
Keith's use of the term 'bunny' for the great invader, 
and it was by this pet name that the rabbit was commonly 
known. Someone who is a 'bunny' is not a dangerous 
adversary; a 'sitting bunny' is not a difficult target to 
kill.
The importance of linguistic factors can easily
be over-emphasised but before dismissing them notice how
well the reverse case applies to two other anti-vermin
campaigns: the persistent attacks on the dingo and the
5efforts made to eliminate Alsation dogs. There is no 
Australian pet name for a dingo and all metaphoric uses 
of the word convey hostility. No-one, at least till very g
recently, would have referred to the wild dog as a 'doggy'. 
Similarly when the furore about the presence of unsterilized 
Alsation dogs was being orchestrated by the Graziers' 
Association during the 1920s, innumerable writers re­
inserted the inappropriate word 'wolf' (which had been in 
the original English breeders' registration) into the 
usually abbreviated name. The Alsation wolf dog (or the 
even more hostile German wolf dog) became an object of
5 See Chapter 9.
6 An American illustrator of popular books for young 
children, Richard Scarry, has made 'dingo doggy' a 
leading character, but he is still a villain, tearing 
around in a fast car, breaking rules and knocking 
over parking meters.
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fear. Its opponents never spoke of it by its pre-World 
War 1 name of German Shepherd dog. That would have given 
the wrong impression. However black a view is taken of 
the dingo and the dangers of a super cross-bred, Alsatian- 
dingo, compared to the economic damage caused, a 
disproportionate amount of rural money and energy went 
into attacking these probably maligned canines, but, more 
importantly, the memory of the propaganda against them is 
still strong, even in the cities.
It is hard to imagine how a good public 
relations firm would have gone about making Australians 
scared of rabbits, but undoubtedly use of the term 'bunny' 
would have been swiftly forbidden to its copy writers, and 
twentieth century children would never have known the 
comfort of bunny-rugs, even if they were still given 
Beatrix Potter books uncensored. There are no present day 
parallels to the invasion of Australia by rabbits. The 
slow migration northwards through South America of the so- 
called 'killer bees' is hardly a fair comparison, because 
they cause only a fraction of the ecological havoc 
attributable to rabbits. However, much scientific attention 
is already being paid to them in North and South America, 
perhaps not least because the idea of advancing swarms of 
well-armed bees is the stuff of nightmares, not children's 
stories.
The northward movement of the rabbits did not
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provoke the frantic response hindsight might suggest was 
warranted. New South Wales settlers did not 'man the 
barricades' or even fortify the river banks with traps, 
poison and the new, strengthened wire netting. Because of 
its implications for policy formation this requires ex­
planation. Ignorance might be the answer; but it is hard 
to find out how much or how little knowledge there was.
Granted that the 'bush telegraph' was no
substitute for modern means of communication, it could
hardly have been a poorer source of information about the
Victorian rabbit problem than were the local New South Wales
newspapers. As Rolls discovered, even after the pest was
well established in New South Wales there is little point
studying the local press in the hopes of discovering a
developing response, because most stories were not followed 
7up. Like the weather, rabbits soon became too familiar to 
warrant comment. Although editors probably were concerned 
with 'the vigorous promotion of the material and social
gadvancement of their town and district', their zeal was 
most apparent around election times and usually concerned 
the provision of roads, bridges, railways and local halls. 
Most editors in the 1870s and 1880s seem rarely to have 
investigated matters that were not already being discussed 
by their public, and they also ignored the commonplace.
7 Rolls, p. 56.
8 R.B. Walker, The Newspaper Press in New South Wales 
1803-1920, Sydney, 1976, p. 176.
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So, before the rabbits became obvious in a district 
they were rarely reported, and once they became common 
they were rarely worth an article.
News items in country papers often comprised an
assortment of snippets. The doings of European royalty
rubbed shoulders with local social events. There was a
marked preference for reports of sensational crimes of
violence anywhere in Australia, and papers printed a wide
range of syndicated articles, often on obscure topics.
It is hard to envisage the life and interests of the average
reader from the subject matter of local papers. As a
result rural papers of this period are not a reliable guide
*to the state of general knowledge on a particular matter.
The Wilcannia Times, for instance, did not mention the 
rabbit influx till 1886, although by 1881 the rabbits had 
reached Bourke and by late 1884 they were crossing the
9Queensland border. The editor ominously proclaimed that
* A peripheral example is the way many small, sensational 
stories, always located in foreign countries, did the 
rounds of many papers. Before assuming that such tales 
of incredible operations, miraculous cures, the weird 
doings of foreign gentry and so on are indicative of a 
naive, credulous public, it is worth noting that these 
papers had no parallel to the modern astrology columns. 
Interest, relevance and accuracy may have been 
conflicting qualities in the eyes of the local editors.
9 B. Hardy, West of the Darling, Brisbane, 1969, p. 190.
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the New Year, 1886, looked 'anything but propitious', but 
he went on to refer to an excess of festive spirit among 
some citizens and a series of local accidents.^ He did 
not mention rabbits or any economic factors. Yet the 
Wilcannia rabbit inspector, Abram Clarke, claimed that 
the district was heavily infested by 1885.^ The residents 
undoubtedly knew what was happening but it was not news­
worthy. In September 1887 an article headed 'The Rabbit
Pest' was reprinted from the Melbourne Daily Telegraph but
12there was no accompanying local comment. Probably the
paper's longest article on the pest during the 1880s was a
two-column spread under the heading 'Rabbit Plague'. This
was far more space than the paper usually devoted to any
single topic, but the article turned out to be a thinly
disguised advertisement for a local poison mixture.
Readers were advised that, by use of one ton of arsenic
and fifty-six gallons of ammonia a month two men had made
13considerable inroads into the local rabbit population.
More important sources of information than the 
local papers were the personal and economic ties linking 
the settlers in the Darling and Riverina districts with
10 Wilcannia Times, 13 January 1886.
11 Royal Commission into Schemes for the Extermination 
of Rabbits, 1888-89, p. 89. NSWV&P, II, 187. Most 
bound copies omitted the evidence. Complete copies 
of the report and evidence are held by the Victorian 
Vermin and Noxious Weeds 3oard and the New South Wales 
Archives.
12 Wilcannia Times, 16 September 1887.
13 Ibid., 13 September 1888.
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those in Victoria. The main lines of communication led
to Melbourne, not Sydney, and many leading pastoralists
had homes in Melbourne or used the Melbourne or Australian
Club as a city base. There were also a number of Victorian
Western District graziers who had moved out to take up
pastoral leases in New South Wales. They had first-hand
knowledge of what rabbits could do. As early as 1868 up to
£5,000 was being spent annually by some Victorian land
14holders to try to clear their land. It is hard to believe
that most settlers in southern New South Wales did not
know what rabbits had done to Victoria. Nevertheless, in
the early 1870s rabbits were deliberately introduced into
the Riverina by property holders.^ James Ormond claimed
that there were rabbits on his 800,000 acre property near
16Wentworth when he took it over in 1871. He made no
effort to eliminate them. According to the South Australian
chief inspector of vermin, Samuel Grau Hubbe, they were also
deliberately released in the Barrier Ranges and near
17Menindee in 1874. Other rabbits found their own way. The 
slow moving, sand-bar and snag-ridden rivers were ineffectual 
barriers. Balranald and Wentworth were the breeding centres 
from which they gradually moved out, sometimes following
14 Kiddle, Men of Yesterday, p. 542, footnote 44.
15 Rolls, pp. 32-40.
16 Royal Commission into Schemes for the Extermination 
of Rabbits, 1888-89, p. 105.
17 Ibid., p. 101.
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water-ways, at other times simply responding to the 
pressures of drought and population or the lure of favour­
able habitat. Itinerant workers also assisted them on 
their way, carrying a few pregnant does to set up little 
colonies of free food, far ahead of the main wave.
In part the New South Wales response may be
traced to the same reason that the entire rabbit plague
left such little impact on conscious Australian history:
it is hard to be scared of a rabbit. However, this can
only be a partial explanation. Judicious caution might
have been expected, at least from the former Victorians.
Yet even such a capable manager as the young Victorian
Richard Gardiner Casey, who took over Kilfera Station
(near Willandra Creek, Ivanhoe ) in 187 5 apparently saw
no dangers during the prosperous years of the late 1870s.
However, in mid-1881 he warned the owners about the growing
rabbit menace: 'I believe ... do what we can in this style
of country in three or four years they will be in
18possession and the place virtually unsaleable'. By 1880
Sir John Robertson admitted that the government should
19have been alarmed much earlier. It was not till November
1880 that an Inter-colonial Premiers' Conference discussed
rabbits and then all they agreed was that action was
necessary along the Victorian-South Australian border.
20They went no further than this vague recommendation. Yet
18 Lord Casey, Australian Father and Son, Sydney, 1963, 
p. 65.
19 NSWPD, 1879-80, 3, 2986.
20 NSWV&P, 1880-81, 1, 327.
98
experience in the Victorian Mallee had proved that rabbits 
could flourish in areas drier than the Riverina and 
Darling frontages. There was no sound reason to expect 
that rabbits would not eventually make themselves 
prolifically at home in south-west New South Wales.
I have no intention of reworking ground so ably 
covered by Eric Rolls but some emphasis has to be placed on 
the timing of the advance and the areas in which it occurred; 
otherwise the nature of individual and governmental 
responses remains inexplicable. The advance took place 
along a broad, uneven front. The accompanying map is 
copied from ones compiled on the basis of the 1881 and 1882 
reports of the inspectors appointed under the Pastures and 
Stock Protection Act, but they probably underestimate the 
spread. Aboriginal women on Murtee Station, Mt Murchison 
(near Wilcannia) were observed by E.F. Murphy in 1880
21performing a 'nip nip' corroboree, imitating rabbits.
By 1883 many of the large west Darling stations, such as
Tarella, had been over-run, and the next year Queensland
graziers were warned that rabbits were breeding along the
22Paroo River and approaching the border. The eastward 
migration was slower and far more uneven in outline 
because the rabbits followed the rivers and ranges.
21 Hardy, p. 189.
22 T.K. Cameron, 'Queensland's Struggle Against Rabbits 
1880-1930 ', Hist. Soc. Qld. Journal, Vol. 5, 1956, 
p. 1205.
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Before 1910 they had established themselves in the
Armidale district on one flank and on the Monaro table-
2 3land on the other. By 1925 they were to be found along 
the Tweed River in the far north of New South Wales. By 
then, with the exception of the northern black soil plain, 
which rabbits did not like, the whole state was rabbit- 
infested. However, the early counter measures and the 
initial legislative response were influenced by the fact 
that until the 1890s the rabbit plague was primarily a 
southern and western problem, and it is on these areas that 
this chapter will concentrate.
It was not only landholders who seemed indiffer­
ent to the danger in the 1870s. The Chief Inspector of 
Stock’s report for 1874 was extensive but contained no
mention of rabbits despite the long section on the advantages
24of stranded wire fencing. Perhaps it was too early to 
expect that there would be much general knowledge about wire 
netting, but the Chief Inspector was supposed to have 
contact with his Victorian counterpart, because of the anti­
scab campaigns, and by 1874 Victoria was importing wire
25netting to deal with rabbits. The 1881 return of the 
reports of inspectors asked to investigate the proliferation
23 Rolls, pp. 60-63.
24 Conference of the Chief Inspectors of Stock, 1874, 
NSWV&P, 1875, IV, 457 ff.
25 Statistical Register of Victoria, 1874.
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of rabbits and marsupials clearly shows that many were
surprised by their own findings. Their districts were so
vast that their routes could only cover a small portion of
the country and their time on the move was limited by the
2 6amount of paper work required. However the New South
Wales Blue Books, showing length of service, indicate
that these were, by and large, very experienced men, and
therefore used to observing changes in stock and pasture
and to collecting rural gossip. Their surprise is a
measure of the insidious nature of the invasion. This
suggests part of the answer to the question why landholders
were not more alarmed about rabbits. Rolls concluded that
before the problem became obvious most farmers did not
believe that rabbits would prosper in New South Wales, and
afterwards they believed that individual action was too 
27late. This is hard to dispute. The pattern has been 
repeated too often with too many pests all over Australia. 
However, with rabbits the middle stage, the period between 
disbelief and fatalistic acceptance, was probably very 
important, helping to counteract the warnings that should 
have been heeded from Victoria and South Australia.
Rabbits had been known around the Riverina and 
Darling areas for nearly ten years before the numbers 
started to cause concern. That was plenty of time for the
26 Rolls, pp. 93-94.
27 Ibid., p . 46.
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traditional European attitude to be reinforced. Without 
doubting that things were bad in parts of the two neigh­
bouring states it was easy to see these occurrences as 
aberrations. Large properties, dense scrub and a quiet 
invader made early recognition of the danger difficult. 
Dingoes howl their presence and mauled sheep are soon 
spotted. Rabbit-damaged grazing pasture is not so easily 
recognized and a breeding colony in mallee scrub is not 
nearly as obvious as a mob of kangaroos breaking through a 
wire fence or bounding across the horizon.
A Deniliquin grazier, Alexander Wilson, supposed­
ly warned a meeting of stockholders about the danger of
2 8rabbits in the area in 1877, but he was ignored. The
first calls for government action came two years later in
the form of a petition from Hay, which attracted few
signatures, and in the annual report of the Chief Inspector
2 9of Stock, Alexander Bruce. Bruce commented on the rapid
spread of rabbits on the Lower Murray and their incursions
along the Murrumbidgee. He wrote that 'it is very
necessary that effective measures should be introduced for
30their eradication'. However, when he asked 36 local 
districts whether they wanted legislation 18 favoured 
action against dingoes but 13 opposed; 19 wanted effective
28 Australasian, 31 December 1881, p. 858.
29 Rolls, p. 105; NSWJLC, 1879-80, Mines Department, 
Annual Report, Stock Branch.
30 Ibid.
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measures against marsupials but 11 said they could manage,
and 14 would support legislation to combat rabbits but 15
would not. The rest could not make up their minds.
Considering that there was no Victorian legislation till
1880 the government's action is more remarkable for its
promptness than its inadequacies. The Australasian pointed
out that at the time New South Wales and, incidentally,
Queensland, were looking for effective government action,
the Victorian Minister for Lands was still talking in terms
of sending 'town loafers with mongrel dogs' to deal with
31the pest in the north-west.
In 1830 Sir Henry Parkes introduced the Pastures
32and Stock Protection Act. It provided that all sheep 
district boards, unless exempted by the government, would 
have three additional members, elected by large stock­
holders. The new boards would be responsible for ordering 
landholders to destroy rabbits and other noxious animals, 
such as marsupials and native dogs, as well as their 
harbour. When landholders did not comply within 28 days 
the board could do the work and then sue for repayment of 
costs. Stockholders would be levied to provide a fund 
from which the administration of the act and the provision 
of scalp bounties would be financed. The debate was 
perfunctory in the Legislative Assembly and short but 
interesting in the Council.
31 Australasian, 31 December 1881, p. 858.
32 44 Vic., No. 11.
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There were three main speakers. All were
pastoralists and all adopted different positions, not
necessarily related to their personal experience of
rabbits. Sir John Robertson presented the legislation
in the Upper House. His own property lay on the rabbit-
free Liverpool Plains but he referred to the serious
situation in Victoria and argued that rabbits should be
33treated with as much rigor as scab-infested sheep.
Charles Campbell, who admitted to two years' unsuccessful 
effort to breed rabbits on his Canberra property, disputed 
that rabbits were such a menace. The Belgians made a 
handsome profit from them and he could not see why 
Australians should not do likewise.34 In his opinion the 
root of the problem was that some men held more land than 
they could properly manage. They should be penalized, 
not the whole colony:
Why should gentlemen who settled in the 
country be prohibited from having rabbits?
... He did not see why a man should not 
keep even fifty rabbits. It was monstrous 
to enact that if a man wished to have game 
he should be compelled to destroy it. 35
The middle ground was occupied by Sir John Hay, who had 
threatened land on the Murrumbidgee. He drew attention to 
the fact that the government could exempt those sheep 
districts where rabbits were not a menace, and he observed 
that the boards themselves could be relied upon to know
33 NSWPD, 1879-80, 3, 2987-8.
34 NSWPD, 1879-80, 3, 2990.
35 Ibid., 2988.
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3 6where action was needed. Thus in the very first debate 
three of the main themes of future vermin legislation had 
been introduced: the degree of autonomy to be retained by
the local authorities; the value placed on rabbits by some 
sections of the community; and the possible conflict of 
interest between large and small landholders, more 
specifically between squatters and the rest.
The speedy introduction and easy passage of the
measure seems to have been due to three main factors. The
first was that the experiences of Victoria and South
Australia proved that once rabbits started to multiply
unchecked, worse could be expected. This particularly
influenced Robertson, who took considerable interest in the
legislation. Secondly, although rabbit infestation was
new, it fitted easily into a long recognized vermin
problem, namely what to do about wild dogs and marsupials,
and to a lesser extent, domestic cattle, pigs and horses
that had gone wild. The new act did not cover only rabbits,
and whereas there had been virtually no outcry about them,
there had been many complaints about other forms of vermin.
Stock inspectors' reports regularly referred to them and
during the 1878-79 session a private bill had been intro-
37duced to facilitate the destruction of marsupials.
36 Ibid.
37 NSWV&P, 1878-79, 7, 891-3, 889. (Petitions from New 
England, 264 signatures and from Gwydir, 254 signatures; 
R. Webster, Bygoo and Beyond, Ardlethan, N.S.W., 1956, 
p. 121 for accounts of the problems of domestic stock 
that had gone wild.) NSWV&P, 1878-79, Table of bills 
introduced. Dillon's Marsupial Destruction Bill with­drawn in the Assembly.
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Thirdly, the act broke very little new ground. One speaker,
Thomas Holt, a well travelled, wealthy, former wool-buyer,
financier and pastoralist, objected to the right of entry
given to inspectors as 'a great infringement on the rights
3 8of private property'. However, there was a strong
tradition in England of legislative interference in
39agriculture to regulate the actions of neighbours. More­
over, scab inspectors had long had the same authority. In 
fact the Pastures and Stock Protection Act was a fine 
example of the accumulative nature of legislation.
In 1883 the Minister for Mines, Joseph Abbott,
told parliament that he did not know why rabbit control
fell under his jurisdiction: 'the matter appears to have
been placed in the department over which I preside for no
other reason that I can see than that rabbits are very
40industrious miners'. The real answer lay in the anti­
scab legislation of the mid-nineteenth century. In 1864 
scab districts were proclaimed and the stockholders elected 
a sheep board in each area to administer the act and to 
nominate inspectors.^ The government appointed a chief 
inspector responsible to the Secretary for Lands. The
act was soon amended to increase the powers of the inspect- 
42ors. At this time the Lands Department was also
38 NSWPP, 1879-80, 3, 2988.
39 L. Peel, Rural Industry in the Port Phillip Region 
1835-1887, Melbourne, 1974, p. 121.
40 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 287.
41 27 Vic., No. 6 which replaced 17 Vic., 27 & 24 Vic. 15.
42 30 Vic., No. 16.
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responsible for goldfields and mining. When a separate 
Mines Department was created in 1874 a number of functions 
dealing with the occupation and utilization of land, not 
subdivision or ownership, were passed to it, to reduce the 
work load of the notoriously slow Lands Department. As a 
result the new department formed a stock and brands branch, 
which ultimately inherited the rabbit problem.^
It is important to remember that in New South
Wales, unlike in Victoria, no district could be compelled
to become an incorporated body with all the associated legal
rights and responsibilities and, according to Parkes, in 1881
only one one-hundred-and-eighty-sixth of the colony was
administered by local government bodies and only 98
44municipalities had been incorporated. Therefore, those 
framing vermin acts could not utilize a colony-wide system 
of local government, such as the Victorian shires. If 
local administrative authorities were desired they had to 
be created, which was slow and expensive, or use had to be 
made of existing bodies, such as the sheep boards, which 
were naturally sectional in interests because of their 
origins. Despite a plethora of bills during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century New South Wales did not 
pass a Local Government Act till 1905.
The Pastures and Stock Protection Act also drew
43 A separate rabbit branch was formed, which lasted till 
1888. See p.149 for later administrative history.
44 NSWPD, 1881, 4, 1364.
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on the precedent of the Native Dog Acts, which made the
killing of native dogs an occupier's responsibility, but
allowed a proprietor who laid poison up to his boundaries
45to recoup some of the cost from his neighbours. Bonuses 
had long been paid for scalps and the levying of local 
taxes for local expenditure was also an established practice. 
By making each board responsible for its own vermin levy the 
new act sought to avoid the dilemma of deciding whether 
action by one group that benefitted all should be paid for 
by that single group or the whole community.
Just as the Pastures and Stock Protection Act 
relied on the precedents of the Scab Act for its administrat­
ive structure, so the act looked no further than current 
rural policies for its practical remedy. It was based on 
the assumption that landholders could and would kill rabbits, 
just as they had been prepared to tackle other forms of 
vermin. This simplistic approach was shared by the weekly 
companion to the Evening News, the Town and Country Journal, 
which commented on the 'arbitrary nature' of the fines
stipulated, but concluded that they mattered little because
46'evasions of the law will be rare'. There was no suggest­
ion that it might be necessary to look for new weapons, 
that poisoning, trapping and fumigation might not be enough
45 39 Vic., No. 15 (1853 Dog Act).
46 Town and Country Journal, Sydney, 21 August 1880, 
pp. 354-55.
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and that not everyone would vigorously pursue even these 
measures.
The 1881 report of inspectors on the increase 
of rabbits and marsupials quickly illuminated one 
inadequacy of the act. Inspector McClymont summarized 
the situation in the Wentworth district as follows:
Very little has been done to destroy 
rabbits in this district. Owners are 
very supine. No meeting of the Board 
held this year. Directors absent out 
of the colony. 47
In the Balranald district the inspector reported that he 
had found rabbits on 152 holdings but that efforts to kill 
them were being made on only 106. Things were worse 
around Deniliquin where there were rabbits on 271 holdings. 
Thirty-three of these were badly affected but killing 
was only proceeding on 22. Inspector Edwards of Hay 
commented that 'the rabbit nuisance has wonderfully in­
creased ... and kangaroos are increasing on the runs north
48of the Lachlan River'. In short, too many landholders 
were not killing the pests and not all boards were co­
operative. Those landholders who were trying to obey 
spread phosphorised grain or other poisons, employed men 
to fumigate burrows and dig them in, and set dogs to drive 
kangaroos and rabbits into killing yards. The Deniliquin
47 NSWV&P, 1881, III, 849. Telegram to Chief Inspector 
7 July 1881.
48 Ibid., Hay, 1 August 1881.
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Sheep Board paid bonuses on 60,000 kangaroos and estimated
that 100,000 had been killed. Around Balranald the total
49was 50,000 to 60,000 killed. This indicated the scale 
of the problem and pointed to the expense of counter­
measures .
The nineteenth century interest in natural 
science had made its mark on the thinking of many educated 
colonists and there was much speculation about why the
50numbers of marsupials had increased. Charles Campbell
saw a straight causal line linking the European decimation
of the aborignal population, the increase in the dingo
population, the poisoning of dingoes and the massive
51increase in marsupials. While disputing the first factor,
Sir John Robertson agreed that 'nature intended that the
52dogs should keep the kangaroos in moderate numbers'. 
Unfortunately nature had not planned for sheep stations.
The native dog had few vocal defenders, so something else 
had to be done about the marsupials, as well as about the 
rabbits.
The amendment drawn up by E.A. Baker before his 
expulsion for corruption was presented by the new Secretary 
for Mines, Arthur Renwick. The important changes were 
that occupiers could be fined up to £50 for non-compliance;
49 NSWV&P, 1881, Report on increase of rabbits, p. 853.
50 See p. 104.
51 NSWPP, 1879-80; 3, 2987.
52 Ibid.
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the voting qualification for board election was lowered
from 100 to ten head of stock, although the graduated
voting scale remained the same; the penalty for releasing
rabbits anywhere in the colony was increased from a maximum
of £10 to a minimum of that figure and a maximum of £100 or
six months gaol; and a wider levy scale was set for the
creation of the noxious animal destruction account to be
53held by each board. Any holder of over ten cattle or
100 sheep would be obliged to pay up to 3d per head for
large stock and ^d for sheep. Unstocked runs would be
54assessed at up to twice the annual rental.
The proposed amendments stimulated much more 
debate than the original act of 1880, but they could hardly 
be classed as a topic of burning concern for that session. 
Once again most speakers had pastoral interests and, 
despite the divisions foreshadowed in the earlier debate, 
there was no discernable block of anti-squatter opinion. 
George Loughnan, member for the Murrumbidgee, drew 
attention to this supposed unanimity of purpose:
He spoke as a squatter and from interested 
motives; but after the squatters came the 
free selectors, who - whatever might be 
thought of the squatters - were looked upon 
as the bone and sinew of the country. 55
53 The voting scale remained 10 to 500 head, 1 vote; 500 
to 2,000 head, 2 votes; 2,000 to 5,000 head, 3 votes 
and over 5,000 head, 4 votes.
54 NSWPD, 1881, 6, 1774-5.
55 NSWPD, 1881, 5, 71. Adjournment debate.
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It was on these grounds that Renwick rejected the
suggestion that the minimum stock requirement for the
5 6levy should be raised, to spare small men.
The strongest divisions became apparent when
Thomas Dangar, who held property on the Namoi River and
was interested in the Darling River trade, tried to pass
an amendment to include hares in the legislation. This
was defeated 17 votes to 32 and a similar amendment soon
57after failed by 14 to 28. George Cox, a leading sheep
breeder near Mudgee, had many supporters when he objected
that, 'If we destroy the few hares we had we should, when
the native game was gone, have no objects of legitimate 
5 8sport'. Shooting hares was acceptable recreation for
a country gentleman and his guests. After all, unlike
rabbits, which, as sport, were socially rather suspect in
59England, hares were definitely 'game'. As James Fletcher, 
the influential pioneer of trade unionism, mine manager and 
Secretary for Mines in 1886 pointed out:
The individuals who had introduced hares 
into the colony were, as a rule, proprietors 
of large estates ... the Lees, the Suttors, 
and the Kites - who owned nearly the whole 
property about Bathurst - had introduced 
hares; but they never complained about their 
properties being destroyed. 60
56 Ibid.,
57 Ibid.,
58 NSWPD,
59 See p .
60 NSWPD,
1812 .
1813 .
1881, 2530. 
21.
1881, 1814.
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This perception of the hare as quite a different kind of
animal from the common rabbit was not just a matter of
English tradition. Hares and rabbits are closely related
but stories of interbreeding are doubted by zoologists
and there is some evidence that hares do not thrive where
there are many rabbits.^ Because of their less gregarious
habits and greater speed and stamina hares have historically
been regarded as worthy sporting targets, but the bland
assumption that hares in Australia could not possibly follow
the example of the rabbits and become a menace is a further
instance of the strength of traditional impressions. Sir
John Robertson claimed that the large owner's sport was
the small owner's pest, but ties of sport and social
position prevailed and hares did not become vermin in 
6 21881. However by 1885 some pastures and stock protection
6 3boards were paying bounties of 2d to ls.6d on hares.
At the heart of the amendment legislation lay 
the realization that faith in the capacity and good intent­
ions of boards and landholders was not necessarily justified. 
There were some objections to the level of fines, on the 
grounds that large landholders would suffer because of 
repeated violations and small children might be gaoled for 
releasing pets, but no-one strongly disputed the new
61 H. Thompson and A. Worden, The Rabbit, London, 1956, 
p. 107.
62 NSWPD, 1881, 2530.
63 Report of the Stock and Brands Branch, Department of 
Mines, NSWV&P, 1885-86, VI, 1.
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principle that individuals and boards had to be forced
64to comply. Renwick bluntly told a Hunter River
pastoralist, Archibald Jacob, who preferred the 1880 act,
that 'The boards are found to be very reluctant to take
the necessary action, but perhaps they will not have any
6 5hesitation instructing an inspector to do so'. Whereas 
previously a recalcitrant board could be compelled to act 
only after the government received petitions from 
adjoining boards, under the amendments any five vermin 
levy payers in a district could direct an inspector to 
serve notice on an offender and thus set the system of 
compulsion in motion.
Apart from the sporting issue there were two 
other points of dispute. The Legislative Council passed 
amendments removing marsupials from the legislation and 
defining the level of reasonable expenditure by a land­
holder against pests as twice the amount of the vermin 
destruction rate paid. This was intended to protect 
those genuinely trying to clear badly infested properties 
from an endless series of fines, but in practice there was 
no check on the nature and effectiveness of the claimed 
expenditure. The base figure of twice the levy was also 
very low, particularly as few boards applied the maximum
64 NSWPD, 1881, 1775, 1811.
65 Ibid., 1812.
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levy rate. The Assembly refused to confine the act to
rabbits but accepted the latter amendment. Whereas
William Forster, pastoralist member for Gundagai, regarded
the inclusion of kangaroos as 'a tyranny', because there
was little problem with them in coastal areas, Leopold de
Salis, who resided in the neighbouring electorate, claimed
that 'kangaroos and wallabies eat more grass than is
consumed by sheep and if they are not got rid of their
depredations and the overstocking of runs will destroy the
6 6pastures of the colony'. Still in its first flush of
enthusiasm for positive action against pests, and full of
confidence in the potential of the western lands, the
members probably thought that with the amended Pastures
and Stock Protection Act they were going for the 'big kill'.
Only Leopold de Salis, a shrewd pastoralist, well regarded
by selectors as well as squatters, described the legislat-
6 7ion accurately as 'a tinkering measure'. He called for 
a complete government take-over of vermin eradication, a 
huge outlay and at least ten years for landholders to 
repay the government.
The Stock and Pastures Protection Acts did not 
work. The rabbits continued to advance. A new piece of 
legislation was planned for 1882 and although Parkes'
66 NSWPD, 1881, 2122. (Forster had defeated de Salis 
in an election in 1869. Perhaps this accounts for 
the extremely definite tone of the retort.)
67 Ibid.
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government fell before it could be introduced the Rabbit 
Nuisance Act was passed the following year. Once again 
the speed of the official response must be emphasised 
because it contrasts markedly with the slowness of the 
initial reaction to the rabbit menace and with the high 
degree of scepticism still found in areas not directly 
affected. The city press had not yet taken up the anti­
rabbit crusade, as the Sydney Morning Herald was to do in 
1890 with its series 'In Rabbit Land', nor had parliament 
been flooded with petitions, as was to happen in 1887-88. 
One influential deputation of squatters from the south-west
had seen the Minister for Mines in 1882 and petitions had
6 8been received from Corowa and Albury. Another petition 
had been drawn up in Wentworth in October 1882, outlining 
the kind of clauses graziers wanted in the new act.
However, this activity was a response to the fact that 
fresh legislation was already being prepared, not a cause 
of it. More usual was the response reported by the 
Milparinka rabbit inspector. He found traces of rabbits 
on every station in the area in 1883 but when asked 
whether this had alarmed the owners he replied: 'Some
were and some pretended they were ... but they were 
keeping it quiet ... They did not like the expense of
68 NSWV&P, 1882, IV, 1509. Report of the Prevalence 
of Rabbits in New South Wales; NSWPD, 1883, 8, 
289 .
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destroying the few rabbits that there were 69
Of course there was ample evidence from the 
reports of the Chief Inspector of Stock, Alexander Bruce, 
that the situation was getting worse. All the district 
inspectors had submitted grim forecasts and Bruce roundly 
condemned existing measures and urged the government to 
hurry and present its new bill. He ended his report with 
a plea that nicely balanced current gloom and the prospect 
of future relief:
It is not unusual to hear doubts expressed 
as to the possibility of ever being able to 
effectually check the spread of rabbits.
But if a proper measure were speedily passed, 
and prompt action taken to enforce its 
provisions, there is no doubt their advance 
would be speedily stopped, and their 
eradication effected much sooner and much 
more easily than many supposed; for with a 
proper Act compulsion can be secured, and 
with compulsion simultaneous action, and 
that is an aid which has not as yet been 
obtained, and with the effect of which very 
few are fully acquainted. 70
However, a deteriorating situation does not necessarily 
elicit prompt counter-measures, particularly when large 
outlays are involved and strong sectional interests have 
to be placated. As has been shown, Victoria managed to 
ignore its problem for quite a long while, and, after all,
69 Report and Evidence of the Select Committee into the 
1883 Rabbit Nuisance Act, NSWJLC, 1887 (2), XLII,
Pt. 3, 506.
70 Rabbit Pest Return, 1882, p. 814.
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it was only 15 months since the very first New South Wales 
rabbit act had been amended.
Part of the answer as to why the Stuart Ministry,
which was not sworn in till 5 January 1883, made a new
rabbit act one of its first concerns, probably lay in the
unexpectedly steep rise in the cost of the Stock and
Pastures Protection Act. In 1881 £15,000 was allowed in
the estimates. The following year the sum was £30,000 and
in 1883 it was expected that £50,000 would be needed and
71£15,000 under supplementary estimates. The contemplation 
of such large outlays no doubt inclined the authorities to 
look for ways of getting better results. If the boards 
continued to operate as they had done in 1881 and 1882 
they would be entitled to increasingly large grants, even 
if they achieved little, but if economy had been the main 
consideration it could have been secured by simply reduc­
ing the subsidy. In fact it was acknowledged that the 
Rabbit Nuisance Act would involve greater expenditure.
72The 1883-84 budget allocated a total of £72,000 for it. 
Rather than short term economy, the main stimulus to the 
formulation of yet another act was probably the desire of 
the new ministry to pass a major land act which would 
break the hold of the squatters on the Riverina and western
71 NSWV&P, 1881, II, 210; 1882, IV, 188; NSWPD, 1883; 8, 
15 (£35,000 under the Pastures Protection Act and 
£15,000 under supplementary estimates).
NSWV&P, 1883-84, II, 347. Included £10,550 for 
salaries and £45,000 for subsidies.
72
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lands. These were the areas the rabbits were devouring. 
Closer settlement was supposed to increase the prosperity 
and revenue of the colony. This would not happen if 
rabbits remained unchecked. Regardless of expense the 
matter could not be ignored. Existing measures were 
costing a great deal of money and there seemed little to 
be gained from persisting with them. On the other hand, 
it would have been economically and politically foolhardy 
simply to opt out of the endeavour.
Whether rabbits could have pushed their way into 
parliamentary attention so frequently had they not been 
linked to the land question is a moot point, although 
Victorian experience suggests otherwise. In New South 
Wales the matter cannot be tested because the heart of 
the land reform battle and the centre of the rabbit problem 
corresponded in time and place. This left an indelible 
mark on nineteenth century New South Wales rabbit legislat­
ion and, indirectly, on all vermin legislation.
Joseph Abbott, Secretary for Mines under Stuart 
and Dibbs, introduced the second reading of the Rabbit 
Nuisance Act with an eight-page speech outlining the weak­
nesses of the existing system. He acknowledged the work 
done by his predecessor, Renwick, but rejected the bill he 
had been working on because it attempted to cover all 
vermin and would have involved the creation of new boards. 
Abbott argued that there was no time to prepare such a 
complex bill and that efforts should be concentrated on
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dealing with rabbits as quickly as possible. Ke emphasised
that drafting faults made the existing measures hard to
enforce in the courts and that the boards had proved to
be unsatisfactory administrators. Because they were
elected by stockholders, 'they would be personally affected
7 3by stringently carrying out the law'. Boards also failed
to act simultaneously, which nullified the efforts of the
diligent. This view tallied with that of Chief Inspector
Bruce, who described the mechanism of local control as
74'uncertain, tedious and costly', and also with that of.the
editor of the Pastoral Times, a pro-squatter paper published
in Deniliquin. While not condemning the principle of local
control the Pastoral Times acknowledged that the practice 
75had been poor. Only the Wentworth Board had taxed to the 
full amount, despite the low level at which the vermin levy 
was set. Of the other badly infested districts Balranald
had raised only one-fifth the possible amount and Menindee
. 14r 76one-half.
The new legislation proposed to centralize control 
under a rabbit branch of the Mines Department. The branch 
would appoint inspectors, initiate prosecutions and control 
the financing of the system. Subject to the right of 
appeal large stockholders would be levied at a rate of up
73 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 287.
74 Prevalence of Rabbits, 1882, p. 814.
75 Pastoral Times, 8 October 1881.
76 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 288.
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to l^d per head and those holding over 500 sheep would 
pay up to hd per head. This money would be paid into a 
rabbit account out of which property holders would be 
reimbursed to a maximum of half the cost of approved 
eradication work. As in the previous acts there were 
penalties for non-compliance and for spreading the pest, 
but this time expenses incurred during compulsory clearance 
by the authorities became a first charge on the land.
The main clauses indicated the changes that had 
occurred in official thinking since the first foray into 
vermin control legislation. There was a logical progress­
ion from the assumption implicit in the 1880 act that the 
authorities had only to order property holders to clear the 
land and it would be done, to the recognition in 1881 that 
stronger powers of coercion and higher levels of reward 
were needed and hence to acceptance in 1883 that individuals 
must be given direct financial assistance to meet the heavy 
demands imposed by any eradication act. This meant that 
the funds for the scheme had to be drawn from a wider source 
than those directly plagued with rabbits. Abbott had 
actually suggested taking the major step of funding the new 
policy from consolidated revenue, leaving only some adminis­
trative costs to be met by local levies, but Riverina 
graziers had objected. They argued that they would have to 
go 'cap in hand' every year to ask for the allocation.
This would mean a lack of security because as Abbott said, 
'the evil might at some time necessitate a vote of £100,000,
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and I think the House would hesitate before voting such 
77a sum'. A motion to test the feeling of the House on
7 8the subject revealed substantial agreement. The
suspicion was justified but the alternate arrangements
still proved inadequate. Although it was supposed to be
completely self-supporting through the vermin levy, there
was provision for special appropriations from consolidated
revenue to make up any shortage in the rabbit account due
to heavy subsidy demands. It was assumed that these would
79be repaid when there was a credit balance in the account. 
No-one foresaw the growing demands that would be made of 
the account.
Apart from the financial innovations the most 
striking feature of the new proposals was the willingness 
of the Minister to look beyond the precedents of earlier 
legislation to try to find a specific counter-measure.
Abbott was particularly impressed by the New Zealand scheme. 
Unfortunately the New Zealand act had been in force only 
one year and, as squatters pointed out, New Zealand graziers 
enjoyed greater security of tenure than their New South 
Wales counterparts. However, awareness of how New Zealand 
was coping with its serious problem was a sign of a 
broadening of official concern about rabbits that was
77 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 689 ; SMH, 13 February 1883
78 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 700 .
79 45 Vic . No. 19, sec. 45.
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expressed also in a host of wide-ranging investigations 
promoted by various government departments from this time 
onwards. In 1830 there had been little interest shown in 
Victorian and South Australian experiences, let alone the 
reactions of those further afield.
Within parliament the same main points of debate 
emerged as in 1880 and 1881. Was centralization better 
than local control? Was there a case for allowing some 
people to keep rabbits? Should all landholders, large and 
small, leasehold or freehold, rabbit infested or rabbit 
free, be compelled to pay for rabbit eradication? 
Interestingly, the first of these issues, the nature of the 
controlling body, aroused the least disagreement. Never 
again would a New South Wales government be able to 
introduce a centralized system to handle a rural problem 
with so little opposition. Thus the Rabbit Nuisance Act 
became a turning point in New South Wales vermin legislat­
ion. Because it was considered to have failed disastrously 
it reinforced the tendency in New South Wales to favour 
local administration of rural matters.
Those who opposed a total ban on the keeping of 
live rabbits waged a far stronger campaign than the opponents 
of centralization. Early in the debate the Post Master 
General, William Trickett, member for Paddington and a very 
articulate lawyer, sponsored two amendments to moderate the 
bill. He claimed that Abbott's provisions would 'extirpate
124
every rabbit in New South Wales, which he ventured to
8 0think was not the intention of the committee'. The
House voted 28 to 25 to let people keep caged rabbits and
shortly afterwards voted 34 to 15 to allow this without an
81inspector's permission. Much argument followed because
it was claimed that many members had been confused and had
voted in error. Abbott himself voted in support of the
first amendment. The cantankerous stock and station agent,
John McElhone, representative for the Upper Hunter, and
the even more unruly Adolphus George Taylor of Mudgee, who,
in a display of vituperative larrikinism, challenged each
other to resign later that month, and were promptly re-
8 2elected by their constituencies, were for once in agree­
ment declaring that there was no harm in a few caged
rabbits. Pastoralist member for the Hume, William Lyne,
8 3who consistently supported the viewpoint of selectors, 
was of the same opinion. Charles Campbell persisted in the 
belief he had expressed in 1880 that in 'safe areas' 
rabbits should not be banned and that they might even be 
bred for food.^ The argument was carried on outside 
parliament by the Poultry, Pigeon and Canary Society, which
80 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 320 .
81 Ibid.
82 Pastoral Times, 3 March 1883.
83 G.L. Buxton, The Riverina 1861-1891 - An Australian
Regional Study, Melbourne, 1967, p.279.
84 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 1037. See also p.104.
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pleaded the cause of the breeder of fancy rabbits in
the Sydney Morning Herald: 'is it in justice to be
advanced that, because other people do not sympathise
with his hobby, and that hobby is not pernicious, he is
to be persecuted? Are minorities to be crushed out alto- 
8 5gether?1 The editor remained unimpressed, replying
coolly that 'To cumber up the Act with exceptional clauses
to meet so few cases is hardly desirable ... I and ] would
8 6lead to all sorts of quibbling and expense'. Opponents
of the amendments organized vigorously behind-the-scenes
and converted Abbott to their more extreme position. In
the absence of McElhone, who had threatened to stonewall
the debate if a total prohibition was introduced, another
amendment was put, and this time the House voted 53 to 12
8 7to ban all keeping of rabbits.
These details are trivial in themselves but they 
indicate the long history of the commercial interest in 
rabbits, and more importantly, the difficulty of sorting out 
any socially definable interest groups at this stage of the 
rabbit debate. Leopold de Salis was quite sure that the 
pressure for the legislation came from a group of 'Victorian 
large landholders, people who had everything ready to absorb 
three-quarters of the fund, and who could lose nothing by
35 SMH, 12 March 1883; 19 March 1883.
86 Ibid., 14 March 1883.
87 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 818-19.
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8 8this legislation'. While not denying that these men
were actively fighting the rabbit plague he considered that
they were merely 'half colonists', and he thought it unfair
that they should benefit more than those who only held land
8 9in New South Wales. De Salis knew that, despite popular
rumour, many were not squatters, and so, implicitly, did
McElhone, who was an unlikely ally for the well respected
de Salis. McElhone frequently saw grasping squatter hands
dipping into the public purse, but even his biased eyes
recognized that support for the Rabbit Nuisance Act was
not confined to that narrow group. However, he interpreted
what he saw in the light of his prejudices and concluded
that 'it was a dangerous thing for people to come here to
legislate in their own interests. There were in the House
squatters' agents who advocated the interests of the
squatters more consistently than did the squatters them- 
90selves'. Joseph Abbott, whose family owned extensive
property in the rabbit-free Hunter River district,
admitted that his opinions about rabbits had hardened the
more he learned. He had decided to support the banning of
all rabbits and had already imported mongooses and begun
91releasing them.
88 Ibid., 996.
89 SMH, 19 March 1883.
90 NSWPP, 1883, 8, 319.
91 See p. 174.
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When it came time to count heads for crucial 
amendments Edward Combes, who frequently reminded members 
he had tried and failed to establish rabbits on his 
property, drew attention to the absence of the represent­
atives of the rural groups most affected by the legislation
and another time noted that there was not even a quorum 
92present. Abbott claimed that country members had seen
93the amendments and indicated their support. Part of the
committee stage was conducted late at night after private
members' business had been discussed, but presumably if
there had been a danger of a non-rural, or sectional rural
group obstructing the legislation more representatives of
rabbit infested districts would have attended. Undoubtedly
much of the support for the measure came from the Murray,
Riverina and Darling seats, but all the faction leaders of
the period, Parkes, Robertson, Farnell, Stuart, Dibbs and
Jennings supported it. On the whole they said little or
nothing: Parkes' one contribution was a terse statement
to the effect that importing mongooses was a waste of time
because their only bloodthirsty impulses were towards 
94reptiles. However, none spoke against its main 
principles.
Even the discussion of financial clauses revealed
92 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 695; SMH, 19 March 1883
93 NSWPD, 1883, 8 / 696 .
94 NSWPD, 1883, 8 / 821.
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only hints of the sectional political overtones one might
have expected from a parliament in the midst of major land
reform proposals. Abbott accepted two important amendments
in the Assembly. The maximum reimbursement was raised to
three-quarters of total expenditure and the starting point
for levy payment was doubled to 200 large stock or 1,000 
95sheep. The first change was passed without discussion or 
vote but the second prompted considerable interest. Although 
the man who proposed it, Frederick Humphrey, a wealthy 
merchant and owner of a Queensland station, explained the 
change as an administrative convenience, to avoid having to 
do too much paper work for a small return, it was immediate­
ly recognized as a way of reducing the burden on small 
landholders, particularly selectors. A number of members 
of the Legislative Council spoke against setting a base 
level, arguing that, as all would benefit, all should pay. 
William Dailey, who was responsible for the legislation 
in the Council, warned that insistence on cancelling the 
exemptions might defeat the whole measure: 'That amend­
ment is just the kind of amendment which would be resented
9 6in the Legislative Assembly'. He claimed that it would 
be held to constitute an interference in basic money 
matters and would contravene an established principle that 
small owners were spared such imposts, for instance, under 
the Scab Acts and the Pastures and Stock Protection Act.
95 Ibid., 697.
96 Ibid., 994.
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The matter was not pursued.
The best reasoned attack on the legislation
again came from Leopold de Salis. He was anxious for an
effective measure to be introduced but had many doubts
about the Rabbit Nuisance Act. He thought the burden of
costs was too high and should be shared by agricultural
and metropolitan areas, and he pointed out that salaries
and administrative expenses would swallow much of the
money raised by the levy, leaving little to reimburse 
97landholders. He urged parliament to delay or to agree
to review the act in 1886. Dailey accepted this amendment
9 8because Abbott had intimated that he would not object, 
but in fact the Legislative Assembly rejected it. Although 
the Rabbit Nuisance Act was pushed through quickly because 
of the desire to pass the Land Act, it was not expected 
to be a stop-gap measure. Nor, despite its faults, was 
it the product of lack of thought. Drafting had begun 
under Renwick, attention had been paid to experiences out­
side New South Wales and new approaches to the key problems 
of administration and finance had been made. The govern­
ment also took prompt steps to enforce the new system.
SMH, 9 March 1883; 19 March 1883.97
98 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 1038.
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CHAPTER 5
An Attempt at Centralized Rabbit Control,
1883-1888
According to the Australasian, which had a large 
circulation in the Riverina and a special section on 
affairs affecting that region, the stock branch of the 
Mines Department showed admirable determination to 
administer the rabbit act vigorously.^ Sheep inspectors 
and forest rangers were appointed as rabbit inspectors 
but as only 14 were in infested districts 25 new appoint­
ments were immediately made. The Blue Books reveal that 
most of the minor appointees were new to the public 
service. Salaries were high. Ordinary inspectors 
received £300 p.a. as compared with the £200 of forest 
rangers and £250 to £350 for sheep inspectors. When 
the act fell into discredit high staff and salary levels 
were cited as examples of needless extravagance on the 
part of the central authority, but rabbit inspectors were 
expected to work hard. The areas were large and the paper­
work was onerous. This latter fact may help account for 
the rapid turnover of staff and the number of dismissals.
By 1888 few of the staff listed in the rabbit branch had
1 Australasian, 12 May 1883, p. 601.
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been employed in 1884. Of course some men took on this 
kind of job because their family properties were 
financially embarrassed. Orwell Patterson, son of the 
wealthy pastoralist John Hunter Patterson, made Tapio 
Station profitable only to lose it when the bank decided 
to sell. Because the bank reneged on its promise to 
give him another position as manager, he had to work for
3the Hay Rabbit Board till something else turned up.
This was not an unusual situation.
2
The authorities were well aware of the possible 
abuses of the new system and seem to have tried to avoid 
them. Abbott appointed an experienced inspector, J.C.W. 
Crommelin, as Chief Superintending Inspector, under 
Alexander Bruce. Crommelin had been a sheep inspector 
since 1876. Both men opposed the idea of straight bounty 
payments. Claimants under the act had to submit details 
of what they intended to do, fourteen days in advance, and 
afterwards give details of the wages and capital costs 
involved. It was hoped that this would prevent the 
unscrupulous claiming for all labour costs involved in 
running a property. The vouchers were checked and the
2 All information on salaries and staff numbers is 
taken from the Blue Books and the State Civil 
Service lists. At its peak the Rabbit Branch 
employed 54 staff. In that year, 1887-88* about 
3,000 men were engaged solely in the work of rabbit 
extermination.
PR, 17 April 1895 , p. 82 (Speech by J. Carruthers, 
Minister for Lands).
3 J.O. Randell, Pastoral Pattersons, Melbourne, 1977, 
p. 172.
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4inspector was not obliged to recommend the full refund. 
However, their good intentions were soon thwarted by the 
sheer bulk of paperwork and the size of each district.
The government's policy was first modified and then 
destroyed by the inadequacies of the administrative system 
on which the scheme relied. There were grave flaws in the 
underlying principles which hindsight suggests would have 
eventually led to its reappraisal and probably its reject­
ion but these were not the reasons why the 1883 act was 
soon so thoroughly discredited.
As early as March 1884 pastoralists were 
complaining that inspectors could not keep up with the flood
5of applications for subsidy payments and the conference 
of rabbit inspectors which met at Wentworth in February 
decided that payment for scalps was the most practical way 
of proceeding with rabbit eradication. The inspectors 
did not report their arguments but the perennial complaints 
in the stock inspectors' reports about the difficulties of 
overseeing work done on the stations suggest a likely 
reason. Fencing, fumigation, ploughing in of warrens and 
the spreading of poison could not be checked effectively 
simply by examining a few receipts. Yet each inspector 
was responsible for about 250 square miles of territory.
4 Regulations relating to the Rabbit Nuisance Act,
NSWJLC, 1883 (2), Pt. 1, 167; 1883-84, Pt. 11, 1093.
5 Australasian, 29 March 1884. A meeting at Scott's 
Hotel, Melbourne.
SMH, 9 February 1884; Australasian, 16 February 1884.6
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Where control measures were non-existent the inspector
could send in his own gangs and then sue for recovery of
the cost. The annual reports indicate that the department
would like to have done more of this, but there was no
guarantee that the courts would or could force property
holders, who were usually already heavily in debt, to repay
7the full amount. Where an occupier had made some motions 
towards rabbit elimination it was doubtful whether the 
courts would uphold official intervention, because it was 
difficult to define what was meant by 'reasonable effort'. 
In the view of over-worked inspectors scalps at least 
showed that something was being done, and many of them 
agreed with those pastoralists who believed that without 
the incentive of a bounty, employees would not exert them­
selves to kill the pest.
Rural arguments about the value of bounty 
payments are far from a dead issue, even in the 1970s.
After the rabbit bounty was abolished bonus payments 
remained for other vermin, and the idea has been periodic­
ally revived ever since. It is easy to argue that such a 
system must fail, because trappers will naturally refuse 
to work themselves out of a lucrative business; but this 
is exactly what they did do in the case of the hairy-nosed 
wombat in the Riverina and the dingo throughout much of
7 Annual Reports, Stock and Brands Branch, Department 
of Mines, NSWV&P, 1883-84; 1885.
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gVictoria. There is no more reason to assume that self-
interest prompted an inviolable conservationist ethic
(or lack of it) among men employed to kill rabbits for
scalp payments than there is to assume a similar restraint
among whalers or any other hunters. Admittedly there is
strong evidence that gangs who contracted to clear
particular paddocks did leave some breeding stock when
they had reduced the numbers to such a point that the
daily return was no longer profitable. If they were not
carefully watched they also transported pregnant does to
9clear areas, to promote business. However, ordinary 
station hands were still primarily wage earners who had to 
work in the area that the boss specified, regardless of the 
return. No doubt many became full-time rabbiters, follow­
ing the lure of big money, but, until the depths of the 
1890s depression, almost every station had its core of 
permanent employees, who could have been utilized to 
remedy the inadequacies of the transient gangs. Large 
stations were sometimes compelled to employ up to 100 or 
150 rabbiters, but the essential follow-up work, such as 
fumigation and destruction of established warrens, regular 
laying of poison and the netting of remote waterholes, which 
could have been done by wage labour, seems to have been
8 Native animals and the bonus system are discussed in 
Chapter 8.
Select Committee on Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887, p. 484.9
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consistently neglected.^ One trapper who objected to
the common claim that the spread of rabbits was encouraged
by men like him wrote indignantly to the paper explaining
that as soon as a gang's rabbit catch declined the
occupier would transfer the men to another section.^
Another rabbiter criticized a meeting of graziers at
Tibora, which urged bonus payments instead of wages. He
12pointed out that all systems needed good supervision.
It was not so much the nature of the system as
the nature of the rabbit that made the bounty system fail.
The rabbits bred too quickly. Had it been possible to
retain the original policy, perhaps supplemented by a
small, standard bounty payment, more progress might have
been made, but that idea had to be abandoned within the
first year, because the administration could not cope and
the pastoralists would not co-operate. Much was made of
the demoralizing effect of big money on rural labour.
During the 1880s it was sometimes hard to get gangs of
men, capable of working safely in the dry, remote areas of
the colony, so payments were raised. It hurt hard-pressed
pastoralists to see such men with buggies drawn by four 
13horses. However, they themselves were not above cashing
10 Select Committee into Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887, p. 
505, R. Strachan, Superintendent; p. 506, A. Bruce, 
Chief Inspector of Stock; p. 489, R. Officer, Union 
Mortgage and Agency Co., Melbourne.
11 Australasian, 1 March 1884, p. 283.
12 Town and Country Journal (Sydney), 17 May 1884, p.946.
13 NSWPP, 1887-88, 30, 2109-11; Select Committee into 
Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887, pp. 508-9.
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in on the system by charging exorbitant amounts for 
rations and grazing.14 The discovery of valuable 
minerals in the far west of New South Wales in the early 
1880s undoubtedly affected the labour market, but some­
times in contradictory ways. Station hands were drawn to 
Silverton in 1881 and Milparinka in 1883, but they were 
extremely hard fields on which to make a living and 
casual labour on the outback stations was almost the only 
way of acquiring a grub stake. Possibly some fossickers 
deliberately spread little breeding colonies of rabbits 
to provide food for wayfarers but in view of the general 
failure of control methods in the south west this was 
ultimately to be of little account. Even allowing for 
the effects of labour shortages it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that most pastoralists did little to keep 
down the level of bonus payments. Every year from 1883 
until 1892 the annual stock and brands branch reports 
referred to the need for a uniform, low set of vermin 
bounties, but there is no evidence that graziers made any 
effort to promote the plan. Their attitude in this 
regard is in marked contrast to the one they adopted over 
shearing rates in the 1890s.
In his pamphlet Rabbits and How to Deal with 
15Them, Crommelin, the Chief Rabbit Inspector until his
14 Select Committee into Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887,
p. 489. R. Officer, Manager of Murray Downs Station 
and one near Deliniquin for the Union Mortgage and 
Agency Co., Melbourne.
15 J.C.W. Crommelin, Rabbits and How to Deal With Them, Sydney, 1886.
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forced resignation in 1886, advocated adoption of a 
comprehensive system. Landholders should set men to 
watch for approaching rabbits and start destroying possible 
harbours, such as brush fences and hollow logs. He 
reverted to his original position on the superiority of 
wages to bonus payments, but conceded that boundary riders 
should get a bonus when their areas were quite clear of 
rabbits. Whatever system of payment was used he was sure 
the essential factor was good supervision, and he argued 
that a badly infested run of 65,000 acres could be 
controlled by two camps of five men costing £130 p.a. 
each. This presumed a weekly wage of 10s. which was too 
low and did not allow for living expenses, equipment and 
poisons, but even when allowance is made for these charges 
there is still an enormous discrepancy between his 
estimates and the amounts paid to stations up to 1887.
In attacks on the Rabbit Nuisance Act a few 
examples of large subsidy payments generally not 
identified by name were frequently quoted. These suggested 
an horrific picture of stations being granted subsidies of 
well over £13,000 p.a.^ The table compiled in 1887, list­
ing all infested runs, their expenditure, subsidies and
18rent gives a different picture.
16
16 See p. 145.
17 NSWPD, 1887-88, 30, 2116.
18 The Rabbit Pest, Return of runs infested, their area, 
expenditure, subsidy and rent, NSWV&P, 1887-88,
VIII, 973.
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Two hundred and five properties were in the
proclaimed area and of these 19 received over £1,000 each
in subsidies for 1883-84. The top payment was £7,552.16s.Id.
to Canally Station, Balranald. This was almost double the
next highest payment, £4,050.9s.lOd. to Avoca Station,
Wentworth. Neither run ever again put in such a large
claim and the size was due to the fact that both had begun
expensive eradication work in 1883, before reimbursements
were properly organized, so the 1884 payment was actually
for two years. In 1886 only 15 properties received over
£1,000. Teryawynia, Wilcannia got the largest amount,
£4,977.72.Od., over £1,000 more than the next highest sum.
In 1886 subsidy reimbursement totalled just under £72,000
as compared with over £128,000 for 1885. This figure was
to increase considerably in 1887 to £179,393, but
opposition to the act had hardened by 1886 if not before,
and it was not mollified by the fall in payments in 1888 
19to £119,146. De Salis was correct when he claimed that
men who held property in Victoria as well as in New South
Wales received a large share of the subsidy. Of the 44
runs which received over £1,000 in any year between 1883
and 1887, 12 had owners who were also listed in the
2 0Victorian pastoral directories. Some of the other runs
19 Return of Receipts and Expenditure Under the Rabbit 
Nuisance Act, NSWV&P, 1890, V, 328.
20 Australian Federal Pastoral Directory, 1889; Pastoral 
Possessions of New South Wales, 1889; A. Birch and
D. Macmillan, Wealth and Progress: Studies in 
Australian Business History, Sydney 1967.
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were held by private companies, finance houses or banks 
which also had Victorian connections. Nevertheless, the 
bulk of the money was widely distributed.
The Rabbit Nuisance Act was a very expensive 
piece of legislation, but it was well known that rabbits 
were a very expensive problem. Cost alone cannot account 
for the opposition the act rapidly aroused, because 
pastoralists were as hostile as anyone else although it 
looks as if they should have been very content because 
they were getting back three-quarters of their expenditure. 
The change in rural attitude also occurred very rapidly, 
before the total indebtedness of the scheme reached great 
heights.^
NSWV&P , 1890, 328 . Receipts and Expenditure under the
Rabbit Nuisance Act (to the nearest £) .
Year Levy Subsidy Fencing Other Debt
£ £ £ £ £
1883 35,900 — — 490
1884 44,757 59,223 - 25,606
1885 37,444 128,207 - 31,347
1886 40,024 71,912 5,194 38,601
1887 41,173 179,393 9,732 21,469
1888 47,941 119,146 11,323 26,783
1889 46,901 73,028 13,164 12,120
1890
(June) 33,531 481 2,624 1,609
TOTAL 327,671 631,390 42,037 158,025 503,786
* Other included:
a. administration
b. Rodd Island experiments £8,798 (See p.194 ff.)
c. Rabbiters wages and expenses, £62,655
d. Conferences and legal expenses.
There is no entry indicating how much of the money 
spent on the rabbitting gangs was recouped from run 
holders.
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The Australasian always took a dim view of 
22bounty payments, but most of the graziers’ letters it
printed had favoured them. In 1883 the Minister seemed
adamant. He ordered his department to issue a circular
setting out the 'pernicious effect' of a bounty system,
although faced with strong local feeling his inspectors
23already had their doubts. These doubts were strengthened
by a meeting of Riverina graziers in Melbourne in March
1884 which complained strongly at the delay in settling
voucher claims and at the departmental insistence on wage
rather than bounty payments to labourers. They considered
that they were 'merely paying the men to sit down under any
24convenient bush and play euchre'. Their voices helped 
convince the authorities that the original policy had to be 
changed. From 1885 it appears that reimbursements took the 
form of scalp payments, up to a maximum of 6d per head.
It is hard to document this change because the regulations 
relating to the act which were published in 1885 and 
1885-86 continued to refer to the forms whereby claims 
could be lodged for other kinds of eradication work and 
wage and equipment costs; nevertheless, in practice, 
ministerial discretion was exercised as to what was meant
25by the phrase 'to take all such steps as may be necessary', 
and only bounty hunting met with approval. Harrie Wood,
Under Secretary for Mines throughout the period, replied to
22 Australasian, 19 September 1885, p.490 - Editorial.
23 Ibid., 20 September 1883, p.409.
24 Ibid., 29 March 1884, pp. 410-11.
25 Rabbit Nuisance Act, clause 18.
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a query on this point from a member of the Legislative
Council Select Committee who had read the law and was
mystified as to why the department seemed to operate
under different rules: 'That is in the discretion of the
Minister; he can give anything or nothing as he pleases.
The Minister does not recognize the wages system. It
was found to be terribly costly and difficult of super- 
2 6vision'. By 1887_the department was well aware that
any system based on sending men out to kill rabbits was
bound to fail, but, as the head of the rabbit branch,
Charles Taylor, pointed out, up till December 1886 bounties
had been paid on 7,853,787 rabbits, which was many times
more than had been killed under the wages system, and many
other carcasses had probably not been found. He saw his
inspectors as conducting a holding campaign: 'Until some
better plan is suggested I do not see what else there is
for it. The expenditure at present seems to have the
effect of keeping the pest down to such an extent that
they do not depreciate the grazing capabilities of the
27country, and that is about all'. He was optimistic in 
his assessment but probably right in his decision. The 
rabbit branch had been unable to cope with the demands of 
the wage system and the pastoralists had helped destroy it. 
There was no going back to the original 1883 policy but 
if the western division was not to be left to the rabbits
26 Select Committee into Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887, 
p. 484.
27 Ibid., p. 475.
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some action was necessary.
The Pastoral Times hinted at the basic cause
of rural disaffection when it reported with confidence
and approval a rumour that the Rabbit Nuisance Act was
to be fundamentally changed: the wages system would be
replaced by bounty payments and the whole system would
be administered through the pastures and stock protection
boards with the Mines Department retaining only the power
2 8to dismiss those who proved inefficient. Two
conferences arranged by the Minister in 1885 and 1886,
which were attended by representatives of the sheep and
pastures and stock boards, adopted the same line. They
urged the government to return control of all matters
relating to vermin to the local boards and to set up an
2 9advisory central committee.
Opinion within the department was divided on 
the subject. Alexander Bruce, Chief Inspector of Stock, 
thought that the local boards could successfully administer 
the act provided that the central board and the minister 
had strong powers of compulsion.^  On the other hand, 
Harrie Wood, the Under-Secretary, was firmly against the 
idea because of the self interest displayed on previous
28 Pastoral Times, 19 July 1884. Only the first rumour 
proved to be accurate.
29 SMH, 6-7 October 1885; 16-18 June 1886.
30 Select Committee Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887, p. 494.
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occasions: 'in one or two instances where we had to use
the inspectors of stock as rabbit inspectors they were
31prevented from enforcing the act'. He was sure that
the rabbits would increase very much more quickly than
they have done. 1 think in all probability expenditure
32would be heavier'.
The details of changing policy during the late 
1880s will be considered later, but it is important to 
notice the hostility aroused by the inspectors. This 
showed itself in all the relevant debates and in the 
newspapers I read. In part it might be considered a 
measure of the zeal of the new men. They made runholders 
do something about rabbits: the returns show a steady
increase in the number of runholders in the infested
33region who began to spend money only during 1884 and 1885. 
However, because lasting relief seldom resulted, many 
occupiers swiftly became disillusioned and decided that 
their money could be better spent. It is also apparent 
that many objected to taking instructions from Sydney 
and particularly from men they regarded as their inferiors. 
One landholder wrote about the 'arrogance of underlings' 
and claimed that 'there have been civil wars over less 
than the treatment we in the western district receive from
31 Ibid., p. 485.
32 Ibid.
33 The Rabbit Pest Return, 1887.
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34the Sydney Government'. He had many supporters but
also at least one opponent who wrote condemning squatters
who resented direction: 'most probably he is one of
those festive and ponderous individuals who seek to rule
the destinies of a colony from the crack hotel of a
neighbouring colony ... and wield a power which they
35abused in time gone past'. Departmental notes on the 
qualities desired in a new superintending inspector 
suggest an awareness of this problem. The Officer-in- 
Charge noted of one favoured candidate: 'He is a gentle­
man in speech and manner, and this I consider a most
3 6important qualification in a superintending inspector'.
Despite an initially favourable response the
rabbit branch soon slipped in rural esteem. Incidents
that found their way into the parliamentary papers indicate
that a zealous officer could find many hurdles placed in
his way, and that the department was far from immune to
pressure. In 1885 a Balranald storekeeper lodged a
complaint against Crommelin, the senior man in the field,
37for alleged abuse and refusal to deal with his store.
34 Town and Country Journal (Sydney), 21 June 1884, 
p. 206. Similar comments appeared in the NSWPD, 
eg NSWPD, 1887, 2117 (Mr Wilson) 'I could bring 
well-founded cases in which the action of the 
inspector has exhibited the greatest oppression'.
35 Town and Country Journal (Sydney), 5 July 1884, p. 22.
36 Civil Service (appointment of Mr H.E. Vindin as 
Inspector of Rabbits), NSWV&P, 1885-86, II, 403.
37 NSWV&P, 1885-86, II, 173-80.
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The rights and wrongs of the case can no longer be
discerned. It developed from a disputed dog meat account
and, despite widespread denials, it is clear that those
under Crommelin were strongly advised not to trade with
the firm responsible. The interesting point is that
within a matter of months Crommelin had been sacked from
3 8the rabbit branch following two trivial charges. He 
was suspended for having spent £2.19s.6d on going to 
Melbourne to buy a special poison trough (and cheaper 
poison) to conduct an experiment requested by the depart­
ment. He had notified the department of his intention but 
had not waited for a reply. He was away two days and said 
that he had to do things so quickly because the dry season 
was due to break. As it was the rain began the day he 
started the experiment and spoiled it. Probably he was in 
error but he was the only experienced field officer in the 
entire branch. Following his suspension departmental 
attention was drawn to a letter written by Crommelin two 
years before, giving an inspector permission to hire two 
boys to clear a common. The boys were sons of an inspector, 
so presumably the man hiring them wanted to be sure that 
he was not going to get into trouble. Crommelin replied, 
'Dear Charley, The whiskeys mix a man up so much that a 
sober man like your humble servant has no chance. Put on 
the youngsters, and do them over if they don't behave
38 Ibid., 389-97.
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themselves'. According to the Under-Secretary this 
was a 'coarse and filthy minute', but worse was to follow. 
The father of the boys had scrawled across the corner, 
'Seconded, Bugger you'. Abbott expressed profound shock 
but in view of Crommelin's long service and previously 
unblemished record it was recommended that he should be 
demoted to the lowest rank of inspector at £50 p.a. less 
than anyone else. He resigned instead. In his own 
defence Crommelin wrote:
39
I have been nearly thirteen years in the 
Public Service, and I hold from Albury the 
highest character, both from the Lands 
Office and the Chief Inspector of Stock.
I have ever fearlessly done my duty in spite 
of threats and all obstructions, and in 
consequence of being outspoken and insisting 
upon squatters killing their rabbits I have 
incurred in the Western District only their 
deadly enmity ... If I had worked in with 
and pleased them I should have been the best 
fellow in existence. 40
The man selected to replace him caused some adverse comment
too. Harry Vindin was only 23 and the brother-in-law of the
Minister. He was also inexperienced and charges of nepotism 
41were made. By 1887 both the Lands and Mines Departments 
were under review and reorganization, a fact which did not 
add to public confidence.
Pastoral opposition to the working of the act was
39 Ibid., 393.
40 Ibid., 395.
41 NSWPD, 1885-86, 18, 680.
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exacerbated by a series of outside events. The drought
of 1884-85 helped reduce rabbit numbers on some runs and
drove them onto others. Some runholders thus felt less
need of the new act and almost all were financially
embarrassed by its demands. Most rents in the western
district had doubled after the 1884 Land Act, and some
42were increased far more. There was also the problem of
deciding what to do with the resumed half of each run. In
practice it tended to become a kind of no-man's land where
rabbits bred unchecked unless government gangs were sent
in. The owners of Kilfera Station near Ivanhoe took the
advice of the manager, Richard Gardiner Casey, and sold out
43in 1383, just ahead of the main rabbit advance. Casey
had followed a policy of ploughing back profits to increase
the capital value of the property and, on this occasion,
his sense of timing was excellent. Because they sold before
the worst of the rabbits, and before the drought and the
1884 Land Act, the owners made a very satisfactory profit.
The next holder was not so fortunate. Rabbit eradication
expenditure rose from £588 in 1883 to over £3,000 in the
44following year and had reached £4,856 by 1886. On such 
a large, comparatively well established property this was 
not a crippling outlay, but it assumes ominous proportions 
when it is noted that the annual rent also rose from £390
42 Rabbit Pest Return, 1887.
43 Casey, Australian Father and Son, p. 65.
44 Rabbit Pest Return, 1887.
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p.a. in 1883 to £3,003 in 1884, and half the area was 
resumed.^ It was far easier for squatters to fight the 
Rabbit Nuisance Act than it was for them to resist the 
Land Act.
Just as enthusiasm for the introduction of the
Rabbit Nuisance Act was linked with the demands for a new
land bill, so disillusionment with the 1884 Land Act
paralleled dissatisfaction with the rabbit legislation.
Confidence in the potential of the western lands had been
shaken by the drought: the rabbit legislation became a
focus for general economic anxieties about the future, as
well as for specific resentment of its impositions. The
Wilcannia Pastures and Stock Protection Board members
published a pamphlet in 1886 based on the views they had
expressed at the rabbit conference in Sydney. They
objected to the way other delegates had accepted the
minister's direction and had refused to discuss the rent
and land tenure questions: 'Rents and rabbits are both
4 6questions of annual outlay'. In their view compulsion
had brought many men 'to the verge of ruin'. They believed
that self interest would be sufficient incentive for rabbit
47control if tenants had security of tenure.
The most important other issues affecting the 
outcome of the first venture into centralized vermin
45 Rabbit Pest Return, 1887.
46 Wilcannia Pastures and Stock Protection Board, The 
Land Act and the Rabbits, Sydney, 1886, p. 21.
47 Ibid., p. 29.
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control were the political instability of the late 1880s
and the budget difficulties experienced as a result of the
drought and the fall in land revenue. The shifting
alliances that accompanied the transition from the old
faction politics to the new groupings linked to tariff
policy were not conducive to the calm consideration of
difficult problems, particularly when the area worst
affected was so remote from Sydney. More importantly, the
1885 budget deficit of £1,052,614 which had caused
Treasurer Dibbs grave anxiety had by 1886 reached the
48previously unheard of amount of over £2,000,000. Rabbit 
legislation had proved alarmingly expensive. At a time of 
falling land revenue the large sums being spent on western 
properties were politically embarrassing.
The large staff of the rabbit branch was also a
convenient target for Parkes1 promised civil service 
4 9retrenchments. In 1888 responsibility for the rabbit 
problem was transferred to the Lands Department and the 
number of staff was cut drastically. By 1889 there were 
only three inspectors and seven temporary clerks clearing 
up the backlog of claims. In 1890 there were three 
inspectors, three senior men and a clerk. The number of
48 P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and
Parties: The First Thirty Years of Responsible
in New South Wales, 1856-1889, Melbourne, 1966, p. 
130, p. 133; P. Loveday, A.W. Martin and R.S. Parker 
(eds.), The Emergence of the Australian Party System, 
Sydney, 1977, p. 33.
49 Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, 
p. 134.
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active field inspectors rose briefly in 1892-93 to five, 
plus one senior inspector but fell again in 1894 to one 
inspector. From 1899 till the closing of the branch in 
1904 two clerks conducted all business.
Between 1885 and the repeal of the Rabbit 
Nuisance Act in 1890 members did not lose sight of the 
problem, but the kind of legislation that would have 
satisfied everyone - effective but not expensive, compulsory 
but not coercive, locally administered but centrally 
controlled - could only have existed in the best of all 
possible worlds. The simple faith that had been expressed 
in the 1880 and 1881 Pastures and Stock Protection Acts 
had lost its adherents, but loss of faith had also weakened 
the will needed to take time from the more dramatic issues, 
such as tariff changes and federation, to discuss legislat­
ion that would inevitably antagonize influential groups 
and would probably either cost a great deal or fail to 
achieve much. A tour of the western division was arranged 
in mid-1885 for Abbott, the Minister of Mines, to show the 
area of the new mineral discoveries and also to prove how 
serious rabbits had become. No doubt his escort, Edward 
Quin, member for Wentworth and holder of the large western 
property, Tarella Station, followed the advice of a fellow 
Reform Club member:
50 N.S.W. Blue Books and Public Service Lists, 1883-1905.
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When he talks about the loveliness of the 
climate ... whisper in his ear - rabbits.
When he dilates on the valuable properties 
of saltbush, just mutter 'rabbits'. When 
he grows eloquent on the security of tenure, 
shout aloud 'rabbits', and when he goes into 
ectasies over a patch of waving grass, scream 
in a higher key - 'Rabbits!' 51
The plan worked, at least to the extent that Abbott left
office a more fervent hater of rabbits than he entered it,
but it did not make it any easier to pass better counter- 
52measures.
In December 1887 Francis Abigail, Parkes'
Minister for Mines, introduced the second reading debate
on a new rabbit bill. Its main function was to end the
subsidy system but it was also intended to facilitate the
erection of wire netting by reducing the legal problems.
Abigail believed that 'it is only fair that those who have
to deal with the pest at their own cost should be relieved
53of any interference after they fence in their runs', 
meaning they would not be compelled to take any particular 
action to clear the land. This was one way of avoiding 
the disagreements surrounding the control and authority 
of inspectors, but it presumed that fences would be built 
and maintained to a satisfactory standard so that rabbits 
on one property could not menace another. The bill also 
implied that all stockholders would continue to pay the
51 Pastoral Times, 00 1—1 July 1885.
52 NSWPD, 1885-86, 30 , 2111.
53 NSWPD, 1887-88, 30, 2111.
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rabbit levy and it was unclear what was to become of the
army of inspectors still at work, particularly in areas
that had not been fenced. In brief, it was a confused
piece of legislation and deserved its luke-warm reception
from pastoralists and members of parliament. The crucial
weakness was that, because it involved the matter of
compensation for improvements, financial aid for the
erection of wire netted fences was left for the promised
land bill to determine. There was no guarantee such a
bill would pass in the near future, or in the form
promised. The government admitted that the rabbit bill had
just been 'a feeler to ascertain the opinion of hon.
54members', and it was promptly dropped.
According to the Pastoral Times the bill intro­
duced in February 1888 by Thomas Garrett, Minister for Lands
55in the same government, was much better. It was probably
the result of Abigail's instructions to his senior men,
because the rabbit branch had only just been transferred to
the Lands Department, and, because of his drinking, Garrett
5 6was no longer an effective Minister. The proposal was to 
divide the colony into districts corresponding to the land 
districts. The land boards would be responsible for 
administration and there would be a central board to advise
54 Ibid., 2124.
55 Pastoral Times, 26 May 1888. Details were discussed 
3 June 1888, 16 June 1888.
56 ADB, IV, 235.
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the minister. Once a district was proclaimed infested, 
fencing would be compulsory and the government would 
advance up to £25 per mile at 4% on first mortgage 
security. Once again the matter of compensation for improve­
ments to pastoral leases was left for the long promised land 
bill. It was the government's explicit intention that the 
rabbit legislation should be dependent on the land bill then 
under debate and this hampered its chances of passing.
Once again the bill was stopped by prorogation. Two similar
bills were drafted in 1889 but neither was printed before
57the end of the session.
Draft bills were not the only form of political
activity generated by the failure of the Rabbit Nuisance
Act. As so often happens when action is demanded and no
course looks appealing, the governments turned to select
committees, departmental reports and even a massive royal 
5 8commission. John Neild moved to appoint a select committee
to investigate the Rabbit Nuisance Act in February 1886, but
he was a new member and failed to follow the proper proced- 
59ure. His second attempt in April of the same year at
least prompted a vigorous discussion, but despite his
assurances that 'this is no party movement: I have not
6 0consulted with a single member of the House', his
57 Consolidated Index, NSWPP.
58 Some of the information gathered by the royal commission 
was referred to in the previous chapter but a discussion 
of the investigation will be found in Chapter 6.
59 NSWPP, 1885-86, 18, 679.
60 NSWPD, 1885-86, 19, 1140.
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suggestions as to members did not meet with approval and
there had been no action by the end of the session. It
was not until 30 March 1887 that a select committee was
formed, and it was at the instigation of the Legislative
61Council, not the Assembly.
The committee was set up by squatters. Of the
nineteen witnesses two represented large agricultural
finance companies, ten held or managed large runs, six had
experience of administering the act (as Minister, civil
servant or inspector) and one was a member of the committee.
Not even the senior administrators in the Mines Department
argued for the retention of the act, and the former Minister,
Abbott, said he had swung round to favour full local control
because, unlike in 1881, ’the pastoral boards realise the
6 2necessity of working for their own benefit'. No doubt it
is easier to be trusting when you are no longer responsible
for the outcome. Despite its narrow composition the
committee's findings were probably a good indication of
opinion in the worst affected areas. The report tallied
exactly with the recommendation of the two big pastoral
conferences, October 1885 and May 1886, which had favoured
assistance for fencing, decentralized administration and
6 3investigation of all possible methods of control.
61 Select Committee into the Rabbit Nuisance Act, 1887.
62 Ibid., 492.
63 See p. 142.
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Because the whole issue of rabbits in the late 
1880s has been buried in the history books under the turmoil 
associated with land legislation, free trade debates and 
federation, it is easy to under-estimate the strength of 
feeling generated and the scope of the discussion which 
occurred. Almost every town in the north west of the colony 
had a succession of public meetings; the pastures and stock 
protection boards made loud representations through their 
annual conferences; and the Australasian Stock Conference, 
held in Sydney in October 1886, which was attended by 
senior public servants responsible for stock in New Zealand 
and all the Australian colonies, except Western Australia, 
devoted much of its time to rabbits.^
Whereas in 1880 the government was in advance of
public opinion, instructing its inspectors to send out
lists of questions, and framing legislation before there
was much public demand for it, by the end of the decade the
incentive for new measures was coming from the rural
electorate, not from the front benches, regardless of which
faction occupied them. The concerted opposition shown to
the system of inspection in New South Wales makes an
interesting contrast to the situation William Oliver has
described in New Zealand. There it seems that the rabbit
control programme led to a growth in the power and number
6 5of inspectors regardless of the controlling authority.
64 SMH, 11 July 1885; 24 March 1887; Australasian Stock 
Conference 1886, NSWV&P, 1885-86, VI, 21.
65 W.H. Oliver, Towards a New History, University of Otago, 1971, pp. Ib-17.
156
Oliver has tentatively suggested that the lack of New
Zealand opposition to the growing army of inspectors is
an indication that the pioneer stereotype is false, that
men on the limits of settlement wanted 'betterment, not
6 6independence, more not less civilization'. The New
6 7South Wales reaction also contrasts with that of Victoria. 
Rabbit inspectors were not the only rural inspectors in 
New South Wales and the evidence is too slight and contra­
dictory to support any sweeping conclusions, but the New 
South Wales experience during the 1880s clearly indicates 
how the initiative for legislation can fluctuate over a 
very short period.
Legislation itself helps change perceptions, 
not just by what it does but also by the way it provides 
a focus for other resentments. Later legislation becomes 
a response to the new way of seeing things as well as a 
reaction against the specific details of earlier acts. New 
South Wales experimented at a bad time with centralized 
rabbit eradication. Whether northern pastoralists were 
more individualistic than their Victorian relatives seems 
doubtful: after all, they belonged to an intermarrying,
closely connected segment of society. Probably because the 
larger state had tried to do much more than Victoria the 
disappointment and reaction were proportionally greater.
66 Ibid., p . 19.
67 See Chapter 2.
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The swing against centralized control was also strengthened
by the apparently more successful record of the stock and
pastures boards after 1883. Kangaroos and dingoes simply
do not breed like rabbits, and whatever farmers may say,
eagle hawks and crows cause insignificant damage compared 
6 8to rabbits. So the narrow, sectional organization had a
good opportunity to refurbish its image and by the end of
the decade many people were prepared to support its claim
that rabbit control should be returned to local hands. As
has been pointed out, because of the failure of local
government initiatives in New South Wales, there were few
other local contenders for control, although the 1884 Land
Act had set up land boards and courts, and during his last
two years of office Parkes attempted three times to pass a
6 9District Government Bill.
The problems arising from this situation were 
well appreciated by the ministers responsible for vermin 
legislation. The clamour for a new act was increasing and 
the £500,000 debt left by the last experiment was a good 
reason for an economy-minded government to heed the calls 
for local control. On the other hand, the pastures and 
stock boards were considered bastions of the squattocracy, 
and it would be a strange move to increase their authority
68 See Chapter 7 „
69 E.A. Larcombe, The Stabilization of Local Government 
in New South Wales, 1856-1906, Sydney, 1977, p. 262.
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at the very time Parkes was striving to establish a more
70broadly-based system of local administration. There
was some sense behind the idea that the government would
do well to wait till both the local government bill and
the security of tenure and compensation for improvements
clauses of the new land bill had been decided upon. Another
reason for delay was that, although by an exercise of
ministerial discretion, (such as had already been used to
change from the salary to the bounty payment system) all
subsidy payments ceased in 1888, the government continued
to collect the rabbit levy, which amounted to about £40,000 
71p.a. Thus the government had sound reasons for delay, 
but one of the reasons for delay made pastoralists doubly 
anxious for action.
By 1890 western pastoralists were exerting great
pressure on their representatives to get a rabbit bill
passed, primarily to abolish the levy, but also to facilitate
fencing. Fencing disputes could already be heard by the
72Land Courts, but only if both parties agreed. This placed 
a heavy burden of trust on a landholder who wanted to fence 
but did not have a written contract with his neighbours.
In May 1890 Edward Dickens, the son of the novelist, who 
was the member for Wilcannia where he was a stock and 
station agent, moved an adjournment to discuss the problem.
70 Ibid., pp. 262-63.
71 NSWPD, 1890, 44, 792; 795.
72 Ibid., 778.
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Dickens had managed the big Moomba Station and had been 
an inspector of runs in 1886, so he had first-hand know­
ledge of the situation. He was very critical of the 
tardiness of the Minister for Lands, James Brunker, in 
repealing the levy provisions of the 1883 Rabbit Nuisance
Act, and he outlined in some detail the half promises and
73evasions which had taken the place of decisive action.
However, his own speech mentioned one of the basic
problems confronting the minister: some pastoral tenants,
particularly the larger ones, favoured compulsory fencing,
but others, particularly the smaller ones, were opposed to 
74it. The 1889 Land Act had cleared the way for fencing
legislation by extending the duration of pastoral leases
and by classing fencing as an improvement for which
compensation would have to be paid when the run was 
75resumed. Poor men with rich neighbours had good reason 
to dread the introduction of compulsory fencing and small 
tenants wishing to extend their runs were naturally wary 
of any plan that would enable the squatter to increase the 
amount of money he was entitled to receive when some of 
his land was taken up. The old squatter/selector division 
latent in the debates of the early 1880s had re-emerged, 
although it was far from clear-cut.
The member for Grenfell, George Greene, a large 
landowner in the central division, who pioneered the share
73 Ibid., 768-73.
74 Ibid., 772 .
75 Ibid., 778 .
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farming movement in the colony, pointed out that in some 
cases it was the small men who took advantage of the large. 
Selectors who refused to contribute to the cost of fencing 
could turn around and demand more money when they wanted to 
sell out because the fence had increased the value of their 
property. Greene estimated that a 640 acre selector 
compelled to share the cost of netting existing fencing at 
a rate of £40 per mile would be liable for about £22.10s.0d?( 
However, such calculations ignored the additional expense 
incurred where there was no existing fence (which meant 
a total outlay of about £70 per mile) or where the selector 
was on the boundary line and thus became liable for the time 
and labour of putting up his share of a compulsory fence. 
They also ignored the basic problem of under-capitalized 
small farmers, namely their inability to get cash. It did 
not matter whether the actual sum was comparatively small 
or not, to men struggling to exist 'on tick' from one season 
to the next, it could still prove unobtainable.
Tne unpredictable larrikin, William Crick,
admitted that although he was 'anti-squatter', this was one
occasion when it seemed that selectors and squatters shared
7 7a genuine grievance. The founder of the Free Settlers' 
Association in Wagga Wagga, James Gormly, agreed with 
Crick. He believed that the 1889 Land Act had been over-
76 Ibid., 779.
77 Ibid., 797.
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generous to squatters and that they were 'acting now as
they have acted on a hundred other occasions; after
having received large concessions they come back to the
7 8House and say they want something more'. Nevertheless,
he thought it was also apparent that 1pastoralists who go
to great expense in procuring wire netting and erecting
fences are working at a great disadvantage when their
79neighbours will not assist them. He favoured compulsory
fencing but only in specified, badly infested areas. On
the other hand, a supporter of the government, John Burns,
who had proved himself to be an incompetent treasurer in
1887-89, opposed any change: 'where is the money to come
from to recoup the government what they have advanced ...
It is too much to expect the government to put forward a
scheme when we find that all previous schemes have only
8 0resulted in a large expenditure'. He was supported by
the member for Morpeth, Myles McRae: 'unless they
Ipastoralists ] want to rob the people of this country
the onus of eradicating the rabbit pest should fall upon
81the pastoralists'. A supporter of the legislation
claimed that McRae's well-known, uncompromising hostility
to pastoralists was a result of his experiences as a drover
8 2and not a reasonable response to the proposed measures.
78 Ibid., 779.
79 Ibid., 780.
80 Ibid., 781.
81 Ibid., 797.
82 NSWPD, 1890, 46, 2557.
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Because no action followed, another adjournment
debate was held in July at the instigation of Allan Lakeman,
who held land under conditional purchase in the Hay 
8 3district, and was a member for Balranald. The speeches
were very similar to those heard two months before. Once
again attendance was poor,^ but considering that no bill
was under discussion and that attendance at the Land Act
debates had also been low, this need not be taken to
indicate that the matter was considered unimportant. There
were many calls on a member’s time and, as now, some topics
8 5were regarded as the concern of specialists. Three hours
into the adjournment Brunker announced that he would
submit the question to the next Cabinet meeting and decide
whether to introduce a bill that year. Other speakers were
quick to see a connection between this move and the
imminent introduction of the Crown Rents Bill: it might
be another way of giving pastoral lessees further rent 
8 6reductions. Nevertheless, Dibbs rose and promised 
Brunker that a rabbit bill would be regarded as a non-party 
issue and 'every assistance' would be given to its passage: 
'The hon. member need not be modest, and blush like a
8 7maiden; we know that the subject is a difficult one'.
83 Annual Report Stocks and Brands Branch, Department of 
Mines, 1883, Appendix 2, Alphabetical return of holdings 
in the colony. NSWV&P, 1883-84, IV, 756 ff.
84 NSWPP, 1890, 46, 2552.
85 NSWPD, 1890, 50, 6574 - a comment by Bruce Smith on the 
committee stage of the 1890 Rabbit Act.
86 NSWPD, 1890, 46, 2553-54.
87 Ibid., 2555.
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Brunker chose to get around most of the
difficulties by presenting a bill which promised very little
and by allowing even less time for discussion. The second
reading debate began on Wednesday 17 December at 10.45 p.m.
and the measure had to be in Legislative Council by the
next day if it was to pass before the end of the session,
which was set for Monday 22 December. If it lapsed it was
unlikely to be re-introduced next year because of the
pressure of work resulting from the long debates on
federation although it might be possible to introduce some
amendments. The debate in the Assembly went all through
the night, ending at 8.50 a.m. on Thursday 18 December.
Judging by the division lists, about 40 members were
present at the beginning and 30 saw it through to the end.
Considering the lateness of the debate and the fact that
there had been confusion about when the bill was to be
8 8presented, it was a reasonable attendance. Gormly
89claimed all country members were present, and there was 
a sufficient range of speakers to provide the foreshadowed 
spread of arguments, but the numbers are too small to more 
than hint at developing, or pre-existing sectional 
allegiances.
The legislation repealed all sections of the Rabbit 
Nuisance Act and made the £500,000 rabbit fund debt
88 NSWPP, 1890, 50, 6510.
89 Ibid., 6497.
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9 0chargeable to consolidated revenue. The minister was 
empowered to declare any district rabbit infested and in 
those areas rabbit-proof fencing became compulsory.
Small selections could group together to form larger 
fencing areas and thus reduce costs. All matters of 
administration became the responsibility of the local land 
boards and the existing stock and land inspectors. Cases 
would be judged by the Land Court. As under the previous 
act all creatures listed as 'natural enemies' of the rabbit 
were protected, and inspectors could order occupiers to 
destroy rabbits on threat of a fine. The government could 
also gazette certain days for simultaneous vermin destruct­
ion throughout an area. The one startling innovation 
was the acknowledgement that unleased crown lands were the 
responsibility of the government and 'will have to
91contribute in the same manner as a private owner'. The 
same condition applied to land under the authority of the 
railway commissioners.
Although there were good points in the proposals
a number of speakers were aware of serious weaknesses.
There was no provision for financial aid to those compelled
to fence, nor did the free-trade government suggest
92lifting the bounty on wire. The clause outlining
90 Ibid., 6487-90.
91 Ibid., 6488.
92 NSWPD, 1890, 46, 2543; 1890, 50, 6509, 6651.
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government responsibility for unoccupied crown lands was
ambiguous. Brunker accepted an amendment changing the word
'may' to 'shall' in a description of the government's
responsibility for clearance of public lands, but he did
so on the understanding that no amendment was offered to
the clause which vaguely defined where the money was to 
93come from. In reply to a specific question from Gormly
about the source from which the Minister expected to get
money to finance fencing and vermin eradication on crown
land, Brunker replied, 'Out of the general revenue, I 
9 4suppose!'
Another worrying point was that although the
Land Court was the first and final court for all cases, it
9 5had no power to enforce awards. Civil litigation was the 
only remedy against defaulters and this could prove slow 
and costly. Disquiet was also expressed over the 
definition of 'rabbit proof fencing'. The wire netting 
standard was set at 36" high, 1.5/8" mesh, but there was 
a strong body of opinion that held this was too low and too
93
94
NSWPD, 
Ibid.
1890, 50, 6505.
95 Ibid., 6503. An amendment removed the subclause
referring to further litigation but did not completely 
remove the possibility of such appeals, or increase 
the coercive powers of the Land Court.
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96large a hole. As the 1888 royal commission into rabbits
had discussed the mesh size of wire netting, without
reaching a definite conclusion, Brunker had grounds for
arguing that it was best to select the cheapest, but it
was unfortunate that an amendment to allow boards to set
9 7a smaller mesh size was rejected.
Throughout the evening, regardless of the specific 
point under discussion, the debate kept returning to the 
effect any legislation would have on the land tenure 
situation and the ability of poor selectors to survive 
financially, but no simple faction division emerged. One 
pastoralist, William Alison, who owned two central 
division stations near Nyngan, argued that the act would
9 8be better administered by the pastures and stock boards.
9 9This was also the view of the pro-selector William Lyne. 
Another central division property owner, William A'Beckett, 
defended the record of the pastures and stock boards but 
thought that, in this instance, the land boards had a 
better c l a i m . T h e  most vocal spokesman for the
96 Ibid., 6507.
97 Ibid., 6508. The wire netting recommendations of 
the royal commission will be discussed in Chapter 6.
98 Ibid., 6497.
99 Buxton, Riverina, p. 279.
100 NSWPD, 1890, 50, 6500.
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selectors' interest, John Chanter, founder of the Kyneton
Farmers' Union, Riverina selector and a member for Murray,
rather surprisingly favoured the pastures and stock
boards as the administering authority, and James Gormly
did not seem to think it a particularly important point 
102of dispute. On the other hand, the idea was vigorously
resisted by George Cass, a member for the Bogan. He was
a wine and spirit merchant and owner of several central
103division newspapers. Charles Collins, representing the
Namoi and also a prosperous rural merchant, sided with 
Cass.^^ This spread of opinion on a question that might 
have been expected to reveal a simple alignment is just one 
more indication of the complexity of the land question in 
the late nineteenth century.
On a practical question, such as administrative 
authority, it was not necessarily those who had the most 
direct experience who always held the most radical opinions, 
as illustrated by the differences between Chanter and Cass. 
However, this is not to say that the 1890 rabbit debate 
could be used to illustrate N.G. Butlin's suggestion that 
the selector-squatter conflict was possibly not of great 
importance in explaining rural policy in the late nineteenth
101 Ibid., 6496.
102 Ibid., 6499 .
103 Ibid., 6499, 6501.
104 Ibid., 6496-98 (interjections).
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10 5century. When the discussion got down to the basic
fear of selectors that the squatters were manoeuvring to 
tighten their grasp on leasehold property (by investment 
in improvements) and to apply financial pressure to make 
selection more difficult (by increasing the capital 
required), a range of pro-selector opinion came together, 
including John Chanter, James Hayes, James Gormly, John 
Barnes, George Cass, Allan Lakeman, William Schey and 
William W i l l i s . I t  is impossible to tabulate the voting 
records of those involved in the debate in order to reveal 
a steady pro-selector coalition, because members drifted 
in and out of the Chamber (or fell asleep) so that 
different votes were recorded for similar amendments. 
Nevertheless, the men listed were the most outspoken 
representatives for what appears to have been a pro-selector 
group. By and large this assessment is confirmed by the third 
reading vote in the Assembly.
Thirteen men opposed passage of the act. Most 
of them had spoken against various clauses in the committee 
stage but many factors which go far beyond a simple squatter- 
selector designation combined to influence the vote. Most 
importantly, those voting against the legislation knew 
that it would pass. Opposition was a luxury they could
105 N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Develop 
ment, Cambridge, 1964, p. 89.
106 Chanter, Hayes, Gormly, Barnes are discussed in Buxton, 
Riverina, pp. 279-83. Cass, Lakeman and Willis have 
already been mentioned (see p .16QEÖ • Schey was the 
member for Redfern, an active unionist who helped form 
the Railway and Tramway Employees' Association.
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afford. No-one now expected a quick solution to rabbit 
problems. It was most unlikely that the new act would be 
an immediate success, whatever its long-range possibilities, 
and it might well be politically useful for a man to be 
able to point to a negative vote, provided that vote had 
not meant rejection of the act, retention of the levy and 
legal problems for those wishing to fence. The Sydney 
Morning Herald observed that although a new act was widely 
favoured there was much underlying dissension: 'The
pressure of a common danger like the rabbits may, for the 
moment, induce them l squatters and selectors ] to work 
together, but the impulse will not last long'.^^
Although the discussion inside and outside 
parliament was full of concern over the impact of rabbit 
legislation on the selectors, the issue was complicated by 
the lack of discrimination shown by the rabbits: they did
not care who owned the pasture they ate. This helped blur 
the divisions between leaseholders and freeholders. In 
one infested seat, the Murray, the two selectors' 
representatives, John Chanter and Robert Barbour (who,
10 8incidentally, were both protectionists) voted differently.
109Arthur 'firebrand' Rae, that Laborite hater of squatters,
supported the act, but his fellow member for the
107 SMH, 23 December 1890. Part of the series of articles 
'In Rabbit Land' by a special correspondent who had 
been sent to the western division.
108 NSWPP, 1890, 50, 6575 - Division list.
109 Buxton, Riverina, p. 281.
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Murrumbidgee, the leading selector spokesman, Gormly,
- . .  110 opposed it.
When the voting list for the third reading of 
the Rabbit Act is compared with the voting on clause 43 of 
the 1889 Land Act (which dealt with extension of pastoral 
leases as compensation for improvements) certain similarit­
ies emerge. There were five formal divisions over clause 
43. Of the 13 men who voted against the Rabbit Act, only 
one, William Alison, who later became the first vice- 
president of the Pastoralists' Association, never voted 
against any aspect of clause 4 3 . ^ ^  William Crick was 
absent from several divisions in 1889, but apart from that 
he too voted for all clauses. Allen Lakeman, a selector 
holding the seat of Balranald, which still included many
large pastoral leases, favoured ’fair compensation ...
112provided it does not lock up the lands', but he was
absent from the votes. In the final division on the
compensation issue 19 men voted to reject the clause and
of these seven were to vote against the Rabbit Act, eight
113were to accept it and four were not present.
The most clear-cut evidence illustrating the 
relationship of the land tenure question to the rabbit 
legislation is the contrast between the Council and 
Assembly debates. Only five men spoke in the Legislative
110 NSWPD, 1890,
111 NSWPD, 1889,
112 Ibid., 3002.
113 Ibid.
6575 . 
39.
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Council. Regret was expressed by Leopold de Salis and 
J. Smith that no financial aid for fencing had been 
provided, but the only amendment passed was one to rein­
state the ban on keeping rabbits without permission. ^ ^
The entire proceedings in the Council only took up four 
pages in the Parliamentary Debates. Obviously in that 
section of parliament where the pastoralists were most 
strongly represented there were no objections to the 
principles of the act.
Within the short span of ten years New South 
Wales rabbit control policy had swung around almost a 
full circle, back to local administration and minimal 
government financial involvement. Yet despite the rapid 
changes and the close ties between land tenure legislation 
and the rabbit question, the various rabbit acts intro­
duced from 1880 to 1890 deserve to be considered as among 
the most intense searches for a vermin policy ever tried 
in Australia. The acts were not just a series of ad hoc 
measures produced because other, more engrossing problems 
forced the authorities to pay some attention to vermin.
New ideas on method, administration and finance were 
developed and tested, not usually very thoroughly but at 
least with much discussion, and not just as a corollary 
to other concerns.
No policy stands alone, separate from all other
114 NSWPD, 1890, 50, 6649-51.
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policy considerations, but it was unfortunate that the 
area most affected by rabbits was also the area in which 
the economic and social tensions associated with the 
changes in land policy were strongest. Nor did it help 
that, because the rabbit menace was still remote from 
Sydney and the more populous parts of the colony, lack of 
first-hand experience sometimes reinforced the prejudices 
of those called on to evaluate new, expensive government 
initiatives. There were many men who believed that rabbits 
would never be a problem in the more settled regions. When 
time proved them wrong they looked back to the legislative 
precedents of the 1880s and drew lessons that made little 
allowance for the peculiar difficulties of forming policy 
for that particular region at that particular time.
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CHAPTER 6
Experimenters and Policy Makers
The relationship between experiments in various 
methods of rabbit control and the framing of new legislation 
is complex. On the most basic level legislators could not 
be expected to encourage the introduction of methods about 
which they had never heard. However, adoption of new ideas 
was not necessarily based on the degree of testing they had 
received or even on the faith expressed in their effective­
ness. As was shown in the last chapter, considerations of 
expense, legal precedents and social acceptability were 
often the most important factors influencing the passage of 
legislation. Nevertheless, between 1880 and 1890 every 
kind of method that has since been employed in Australia 
against rabbits was tried: poisoning and trapping,
fumigation and digging out, natural enemies and biological 
control, barrier and private fencing. The development of 
these approaches to the problem reveals a great deal about 
contemporary attitudes and a little about the way a colony 
formed its policies. Again a detailed and extremely readable 
account of the kinds of methods used by landholders has been 
given by Rolls,^ so I will not go into biological or 
technical detail, except where it is needed to illustrate
1 Rolls, They All Ran Wild, pp. 113-149.
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attitudes and particular legislative decisions.
A far sighted optimist confronting failure after 
failure of control schemes in the 1880s might still have 
concluded that things could always have been worse: the
first hope of the experimenters might have succeeded. If 
this had occurred Australia might have conquered the rabbit 
only to be faced with a plague of small carnivores. From 
the 1870s onwards the introduction of weasels, stoats, 
ferrets, mongooses and polecats was widely recommended. In 
rabbit infested areas domestic cats that went wild were
2protected from 1881 in New South Wales and 1884 in Victoria. 
Joseph Abbott, responsible for the 1883 Rabbit Nuisance Act,
3released mongooses to help the new control measures and
there were numerous private attempts to establish mongooses
4 5and ferrets. Cats were released by the dray-load. The
significant point is that this was done without prior testing
or serious thought about possible consequences, much in the
same spirit as rabbits had been introduced. One might have
expected that the rabbit experience would have made settlers
cautious about bringing in new species, but such caution
apparently ran counter to the popular scientific ideas of the
2 Stock and Pastures Protection Act (Amendment) 1881. 
Rabbit Nuisance Act 1883 and NSW Government Gazette
1 May 1883. Rabbit Act 1890. Pastures Protection Act 
1902 and the Victorian Vermin Acts 1890, 1915.
3 NSWPD, 1883, 8, 821.
4 Select Committee on Rabbit Nuisance Act 1887, p. 480.
5 Rolls, They All Ran Wild, p. 116.
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age. It was argued that rabbits became a pest because they 
had too few natural enemies: a primitive survival of the
fittest idea. Looked at from this view point the logical 
step was to introduce the natural predators. Lest it be 
thought settlers were entirely blind to the fact that they 
were in a new environment it should be noted that they also 
conducted vociferous campaigns to protect the iguana as one 
of the few native predators that was not a sheep killer.^
Recent studies have shown there is validity in
the claim that feral cats play an important role in
stabilising the rabbit population in warrens, but this is
only possible where numbers have already been reduced by 
7other methods. What was almost totally lacking in the 
nineteenth century was awareness of the threat that such 
introductions posed to the native bird, animal and insect 
life and thus to the broader environment and indirectly to 
the pastoral and agricultural industries. Considering how 
many thousands of ferrets have been lost or deliberately 
released over the years Australia had a lucky escape, 
probably due to climatic factors more than the breeding habitsgof these animals. New Zealand was not so fortunate: the
small English carnivores destroyed native birds and menaced
6 Australasian, 24 March 1883, p. 378. NSW Government 
Gazette, 1 May 1883.
7 ECOS.CSIRO Environmental Research, November 1979, p. 18.
8 In a typescript autobiographical account of life during 
the depression Tim Watson, now of Canberra, described 
rabbit hunting with ferrets in the Victorian Alps in 
1933. At the end of the season he not only released
his ferrets but also hung up strips of dried meat to help 
them through the winter.
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lambs and poultry. Settlers were slow to appreciate what 
had really happened as distinct from what they believed 
ought to have occurred.
Some men wondered what the result would be if
weasels and the like ate out the rabbits but very few
expressed much concern and most dismissed the matter with
the claim that ’man has always proved himself capable of
9dealing with carnivorous animals.’ A Cooma farmer wrote 
that it would be unwise to introduce the larger carnivores 
but ferrets and polecats would do very well because 
poultry could be protected from them and, when they had 
done with the rabbits, the foxes would kill the surplus.^ 
The Bulletin gave the problem a little thought and 
produced a cartoon of the natural chain of predators, 
based on Indian experience: rabbit, mongoose, crocodile,
missionary.^ Of course not every one was convinced that 
predators could eliminate rabbits but Felix Mitchell of 
Walgett showed himself to be one of a small group of 
sceptics when he wrote:
Did the tigers in Saugor Island kill all 
the deer or other animals? Did any means 
squelch the tigers? Yes. God sent a tidal 
wave in October 1864 ... The thirty feet 
of water is a good cure for vermin ... but 
a counter pest is bosh.
9 PR, 1 May 1891, p. 476.
10 Australasian, 18 June 1887, p. 1164.
11 Bulletin, 18 August 1883, p. 15.
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Belief in the natural enemy approach lasted well 
into the twentieth century. In 1916 Western Australia 
invited Sir David Hutchins, a noted British forester with 
experience in India and South Africa, to advise the govern­
ment on forest policy including vermin control. He wrote:
'it does not seem a very hazardous proceeding to strengthen
the Australian wild cats with some of their African 
13cousins.' At least he added the rider that it might be 
as well to experiment first on an island. Whereas settlers 
in the 1880s had the excuse of inexperience it is hard to 
understand why the idea of natural enemies retained its 
attraction for another 30 or 40 years. It should have been 
obvious after the rabbit numbers recovered time and again 
from the decimating effects of drought that natural predators 
could not cope. As Francis Ratcliffe wrote in the classic 
description of his investigations into wind erosion and 
flying foxes, even under apparently perfect conditions 
following droughts, foxes, wild dogs, iguanas and crows 
failed to control let alone exterminate the remnants of the 
rabbit plague. ^
Probably so many people clung to the idea of 
natural enemies because such a solution, would be cheap and
12 Town and Country Journal, 9 July 1885, p. 958.
13 D. Hutchins, 'Control of the Rabbit Pest', Western 
Australian Forest Department Bulletin, 1916, p. 408.
14 F. Ratcliffe, Flying Fox and Drifting Sand, New York, 
1938, p. 224.
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the idea of nature striking a balance was a deeply held
part of popular belief. It was easier to ignore the
evidence than to adopt a new view of the way the natural
environment operated. However ideas did change, if slowly.
In 1921 the Pastoral Review went to the trouble of seeking
expert advice on some proposals it received, particularly
those involving the importation of South African animals.
The director of the Port Elizabeth museum warned against
the introduction of the meercat because it was swift and
savage but recommended the polecat; 'It would, in time,
eliminate the rabbit ... It is a slow mover and dogs can
easily run it down and destroy it.'^ An even more drastic
solution was suggested by the Perth Farmers and Settlers'
Association which wrote to the Institute for Science and
Industry (the forerunner to CSIR and CSIRO) in 1919
proposing the introduction of the carnivorous ant. The
Institute's entomologist pointed out that 'this ant is a
most formidable creature invading at times whole villages,
compelling the people to leave. The ants take possession,
destroying and carrying off all stores and food to their 
16liking.' The Pastoral Review continued to receive many 
letters on the topic of natural predators but by the 1920s 
pastoral leadership had become rather more doubtful about 
massive new introductions. Inquiries were made in New 
Zealand about the effect of weasels and stoats on the
15 PR, 15 October 1921, p. 811. Editorial.
16 CSIROA, Annual Pest Correspondence File 102/A, 
5 February 1919.
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countryside. The replies were an unequivocal indictment 
of the scheme.^
At the start of the twentieth century state and
federal authorities were far better informed and far more
cautious than many spokesmen for the rural sector. In 1909
the commonwealth forbade importation of stoats and weasels
18because of the New Zealand experience and when in 1914 a
South American aroused some interest by his proposal to
solve the rabbit problem by introducing the Chilean 'quique'
(a relation of the stoat) all the state premiers opposed the
idea and attention was drawn not only to the danger to
19poultry but also to the effect on native fauna. Yet state 
protection of feral cats remained, illustrating again the 
difference between making a new ruling and changing an 
existing law to create a consistent policy.
During the 1880s the most widely used method of
attack in New South Wales was trapping. Victorian experience
had shown it was far more labour intensive and therefore more
expensive than poisoning and many graziers blamed the panic
20it aroused among rabbits for further spreading the pest.
17 ANUA, E 256/126/8033, Graziers' Association, Package of 
letters from New Zealand about Colman Phillips, August 
1922. The Institute made a thorough report on Colman 
Phillips' claims in 1923 at the government request. A.A. 
CRS. A 458/2. P.M. Dept. Correspondence files multi- 
number series, 2nd system.
18 Government Gazette, 22 May 1909.
19 A.A., CRS A2/230/1912-13. Correspondence Files, Annual 
Single number series.
20 See Chapter 2 and Royal Commission Into Rabbits 1888-89 
pp. 65, 66, 86, 90, 94, 113.
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However it had a number of advantages. When feed was 
plentiful rabbits were hard to poison and baits left lying 
around were a danger to stock. Deep pit-traps or funnel 
traps constructed in the angle of fences or on approaches 
to water could catch thousands of rabbits at a time. More 
importantly, when subsidy payments were based on scalp 
counts it was necessary to find the bodies. Poisoned 
rabbits often hid: trapped rabbits were easily located.
This argument also told against the use of fumigation. 
Nevertheless, it became as obvious to New South Wales 
graziers as to their Victorian counterparts that while 
rabbits were free to move in and out of a district as 
weather, food numbers or vigorous counter-measures directed, 
the task of control was hopeless. The divide and try to 
rule principle had to be applied and calls for netted 
fences spread. At first the demand was for the government 
to erect long barrier fences to turn the grey tide. Soon 
the emphasis shifted to the provision of individual 
property fencing but the work on the long barriers continued, 
often long after the rabbits had swept past.
Barrier fencing remains a contentious issue in 
rural Australia to this day. It has been used against 
rabbits, dingoes, ticks, kangaroos and emus. Nowhere can 
its advocates claim it was completely successful and to many 
it rapidly became an object of ridicule. Henry Lawson 
described the Queensland border fence at Hungerford, north­
west of Bourke, where the rabbits 'crack Noah's Ark rabbit
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jokes about that fence, and burrow under and play leap-
21frog over it till they get tired.' However all states,
with the exception of Tasmania and Victoria, persisted
with the erection of barrier fences against rabbits until
well into the twentieth century and some of the dingo and
emu fences are still maintained. The scientific rights and
wrongs of this policy are beyond the scope of a history
thesis but the relationships between contemporary knowledge,
public attitudes and government policy decisions are not.
The question of dingo fencing will be considered in a later 
22chapter but the reasons the New South Wales government 
expended large sums on barrier fences against rabbits are 
worth examination.
The first New South Wales barrier fences were
begun in 1886. Building northwards from the Murray River
and from Cockburn (west of Broken Hill) the 346 mile border
2 3fence was almost finished by 1890. Tenders for the fence
from Bourke to Narromine (on the Macquarie River) were 
24called in 1887 and by 1889 the 207 miles had been complet­
ed as well as another 84 miles to Barringun on the Queens­
land border. By 1894 the line had been completed from 
Bourke to Dubbo and then south along the railway, using
21 H. Lawson, "Hungerford", Prose Works, Sydney 1935, Vol.
1, p . 26.
22 See Chapter 8, p. 260 ff.
23 T.A. Coghlan, Wealth and Progress of New South Wales, 
1888-89, p. 323; 1889-90, p. 370. These state year 
books are the best source for barrier fencing statistics.
24 NSWPD, 1887, 25, 259.
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existing wire fences for stringing netting, through 
Murrumburrah and Wagga Wagga to Corowa on the Murray, a 
total distance of 693 miles. In 1895 another fence was 
begun at joint expense with Queensland to run from 
Mungindi to Narrabri.^  By 1898 there was a total of 1157 
miles of government erected barrier fencing in New South 
Wales. The only extension to this total came in 1921 when 
the state took over part of the Queensland border fence as 
part of an anti-dingo campaign and had to agree to keep it
2 6rabbit proof to soothe the feelings of Queensland graziers.
There was consideration of a fence from Tweed Heads to
27Lismore in 1925 but it came to nothing.
The initial meeting about the Bourke fence had
2 8been attended by 81 run-holders at Cobar in March 1883.
They wanted an 180 mile fence costing about £100 per mile
running from just north of Wilcannia on the Darling, east
to the Macquarie River near Canonbar. The driving force
was Archie Maxwell, a former Victorian grazier with personal
experience of rabbits. The final meeting was held in June
1883 and, although those attending expressed strong
sympathy for the idea, no decision was reached because of 
2 9the cost. It was decided to collect signatures on a 
petition seeking a government subsidy. As the rabbits
25 Wealth & Progress, 1895-96, p. 839. Summary of barrier 
fencing to that date.
26 Rolls, p. 123.
27 Steed, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, Report, Pt. 11.
28 Australasian, 21 April 1883, p. 505.
29 Ibid., 16 June 1383, p. 761.
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moved northeast so did the debate about the barrier fence.
In 1885 70 run-holders met at Bourke and requested govern­
ment aid for a fence.^ Both the 1885 and 1886 Sydney
31rabbit conferences favoured the construction of barriers.
In contrast to the enormous amount of discussion 
that surrounded the rabbit acts barrier fencing projects 
were begun with very little debate, despite the outcry over 
other forms of expenditure under the Rabbit Nuisance Act and 
considerable scepticism about the effectiveness of long 
lines of fencing. When Abigail, the Minister for Mines, was 
asked whether he still thought that the Bourke fence was 
worth constructing, seeing that rabbits had been reported 
40 miles beyond, he replied 'I cannot be held responsible 
for what is commonly reported. I am satisfied that the 
work will be a great public benefit and I propose to 
proceed with it.'^
Work had begun before the 1887 Stock Branch 
investigation of effective mesh size and before the massive 
1888-89 royal commission into all methods of control. As 
a result a number of different gauges of wire, heights and 
mesh sizes were used. The South Australian border fence 
was lk inch mesh, 17 gauge and 42 inches high. It cost
30 Ibid., 12 September 1885, p. 493.
31 See Chapter 5. 
p. 1212.
Also Australasian, 26 June 1886,
32 NSWPD, 1887-88, 30, 1983 .
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£37 per mile (or £76 erected). Narromine to Bourke was
netted in the heavier 16 gauge wire, 48 inches high but
with a larger 1\ inch mesh, which cost £48 per mile (£84
erected). The southern section of the line was 17 gauge,
inch mesh and 42 inches high. It cost £31 per mile
(£60 erected). The Railway Commissioners contracted with
the Lands Department to maintain the wire netting on their 
33fences.
The lack of investigation of the best mesh size,
height and gauge and the lack of concern shown at criticism
of the whole exercise illustrates the problem of trying to
relate policy decisions to contemporary research. The
reasons for building barrier fences remain obscure but
there is no evidence that they were based on scientific
investigations, although such investigations took place.
Rolls sees the explanation for the construction of netted
34border fences in terms of a 'jealous parochialism':
New South Wales did not want to deal with South Australian
rabbits. This line of argument seems to have influenced
35Queensland to build a border fence and it may well be 
the correct one, but it cannot explain the eastern barrier 
fence. There is a marked lack of records, possibly 
because barrier fencing was also seen as simply part of the
33 Wealth and Progress, 1895-96, p. 839. The finished 
height of the fence was always six inches less than 
the width of the netting because of the need to bury 
the lower six inches to prevent rabbits burrowing 
underneath.
34 Rolls, p. 122.
35 Cameron, "Queensland rabbits".
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accepted roads, railways and bridges syndrome whereby 
local members sought to prove their worthiness to 
represent a district by the amount of capital works they 
won for the area. The weakness of this argument is that 
the eastern fence crossed many electorates. The members 
differed in experience and influence but the actual 
building was not a disjointed project. Tenders were called 
by section but the work proceeded steadily, despite the 
expense and the sometimes enormous difficulties of 
construction.
Severe maintenance problems were obvious long
before the fences were finished. Graziers and farmers
refused to mend them, claiming that the government should
do it, and drifting sand, animals, wind, fire, floods and
3 6corrosion soon began their destructive work. Yet serious 
efforts were made to keep the fences rabbit proof.
Boundary riders were appointed and many sections were re­
built time and again. Even after the 1902 Pastures Pro­
tection Act made fencing and all rabbit control the 
responsibility of the pastures protection boards the state 
continued to pay the Railway Commissioners to maintain
the netting along the railway lines. Between 1902 and 1918
37this cost £13,414. The payments were made despite the
36 Rolls, p. 123.
37 Wealth and Progress, 1920, p. 795.
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admission of the Commissioners that the fence condition was
3 8only fair and that they doubted its worth. In contrast
to the huge sums spent under the Rabbit Nuisance Act Lands
Department expenditure on rabbit control between 1890 and
1895 only came to £39,358, but of this £28,897 was spent on
39barrier fencing.
It is clear that the government of New South Wales 
saw some advantage in continuing the barrier fencing policy, 
perhaps not least because it was the most conspicuous policy 
available. In success or failure the fences were a visible 
sign that the government had tried to do something. In his 
local history of Condobolin, William Bayley noted that at 
the time the town was becoming concerned about rabbits, 1892, 
there was much public comment on the wagon loads of wire 
netting seen moving northwards. A few local men took up the 
idea of fencing and in 1897 there was a petition for govern­
ment fencing assistance.^
There are also a few anomalies in the fence build­
ing schemes that strengthen the idea that conspicuous effort 
was at least as important a motive as faith in the ultimate 
effectiveness of the barriers. The original proposal of the 
1886 rabbit conference was for a fence from Barrigun (on the
38 Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, p. 197.
39 Wealth and Progress, 1898-99, p. 713.
40 W. Bayley, Down the Lachlan Years Ago: History of
Condobolin, Condobolin, 1965, p. 66.
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Queensland border) south through Bourke, south-east to
Nyngan (not Narromine) then south to Condobolin, Junee and
Albury. According to disgruntled settlers in the north the
Barrigun to Bourke section was initially deleted on the
representation of a small group of self-constituted delegates
of large central division holdings, presumably anxious for
more rapid construction south of Bourke, and as a result
41the rabbits went round the northern end of the fence. It 
is probably more significant that the Bourke to Barrigun 
section posed by far the most difficult construction 
problems because of the rivers, the climate, the sand and 
the scrub. The diversion of the southern section of the 
fence to Narromine and then southwards was a more justifiable 
decision because it moved the barrier fence along to the 
railway line where there was existing wire fencing on which 
to hang the netting. Despite the complaints from the 
Condobolin area that they should have been protected there 
were already rabbits east of Wagga Wagga and Corowa, let alone 
around Junee and Albury.
The fencing projects may have had a subsidiary 
worth in the eyes of non-rural politicians in that they 
encouraged a new secondary industry. John Lysaght Pty. Ltd. 
had begun wire netting manufacture in New South Wales in 
the early 1880s. Despite the predominance of free trade 
ministries and the demands for cheaper netting from settlers
41 PR, 15 March 1892, p. 536.
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there was a £3 per ton protective tariff till 1892, when 
Dibbs' Protectionist ministry reduced it to 30s. The 
duty was not finally dropped till 1896, whereas protect­
ionist Victoria had repealed the duty in 1886. Although 
Lysaght wire was £1 to £3 per mile dearer than its British
and German competitors, it was better quality, less tightly
42rolled and therefore easier to erect. On these grounds
it continued to win New South Wales contracts, despite
some freetrader scepticism, and the company sold its entire
43output in the colony. Fence construction was also a 
source of employment in the lean years of the early 1890s.
The lack of strong opposition to expenditure on 
barrier fences from representatives of non-rural areas is 
in marked contrast to the response to schemes involving 
more direct aid to those afflicted with rabbits. There was 
something in this policy for everyone; from the western 
division grazier being eaten out by rabbits to the eastern 
settlers anxious to avoid them; from the rural labourers 
dismissed from the big rabbiting gangs to the supporters 
of secondary industry.
By the early 1890s it was obvious that barrier 
fences could not keep an area free from rabbits but this 
did not prove that they were useless. They broke the free 
flow of rabbits, provided the opportunity for large pit trap
42 C.B. Shedvin, "Rabbits and Industrial Development", 
Australian Economic History Review, 1970, Vol. 10, 
p . 34 .
43 NSWV&P, 1887, (2), IV, 633. Wire Netting Tenders.
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construction and served as starting points and often as the 
initiative for private fences. What was totally lacking 
in the barrier fencing policy was any attempt to test 
scientifically the efficiency of various types of fences 
or to weigh the benefits of this form of expenditure against 
the other possible forms. Victoria had swung around heavily 
towards government loans for private fence construction.
New South Wales resisted similar demands from the rural
44electorate. Not even minimal aid was provided until 1899. 
This omission made for an oddly unbalanced policy and further 
reduced the effectiveness of the long fences.
The main contact between policy makers and 
experimenters was in the area of vermin control by the intro­
duction of diseases. The idea of killing rabbits by disease 
was as popular as the idea of introducing natural predators 
and for similar reasons. It would be cheap, require little 
labour and it was in line with popular conceptions of the 
way the natural environment operated. Some of the suggest­
ions were horrific in their possible implications. In 1883 
Anthony Willows, the New South Wales veterinary officer, put
forward plans based on his experiments in 1874 with 
45tuberculosis. John Creed, who later became president of 
the New South Wales Medical Association and was a member
44 Private fence construction is discussed in the next 
chapter. The first Advances to Settlers Act was not 
specifically intended to help farmers build fences. It 
was primarily emergency relief but it may have provided 
minimal indirect assistance.
45 Australasian, 19 May 1883, p. 635. SMH, 31 March 1883.
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for the Upper Hunter, was also very interested in the use
46of tuberculosis against rabbits. Other scientists
47proposed use of syphilis or even anthrax. The 1884 
Conference of Rabbit Inspectors from New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia, which met in Wentworth 
discussed the general topic of disease introduction but 
decided to wait for the results of a Tasmanian investig­
ation into an outbreak of tuberculosis in r a b b i t s . M a n y  
pastoralists also had schemes for encouraging the spread 
of diseases that they had heard afflicted European rabbits 
or that they thought they had observed among rabbits on 
their land. For instance, John Hunter Patterson applied
to the Lands Department for permission to release 'a mange'
49among rabbits on his Riverina properties. He was referred 
to the royal commission investigation and permission was 
refused.
Matters came to a head when Parkes suddenly
offered a £25,000 reward for a solution to the rabbit 
50problem. There had been an earlier suggestion of a 
combined Victorian and New South Wales offer of £60,000 by 
William Dailey, a Sydney barrister, who, while he was acting 
Premier had been responsible for the presentation of the
46 Creed Papers, Rabbit Destruction 1883-89. ML, A692.
47 Australasian, 1 November 1884, p. 826.
48 Ibid., 16 February 1884, p. 217.
NSWV&P, 1883-84, IX, 275. Report on Diseases in 
Tasmanian Rabbits.
49 MUA, John Hunter Patterson, Correspondence, 1889, 
June - December.
50 Proclamation, Department of Mines, 31 August 1887.
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Rabbit Nuisance Act in the Legislative Council, but it had
not eventuated.^ Parkes' offer came without warning after
Abigail had made it clear that there were going to be big
52cuts in spending under the Rabbit Nuisance Act. There
was some complaint that members should have been consulted
but the offer was justified on the grounds that £25,000
represented only one eighth of the Department of Mines'
53annual expenditure on rabbits. Of course the rabbit 
account was already heavily in debt but an assured solution 
would have been well worth many times the reward, though 
whether the ministry would have shared this view had it 
been called upon to produce the cash was never put to the 
test.
The announcement prompted a flood of about 1,400 
proposals, many from overseas. Most could be dismissed 
quickly as impractical but some raised high hopes. Three 
likely schemes from reputable authorities advocating the 
introduction of contagious diseases were referred to the 
Board of Health in early 1888. Louis Pasteur, founder of 
the famous French institute for microbiological research, 
suggested the spreading of chicken cholera germs, Drs Henry
51 Argus, 19 May 1885; Australasian, 30 May 1885, 4 July 
1885. The 1886 Intercolonial Stock Conference also 
recommended that all colonies should offer bonuses for 
a successful remedy. NSWV&P, 1885-86, VI, 21.
52 NSWPD, 1887, 25, 375. Introduction to Rabbit
Nuisance Act Amendment Bill.
53 NSWPD, 1887-88, 28, 365-6.
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Ellis and Herbert Butcher favoured experiments with the
so-called Tintinallogy disease present on John Reid's
Wilcannia property, where Butcher lived, and Professor
Archibald Watson of Adelaide University recommended the
introduction of a German parasite which caused a skin
54 *disease similar to scab in sheep.
Preliminary investigation by the Board of Health 
consisted of sending the officer in charge of the rabbit 
branch, Henry Taylor, and the Chief Inspector of Stock, 
Alexander Bruce, as well as local rabbit inspectors to look 
at the rabbits held by Watson and Butcher and expert 
veterinary opinions were sought on the three schemes, 
although in all three cases little had yet been done beyond 
observing the progress of each disease among small groups 
of enclosed rabbits. The scientists were sceptical of the 
contagious potential against rabbits in the wild and were 
concerned about the effects of chicken cholera on poultry 
and wild birds and of the scab on stock. The staff of the 
rabbit branch were inclined to favour wider tests. They 
described the limited experiments that they had observed 
and the condition of the rabbits but were wary of trying to 
forecast what would happen on a larger, more natural scale 
of test. The board replied to the proposals in February 
1888. It found all three studies very incomplete and 
inconclusive. There was either no evidence that the
54 NSWV&P, 1887-88, VIII, 955. Report of the Board of 
Health on Destruction of Rabbits by Means of Disease.
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diseases would work under natural conditions or there was 
reason to fear that infection might spread to other 
creatures.
Rural pressure would not have let the matter
rest there, as Pasteur's name in particular carried great
weight, but the government had promised a detailed, expert
investigation into all claims for the reward, so these
three claims formed the largest section of the 1888-89 Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Schemes for Extermination of
Rabbits in Australia, known popularly as the Intercolonial
Rabbit Commission. All the colonies and New Zealand were
invited to nominate experienced persons to sit in association
with the special representatives of New South Wales, Victoria
and South Australia. Only Western Australia declined. The
official committee was composed of doctors, scientists,
graziers and businessmen. Despite later criticism of the
presumptuousness of a group of relatively unknown 'colonials'
sitting in judgment on one of the great scientists of the
55century the members were very well chosen. They had a wide 
range of relevant professional experience and a good 
knowledge of the Australian situation. As the age range 
of the group shows the members were not hide-bound old men. 
Some had yet to reach the peak of their careers. Others 
already had high reputations outside Australia. An 
annotated copy of the original preliminary report and
55 See Appendix.
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correspondence between members, held by the Vermin and 
Noxious Weeds Board, Melbourne, shows how seriously and 
thoroughly the investigation was approached. However, not 
only were its conclusions ultimately disputed but its 
operations soon ran into difficulties not altogether of 
its own making.
The investigation got off to a bad start. Pasteur 
had sent his nephew, Adrien Loir, and two scientists, Drs 
Germont and Hinds from the Institut Pasteur to conduct tests 
of chicken cholera on Rodd Island near Sydney. As a sub­
sidiary project they were also to consult with the stock 
board about an outbreak of what was thought to be anthrax.
The board was considering buying Pasteur's new anthrax 
vaccine. The Frenchmen were treated to a fine display of 
bureaucratic ineptitude, suspicion and sly dealing. Mail 
and samples from Pasteur to his assistants were delayed and 
opened. ^  A cable from Pasteur instructing his men to do 
no further work for the stock board until the chicken cholera 
investigation was completed was detained by Parkes for 36 
days and then delivered with the terse comment on one corner 
'Mislaid. H.P.' Despite wide publicity given to these 
incidents by Creed the government gave no explanation beyond 
the unbelievable assertion that they were all due to over­
sights and accidents. The anthrax telegram was probably
56 Creed papers. Cuttings from the SMH and Daily Telegraph, 
particularly February and June 1889. The letters were 
cut open, not steamed, and no attempts were made to 
conceal the fact they had been opened, although it was 
denied they had been read.
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delayed so that the stock branch could get more free advice
to help it decide whether to pay Pasteur £38,000 for his 
57discovery, but why the other letters were opened remains
a mystery. The French scientists were not easy men to work
with. They were under strict instructions from their
illustrious superior: 'We cannot modify the instructions
which he has given us ... We can only make the experiments
5 8which we are authorized to make.' They were determined 
not to be cheated of their reward through a premature 
revelation of their bacteriological techniques, but whether 
New South Wales officials were actually hoping to steal 
ideas or whether they were merely clumsily trying to find 
out if it was likely that the financially hard pressed 
government was going to have to disgorge £25,000 is an open 
question.
The commissioners' main difficulty emerged when 
they presented the French scientists with a schedule of 
experiments designed to test the spread of the disease in 
close quarters, its effect on domestic fowls, its effect on 
a range of wild birds and its lasting communicable quality. 
Initially Pasteur's representatives agreed to do this work 
in association with Dr Katz, Chief Expert Officer of the 
commission, but later instructions from Pasteur led them to
57 Stock Branch Report on Anthrax (Cumberland) Disease in 
Sheep and Cattle, NSWV&P, 1888-89, III, 649. The 
vaccine was effective but heat sensitive and two doses 
were needed. Pastoralists were financially hard 
pressed and refused to pay but the vaccine was later 
produced under licence.
58 Royal Commission into Rabbits, 1888-89, Report pp. XI-XII.
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change their position and to refuse to do any of the
broader, non-laboratory tests on the communicable nature
59of chicken cholera. There was no doubt that, as Pasteur
had observed in the small rabbit infested walled field of
the Widow Pommery, ingested chicken cholera culture was
a rabbit killer, but Australia was not a compact French 
6 0garden. Many poisons effectively killed rabbits, if the 
rabbits could be induced to eat them and if they retained 
their potency. The value of a disease would lie in its 
involuntary communicability from generation to generation, 
but there also lay its danger. It was these qualities that 
Pasteur's experiments failed to test. Pasteur wanted the 
final test to be conducted in a 500 acre, heavily rabbit 
infested enclosure. Every few days his men would spread 
fresh bacterial culture on suitable feed. As the 
commissioners said in their report, this would prove only 
that the culture was poisonous, not that it was a fatal 
contagious disease.^ Many years later a member of the 
commission, probably Quin, wrote anonymously about the 
refusal of large sectors of the public to accept that the 
investigation had been right to reject Pasteur's proposal. 
He pointed out that when some of these doubters conducted 
rather risky, amateurish tests in Queensland and New 
Zealand the results confirmed the commissioners' judgments.
59 Ibid., p. XIII.
60 Ibid., Evidence p. 194.
61 Ibid., Report, pp. XXII-XXIII.
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He also reminded readers that Pasteur never made any attempt
by experiment or statement to disprove or contravert the
findings: 'He died loyal to the honour of science, but
6 2nobly disloyal to his "choldra des poules"
The commissioners also encountered a great deal
of trouble in arranging tests of the so-called Tintinallogy
disease. Tintinallogy was a station on the Darling between
Menindee and Wilcannia. In 1887 291,000 rabbits had been
killed there under the bonus system but shortly afterwards
Dr Butcher, a graduate of King's College London, who was
resident on the property and had been on the look-out for
a spontaneous outbreak of disease, noticed many sick rabbits
and received permission from the Mines Department to try to
foster the infection on 500 acres which were almost cut off
6 3from the rest of the property by a bend of the Darling. • 
Butcher collaborated with a colleague, Ellis, in Sydney and 
in five or six months claimed to have wrought havoc among 
the local rabbits. The disease also appeared on other 
western stations. Argument centred on whether the sickness 
was related to poor feed (a result of drought and over 
grazing) and whether it could have a lasting impact. The 
commissioners wanted to release 50 infected rabbits into a 
large enclosure of healthy rabbits in another district.
Ellis and Butcher refused to supply the rabbits. They said 
they were already out of pocket over the experiment and that
62 PR, 15 August 1902, p. 395.
63 Royal Commission into Rabbits, 1888-89, Report, 
p. XXIII.
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the commissioners were too slow and too niggardly in
settling their expenses.^ The commissioners replied that
the failure to supply rabbits had occurred long before any
difficulties arose over reimbursements and they implied
that for a £25,000 reward they expected that the promoters
6 5of the scheme would have been more helpful. The invest­
igating officers and pathologists suspected that a parasite 
of the coccidiosis family, which breeds in the liver, might 
be involved and twentieth century scientists tend to agree. 
Such infections are endemic among wild rabbits and only 
occasionally cause sudden widespread mortality.^ The 
third major proposal, Dr Watson's scab infection, was found 
to be quite effective in a mild, wet climate but harmless in 
the hot, dry interior.
There were several minor dissenting views to the 
final report but they only concerned disagreements over 
whether all field tests of chicken cholera microbes should be 
banned in the interests of poultry, or whether the door should 
be left ajar, in case there was a remote possibility of 
achieving something by further experiments. All the members 
agreed that there was nothing in the present proposals that 
justified raised hopes of a solution, let alone a £25,000 
reward. The evidence on the main submissions was all printed 
and the Chief Expert's scientific reports were detailed, 
well presented and clear. From them the day to day, indeed
64 Ibid., Evidence, p. 199.
65 Ibid., Report, p. XXIV.
66 Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, p.543.
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the hour to hour research routine can be reconstructed and 
it was very thorough. The rest of the evidence comprised 
interviews with the leading experimenters, the most experi­
enced members of the rabbit branch (including the dismissed 
Crommelin) and some noted pastoralists, as well as some 
special evidence from New Zealand. The latter is worth a 
little attention because it shows the thoroughness of the 
investigators.
Colman Phillips was a landholder in the Wairarapa 
District of New Zealand. He was convinced that the answer 
to the rabbit problem lay in the combined operation of 
'natural enemies', primarily ferrets but also dogs and 
stoats, and a disease, bladder worms. He won many followers 
and persisted with his campaign until well into the 1920s. 
His fanatical zeal, and also his nineteenth century romantic 
view of nature, are illustrated by his statement to the 
commission:
we shall get little help from the men 
of science ... Professor Thomas, one 
of the most able biologists in the 
colonies I believe, visited the 
Wairarapa and failed completely to see 
the beauty of nature's working - this 
conquest of a pest by means of a worm 
... The question arises, then, as to 
whether there is not a higher law than ^  
the minute investigations of scientists.
He was still preaching the same message in 1917: 'As to
submitting my plan to a "Committee of Experts", what experts
67 Royal Commission into Rabbits, 1888-89, Evidence 
pp. 115-6 .
200
have you? I think I may say, without egotism that I
happen to be the only "expert" on Nature's great balance in 
6 8Australasia'. Under polite but searching questioning it 
was revealed that, although he was convinced that the ferret 
was not only the best 'natural enemy' of the rabbit but was 
also an ideal spreader of bladder fluke, he had never
69actually dissected a ferret to find out if it was infected.
Professor Thomas of Auckland, who had undertaken a study
of the decline of rabbits in the Wairarapa for the New
Zealand government, sent a report showing the weaknesses of
Coman Phillips' theories. Thomas concluded that 'Like all
parasitic diseases it C bladder worm ] is variable and
apparently capricious in its distribution, and its
propagation is limited by conditions which will vary with
locality and season ... C it 3 must be looked upon as simply
70a minor and auxiliary means of destruction'. This could 
just as well have served as the main conclusion of the 
Intercolonial Commission's findings and nearly 100 years 
later it would raise very few scientific eyebrows. The 
unexpected success of myxomatosis (after years of futile 
trials) and its every more unexpected lasting qualities 
(which owe much to sophisticated research into virus 
strains) have reinforced a largely unjustifiable public 
faith in such remedies. Contemporary criticism of the 
scientific competence of the commission was unwarranted.
68 PR, 16 April 1917, p. 348.
69 Royal Commission into Rabbits, 1888-89, Evidence
pp. 118, 121.
70 Ibid., Appendix VIII, p. 213.
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As regards its positive recommendations the
findings of the commission are more open to dispute. It
strongly favoured fencing and opposed professional trappers
and the bonus system. It said that infested areas should
be fenced and cleared; large owners should be compelled to
fence and poorer small holders should be grouped together
for fence construction. The main weakness of this section
of the report was that no experiments on mesh size or
height of netting were conducted. Instead the commissioners
accepted the weight of pastoral testimony which claimed that 
51 /g inch, three feet high mesh was the cheapest effective
71rabbit barrier. Some districts soon reported that too
many rabbits could get through and some fences had to be 
72replaced.
The practical recommendations of the commission
were largely reproduced in the 1890 Rabbit Act but this
need not mean that the inquiry had much effect on government
policy. Both the commissioners and the government were
listening to the same group of major pastoralists so it is
hardly surprising that they reached similar conclusions.
The details of the 1890 act had actually been foreshadowed
7 3in earlier bills before the investigation began. There
71 Ibid., Report, p. XXXII.
72 Webster, Bygoo, p. 123.
73 See Chapter 5, p. 151.
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were also important differences of emphasis. The strong 
recommendations of the commissioners concerning compulsory 
fencing and the duty of the government to deal with 
unoccupied crown lands were ambiguously adopted in 1890.
Under the act compulsion could only follow the formal 
declaration of an infested area, which was a decision made 
by politicians, not vermin inspectors, and the control of 
vermin on crown lands, while endorsed in principle was, in 
practice, left in a kind of financial limbo. The report 
made no reference to barrier fencing which became the core 
of official policy in the 1890s. Nevertheless, the inquiry 
was not just a time serving devise, a sop to public demands 
for action. It was an expensive venture, costing about 
f12,000 and though it basically provided backing for the 
kind of legislative changes that had been outlined before 
it began, it also supplied the scientific justification for 
an extremely wary attitude towards the introduction of 
diseases.
The caution shown by all New South Wales govern­
ments towards the introduction of a rabbit disease stands 
in marked contrast to the popular faith in a cheap, quick, 
'natural' solution to the rabbit problem and to the generally 
rash manner in which strange animals had been introduced and 
drastic changes made to the environment. In part this 
caution rested on an understandable fear. In the days 
before penicillin and antibiotics doctors had few remedies
203
against infection and the death rate for infectious
diseases, particularly in childhood, was high, The idea
also aroused vague fears about 'playing God'. As The Times
of London observed, 'It is impossible to suppress the
misgiving that Nature will avenge herself'."^ Similar
anxieties were widely expressed in the city press. Some
rural papers copied the articles and a few wrote their
own warnings against growing rural enthusiasm. The Mildura
Irrigationist consistently opposed the spread of a rabbit
disease: 'The more thoughtful among the residents of the
Riverina are beginning to view with considerable alarm the
rapid progress which Mr. Pasteur's method of destroying
rabbits, by means of disease seems to be making in public 
75favour'. Yet such was the popular enthusiasm that the 
authorities were under almost constant pressure to permit 
a wide range of loosely controlled tests. Sometimes it came 
from well educated men, like Creed, convinced that a break­
through was near; more often it came from hard pressed 
graziers. Nevertheless, a succession of ministries stood 
firm.
Abigail had proclaimed all use of diseases against 
rabbits to be illegal except under strict Board of Health
74 The Times, 3 April 1892. Referring to the Australian 
controversy over the rejection of Pasteur's proposal.
75 Mildura Irrigationist, 14 March 1888.
204
supervision and this was later codified under the 1890
Animals Infectious Diseases Act. The ruling was rigorously
enforced. Despite the support of his local newspaper, the 
7 6Western Herald, Dr Samuelson of Bourke lost his license to
keep rabbits for the purpose of experimenting with drugs
once the Lands Department learned that he was infecting
rabbits, rats, sheep and dogs with 'the germs of tubercule,
77gonorrhoea, septicaemia and syphillis'. He was allowed 
to apply for another license under the Animals Infectious 
Diseases Act but as Samuelson kept complaining 'so far I 
have learned only what will not satisfy the Board of Health'. 
An official memorandum makes it clear that the board was 
not going to be easily satisfied:
It seems to me a matter requiring the most 
careful consideration whether, in view of 
the fact that any supervision which the 
government could exercise over the operations 
would be almost nominal, it would be expedient, 
under any conditions, to grant licenses to 
inoculate domestic animals with the germs of 
such diseases as tuberculosis and syphillis 
in a township where the sanitary conditions 
are such as exist at Bourke. 78
The demand for similar experiments persisted
throughout the 1890s, culminating in the Dansyz experiments 
79in 1906. As well as showing an unquenchable faith in
76 Western Herald 28 October 1891. Quoted in NSWV&P 
1891-92, VIII, 1029.
77 NSWV&P, 1891-92 , VIII, 1031. Experiments on Rabbits, 
Application for a License.
78 Ibid.
79 See Chapter 9.
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science such demands also showed a paradoxical lack of 
faith in Australian scientists. There was much praise for 
foreign experts, such as Pasteur, Koch and Dansyz and much 
scepticism about the local experts who disagreed with them. 
This attitude also led some to a vague 'conspiracy theory' 
in an attempt to explain why no easy solution had been found 
to the rabbit plague. In 1891 the Pastoralist and Farmers' 
Gazette printed a long article on rabbits which was later 
reprinted as a pamphlet, supposedly because of the demand 
by the public. It argued that Pasteur's proposal had not
I
received a fair trial:
I know nothing of the people who control 
the Rabbit Branch of the Lands Department. 
I therefore only write in a strictly 
impersonal sense in observing that the 
policy of leaving the initiative in the 
matter of Rabbit destruction on a 
comprehensive scale, to a section of 
administration whose triumph would be the 
signal for its own demolition, is one 
which involves a ridiculous contradiction 
to every known motive by which the action 
of the average man is influenced. 80
A similar response to a devastating plague has also been
observed in Southern Africa following the outbreak of
81rinderpest in the 1890s. There is no way of estimating 
how strong such feeling was in Australia at the time and
80 C.M. Smith, Sheep versus Rabbits, an article on Louis 
Pasteur, reprinted from Pastoralist and Farmers' 
Gazette, 1891, p. 4.
81 C. Van Onselen, 'Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern 
Africa 1896-97", Journal of African History, 1972, 
XIII (3), p. 474.
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because a vocal commercial rabbit pressure group emerged
during the 1890s it would be unfair to assume that later
expressions of similar sentiments were groundless. Oddly
enough the development by 1897 of a one dose, heat resistant,
long life anthrax vaccine by John Gunn, owner and later
manager of Yalgogrin Station, and John McGarvie Smith, a
Sydney industrial chemist who had worked with the 1888 French
team, reinforced the popular faith in the possibilities of
scientific advances without appreciably altering the
8 2attitude towards Australian scientists.
As well as the mainstream of scientific
experimenters there was an influential group of men kindly
called by Rolls 'enthusiasts'. Colman Phillips, who never
subjected his theories to biological tests, fits this
category, as does William Rodier of Tambua Station, near
Cobar. In 1888 Rodier bought out his partner following a
8 3disagreement over the best method of rabbit control.
From 1887 until the late 1920s Rodier devoted considerable 
energy and much money to promoting his remedy. He argued 
that European rabbits were monogamous and that trapping and 
poisoning killed more bucks than does, which made the 
rabbit communities polygamous and turned them into pests.
As there was no way trapping, poisoning or drought could 
kill all the rabbits, the surviving females rapidly restored
82 ANUA, 55/1, J.A. Gunn Papers and newspaper cuttings.
83 Royal Commission to Inquire into the Condition of 
Crown Tenants Western Division of New South Wales, 
1901, Pt. II, pp. 100-6.
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the numbers. However, if by deliberate policy only the
does were killed, producing an excess of males, in the
resulting polyandrous rabbit society drought or unmated
bucks would kill the kittens and the bucks would worry
the pregnant does into a decline, thus ridding the country
84of rabbits, except where they were protected.
Rodier used various forms of traps to catch the
rabbits alive. He then killed the does and ear-marked and
released the bucks. Until the depths of the late 1890s
drought he was able to show that his property was much better
8 5grassed than those of his neighbours. He won many support­
ers, but not among those living on adjoining stations, who 
became hosts to his much harried buck rabbits. Nor did he 
convince his brother-in-law, John Hunter Patterson, to whom 
he was heavily in debt. Patterson thought enough of Rodier 
to name him guardian to his children and to send his 
delicate son to stay with his uncle as a jackeroo, but he
concurred with the boy's judgment that, where vermin was
8 6concerned, Rodier was a 'rabbit maniac'. Yet Rodier's 
ideas were taken seriously. Once again there were many who 
found his view of nature appealing, even though tests 
failed to show that trapping and poisoning actually killed
84 There is a large collection of Rodier's pamphlets and 
letters in the Mitchell Library.
85 PR, 15 August 1895, p. 315; 17 September 1895, p. 388.
86 MUA, John Hunter Patterson, Family correspondence, 22 
March 1904. Tarnbua Station was mortgaged to Dalgety 
Pty. Ltd. The papers are in the ANUA.
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more males than females, let alone the validity of the
rest of his theory. His evidence to the 1901 Western Lands
Royal Commission was praised by Etheridge, the curator of
the Australian Museum, Sydney as a common sense approach to
8 7the 'survival of the fittest'. In 1905, when the scheme
was being briefly tested at the Randwick quarantine station
it was gazetted as an approved way of dealing with rabbit
infested land for the purposes of the 1902 Pastures
88Protection Act.
Unlike Colman's plan Rodier's method involved no
dangerous importations but because it condemned poisoning,
fumigation and the use of traps that killed, and because
Rodier insisted that fencing was a waste of money, unless
a landholder was very diligent in the construction of live
traps, it did no good. Nevertheless, as late as 1926 David
Stead reported that it was still the most widely talked
about method ever proposed and in 1922 the Governor General
had suggested to the new New South Wales government that it
8 9might be a good idea to test it properly. Dr Purdy of
87 NSWV&P, 1901, IV, 130. Summary of rabbit 
evidence.
88 NSW Government Gazette, 22 March 1905; Report of the 
Department of Mines and Agriculture, Stock (P.P.)
Branch for the half year to June 1905.
89 Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, p. 372. Rodier was 
inconsistent. In 1897 he told Dalgety Pty. Ltd in 
response to an inquiry about proposed new rabbit 
legislation that those who had already netted their 
properties should only pay I/5 not h the vermin levy. 
ANUA, Dalgety Pty. Ltd., 100/4/1/35, Rabbit and Noxious 
Weed Legislation 1897.
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the Metropolitan Board of Health advocated a trial against
rats and rabbits on Lord Howe Island but it was decided
90that the terrain was too rough.
Despite its range of supporters and the fanaticism 
of its originator, Rodier's scheme had only a brief period 
of official recognition in 1905. Very few seem to have 
adopted it, possibly because it was so labour intensive. In 
view of the protracted interest shown it might have been 
better had the authorities followed Stead's recommendation 
and conducted decisive tests, but there were factors making 
this difficult. One of the appealing features of the plan 
was that Rodier said fencing was unnecessary, but faith in 
fencing was almost all that remained of official vermin 
policy after 1890. It was also apparent that, without 
fencing, Rodier's scheme could only be tested if all the 
neighbours in an infested area were forced to participate, 
otherwise there would be a constant influx of rapidly 
breeding does and a flight of panic stricken bucks to upset 
the experiment. If the test was conducted behind effective 
fencing or on an island the theory could not be proven, 
because it was common knowledge that, on well netted 
properties, a hard working manager could get rid of rabbits 
using conventional methods. Thus official inactivity is 
understandable.
By far the most important effect of the growing 
relationship between scientists and politicians was the
90 Stead, p. 384.
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creation in 1891 of the combined Department of Mines and
Agriculture. The Agriculture Department had to limp along
on a budget of £10,000 p.a. but its practical work and its
extensive, well written annual gazette were to be of
91inestimable value. However, it is debatable whether
successive governments should be allowed to bask in the
Department of Agriculture's credit. The department remained
under the smothering wing of the Department of Mines until
1907 and the high quality of its work owes far more to the
zeal and calibre of its staff than to the encouragement given
92in the annual budgets. Because of its limited finances and 
its subordinate administrative position it could only under­
take research projects of very limited scope, particularly 
concentrating on animal and plant breeding, practical advice 
to farmers and the dissemination of new ideas. As Powell 
had observed, 'the notable preference for recruiting armies 
of technicians, administrators and scientists into ever
expanding government departments ... is a widely recognized
9 3peculiarity of the Australian experience'. but at least 
during its first twenty years, possibly because of its lack 
of funds, the New South Wales Agriculture Department was
91 NSW Budget Estimates, 1891 £10,000; 1894 £15,000; 1898 
£25,750; 1898 £30,000; 1907 £46,000; 1908 £122,897
C ie after it became a separate department ]
92 M. Hoare, 'Science and Scientific Establishment in 
Eastern Australia 1820-1890', Ph.D. Thesis, ANU, 1974. 
Comments on the new, brilliant university leaderships 
in base metals and agricultural research. Some of 
these young graduates found their way into the public 
service.
93 Powell, Environmental Management, p. 172.
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one organization that managed to keep in close contact
with its public. Through the gazette it frequently told
farmers about new techniques for poisoning or fumigating
rabbits but it had neither the money nor the authority to
conduct its own experiments. The rabbit problem remained
the prerogative of the Lands Department and it was common
knowledge that 'a kind of subdued conflict* existed between
94the Lands and Mines Departments over areas of control.
The over all picture that emerges of the effect 
of experimenters on rabbit policy formation during the last 
20 years of the nineteenth century is a fairly bleak one. 
Much of the best scientific work was ultimately negative in 
character. It served to strengthen the resolve of the 
authorities to resist potentially dangerous new initiatives 
but it did not create new attitudes, nor did it lead to 
decisive, even if limited policies. Fencing became the 
central article of government faith but even that was not 
whole-heartedly adopted. There was no aid for private 
fencing and not until 1896 was the protective tariff on 
wire netting abolished. The Department of Agriculture was 
an important step in the right direction but it was starved 
of funds and authority. The 1890s were to be years of 
fumbling indecision amid increasingly loud demands for 
decisive action.
94 PR, 15 March 1892, p. 536.
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CHAPTER 7
The Years of Indecision- 
New South Wales 1888-1902
Before any good could come of the New South Wales 
1890 Rabbit Act the government had to take the plunge and 
declare some districts officially rabbit infested. This 
was not a simple decision. Although it was easy to tell 
when there were too many rabbits in an area the political 
act of declaring such a district infested imposed obligat­
ions on the government and individuals that had far reaching 
implications for land tenure, government finances and future 
election hopes, particularly as the early 1890s were years 
of financial depression. In March 1891 Parkes issued the 
regulations under the Rabbit Act and gave notice of 
intention to proclaim the land districts of Balranald, Cobar, 
Hay North, Hillston North, Wentworth, Wilcannia, Willyama 
and portions of Balranald South, Bourke, Cobar East, 
Condobolin, Deniliqu^in, Dubbo, Hay, Hills ton, Narrandera, 
Parkes, Urana, and Wagga Wagga.^ They were proclaimed one 
month later.
On 15 December 1891 the Dibbs ministry added the
1 NSW Government Gazette, 1891, Vol. 3, p. 3308.
Land Board Districts were large areas covering several 
pastures and stock protection boards. There is a map 
in NSWV&P, 1894, appendix to the Crown Lands Bill of 
1894. The land boards were subdivided into small 
districts. These are mapped in NSWV&P, 1894, Lands 
Department, annual report, appendix.
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2districts north of the Darling to the Queensland border 
but explained that, at least until a new budget was passed, 
there was no money for government fencing. The £12,000
3voted for 1891 had been used up. At no time during the 
1890s were adequate provisions made to cover the cost of 
fencing unoccupied crown lands. As the Year Books show, 
almost the entire budgetary allowance of the rabbit branch
4was committed to administrative costs and barrier fencing.
By the end of 1891 Henry Copeland, Minister for Lands, had 
made it quite clear to pastoral deputations that 'the 
government were only too glad to help them to help them­
selves so long as they did not call upon the government to 
put their hands in their pockets. But they would give 
them every assistance to put their hands in their neighbours'
5pockets'. Furthermore, in future no area would be 
proclaimed if it contained so much public land that there 
would be strong pressure for government expenditure. In 
1892 John Gunn concluded that the government's intention 
was to 'encourage the rabbits and exterminate the graziers'.
I
7As the map in Chapter four shows, the only
2 Ibid., 1891, Vol. 6, p. 9874.
3 ANUA, J .A . Gunn press cutting book, 24 December 1891,
P. 104/27.
4 See Chapter 6.
5 Western Herald & Darling River Advocate, 30 December 1891, 
J .A . Gunn press cutting.
6 Australasian, 30 April 1892. (writing as 'Manager').
7 See p. 99.
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significant extensions to the districts proclaimed in 1891 
that had been made by 1894 were in the northern rivers 
area and, before these were made, the Lands Department had 
found a new way of ensuring that there would be no heavy
gclaims for the government to meet. Two important test 
cases had proved what pastoralists had long suspected: 
the act was unenforceable against the government. In 
September 1892 a pastoral lessee tried to make the Lands 
Department pay half the cost of a boundary fence after the 
neighbouring selector had walked away from the holding.
The claim was rejected on the grounds that approval had
9not been sought before the fence was built. A far more 
significant case was brought by the New Zealand Loan and 
Mortgage Agency Company on behalf of its Roto Pastoral 
Holding. In November 1891 the company had asked for 
ministerial approval for a fence between the property and 
unoccupied crown land. The Lands Department sent a 
vaguely worded refusal without explanation. The company 
went ahead, completed the fence and then sued for half 
the cost, which came to £102 ls.^
The authorities did not dispute that the fence 
was required or that it was erected in accordance with the
8 NSW Government Gazette, 1892, Vol. 3, p. 4112; 1892, 
Vol. 5, p. 8327; 1893, Vol. 5, pp. 7180, 7276. All 
were small extensions in districts already partly 
proclaimed.
9 PR, 15 September 1892, p.821.
10 Ibid., 15 May 1893, p. 144.
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provisions of the act: they simply refused to accept
financial responsibility for half of it. The President 
of the Land Court denounced the department's attitude as 
'evasive and a kind of ambuscade' and pointed out that 
'there was nothing but the state of the public exchequer
11standing in the way of the Minister paying his contribution*.
The Supreme Court upheld the verdict that the government
could not be compelled to pay for a fence that it had not
formally approved and Justices Windeyer and Innes also
ruled that, although the court might order the department
to supply reasons for the refusal, there was nothing in the
act to say that they had to be sufficient reasons. These
decisions particularly affected the western lands where
millions of resumed acres remained unoccupied. Pastoral
ire was further raised by the fact that, although Copeland
said he would not take as a gift the worst rabbit infested
properties, the parliament merely cut by half the £3 per
ton duty on imported wire netting and refused to reduce
railway carriage charges. The Pastoral Review also pointed
out that New South Wales spent on agricultural and pastoral
societies considerable sums that could have been put into
12the fencing account.
At the same time as pastoralists were becoming 
frustrated at the government's refusal to face up to its
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 15 April 1893, p. 52. Editorial.
In 1892 £20,000 had been given in pound for pound 
grants; £10,000 in special grants;
£ 5,000 in national prizes.
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responsibilities small holders were becoming worried that 
the act was being too rigorously applied in the more settled 
regions.
In June 1891 the Hume Farmers and Settlers' 
Association met at Burrumbattock to protest at the govern­
ment's intention to proclaim country between the Murray and 
the Murrumbidgee as rabbit infested. They advanced without 
explanation the strange argument that 'it is morally
impossible where there are small holdings for it C netting 1
13to be of any use, even if the rabbits are numerous'. On 
19 November 1891 13 pastoralists and two selectors met in 
Forbes and a resolution was passed to petition Copeland to 
proclaim the district, to place administration of the act
14under the stock boards and to repeal the duty on netting.
A month later a large public meeting of 50 to 60 landholders 
met in response to widespread opposition to the petition.^ 
The meeting was very divided and obviously many selectors 
did not understand the difference between petitioning for 
government financed barrier fences and petitioning for 
enforcement of the fencing provisions of the Rabbit Act.
It was decided to call another meeting and meanwhile to send 
a telegram to the Lands Department asking that the matter be 
held in abeyance. On 6 January 1892 the next meeting 
condemned the proposed move but the minister went ahead and 
gazetted a small portion of the Forbes land district.
13 Australasian, 6 June 1891, p. 1064.
14 Forbes Times, 21 November 1891. J.A. Gunn cutting.
15 Ibid., 26 December 1891.
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Later the same year a large meeting of
16selectors at Albury opposed the declaration of their area.
After some delay the government again went ahead. Another
small part of Forbes land district was proclaimed in 
17September 1893 but a year elapsed before large sections
of the remaining central division districts and parts of
the eastern division were incorporated in the infested area,
despite the pleas of those who wanted to fence their 
18properties. Because of the extent of opposition the 
clauses of the 1890 act which authorized the declaration of 
a state-wide compulsory rabbit eradication period were never 
employed.^
The conflict of interest between large and small 
landholders that had been foreshadowed in the debates of 
the 1880s had come to the fore. In 1892 two important 
rural meetings showed the extent of the divisions. In 
March William Alison, who had played a prominent part in 
the passage of the 1890 act, chaired a meeting of 
pastoralists at Nyngan, and in July there was a large 
gathering of farmers in Wagga Wagga. The speeches made 
at the Nyngan conference were fully reported in the Pastoral 
Review and were summarized in the Sydney Morning Herald but
16 PR, 15 November 1892.
17 NSW Government Gazette, 1893, Vol. 5, pp. 7180, 7276.
18 Ibid., 1894, Vol. 5, p. 7543. Included parts of Albury, 
Cootamundra, Corowa, Cowra, Young, Orange.
19 PR, 17 April 1895, p. 82. Speech by Carruthers. Also 
NSWPD.
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the most interesting accounts were given by local papers,
such as the Dubbo Dispatch, the Cobar and Louth Herald and
the Western People, which included the interjections and
made it apparent that many smallholders and townspeople
20were very hostile to the pastoralists. About 80 people
attended the first meeting. Although admission was by
ticket and only stockholders could vote a number of unwanted
spectators crowded in at the back. The conference claimed
to represent the ov/ners of four million sheep and 10,000
cattle. Many pastoral leases in the Cobar area had less
than three years to run and occupiers were insistent that
they would not invest in fencing unless they were guaranteed
more security of tenure. This led many critics to call the
conference 'a sort of Guy Fawkes conspiracy against the
public - an attempt to lock up the lands against settle- 
21ment'. Afterwards a deputation presented the main
resolutions to Copeland. These included local administration 
of any rabbit legislation, preferably through the pastures 
and stock boards, the liberation of 'natural enemies', 
increased aid for wire netting purchases and, above all, 
renewal of pastoral leases for 15 years. The minister 
bluntly replied: 'If he went to parliament and proposed
to give pastoralists an extension of 15 years he would be
20 PR, 15 April 1892; SMH, 11-12 March 1892; J.A. Gunn 
press cutting book.
21 Dubbo Dispatch, 8 March 1892.
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treated as the squatters would treat rabbits - 
22exterminated'.
For at least the next ten years, until after the
Western Lands Commission, the question of land tenure
policy was to overshadow all discussions of the rabbit
problem. Selectors argued that New South Wales should
adopt closer settlement schemes similar to the Victorian
Mallee Land Act. Pastoralists pointed out that there were
already vast tracts of land open for selection which no-
one was willing to take up. The selectors who met at
Forbes to resist the moves to have the district declared
infested claimed that selectors' children could keep small
runs clear; the pastoralists retorted that 'ten to one you
would find them playing somewhere in the scrub instead of
23being at work'. Anyway, it only needed one careless 
family for all the unfencied neighbours to suffer. The real 
problem was that fencing required capital or at least 
credit. Selectors had little and pastoralists and the 
rural finance companies, which had taken over many of them, 
would not invest without security. Security could be 
achieved only at the cost of future selection opportunities.
The Pastoral Review summed up the dilemma in a 
series of articles aptly entitled 'Rents, Rabbits and 
Resumption', which were written by D. Brown of Kallara
22 PR, 15 April 1892, p. 574.
23 Forbes Times, 26 December 1891.
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Station. Aware of the problems confronting any government 
that passed legislation designed to favour one small class 
at the expense of a larger group, particularly at a time 
when the Labor party was growing in strength and Dibbs 
needed its support, the articles sought to make a distinct­
ion between the government as legislature and the government 
24as landlord. In the view of the large leaseholders the 
solution to the rabbit problem lay in a fairer definition 
of the relationship between landlord and tenant under which 
landholders would not have to look for government assistance 
through coercive legislation and subsidized stock levies 
but instead would receive from the landlord rent and tenure 
adjustments in return for the work they had to do against 
rabbits.^
During 1892 there were several semi-official tours
to inspect the western lands. The Governor visited the
Cobar and Bourke districts in February 1892 and William
Davis, the member for Bourke, led parties of fellow members
2 6to rabbit infested properties. The suspicions of some 
non-pastoral groups about the underlying reasons for such 
visits were expressed in the Daily Telegraph:
24 PR, 15 April 1892, p. 575.
25 Just as Carruthers and others were influenced by rent 
theories, such as those of Henry George, which were 
developed abroad, so pastoralists may have been 
influenced by the big tenant rights debates in England, 
which culminated in the 1883 Agricultural Holdings Act. 
The terminology is similar but the theoretical content 
is very different.
26 SMH 5-7 February 1892; Wagga Wagga Express 4 February 
1892 .
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All that the public interest requires 
is that members of Parliament shall not 
be misled into supposing that a single 
'show patch' of rabbit infested country 
is necessarily typical of the whole, or 
that, because there are a few distressed 
pastoralists, they are as a class 
entitled to state charity. 27
The representatives of the 90 farmers' organizations, fore­
runners of the Farmers and Settlers' Association, who met 
at Wagga Wagga, shared these suspicions. They claimed that 
all central division holdings should be opened for selection 
and that rabbits could be countered by government erected
barrier fencing. They did not want any district proclaimed
2 8infested unless a majority of landholders voted for it.
More tension within the rural sector developed
after the 1894 elections. Rickard has pointed out that
many influential pastoralists were not initially greatly
29concerned at Reid's Free-trader victory but the Pastoral 
Review took a more gloomy line: 'What we are now seeing
is the fanatic wing of the Free-traders, led by 
unscrupulous politicians like Mr Reid, being dragged at 
the chariot wheels of the single tax wing of the Labor 
party for the oppression of the producer ...'.^  Nor was 
it reassuring that the Lands Department came under the 
control of Joseph Carruthers, already known for his land
27 Daily Telegraph, 20 May 1892. Editorial.
28 PR, 15 July 1892, p. 728; W. Bayley, History of the 
Farmers' and Settlers' Association of New South Wales, 
Farmers and Settlers' Association, 1957, p. 40.
29 Rickard, Class and Politics, p. 125.
30 PR, 15 January 1894, p. 539.
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reform ideas later epitomized in the slogan 'a million 
farms for a million farmers'. Yet, paradoxically, Reid's 
espousal of a single land based tax coupled with an 
income tax, and the continued demand for more land for 
selection forced the government to recognize that the 1890 
Rabbit Act was inadequate. By 1895 over seven million 
acres in the western and central divisions had been 
abandoned to the rabbits. Rabbits were destroying the 
pastoral tax base and eating out the new selectors. They 
were even moving into the eastern division.
By 1895 New South Wales was also facing another
threat to pastoral and agricultural production. Noxious
weeds were increasing at an alarming rate. In 1889 the
Sydney Town and Country Journal, a subsidiary of the
Evening News, had called the noxious weed threat as serious
as that of the rabbit^but although the colony had passed
Thistle Acts in the mid-nineteenth century they had not been
developed and utilized like their Victorian counterparts.
Graziers had waged a long, slow war against the Bathurst 
32burr and in 1886 a Prickly Pear Destruction Act had been 
passed. However, the prickly pear laws did not provide 
useful precedents for dealing with a wider variety of weeds.
31 Town and Country Journal (Sydney), 9 February 1889,
p. 18; 16 March 1889, p. 18.
32 ANUA pastoral finance company records show regular 
expenditure for burr cutting from the late 1870s. 
Gangs of cutters were employed. They moved around 
the districts with the seasons.
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Basically they consisted of special lease arrangements for
badly infested land, coupled with compulsory destruction
clauses. They had not been very widely applied and were
not successful. The New South Wales State Archives has
extensive files on prickly pear leases. An enormous
amount of work would need to be done to sort out the history
of individual holdings but it is clear that the failure rate
was high. Counter-measures were expensive, labour demands
were heavy and the effort was only worthwhile on good
33agricultural land.
During the 1890s a disturbing range of economically 
worthless plants had established themselves throughout the 
state. Sweet briar, blackberries, Bathurst burr, Scotch 
thistle and tobacco-tree plant were probably the worst 
offenders. Over-stocking, drought and rabbits had made 
enormous changes to the natural vegetation, destroying many 
species and opening the way for a take-over by less 
advantageous kinds. Many of these had been deliberately 
introduced for decorative or nostalgic reasons but a few, 
like bracken, tobacco-tree and a variety of dodder (a plant 
causing staggers in stock) were natives. Travelling stock 
routes were a major problem. Some way had to be found to 
finance the clearance of the worst weeds on them, for the
33 The details are given in Chapter 10.
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sake of neighbouring properties and to encourage regrowth
of feed to assist the movement of stock. There was also
concern about the inadvertant introduction of other
undesirable plants in consignments of foreign seed or
packaging material, and arguments about the best way to
approach the question of quarantine were to take up many
debates in the new federal parliament. These were not
empty fears. St John's Wort was a serious problem in
Victoria by the early 1890s and about 1914 skeleton weed,
which was almost indestructable at the time, made its
34appearance in New South Wales wheat lands. The actual 
machinery of quarantine control was a separate issue: the
main concern in the 1890s was to find ways to limit the 
spread of noxious weeds once they appeared in a district. 
This was one of the few matters on which the Nyngan and 
Wagga Wagga conferences were in complete accord.
It was thus against a background of an economy 
emerging from depression, a political system evolving from 
factions towards clearer party divisions, an increasingly 
organized farmers' movement and a more and more debt ridden 
pastoral industry that the government called a series of 
important conferences to help formulate a replacement for 
the 1890 Rabbit Act and a new system of control for noxious 
weeds. One favourable omen was the passage of the 1895
34 Parsons, Noxious Weeds, p. 95.
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35Crown Lands Act, which was presented in September 1854.
The debate was long and involved but the final legislation 
was generally well received. Curruthers' introductory 
speech emphasised the need to avoid the evils of class 
conflict and, although he explained that his primary aim 
was to help the small settler through more liberal terms, 
a new system of survey before selection and careful
3 6classification of land, pastoralists also benefitted.
They regained possession of the resumed portions of their
runs until they were actually needed for closer settlement
and they were given lease extensions and greater security
37against dummying. Many farmers1 representatives would
have liked to see the whole of the central division opened
to selection but most agreed with Gormly that the minister
deserved great credit for a clearly thought out piece of
3 8legislation that promised a workable compromise.
Another encouraging sign of the government's good intentions
was the inclusion in the 1895 budget of some money to help
39clear rabbits off reserves.
At Carruthers' invitation 62 men met at the Lands 
Department offices on 2-5 April 1895 to help frame a new 
rabbit act. There were four members of the Legislative
35 53 Vic., No. 18.
36 NSWPD, 1894-95, 72, 433-5.
37 C. King, Outlines of Closer Settlement In New South 
Wales, Pt. I, NSW, 1957, pp. 133-34.
38 NSWPD, 1894-95, 72, 445-7.
39 NSWPD, 1894-95, 75, 3629.
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Council, 16 members of the Assembly, Black (the Victorian
Chief Inspector of Vermin), two senior men from the Lands
and Mines Departments, one representative of the rabbit
trade and the rest were pastoralists (mainly members of
boards, rural finance company managers or particularly
vocal individuals) and a few farmers' representatives.
In his opening speech Carruthers summarized the practical
and legislative methods that had already been tried and
expressed interest in the commercial utilization of
rabbits.^ The meeting was then opened for free discussion.
According to the Pastoral Review many Labor politicians
took up a great deal of time on points of order and
procedure although they knew little of rabbits. They
were soon rebuked and afterwards spoke much less. By the
41last day most had stopped attending.
After a great deal of uncertainty it was decided 
to concentrate on repeal of the 1890 Act, local boards, 
compulsory destruction, commercial utilization, financial 
aid for fencing and compulsory fencing. Hardly surprisingly 
the conference found it difficult to reach clear cut 
decisions. The arguments over the best administrative 
authority became so confused that sometimes members did not 
know for what they were voting. Some advocated land boards,
40 Report of the Proceedings of a Conference Respecting 
the Rabbit Pest, Department of Lands, April 1895, NSWA.
41 PR, 17 April 1895, p. 56.
227
others wanted special rabbit boards and a small majority 
favoured the pastures and stock protection boards. Most 
voted for giving the boards powers of compulsion, even if
42they could not decide to which boards they were referring.
There was general belief in the necessity of fencing but
this was coupled with an unwillingness to make every settler
contribute regardless of his financial state and the amount
43of benefit he would receive, and even though they all
agreed that 1 /^Q inch mesh was too big, only the chairman's
o
vote determined that lh inch, not lh inch was a safe 
44maximum. Commercial utilization proved just as contens- 
ious as any of the other points, even among the pastoral 
representatives. Alison favoured the idea and wanted a 
state agent sent to London to encourage trade; Gunn claimed 
that utilization would prevent whole-hearted rabbit destruct­
ion .
It is hardly surprising that when Carruthers' 
legislation was presented in August 1896 it encountered much 
opposition. While on a visit to Grenfell in June the 
Minister told those who presented him with a petition for 
a new act that his proposals would 'enable districts to 
govern themselves in the matter of rabbits in accordance 
with local experience and wisdom'. As the Pastoral Review
42 1895 Rabbit Pest Conference, pp. 19-20.
43 Ibid., pp. 26-29. Because the general movement of
rabbits was still thought to be north and eastward, it 
was argued that fences on the southern and western 
property boundaries conferred greater benefits: they
kept rabbits out rather than in. In already infested 
areas it was an erroneous idea.
44 Ibid., p . 32.
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commented: ’It is exactly this possibility that occurs
45to many to be a fit subject for alarm'. As the pastures
and stock boards of Albury and Germantown had recently
bemoaned the fact that 'until rabbits are officially
declared to be noxious animals in this district stock
46boards have no power to offer bonuses' the journal was 
undoubtedly correct, but probably its fears were directed 
more towards other rural bodies than towards the stock 
boards.
When the draft was laid on the table pastoralists
objected that it was left to ministerial discretion whether
local control of the proposed rabbit districts would be
exercised through an amalgamation of existing pastures and
stock boards or through boroughs or municipalities. They
also disliked the proposal that two of the five rabbit
board members would be appointed by the Minister. The
boards would set a rabbit rate, could fine those who did
not clear their land and could arrange loans for the purchase
of netting. As in previous acts natural enemies of the
rabbit were protected. Gormly made a brief reply to the
introduction of the bill, regretting that rabbit destruction
47was not made compulsory. The measure then quietly lapsed. 
Apparently the opposition was too strong.
45 PR, 15 June 1896, p. 566.
46 Ibid., p . 590.
47 NSWPD, 1896, 86, 4978.
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Nevertheless, calls for legislation to replace
the 1890 act continued and, as the districts proclaimed
rabbit infested now stretched into the eastern division,
the sense of urgency increased. By the middle of 1896 all
of the land district of Forbes and a substantial amount of
good farming land around Corowa, Orange and Young had been 
48scheduled. Because local objections were so intense
extensions were made in very small steps; but by 1897 it
was apparent that all of Deniliquin and Condobolin would
49have to be fenced. In September 1896 the Farmers' and
Settlers' Association conference at Wagga Wagga again
discussed the rabbit question and voted for elected rabbit
boards, compulsory destruction on private and crown lands
50and financial assistance for wire netting. Parliament­
arians were also becoming restive at the failure of the
51government to present a noxious weeds bill. Once again 
Carruthers decided to consult the interested parties and 
another rabbit conference and a noxious weeds conference 
were convened in March 1897.
The 1897 rabbit conference differed from the one 
held two years before in that it was composed of the 
representatives of the pastures and stock boards, selectors'
48 NSW Government Gazette, 1896, Vol. 2, p. 2680.
49 Ibid., 1897, Vol. 3, pp. 3469, 4613; Vol. 4, pp. 
4760, 5578.
50 Bayley, Farmers and Settlers' Association, p. 62.
51 NSWPD, 1896, 82, 765 ff. (adjournment debate); 1379; 
1896, 84, 2409; 2498; 1896, 86, 4978.
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associations and the leading pastoral companies. Only 
three politicans were invited; all were members of the 
Assembly and all also represented rural bodies. The 
omission of the parliamentary contingent may have been 
one of the ways Carruthers hoped to get more clear-cut 
advice. He also tightened the structure of the conference
by giving the members the rejected 1896 bill for specific
,. . 5 2discussion.
Although the Pastoral Review criticised the
timing of the conference on the grounds that it conflicted
with the pastures and stock protection board elections and
5 3so not all infested boards had time to send delegates,
the gathering was dominated by pastoral representatives;
there were so many more boards than there were selector
organizations with officials able to go to Sydney for a
conference that lasted from 9-17 March. The gathering
elected as chairman, Allan Lakeman, a well respected former
member for Balranald who had taken a leading part in
54earlier debates. At the end of his brief introduction
Carruthers pointed out that the bill closely followed the
1895 recommendations 'and it seemed rather hard on him
that the persons who framed these recommendations should
55now condemn them'. However, the criticism continued.
52 Report of the Proceedings of a Conference Respecting 
the Rabbit Pest in New South Wales, 9-17 March 1897, 
NSWA.
53 PR, 15 March 1897, p. 56.
54 See Chapter 5, p.162, 168.
55 1897 Rabbit Pest Conference, p. 7.
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The second conference was a sectionally narrower group and 
its objections were therefore more explicit, and it also 
seems that once legislation had been framed it focused rural 
attention on other problems which were tangential to the main 
issue. For all its vagueness the 1895 conference was more 
concerned than its successor with getting changes to the 1890 
act so that the rabbit menace could be tackled afresh.
Neither conference could be praised for the impartial spirit 
in which the various groups approached their task but the 
amendments made in 1897 show that the dominant group placed 
efficiency of operation low on their list of legislative 
priorities.
Because the 1897 conference was a relatively
homogeneous body most questions were decided without formal
vote. On the crucial question of who would be entitled to
elect the new rabbit control body the motion was lost 23
to 11 that those with 100 sheep should have a vote, 22 to
13 that those with 200 sheep should have a vote, and it was
finally decided that the number of sheep qualifying a man
5 6for a vote should be set at 250. From the few other 
important votes that were recorded it appears that there 
were between 10 and 13 men who supported the small settler 
interests and that no more than 40 of the 59 members 
attended at the same time.
The main amendments served to consolidate the
56 Ibid., p. 54.
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influence of the pastures and stock protection boards.
The existing boards were to be the sole administrative 
authority, and they should not be amalgamated or attached 
to a shire without their consent. The government should 
only nominate one member, not necessarily the chairman, and 
voting for the five other positions should be on a graduated 
stock franchise, ranging from one vote for 250 sheep to 
eight votes for 60,000. Members would only sit for one year, 
making long term planning impossible. The rival body, the 
land board, would have no say in vermin control, and all 
judicial matters would go before Petty Sessions, not the 
more specialized land courts. To protect the financial 
well-being of the boards all wire netting advances should 
come directly from the Lands Department and be secured by 
individual property mortgages (which would be very difficult 
for struggling selectors to obtain).
Although the recommendations were so heavily
biased towards the pastoralists they did not meet with
unqualified approval even from that group. The pastoral
interest was more united than most rural sectors but it was
not monolithic. There were a few boards, like the one in
the badly infested Balranald district, which passed a
motion against any further legislation on the grounds that
57owners were coping successfully. There were also 
individual graziers who considered that the boards were
57 PR, 15 February 1897, p. 626.
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inept or, as Simpson of Walgett put it, subject to ’fads'
5 8such as crow bounties. In the long settled Hunter
River area many influential pastoral families remained
aloof from the board politics, although the boards were
59still dominated by other pastoral families. In some
areas it was also possible for small holders to control
the boards if they exercised their votes. Nevertheless,
within these kinds of limitations shared by all elected
bodies, the pastures and stock protection boards provided
a good gauge to pastoral opinion and Carruthers had
grounds for feeling peeved that, at the best, the 1897
rabbit bill, which closely followed the conference
6 0recommendations, was damned with faint praise, and more 
often met with out-right pastoral hostility.
The amended bill was presented in May 1897. It 
placed administration in the hands of the pastures and stock 
boards which were to be augmented by two government 
nominees. The boards could set a vermin levy of up to ^d 
per sheep and 3d per large stock, and public lands were 
rated at one sheep to ten acres and cultivated land at one 
sheep to five acres. Holdings enclosed by netting need 
only pay half the levy. Boards could compel occupiers to 
suppress rabbits and could choose to do the work if they
58 ANUA, Dalgety Pty. Ltd., Holdings, 100/4/1/35.
59 S. Eldred-Grigg, 'Pastoral Families of the Hunter Valley 
1388-1914', Ph.D. Thesis, ANU, 1978, p. 247.
60 PR, 15 July 1897, p. 227.
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did not comply. The cost became a first charge on the land. 
The government said it would vote some money for dealing 
with crown lands and for supplying netting finance. The 
bill diverged markedly from the draft suggested by the 
conference at only one point; once again the government 
refused to pay its share of fencing costs unless it had 
given prior approval.
A number of pastoral finance companies sent
61copies of the bill to their managers asking for comments.
The Dalgety file of answers provides an insight into the
features that aroused most concern. The comments ranged
from the extreme position that 'if no legislation had been
made it would have been better for all interested - nothing
but expenditure and waste of public and private money has 
6 2resulted' to the mildly approving conclusion that 'details
of administration should be fairly safe in the hands of
6 3such a preponderance of pastoral people'. The most
common complaint was that those who had paid for fencing
64would still have to pay half the levy and many pointed out
61 Ibid.
62 ANUA, Dalgety Pty. Ltd., Opinions on Rabbit and Noxious 
Weeds Bills 1897, 100/4/1/35, Mr Simpson.
63 Ibid., Mr D. Brown.
64 The conference had discussed this point but had decided 
that no fence was impregnable if rabbits were thick 
enough on the other side. Thus even fully netted 
properties benefitted from diligent neighbours, and 
anyway, they should still bear some of the costs of 
inspection.
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that the government could still evade its full responsibil­
ity. On the whole the company management was less critical 
than its clients. The Melbourne branch wrote that the 
administrative structure was a big improvement on the 1890 
act, that cost sharing of fencing on the basis of utility 
was a useful innovation, and that the idea of land board 
inspection and certification of fencing was a good idea.
The company lawyer, J. Riddock, suggested approaching the 
Minister about further lessening the burden on those 
already fenced but the management made an interesting 
notation on his letter which indicates something of the 
way such bodies exerted their influence:
We do not think direct communication would 
be any good - as a rule the Lands Minister 
deprecates such - Especially in this case, 
his measure being based upon the views 
recently placed before him by representatives 
of the country interests assembled at the 
recent conferences. The matter now rests 
with the Legislature. 65
The legislature made short work of the bill.
After the first reading it was allowed to quietly fade
away. Gormly said this was because a pastoral deputation
6 6had pleaded undue hardship but his own supporters had 
been far from enthusiastic. They were wary of administrat­
ion by the stock and pastures boards and disliked the vague 
financial assistance clauses. The kindest explanation of 
the failure of the pastoralists to support legislation
65 Dalgety 18 June 1897.
66 NSWPD, 1897, 85, 434.
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which they had strongly influenced is that it was 
presented at a very bad time. The west was experiencing 
the worst drought in living memory and, after the 1892-93 
drought, the denuding effects of rabbits and overstocking 
and the enormous financial indebtedness of most lease­
holders, few pastoralists had any reserves on which they 
could draw. For the time being nature was dealing 
ruthlessly with the rabbits, along with their sheep and 
cattle. As despair swept over the west there was little 
energy left for new initiatives.
However, the drought cannot provide a complete 
explanation for pastoral obstreperousness. The 1890 act 
continued to operate, so even if the 1896 and 1897 bills 
would have done little to force the government to vote 
adequate sums to deal with crown lands, at least they 
would have placed administration of all matters concerning 
vermin in the sympathetic hands of the pastures and stock 
boards. The sticking point seems to have been the amount 
of vermin rate reduction to be allowed on netted properties. 
This affected large landholders more than small because of 
the capital outlay involved and also because, from the 
comments and figures available, it seems that selectors 
had erected far less rabbit-proof fencing up to that time. 
The mileage of private fencing was given in the annual 
stock branch reports of the Department of Mines and some­
times in the Lands Department reports. It was also noted 
in the Year Books. The figures were based on the estimates
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of inspectors and no information is given about their
reliability or the state of repair of the fences. An
indication of the difficulty of interpreting the statistics
is that in 1892-93, the first year when netting was
distinguished from other wire fencing, inspectors said
there were 53,704 miles of privately erected netting; in
1898 there were 44,868 miles and in 1899 there were 48,765
miles. By 1901 the total was said to have risen to 77,684
miles. For a breakdown into districts it is necessary to
look at the maps in some of the Lands Department annual 
6 7reports. These suggest that large landholders led the 
way. Subsidiary evidence comes from the regular reports 
submitted by the managers of the numerous properties under 
the control of the pastoral finance companies.
The Australian Agricultural Company was typical 
of the large companies in its early concern over rabbits. 
In 1888 the annual report for one of the best of its 
Liverpool Plains properties noted:
In consequence of the urgent representations 
of the Superintendent, the Directors have 
sanctioned the erection of wire netting all 
along the boundary fence of Warrah, a 
distance of 86 miles, as a protection 
against rabbits. The cost in London is £27 
per mile. It is not improbable that a 
further sum of considerable amount will have 
to be spent in order to make the property, 
which is intersected by many through-fares 
rabbit proof. 68
67 NSWV&P, 1894, Pt. 2, Appendix to annual report.
68 ANUA, Australian Agricultural Company, S. 301, 
Reports, Warrah Station.
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In 1891 the manager reported that 75 miles had been 
finished at a cost of more than £50 per mile: 'it may
be that the erection of this costly fence might have been 
safely postponed for a while, but in the case of such a 
property as Warrah, it is better to be somewhat too early 
than a little too late'. By 1895 the property was fully 
enclosed. The 1908 annual report attested to the value of 
the work when it authorized the expensive replacement of 
the old fence with new netting.
Australian Estates was slower to begin fencing its
properties but in 1894 the report on Boolcarrol Station,
near Wee Waa on the Liverpool Plains, commented that 'it is
quite a treat to scrutinize the results of this property
after having been engaged for some days in dealing with the
scrubby, rabbit infested runs in the Nyngan and Cobar 
69Districts'. However, the discovery of nine young rabbits 
in a burrow on the property made the inspector anxious and 
it was decided to fence if the 1895 Land Act was satisfact­
ory. The badly infested Cobar station, Springfield, was
70extensively re-netted in 1896 after flood damage in 1894.
Australian Mercantile Land and Finance Company 
(AML&F) was the pastoral finance house most deeply 
committed in the western division. By 1885 the very able, 
though very difficult General Manager, Edmond Young, who
69 ANUA Australian Estates Company Ltd., 5/1, Reports 
Boolcarrol Station 1889-1929.
70 Ibid., 5/13. Springfield Station.
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had wide experience of Australian conditions and regularly 
visited the colony, was warning the company of the serious­
ness of the rabbit problem."^ By the early 1890s large 
investments had been made in rabbit-proof fencing. By
721892 Paddington Station, Cobar, had erected over £4,649 
worth of netting and by 1897 inspectors were arranging 
for more fencing on the enormous far west stations, 
Cuthawarra, Sturts Meadow, Wonnaminta, Nundora and Mt.
73Arrowsmith, to divide previously fenced large paddocks.
In the same year the inspector reported that the £2,276
spent netting Wallandra Station, near Hillston, had proved
74worth the money and the badly infested Paika Station, 
Balranald, was fully enclosed in 1896 by 62 miles of 
netting costing £1,550. This was a substantial proportion
of the total value of improvements on the run, which only
75came to £2,975.
Because this thesis deals with official not 
private policy formation I have not done the extensive 
analysis necessary to work out just how heavy pastoral
71 J.D. Bailey, A Hundred Years of Pastoral Banking: A
History of the Australian Mercantile Land and Finance 
Company, Oxford, 1966, p. 99.
72 ANUA, AML&F, 6/106/69b - Paddington Station.
73 Ibid., 97/2/1. London Report 21 November 1897.
74 Ibid., 6/106/28b - Wallandra Station.
75 Ibid., 6/106/25. Paika Station.
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investment was in netted fencing by the late 1890s. It 
was obviously sufficiently great to make many influential 
men suspicious of the worth of new rabbit legislation which 
did not provide vermin tax exemptions for those who had 
netted their properties. The situation had reached an 
uneasy balance of opposing interests. The pastoralists, 
who had been the main rural group insisting on action 
against the rabbits had, during the early 1890s, done far 
more than the government under the 1890 act. When the 
easing of the general economic situation began in the mid 
1890s it rekindled the interest of the Reid government in 
land reform and associated vermin and weed problems, but 
the drought made the pastoralists particularly intransigent 
as regards any matter touching their own expenditure.
The drought also helps to explain the reception
of the 1897 noxious weeds bill but, even if there had been
no drought, this legislation would probably have received
rough handling. As Carruthers said, discouragingly, at the
first reading: 'This is experimental legislation and
although very much needed there is no reason for hurrying its
7 6progress through the House'. The noxious weeds conference,
which met 16-19 March 1897 to consider the draft bill, had
77been attended by 47 men. All except three had attended
76 NSWPD, 1897, 87, 483.
77 Report of the Proceedings of a Conference Respecting 
the Noxious Weeds Pest in New South Wales, commenced 
16 March 1897 at the Chambers of Commerce, Sydney. 
NSWA.
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the rabbit conference. Because weeds were considered a 
relatively more serious problem in the better parts of the 
central and eastern districts than in the west, the pre­
ponderance of pastoralists was less marked, but representat­
ives of the stock and pastures protection boards were still 
in a majority. Discussion was poorly organized and although 
the proposed legislation was amended by the gathering it 
remained hard to understand and vague on essential points.
Administration was placed in the hands of the 
pastures and stock boards and the municipalities which were, 
or might be, formed to manage town lands, but apart from an 
unspecified tax on stock using the travelling stock routes 
the sources of finance were not clarified. The local 
authorities could sue for the repayment of compulsory 
clearance work but experience during the 1880s had shown how 
difficult it was to present a satisfactory case at Petty 
Sessions. Where a lessee had an unexpired term of seven 
years to run, he was solely responsible for all costs 
incurred. For lesser terms the cost was borne proportion­
ally by landlord and tenant but where the lease was due to 
end in less than two years the landlord was solely liable 
for weed clearance. To this Carruthers added the clause 
'provided that no lessee or licensee of Crown Lands shall 
be entitled in any case to put the Crown into the position 
of bearing the whole (or any) cost'.
In 1894 the Pastoral Review had written of the
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7 8need for 'modest and frugal' noxious weed legislation,
but the problem was not a modest one and the available
solutions were not cheap. The bill met with 'almost
79unbroken unanimity of denunciation'. Both large and
small landholders dreaded the financial consequences of
compulsory eradication. They pointed to the bad example
set by the authorities in dealing with prickly pear, and
pastoralists argued that it was unfair to make one heavily
indebted segment of society pay for years of official
neglect: 'Let the whole colony bear the expense of clearing
the stock routes etc. as the whole colony is to blame,
through its representatives in Parliament for allowing the
8 0present deplorable condition of things to exist'. The
bill was not read a second time. As Victoria had discovered
years before, when confronted with the possibility of
compulsory weed extermination many landholders decided that
the weeds were not so bad after all, though few went as far
as the man who actively encouraged burrs because they added
81to the weight of his wool clip.
However, years of bitter familiarity with weed and 
vermin infestation could not entirely hide the ever-growing 
seriousness of both problems, and preoccupation with 
immediate financial concerns could not disguise the fact 
that losses from the spread of weeds and vermin were
78 PR, 15 December 1894, p. 508.
79 Ibid., 15 July 1897, p. 227.
80 Dalgety, 100/4/1/35. Mr Ogilvie, Glen Innes.
81 1897 Noxious Weeds Conference, p. 7. Reported by Atkinson, an eastern division landholder.
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affecting more and more settlers. During 1898 and 1899
much parliamentary time was taken up with federation but
the pastoralist, Thomas Waddell, who became Premier in 1904
and in 1913 was re-elected as a Farmers and Settlers'
member, two leading selectors' spokesmen, Hayes and Gormly,
a Forbes farmer, Thomas Brown and the country newspaper
proprietor and member for Rylstone, (just ahead of the
advancing rabbits) John Fitzpatrick, kept asking when the
long promised rabbit and weed bills were going to be intro- 
8 2duced. Finally Fitzpatrick was told that a rabbit bill
would be presented next session, 'and it will rest with
8 3hon. members to assist in passing it into law'. No bill 
was forthcoming in 1899.
Much of the long delay was due to the inability 
of rural bodies to agree about administrative details and 
the understandable financial fears of small landholders. 
However, as shown by the notices of intention to erect 
rabbit-proof fences, which were printed in the Government 
Gazettes, legal demands for neighbours to share fencing 
costs under the 1890 Rabbit Act continued through the years 
1895 to 1900. Whereas a noxious weed act would necessitate 
additional taxation, a new rabbit act need not prove much 
more expensive than the existing vermin rate levied by the 
pastures and stock boards to deal with other pests.
Evidence about the opposition to control by the pastures
82 NSWPD, 1898, 92, 514; 1895, 93, 337, 434, 750; 1898, 
94, 1957; 1898, 95, 2275.
83 Ibid., 1898, 96, 3992.
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and stock boards is patchy but the influential Farmers
84and Settlers' Association was not markedly hostile.
There was far more feeling against centralized control, and 
the land district concept had not won many ardent supporters. 
It is impossible to predict how the representatives of small 
landholders would have voted if they had been presented with 
a bill, but Gormly's charge that the delay was due not to 
the opposition of selectors but to the adverse reactions 
of influential pastoral groups seems substantially correct.
It was not until 1900 that new rabbit legislation
was passed, and then it was with very little debate. This
apparent anti-climax is not hard to explain. In 1899 the
Labor party defected from the alliance with Reid and a new
Protectionist ministry under Lyne was elected. It was
8 5recognized as a country ministry. More importantly, from
the point of view of rabbit legislation, 1900 gave false
8 6promise of the end of the drought. As John Fegan, Minister
for Mines and Agriculture said in his second reading speech
to the Pastures and Stock Protection (Rabbit) Act, new
grass had to be protected against the rabbits and so the
pastures and stock protection boards had urgently requested 
8 7legislation. Moreover, all the measure did was reinsert
84 Bayley, Farmers and Settlers' Association, pp. 66, 92.
85 Rickard, Class and Politics, p. 159.
86 King, Outlines of Closer Settlement, p. 114 drought list.
87 NSWPD, 1900, 106, 3803.
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the word 'rabbit' into the Pastures and Stock Protection
Act. This meant boards could if they wished, act against
rabbits while they were still scarce, in exactly the same
way as they acted against any other declared pest. The
cost would be determined by the electors of the boards. It
was a very weak move but, as Fegan said: 'It is necessary
that something should be done immediately until a more
8 8comprehensive measure is passed'.
Debate began at 1.12 a.m. and, not surprisingly,
was poorly attended. In the Council Kater warned that too
many individual boards left rabbit destruction to their
neighbours, but he advocated acceptance because it was a
89step in the right direction. There were no amendments
or delays. The following year the Department of Mines and
Agriculture reported that a number of conferences of groups
of boards had been held to discuss the best way of dealing
with the pest, and it was hoped that simultaneous action
would result. However, the department warned that 'the
destruction of rabbits is a matter that calls for constant
and energetic work and vigilance, and if any of the Boards
propose to do it under the scalp system they could not
90possibly make a greater mistake'. Some had already
91indicated their eagerness to adopt that very course.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 4008.
90 Annual Report Department of Mines and Agriculture, 
Stock and Brands Branch, 1901.
91 NSWPD, 1900, 106, 4007.
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Unlike many supposedly short term measures the 
Pastures and Stock Protection (Rabbit) Act lasted only a 
year. When Lyne resigned to join the federal government 
John See became the new leader of the Protectionist govern­
ment which, without its Labor component, became even more 
a country ministry. Almost immediately it was confronted 
with a large pastoral delegation which urged the new 
minister, Patrick Crick, to declare a wide area of the state
rabbit infested and subject to compulsory rabbit destruction
92and fencing regulations. They also asked for cost price 
netting on long-term loans. A similar deputation from the 
Farmers and Settlers' Association told Crick it was time to 
replace the 1890 act and to enforce wide-scale destruction 
of rabbits.^
A major reason for the general flurry of activity 
was, once again, the connection between land tenure and 
rabbits. Because of the dire plight of the western land­
holders a Royal Commission of Enquiry into the Condition 
of Crown Land Tenants of the Western Division of New South 
Wales had been set up in 1900. It heard a great deal of 
evidence about the damage and reduction in carrying capacity 
of the land due to rabbits, and brought the whole question 
back to the forefront of pastoral and political conscious­
ness. Because rabbits were a major part of the argument for 
big rent reductions and long extensions of lease, it also
92 PR, 15 April 1901, p. 85.
93 Bayley, Farmers and Settlers1 Association, p. 62.
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highlighted the inconsistency of, on the one hand,
demanding big concessions because of rabbits and, on the
other hand, objecting to legislation designed to force
94more people to kill them.
Crick's 1901 Rabbit Act repealed the 1890 Rabbit 
Act and the 1900 Pastures and Stock Protection (Rabbit) Act.
It set up new rabbit boards consisting of four elected 
members and a government nominated chairman. The boards 
covered the same areas as the existing stock districts and 
would be financed by a stock levy, fines and a government 
subsidy. They would pay an inspector who would be responsible 
to the minister. The government would make budgetary allow­
ances for advances to purchase wire-netting and direct 
subsidies to the boards. The whole of the state would be 
declared rabbit infested but it would be left to the minister 
to decide whether a rabbit board actually had to sit and 
impose a levy, and the western division would be considered 
separately.^
The parliamentary debate was long but repetitive 
rather than detailed. Once again the minister claimed that, 
at least in one important respect, the measure was a short 
term expedient; it was intended to drastically revise the 
whole pastures and stock protection board system next 
session. The three main areas of local rural jurisdiction,
94 NSWV&P, 1901, 1, 125-136 . Brief summary of the evidence 
on rabbits given to the commission.
95 NSWPD, 1901 (2 ser.) , I, 476 ff.
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animal diseases, rabbits and noxious animals would then be
96united instead of coming under three separate bodies.
The only major amendment was made in the Council, which
voted for a graduated stock franchise for rabbit board 
97elections. Crick pointed out that small landholders 
would still comprise a majority of electors. Gormly and 
most farmers' representatives wanted one man, one vote, but
were prepared to compromise in order to get the measure
, 98 passed.
The following year the Pastures Protection Act
was introduced. Crick emphasised that it was primarily
a consolidating act, uniting under one board the functions
of sheep and stock management, noxious animal control and
9 9rabbit eradication. As a result the powers and penalties 
were very similar to those in the earlier acts. The new 
pastures protection boards would have six elected members 
and a government nominated chairman. Three members would 
be elected every two years, to give some continuity. A 
graduated stock franchise would be used but provision was 
made for non-stock-owning landholders. A maximum tax rate 
was set and occupiers of fully netted properties only had 
to pay half. The minister appointed the inspectors but they 
were paid set salaries by the boards. The boards also paid 
three per cent of their funds to the treasury to cover 
administrative costs and could receive government loans at
96 Ibid., 1901, 4, 4037.
97 Ibid, 4249. Kater.
98 Ibid, 4480.
99 Ibid., 1902 (2 ser.) , 9 , 4635.
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five per cent interest. There were also provisions for 
a subsidy payment and for government advances for the 
purchase of wire netting. As before the government was 
only liable to share the cost of fences for which it had 
given prior approval.
The debate was very tightly controlled by Crick.
He was frequently one of the most scurrilous, disruptive 
members of the Assembly, but he had the insider's know­
ledge of how to deal with those who tried obstructive 
tactics against himself. When two Labor men, Nielson and 
Millard, tried to side-track the debate into an attack on 
squatters Crick gave them short shrift. At one stage he 
said he did not care if the legislation never passed and 
he would throw it under the table if the Assembly did not 
apply the gag.^^ Members returned to a rapid assessment 
of the main clauses. The Legislative Council made a few 
minor administrative amendments which were accepted without 
debate. Alison summed up the typical pastoral reaction; he 
thought that, for a time the bill would work well, but that 
some day stockowners would have to get full power over the 
appointment of inspectors and the board membership.
The act was a clever piece of drafting amalgamat­
ion but it left the state with a clumsy system of vermin
100 Ibid., 1902, 9, 4831.
101 PR, 15 January 1903, p. 776.
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control. Administration was shared between the Department 
of Lands and the Department of Mines and Agriculture. For 
instance, stock functions and supervision of vermin control 
were the responsibility of the Department of Mines and 
Agriculture but fencing regulations were overseen by the 
Lands Department. The Lands Department also acquired 
considerable powers of patronage. Whether Crick, who was 
revealed by the 1906 Lands Commission Inquiry as a black­
mailing extortionist, was aware of this factor is an open 
question. For a brief time in the mid 1890s it had appeared 
that policy was being formed as a result of direct consultat­
ion with the interested parties. This did not work. Even 
when Carruthers restricted the circle of advisors he still 
did not get effective recommendations. The problem had 
dragged on too long. Sensibilities had been blunted and 
some of the men most concerned with vermin control had made 
expensive commitments to individual action. The laws that 
were passed were far less serious efforts to solve the 
known practical problems than stop-gap measures, offered 
when the gravity of the situation could no longer be 
completely ignored, and designed to offend as few people 
as possible. The politics of sectional and party groupings 
were becoming the dominant feature of vermin control policy. 
After 20 years of experimenting with other forms of 
administration the pastoral boards were given a second chance 
to show that they could cope with the rabbit. They had won 
out by default and opposing voices were soon raised again. 
During the twentieth century the partiality of the local
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boards, the role of commercial rabbiters, the question of 
state and federal assistance for fencing and the 
unresolved noxious weed problem did not so much add new 
dimensions to the controversy as accentuate an existing 
tendency for vermin debates to be overshadowed by much 
broader political concerns.
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CHAPTER 8
Native Vermin Policy
There is an Australian version of a well-known 
armed services saying which goes 'If it moves, kill it: 
if it does not move, cut it down'. Under this regime 
Europeans drastically altered the Australian environment.
In some cases native animals were exterminated but in a few 
instances the environmental changes removed population 
restraints on native species and their numbers increased.
Then there was additional incentive to kill more of them 
and some came under the vermin acts. Yet within the broad 
category of native vermin there were considerable variations 
of response and it is these differences that interest me.
They reveal something of the way in which perceptions alter 
and something about the kinds of pressures that were applied 
to governments that either made them receptive to the idea 
of becoming financially or administratively involved or 
made them reluctant to adopt firm measures. Very little 
basic research has been done in this area so because of the 
difficulties of getting information and in an effort to 
clarify my argument I will concentrate on three groups of 
animals: kangaroos and wallabies, dingoes and wild dogs and
wombats.
Logically vermin laws should be the opposite side 
of the coin to animal protection laws but in practice it 
does not always work out that way. For instance skin traders
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may have advocated protection laws to ensure a breeding 
season.^ Compromises may have to be reached between groups 
in the community, such as graziers, farmers, sportsmen and 
skin hunters, which apply different economic criteria to 
their assessment of the worth of an animal, as well as 
with those who value an animal for non-economic reasons. 
Therefore, particularly in this chapter, there is inevitable 
overlapping between the question of vermin policy formation 
and the issue of conservation.
2Some creatures, most notably the emu, wander in 
and out of the vermin lists but until recently there was 
rarely any dispute in rural areas about how to categorize 
dingoes. As early as 1839 the Sydney Herald was urging the 
Council 'to take prompt measures to exterminate noxious wild 
animals', by which they meant dingoes. The paper urged that 
the government could offer rewards for the destruction of 
native dogs 'just as legally as it may extend rewards to 
persons apprehending runaway convicts, or for the conviction
3of robbers or murderers'. Like most members of the dog 
family the dingo has probably always had a small group of 
admirers. In the 1830s there was a craze for keeping them
4as pets in Sydney and in the 1880s it was claimed that some
1 1887 Intercolonial Stock Conference, NSWV&P, 1887 
(2), IV, 511.
2 The emu was first protected in New South Wales by the 
1893 Native Birds Protection Act, which was primarily 
a game law rather than an exercise in conservation.
3 Sydney Herald, 27 July 1839.
4 Rolls, They All Run Wild, p. 361.
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dog breeders would pay up to £50 for a pure-bred.5 Never­
theless, in country districts there was agreement that 
sheep and dingoes were incompatible and so the first 
vermin laws in the new land were framed against them.
Initially the laws only sought to control the 
setting of traps and to ensure that poison baits were not 
scattered too widely without some warning to neighbours and 
the public, but they soon moved beyond this regulatory 
function to include such matters as the compulsory sharing 
of expenses where baits were laid on property borders.^
In this small way the wild dog acts provided legislative 
precedents for later vermin laws which involved much heavier 
expenditure on the part of landholders. During the 1830s 
and 1840s in the more closely settled country districts of 
New South Wales and Victoria dingo hunting became a social
7event, akin to fox-hunting. As with the fox in England 
this activity did not make the quarry any the less vermin 
but it helped reduce the need for laws compelling its 
destruction. Because of its comparatively slow breeding 
rate the native dog was easily driven from settled areas.
The early pastoralists assessed their new 
environment in terms of its sheep (or cattle) bearing
5 Town and Country Journal (Sydney), 15 March 1882.
6 Native Dogs Destruction Act 1852 16 vie. 14; 1875
39 vie. 15; see also Chapter 4.
7 Kiddle, Men of Yesterday pp. 80, 86, 87.
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capacity but their reaction to the dingo was not simply 
an unreasoning aversion to an insignificant native 
competitor. They were just as hostile to domestic dogs 
that went wild but they found the control measures far 
more difficult to formulate. Much legislative time in 
both colonies was taken up with Dog Acts, which were not 
just ways of regulating the hordes of city mongrels but 
were also attempts to protect farmers from a growing menace 
and to clarify when a man was entitled to destroy what 
might be another man's property. In 1877 the Australasian 
took up the cause pointing out how at the start of every 
session farmers were 'tantalized by the apparition of a 
law for the suppression of dogs' and how the failure of 
municipalities to enforce existing laws was retarding thegwider adoption of sheep farming. Appropriately most 
rural publications wrote of a wild dog menace rather than 
specifying a dingo problem and later legislation was often 
passed under this name, despite the difficulty of deciding 
whether scalps presented for bounty payments were genuine 
'wild' dogs.
With the exception of western New South Wales, the 
Great Dividing Range and the Mallee, dingoes in New South 
Wales and Victoria were well under control, often non­
existent, by the 1870s, and graziers were already making a 
connection between the massive growth in the marsupial 
population and the decline of the natural predator, but this
8 Australasian, 11 August 1877, p. 182.
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9did not cause a change in attitude. One dingo on a run
was one dingo too many and baits were set out and trappers 
brought in. It was not that graziers' perceptions of their 
environment were so narrow that they could not see that 
there was a role for the dingo, it was rather that their 
emotional commitment to their flocks was so strong that 
they could not tolerate a deliberate sheep killer. A man 
might become blunted to the effect of rabbits on pasture or 
fatalistic about the ravages of liver fluke on stock but 
the sight of maimed and half-eaten sheep retained its impact. 
In addition it was satisfying to be able to hit back at a 
visible enemy. Too much damage was done by forces beyond an 
individual's control, such as drought, disease, fire, flood 
and the international wool market. However, it must be 
emphasised that, whatever the ultimate scientific verdict 
on the damage done by dingoes, the evidence available to 
graziers until after the Second World War strongly supported 
the traditional view of the dingo as a hunter killer. The 
Pastoral Review abounds in descriptions of large nightly 
kills and although the dingo may prefer to single out one 
target and make a straight kill, in a melee of silly sheep 
there were apparently many incidentally mauled casualties'^ 
and shepherds had long known it did breeding ewes no good
9 See Chapter 4, p.110 . The growth in the marsupial 
population was probably a result of changes in pasture 
rather than the decline in the dingo population but 
this later discovery does not affect the argument.
10 Australasian, 11 December 1880, p. 761. Claims that 
20 sheep were mauled for every one killed.
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to frighten them into a panic. The independent minded 
young scientist, Francis Ratcliffe, reported that on one 
unnetted western New South Wales block wild dogs were held 
responsible for the total failure of the lambing season.^ 
Throughout the 1880s and 1890s the stock branch published 
annual estimates in its reports of the sheep losses 
attributed to wild dogs. Dingoes were blamed for between 
£20,000 and £30,000 worth of stock losses every year and 
domestic dogs that had gone wild were blamed for slightly 
more. The estimates rose in the twentieth century.
Because of its unequivocal status as vermin the 
dingo was a prime target when the major vermin acts of the 
1880s were being framed in New South Wales. In 1880 the 
pastures and stock protection boards were set up and from 
their inception offered bounties on wild dog scalps. In 
Victoria, with its lesser problem, the wild dog did not find 
its way into the new vermin laws till ten years after the 
first rabbit act but by 1890 the vague powers previously 
held, if little exercised, by the municipalities had been 
tidied into the new Vermin Destruction Act, under the 
centralized control of the Department of Lands. It is an 
indication of the relatively low importance placed on dingo 
infestation in Victoria that this act only specifically set 
bounties on foxes and left other payments to the discretion 
of the municipalities. Later governments became far more 
cautious as increasing numbers of claims were received from
11 Ratcliffe, Flying Fox and Drifting Sand, p. 235.
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East Gippsland and the Mallee.
In New South Wales the determination of bounty 
levels was always the prerogative of the stock and pastures 
protection boards, later the pastures protection boards.
In Victoria, with its centralized system, there was always 
a high degree of departmental wariness about bonuses. Some­
times a ceiling figure was set. In 1893 the Northern Vermin 
Board, which covered much of the Mallee, refused to pay less
than 30s each for wild dog scalps, so the department set an
12upper limit of £100 for reimbursements. The same year
New South Wales boards were paying 10s to 63s for scalps and
the department returned the money in proportion to the
percentage of the maximum vermin rate that had been levied,
up to pound for pound, but very few districts levied the
13full permissible rate. In 1915 the Victoriai Vermin 
Destruction Act set the maximum wild dog bounty at 20s and 
stated that municipalities could not be compelled to pay 
more than £2 00 p.a. and the government would not return 
more than £100. Because the New South Wales government had 
no control over the boards' power to set bonuses there was 
little discussion of the topic in the 1890s or the early 
twentieth century, despite the enormous furore over the 
rabbit bounties of the 1880s, which had left the state half 
a million pounds in debt. The one lasting effect was that 
the state refused ever again to pay a bounty on rabbits. The
12 McLeod Letter Book (2) 2 February 1893; 4 February 1893.
13 Annual Report Stock & Brands Branch, Department of Mines 
& Agriculture, 1892-93.
259
shrewd, successful South Australian pastoralist, Peter
Waite opposed the bounty system. In 1917 he wrote to the
Pastoral Review: 'The system of payment for scalps so far
from exterminating the pest has not even reduced it, but
on the other hand has firmly established the scalping 
14industry'. However Waite had few supporters.
On the other hand, although most of the relevant 
Victorian files have been lost or destroyed, there are a 
few surviving memoranda that indicate that expense-conscious 
civil servants shared Waite's view. They doubted that 
professional hunters would willingly work themselves out of 
business and they believed that, if farmers were sufficiently 
harmed to warrant setting bounty payments, they would pay to 
do the necessary killing themselves.^  The rural counter­
argument, particularly in the case of the wild dog, was that
14 PR, 17 February 1917, p. 147. On the other hand, on 
10 February 1978 on the A.B.C. mid-day rural session, 
radio 3, NSW, the Chairman of the Wild Dog Destruction 
Board commented on the call by the Maitland Pastures 
Protection Board for the restoration of a government 
reimbursed bounty on wild dog scalps. He admitted 
the bounty had not solved the problem before, and may 
even have helped perpetuate it, but he argued that it 
was better than nothing. The bounty issue is far from 
dead.
15 Vermin and Noxious Weeds Board, Miscellaneous files 
relating to wild dogs. Memorandum from a senior 
inspector (?) 1902.
PR, 15 June 1897, p. 180. Victorian Chief Inspector 
said the fox bounty was much abused, and he only 
reluctantly agreed to accept the Shire Councils' 
recommendations that it be continued. In 10 months 
17,500 scalps had been collected.
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the pest was too cunning to be caught by hard-working 
farmers: plenty of time and professional expertise were
needed to trap and poison wild dogs. This argument is the 
basis of continued scalp payments in a number of states.
The strongest evidence of the sincerity of rural 
belief in the need to control wild dogs come from the 
willingness of landholders in badly infested areas to pay 
for barrier fencing. The original barrier fences in the 
eastern states were intended only to counter rabbits but 
very soon there was agitation to have them heightened and 
reinforced against wild dogs. Kidman, who was not prone 
to spend rashly on his enormous properties, laid out large 
sums on protective fencing, even though he was not willing 
to contribute to a general fund for the same purpose.^ 
Perhaps he believed he had done enough or may be he doubted 
the idea of joint projects. The western end of the Queens­
land rabbit proof border fence was taken over by a local
17New South Wales trust and in 1917 Bourke stockowners
voted to build 46 miles of wild dog proof fencing on the
18border at a cost of £2,000.
During the war years all fencing suffered from the 
shortage of wire, labour and capital for investment, and in
16 Hardy, West of the Darling, p. 231.
17 PR, 15 April 1912, p. 312.
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the far west of New South Wales the backlog was not made
up during the 1920s. Coincidence or not, western division
graziers linked the spread of wild dogs with the decline in
lambing. Although the northern and southern tablelands also
demanded assistance against wild dogs during this period the
19most insistent calls came from the western division. It
is tempting to link the political persistence of these
graziers with the fact that the western division was the
only part of the state where the pastures and stock protection
boards did not control vermin expenditure. Instead the area
was centrally controlled through the Western Lands Commission.
Therefore landholders had an outside body against which they
could complain, rather than having to complain about the
way their own neighbours ran things. There were also clear
grounds for dissatisfaction. The commission refused to
publish a balance sheet. The chairman claimed that if a
balance sheet was issued, and it showed a substantial amount
in hand, some politicians would demand the withdrawal of
government subsidies and the commission would have no
20reserves to meet emergencies. In June 1928 the Wild Dog 
Destruction Fund spent £17,900 of its total deposits of
18 PR, 16 May 1917, p. 417.
19 ANUA, Graziers' Assoc. Records. 1924 investigation 
into L. Le Souef's suggestions for wild dog control. 
E 256/153/9972; 1929 Brindabella Dingo Destruction 
Assoc, estimated annual losses on the Monaro High 
plains at £200,000 E 256/220/DC11, Rolls, p. 362.
New England dingo control.
20 ANUA, Graziers' Assoc. Records E256/194/DC1, 1928.
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21£36,081. The balance was supposedly held to cover the
enormous damage done during drought induced dust storms
that buried the fence and during the periodic floods that
submerged hundreds of miles of fencing, sometimes for years,
but graziers did not believe that this justified a poorly
maintained fence the rest of the time. However, any
explanation in purely political terms of the level of
agitation in the western division runs up against the fact
that, although the tablelands had a problem, the west was by
far the worst affected region. In the 1970s New South Wales
spent over £200,000 p.a. on the dingo fence and the
Agricultural Gazette still presents the view that a 5,000
head sheep property adjoining a well maintained barrier
fence may have up to 2,000 more lambs annually than when the
22fence was not dog proof.
The one definite statement that can be made about 
the official response to claims of a wild dog menace up to 
1930 is that, in areas where numbers of wild dogs bred, 
there was always considerable pressure on the government to 
act. For all its scepticism the Victorian government 
retained the bounty system. The amounts were small, the 
political pressure on local members was great and the evidence 
about the economic necessity of the bounty was inconclusive. 
The same writ large applied to New South Wales. For
21 Ibid., 22 October 1928.
22 New South Wales Agricultural Gazette, 87 (3), 1976, 
p. 50.
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largely emotional reasons many lightly infested districts 
continued to offer bounties but it would be unwise to 
explain the wild dog barrier fence policy and the bounty 
payments of the Western Lands Board and the eastern 
tablelands simply in terms of emotional over-reaction or 
prejudiced environmental vision.
The treatment of wallabies and kangaroos under
the vermin laws is more questionable. As Powell pointed
out, from the earliest days of settlement these animals
have had the misfortune to be seen as 'edible, game and 
23vermin'. Add the later skin-hunters and there can be 
little surprise that Victorian landholders soon rid them­
selves of any serious threat and kangaroos
never figured in the Victorian vermin statutes. A sparser
population and large, relatively untouched breeding areas
of unoccupied crown lands meant that New South Wales did
not find such an easy solution. As was pointed out in
Chapter Four the first New South Wales rabbit acts were
partly carried because they also promised to provide a way
24of controlling marsupials. Once they were classed as 
vermin and came under the control of the local boards the 
government had as little control over the chosen counter­
method as they had over wild dog control. Whereas the 
boards had to admit that they could not cope with rabbits, 
they never said that they could not manage to deal with
23 Powell, Environmental Management, p. 30.
24 See Chapter 4, p. 105.
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the much slower breeding native animals. The central 
authority was left with only one big question: should
kangaroos and wallabies be classed as vermin?
In the days before controlled pasture studies it
was orthodox belief that all herbivores competed for feed.
This put kangaroos and wallabies in competition with sheep
and cattle and, as herds of marsupials are not unobtrusive,
settlers soon knew when there were large numbers on their
land. With the spread of wire netting they were also
blamed for some damage to fences. In 1884 nearly 800,000
25kangaroos and over 330,000 wallabies were killed in New
South Wales in return for bonus payments. By 1890 over
eight million kangaroos and about half that number of
wallabies had been scalped. In the next ten years bounties
were paid on another three million kangaroos and eight and
a half million wallabies. The bonuses ranged from Id to
Is for kangaroos and hd to 6d for wallabies. Despite these
figures the feelings of country people about the animals
were different from their attitudes towards wild dogs.
There were always many who said that they would not like to
see them exterminated. Of course such admissions were often
made rather shamefacedly because, as Ratcliffe noted in his
travels, expression of sentiment towards native trees and
2 6animals seemed to be regarded as 'unAustralian1.
25 'Annual Report Stock and Brands Branch, Department of 
Mines and Agriculture NSWV&P, 1883-84, p. 10. The 
following statistics are taken from the appropriate 
annual reports.
26 Ratcliffe, p. 79.
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Possibly some of the protection arguments based
on the value of marsupial skins were attempts to save the
animals without appearing sentimental. Undoubtedly
scientists used the economic argument in urging preservation
of native flora. The Victorian government botanist,
Professor Alfred Ewart, said in the Victorian Year Book for
1916-17: 'A species once extinct cannot be revived by any
means; and to allow plants to become extinct before all
their economic possibilities have been thoroughly tested
is a wanton wasting of the hidden treasures which Nature
27scatters lavishly around us'. The economic value of the
rare and delicate orchids it was hoped to save at Wilson's
Promontory National Park must have been value well hidden.
Nevertheless, similar views were expressed in the New South
2 8Wales Year Book. Native animal protection laws were 
passed in New South Wales at a time when Victoria was still 
relying on two national parks to save endangered species. 
Possibly the known scale of slaughter in the larger state 
forced the issue to wider attention.
In 1902 a private member's bill to protect native 
animals was unsuccessfully introduced. It was presented 
again in 1903, this time with the firm support of the 
Premier, John See. The bill called for absolute protection 
of red and grey kangaroos, wallaroos, opossums, koalas, 
wombats, platypus and echidna for two years, after which
27 Victorian Year Book, 1916-17, p. 68.
28 New South Wales Year Book, 1921, p. 104.
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the last two would be given perpetual protection and the
rest would be covered by a closed season 1 July to 31 
29December. The main argument advanced in favour of the
measure was that ruthless killing was destroying a
potential economic asset but the inclusion on the list of
two clearly non-commercial species, wombats and echidna,
30show that other factors were also involved. See made 
much of the fact that representatives of the skin trade
31agreed almost unanimously that protection was desirable, 
but some members were not convinced. Broughton O'Conor, 
a former free-trader representing the Sherbrooke electorate, 
where there were kangaroo skin tanneries, said that ’the 
bill protects a lot of animals absolutely of no use what­
ever. Of what use is the wombat or hedgehog? Why should
we not want to preserve the bunyip? Of what good to the
32country are a thousand or even a million kangaroos?'.
He claimed to be more worried about employment in his area
than the fate of a few animals. Opponents also likened the
new law to the hated English game laws and argued that they
would create a new class of criminal: 'The only amusement
33which the youngster in the country has is shooting'.
In the Council some well-known pastoralists, led 
by Henry Kater and Henry Dangar, doubted the wisdom of
29 Native Animals Protection Act, 1903 No.
30 NSWPD, 1903 (2 ser.), 11, 1984.
31 Ibid., 1986 .
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 1987.
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passing an act that would aid the skin trade and might
create a nuisance for graziers. However, Kater and Dangar
parted company when the latter insisted that 'it would
have been far better in the interests of the settlers
generally to bring in a bill to exterminate the whole lot
34of them C native animals 1'. He blamed the whole
measure on 'rotten sentiment'. A fellow pastoralist, who
also opposed the fur trade, A. Ross, took him to task and
used some very modern sounding arguments: 'It is not
right that the native animals should be exterminated because
they do a little damage to some people ... Would any hon.
member here like to see the kangaroo or wallaroo or
opossum extinguished? ... The landowner has no right to
35destroy a whole countryside'. The Council debate was 
very short and although a group of 13 to 17 Liberal and 
Labor men in the Assembly would have delayed the third 
reading, the legislation was rapidly forced through by use 
of the gag. Letters to the Pastoral Review were evenly 
divided between those who thought the act rushed and ill- 
informed and those who thought it was necessary.
From a conservation point of view it was a weak 
act. It covered only a small group of animals and, except 
for the two rarest, the closed season was only six months. 
More importantly, the Colonial Secretary had absolute 
discretion to alter the list of scheduled animals and to
34 Ibid., 3307.
35 Ibid., 3308.
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vary the open seasons. The significance of the act from 
the vermin point of view is that it limited the power of 
the pastures protection boards (without ever once referring 
to them) and set in motion a new piece of administrative 
bureaucracy, which provides fresh information on rural 
attitudes and the politics of vermin control. Any 
individual or group wanting to alter the schedule had to 
present a case to the Colonial Secretary. This evidence 
had then to be checked. The department could hardly call 
on the pastures protection boards to provide impartial 
reports: they were often the petitioning parties. There
was still no compulsory shire organization that could be 
utilized throughout the state, so, as had happened in 
Victoria in the 1890s, the police found themselves with a 
role in the assessment of vermin infestation.
The most striking impression given by the
surviving files is of the apparent efficiency of the
administrative agency, the Colonial Secretary's Department,
and the independence of the reports it received from the
3 6local agents, in this case the police. As soon as an 
application was received reports were requested from the 
local constable and the surrounding police stations. It was 
acknowledged departmental policy to follow the recommendat­
ions. In contrast to many Lands Department decisions, 
applications were processed with remarkable speed. From
36 The surviving files are held in the State Archives
of New South Wales, Fauna Protection bundles ML 5250 
and 5331.
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original letter, through inspection to final answer rarely 
took one month and usually only took three weeks, and most 
files had a minimum of three police reports. The comments 
received were very frank and most did not favour extensions 
of the right to kill:
From enquiries made and the Constable's own 
knowledge the animals mentioned are not on 
the increase ... those principally concerned 
about the matter are people who partly earn 
their living with the gun. 37
... managers made no effort or incurred any 
expense themselves during the present open 
season ... their desire is to have protection 
removed altogether and will continue agitating 
in the hopes of attaining that object. 38
It is evident the intention of the Pastoralists 
in the Western Division is to keep on agitating 
with a view to having protection absolutely 
removed from kangaroos and emus. 39
Mr McGinty has a large family of grown up, 
indolent sons who no doubt expect to benefit 
... so they may make a living without hard 
work. 40
The department was aware that once an area was
opened for increased shooting kangaroos and other hunted
animals tended to move to previously untroubled areas, so
the comment was frequently added to the files that districts
had to be considered as blocks and alterations to the
41schedules were made accordingly. This was a lesson that
37 Tooloom (near Lismore) October 1911, ML5230.
38 Coonabarabran and Milparinka, Police Constable Keagle, 
March 1914, ML 5331.
39 Wilcannia, 31 January 1914, ML 5331.
40 Inverell, Sen. Constable Graham, ML 5250.
41 Memorandum 30 December 1910, ML 5250.
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the pastures protection boards were unwilling to learn, so 
there was rarely co-ordinated planning between neighbouring 
boards. When areas were granted extended open seasons they 
usually lasted for three months but doubtful cases received 
very short extensions. Wilcannia and Milparinka pastures 
protection boards were persistent in their demands for the 
lifting of all restrictions, but despite pressure from the 
Pastoralists' Union and local parliamentarians some closed 
season was retained.
The petitions break down the following way: one
quarter from boards that represented large pastoral holdings,
one quarter from eastern boards and Farmers and Settlers'
Associations that spoke for smaller landholders, and one
half from individuals. An example of the last is the
letter of a trapper: 'Now that thousands of people in
Australia are making a living at the game, some parasites
are weeping salt tears because they cannot get these people
of the bush and freedom to work for them ... There never
has been any complaints from parasites about the squatter
running his poison c a r t ' T h e  two most consistent
supporters of such petitions were Robert Scobie, a leather
merchant and member for the Murray, and William Millard,
representing Bega, who had been a tannery owner in Wollong- 
43ong. There is no indication that any particular politician 
or party received a favoured hearing, but the surviving 
files only cover the years 1910 to 1917, the period of the
42 Fredericks to Meehan MLA, 1912, ML 5250.
43 ADB files.
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McGowen and Holman Labor Governments, so broad, inter­
party comparisons cannot be drawn. During these years only 
one decision was made that strongly suggests political 
pressure had been applied to the department.
In 1915 the government minuted an open season of
two months in the four electorates of Gwydir, Namoi, Cobar
and Murray. For ease of administration, decisions were
usually made on the basis of pastures protection board
districts, not electorates. The department had already
rejected applications from these areas and an internal
memorandum asked the Permanent Secretary whether officers
should delay action while they sought the customary police 
44reports. They were instructed to carry out the Minister's 
direction but to wire for immediate police reports and to 
file them for future reference. The Minister was then told 
that action could not be taken on the basis of electorates 
and that it would be necessary to lift restrictions through­
out the entire central and western divisions and the 
pastures protection districts of Casino, Tenterfield and 
Glen Innes. This was an enormous area but the exemption 
only lasted two months, not the full breeding season. The 
Labor Government had many problems both within the party 
and with rural voters over its land policy but if this
44 Memorandum 9 April 1915, ML 5331.
45 The best terse summary is in Hughes & Graham, Australian 
Government and Politics, p. 64.
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move was a bid for country votes in a possible conscription- 
induced election in 1916 it was a very devious piece of 
work of even more doubtful effectiveness. It was more 
likely to have been an ill-conceived response to poor 
rains and war-time shortages of netting and labour.
The files reveal a surprising degree of environ­
mental awareness. The department decided that, provided the 
promise of good grass was borreout, total protection would
be reimposed for 1917 to ensure that breeding stocks of
46marsupials recovered in all areas. There were also many
sympathetic reports from graziers and some pastures
protection boards. In 1915 the Coonabarabran board wrote
opposing the request from some local men for an extended
open season. The board unanimously resolved that 'if the
kangaroos are allowed to be destroyed during that period
47they will very soon be wiped out altogether'. Condobolin
landholders in 1913 told the police that they opposed the
shooting of kangaroos and were willing to protect them on
their properties.^  Some of the police felt even more
strongly. Constable Vizzard of Wannaring said 'it is a
pity it l the district ] was not set aside in the first
49instance as a National Reserve for Marsupials'.
46 Memorandum 8 December 1916, ML 5331.
47 Kangaroo Protection, 15 June 1915, ML 5331.
48 Ugarie District 29 March 1913, ML 5250 (follows a 
similar report 15 March 1913).
49 Wannaring, 7 March 1914, ML 5331.
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In 1911, 600,000 wallabies and kangaroos were
scalped. By 1915 this had fallen to about 30,000. In 1916
50it was around 9,000 and in 1918 just over 5,000. In 1918
the Native Birds and Animals Protection Act changed the
format of the law so that the schedule referred to
animals and birds which were not protected, instead of the
other way around. Kangaroos were not listed but five kinds
of wallabies remained vermin.^ The changes prompted little
debate. Whereas most pastures protection boards continued
to offer dingo bounties even when no scalps were forthcoming,
wallaby bounties were offered occasionally and by a limited
number of boards, which suggests there was no great passion
52to exterminate them. It is hard to find out how 
frequently protection was lifted on kangaroos during the 
1920s because the notices were only printed in the Government 
Gazettes, but although skin hunters were not put out of 
business, the collected pastures protection board balance 
sheets, held in the New South Wales State Archives, show 
that the boards were no longer offering bonuses. Whether 
this indicates a genuine change of attitude must await a 
proper study of the development of conservation in Australia.
50 NSWPP, 1912-13 (2), I, 158 Department of Agriculture 
Annual Report; 1915-16, I, 165; 1916, I, 40; 1918,
1, 93.
51 Birds and Animals Protection Act, 1918 No. 21, Schedule
2 .
52 Pastures Protection Board Annual Balance Sheets 1920- 
1930, New South Wales State Archives 3/3547. Until 1934 
they were also printed in full in the Government 
Gazettes but not as a group or at the same time every 
year, so they are tedious to locate.
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It may be more a result of the fall in numbers, the
efficiency of commercial hunters or changes in the financial
53priorities of the boards. Whatever the reason, and what­
ever the extent of non-bounty killing that continued, the 
virtual ending of the bounty system on these animals makes 
the policy adopted by the boards towards the wombat rather 
perplexing.
The wombat was included in the 1903 schedule of
protected animals but on 18 March 1904 an open season was
declared in Wee Jasper on the southern tablelands, and on
17 January 1905 wombats lost their protected status through- 
54out the state. In 1918 they were put on the vermin 
schedule. Yet wombat skin had no commercial value and there 
were only two passing references to them in the 1903 debate. 
Both were made in the Legislative Council and both relied on 
hearsay evidence. Kater told the Council that 'Wombats, of 
course are harmful, although I must say that, although I 
have lived in a district where there have been wombats, 
during the last 20 years I have never seen one of them,
55therefore it is evident that they must be very scarce'.
A .W . Meeks said that 'one gentleman, from the hilly districts 
told me, however, that he had found the wombats to be worse
53 Bonus payments were offered on a number of animals 
including hares, opossums, crows and eagles. Some 
boards in sheep areas made regular payments for crows 
while others did not. There was a tendency for boards 
not heavily committed to large bounty outlays on 
dingoes and marsupials to pay more for crows but this 
cannot be taken as a general rule.
54 Government Gazettes, New South Wales.
55 NSWPD, 1903 (2 ser.) II, 3306.
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than the rabbits because they burrow below the wire 
netting, and practically make holes for the rabbits to 
come through. Whilst many people say they have hardly 
ever seen a wombat, and that there is no necessity to worry 
about them, I give that as the absolute experience of a 
gentleman well known to hon. members'
Massive killing of wombats had begun in the early
1880s around Deniliquin and by the end of the century they
were almost extinct in the district. Deniliquin was one
of the first areas of New South Wales to be infested with
rabbits and some wire netting was erected between 1883 and
1886. On the other hand Berrima, 137km south-west of Sydney,
was killing large numbers of wombats by 1894, and, according
to the Lands Department, netting was rarely used in the
57eastern division at that time. Berrima paid bounties
almost every year until 1926 but until 1909 the board sent
annual returns to the Department of Agriculture which
described the area as 'lightly affected' with rabbits and
gave the main counter-measure as poisoning, not rabbit- 
5 8proof netting. Purchases of netting under the assistance 
schemes were not large. To a lesser extent the same 
comments apply to the Tamworth Pastures Protection Board, 
the other consistent bounty paying district. However,
56 Ibid., 3307.
57 NSWV&P, 1894. Annual Reports Department of Lands and 
Department of Mines and Agriculture, Stock and Brands 
Branch.
58 Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, 1909,
276
Tamworth was in the main wombat breeding area and had
invested in dingo-proof fencing. Bonus payments began in
1900 when 39 scalps were handed in and rose to 659 the
following year. After that they fluctuated from 76 in
1912 to over 2,000 in 1916 and bounties were still being
59paid in the 1930s. In other districts little notice was 
taken of wombats except for occasional campaigns that 
usually lasted only one season. In 1915 a Bega resident, 
Moorhead, wrote to William Millard, his MLA, asking for the 
right to kill kangaroos and wombats in the district. The 
Colonial Secretary's Department refused the request about 
kangaroos and noted that there was no protection on wombats 
anyway, but police reports were still requested. Police 
Constable Wyndham said he had only seen one wombat in four 
years and Constable Dunne said there was no native animal 
problem, only a rabbit menace, and that most settlers 
favoured protection.^ ^
Two factors make the payment of wombat bounties 
more difficult to explain than those on wild dogs. Wombats 
dig a few large holes and damage some netted fences but they 
do not harm stock or devastate pastures. They are also 
easy to kill. In 1913 the Victorian Lands Department issued 
an instruction book on vermin destruction which pointed out
59 Annual Reports, Department of Agriculture 1900-1930.
60 Fauna Protection files, Begon, May 1915, ML 5331.
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that there was no need to be subtle when setting out to 
deal with wombats. They needed no 'free food' to allay 
their suspicions before they would take poisoned baits.
They bolted any offerings of maize, apples, quinces or 
carrots, strychnine and all. They left ample signs of 
where they lived and they were almost always at home in the 
day time for the fumigators to eliminate. They bred slowly 
and blundered readily into traps.^ If they were very 
destructive of fences and their holes were a menace why 
were not landholders willing to deal with them without 
further incentive?
The Victorian policy does not clarify the picture. 
Whereas it is hard to find evidence of political pressure 
being applied in New South Wales, in Victoria, it has been 
only too obvious, right up until the present. Victorian 
wombats were not declared vermin until 1904 and no bonuses 
were paid until 1909. Eastern Victorian farmers waged a 
strong campaign in the press and the declaration coincided 
roughly with the extension of wire netting into the difficult 
mountain parts of the state. However, the bounty was not 
lifted until 1966, long after the successful introduction of 
myxomatosis and at a time when the Vermin and Noxious Weeds 
Board inspectors said rabbit-proof fencing had reached a 
very poor state of repair. In 1977 wombats were taken off 
the vermin list and protected in western Victoria, but east
61 F. Allan, Vermin Destruction: Recipes and Instructions
etc. for poisoning and general information, Department 
of Lands, Victoria, 1913, pp. 18-19.
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of the standard gauge railv/ay line they remain vermin.
During the twentieth century New South Wales wombat bounties
ranged from Is 6d to 2s 6d but Victoria paid 5s to 10s per 
6 2scalp. The Victorian Lands Department has lost or 
destroyed the pre-1949 bounty figures but, as the total 
budgetary allowance of the department for bounty payments 
was small, it seems unlikely that the scale of killing
6 3before 1930 ever reached the post World War II levels.
The peak tally of the years 1949-68 was 12,327 in 1965-66.^
62 NSW Department of Agriculture Annual Reports and 
Pastures Protection Board Balance Sheets; Victorian 
information from the Vermin and Noxious Weeds Board, 
supplied November 1978.
63 Victorian expenditure was only divided into expenditure 
on the destruction of rabbits etc. and wire netting 
advances. The actual figures are given in Chapter 3. 
Before 1909 expenditure on rabbit destruction etc. 
never reached £18,000 p.a. Between 1920 and the passing 
of the Vermin and Noxious Weeds Act 1923 av. expenditure 
was about £40,000 and after 1923 it was well over 
£80,000 p.a. Budget figures never revealed how much of 
the rabbit destruction amount was spent on other animals 
but it cannot have been much. The largest bounty outlay 
was on foxes and even this rarely rated a mention in 
newspaper reports of shire meetings to discuss vermin 
control. Maximum government reimbursement amounts were 
set on dingoes, but not on wombats, presumably because 
the wombat claims were smaller. No more than seven 
shires were in a position to claim the full £100 dingo 
bounty reimbursement which suggests pre 1930 wombat 
payments were quite low. The only breakdown of bounty 
expenditure I have found is in VPP, 1918, II, 386;
Lands Department Report, Rabbit Destruction.
Rabbit Destruction £29,931 17s 5d
(Including 15,031 17s 7d on crown land)
Fox & wild dog
subsidy 198 17s 5d.
64 Vermin and Noxious Weeds Board list, supplied 7 November 
1978 .
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The year before that the Towong Shire (central Victoria,
near Tallangatta) reacted strongly to the suggestion by one
6 5of its councillors that the bounty was unnecessary and in
1969 the Bairnsdale Shire was still urging landholders to
6 6petition the Lands Department if they thought that they 
had a wombat problem.
In both states it was rural pressure that put the 
wombat on the vermin lists and led to the long retention of 
a very questionable bounty. According to inspectors of the 
Victorian Vermin and Noxious Weeds Board, the Lands Depart­
ment had been sceptical about the need to class wombats as 
vermin for at least as long as they could remember, which 
meant the 1930s. They said the department had always tended 
towards the view that the bounty only aided the least 
efficient farmers and that if energetic steps were taken to 
counter rabbit infestation there would be no wombat problem. 
Judging by the areas most involved it was small farmers and 
struggling mountain property holders who were the ones most 
concerned to retain the bounty payments. In neither state 
were wombats a topic of concern in the Legislative Councils, 
where wealthy rural interests predominated. However, this 
does not simply show that the less prosperous the farmer 
the less tolerant he was of any form of economic competition. 
Small farmers were often only too tolerant of the most
65 Upper Murray and Mitta Herald, 23 January 1964; 30
January 1964.
66 Bairnsdale Advertiser, 25 July 1969, p. 1 story.
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damaging pest of all, the rabbit. The skin value of some 
animals, most noticably the opossum, probably influenced 
local opinion about their treatment but this is a different 
question from actual bounty payments. Although the state 
governments made rebates to the local authorities, bounty 
money initially came out of the local vermin rates, and 
although it may have provided a bit of pocket-money for the 
local lads most went to men specializing in bounty hunting.
It seems likely that the intense feeling against wombats 
was, as sometimes in the case of the dingo, a result of 
accumulated frustration. Fencing was a major capital invest­
ment and only too prone to damage by trees, stock and general 
wear and tear. There was no redress for this and little 
compensation for flood and fire damage. Only the wombat was 
an easy target for vengeance. The wombat seems also to have 
lacked readily visible appeal which helped win some protect­
ion for the New South Wales kangaroos. Few people actually 
saw wombats in their natural habitat and so were unaware 
of what was happening to their numbers.
Official policy on native vermin was more 
tentative and easily swayed than policy on rabbits, probably 
because far less money was involved but also because rural 
feeling often ran very high. Because it was not hard to 
get rid of native animals on a fenced property, rural 
feeling never became blunted as happened in the case of 
rabbit infestation. As a result it was rarely worth the 
political risk for a government to adopt an opposing line,
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particularly as there were no clear party divisions that 
could be exploited. As was the case with the rabbits, Labor 
had ties with the skin trade and with the casual labourers 
who welcomed the bounties. The party also had an 
ideological objection to laws which seemed designed to give 
special protection to large landholders, even if these were 
popular with small holders as well. As it happened, graziers 
were often hostile to the skin trade, because of incidental 
stock losses, because of the money that went to casual 
labourers or because they were not anxious to clear their 
land of all native animals. Small farmers got caught in 
the middle. The Country party was growing in strength but 
it was a multi-sectional body. In New South Wales the 
intensity of local feeling was masked by the decentralized 
nature of vermin administration. The struggle took place 
at the pastures protection board level. In Victoria broader 
campaigns were needed to get the government to act, and 
once legislation was passed it was far more difficult to 
alter than an individual pastures protection board bounty 
list, which was purely a local matter.
However, the two states are not exactly comparable 
because in the crucial areas of dingo and marsupial control 
Victoria had a far smaller problem. Nevertheless, the 
treatment of these three groups of animals show that there 
were basic similarities of attitude and that similar groups 
in the community were most deeply concerned. Although 
there are some signs that environmental attitudes changed,
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at least in the case of kangaroos, on the whole a narrow, 
emotion-ridden image of their economic self-interest was 
far more important than any particular view of the way the 
environment operated in influencing rural attitudes towards 
native vermin.
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CHAPTER 9
The Triumph of Decentralization - New South Wales
1902-1930
Although New South Wales and Victoria responded 
similarly to the problem of native vermin, the tone and 
range of the broader vermin and weed debates remained 
substantially different. The states were neighbours, they 
shared the same knowledge and similar experiences but 
their policies followed the divergent lines indicated in 
the 1890s. In the years between the creation of the 
commonwealth and the depression both states had to cope 
with increasingly serious noxious weed infestation, the 
need for large-scale government assistance for fencing 
and an entrenched body of support for the rabbit trade.
The range of policy options was small and the establish­
ment of federal government forced all the states to look 
afresh, often jealously, at their own areas of political 
responsibility. Nevertheless, historical differences in 
social and political development proved more influential 
on policy formation than economic and ecological similar­
ities .
The passage of the 1902 Pastures Protection Act 
in New South Wales did not mean that divisions between 
large and small landholders were ended, or that there was 
agreement about the best way of administering vermin and
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weed control. On the contrary, as was pointed out in 
chapter seven, the emergence of more clearly defined 
political parties had accentuated many old differences 
and it was not long before these led to serious challenges 
to the new act.
The first came from the Farmers ' and Settlers' 
Association. It was led in parliament by Eden George, the 
Liberal member for Ashburnham. He moved that clause 49 
of the Pastures Protection Act, which stated that it was 
the duty of every owner or occupier 'to suppress and 
destroy by all lawful means at his own cost all rabbits 
and noxious animals to the satisfaction of the boards', 
should be amended by the omission of the last six words.^ 
Numerous examples were given of small farmers who had 
expended large sums on poison but who were still fined 
because some rabbits survived. Well attended meetings of 
selectors in the Belubula and Lachlan electorates, held 
by Thomas Waddell (Liberal) and A.J. Kelly (Labor) respect­
ively, had argued that it was unfair that the pastures 
protection board directors were both judge and jury in 
such cases.^
Even some adamant supporters of the principle 
of control by the boards conceded that the bench needed
1 NSWPD, 1904 (2 ser.), 16, 1166.
2 Ibid, 1167.
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more guidance in deciding whether reasonable efforts at
rabbit control had been made by those charged, but they
insisted that, if the act was not to become a dead-letter,
boards had to retain the right to define the kind of work
3needed to clear an area. After much discussion outside 
parliament James Ashton, Minister for Lands in Carruthers' 
Liberal-Reform government, found a compromise. The words 
to which selectors objected were replaced by the fuller 
definition 'in accordance with the requirements of the 
boards, as specified in the provisions of section 52 of 
the said principal Act'. Under clause 52 the boards 
could gazette the names of landholders with infested 
properties, specify the measures to be used and stipulate 
the time allowed. If charges were laid later the 
magistrates could hear a defence case based on the actual 
work done.
The next challenge to control by the boards was 
less overt but far more serious. Once again large and 
small landholders tended to take opposing sides. In June 
1905 Carruthers introduced his Local Government (Shires) 
bill. When this was combined the following year with the 
Local Government Extension bill, which extended the pro­
visions of the Shires Act to municipalities, New South Wales 
at last had a system of state-wide local government.
Neither act referred to the pastures protection boards but 
both made provision for the new shires and municipalities
3 PR, 16 November 1904 , pp. 712-13.
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to undertake the work of vermin and weed control. Early
in 1905 Carruthers met with some rural representatives
and asked them to discuss the bill, but because the boards
were not specifically named, Henry Kater claimed that this
aspect of the legislation was not properly appreciated.
In a speech not calculated to please the Farmers and
Settlers' Association, Kater described some of the rural
delegates who favoured giving pest control powers to the
shires as 'country bumpkins', men who were obviously under
the misapprehension that they would escape taxation by the
4transfer of authority.
The pastures protection board defence campaign 
was poorly organized, possibly because attention had been 
concentrated on arranging the Danysz experiment and the 
implications of the legislation had not been realized till
5very late. The 1906 measure met a more organized pastoral 
response. Kater again objected to the transfer of pastures 
protection board pest control functions to the municipalit­
ies. After much sensible discussion a compromise was 
reached whereby the municipalities were given the authority 
to deal with noxious animals not listed in the boardgschedules. This meant that they could deal with town rats 
which were of no interest to the stock-owners, but the 
boards retained their existing powers. When the consolidat 
ing act was passed in 1906 it included the compromise
4 NSWPD, 1905 (2 ser.), 21, 4049.
5 ANUA, J.A . Gunn papers, 55/2. Letter to Kater.
6 NSWPD, 1906 (2 ser.) 25, 3943-9.
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15decision had been reached. Next year the same question
was repeated by three Farmers and Settlers' representatives
and one Labor man. It elicited the terse reply that
Treasury was considering the matter.  ^ With the return of
good seasons after 1902 the rabbit population had again
exploded and crops as well as pasture were being destroyed.
To the dismay of landholders Lysaght had increased the
17price of its wire netting to £40 per mile. Struggling 
selectors who had borrowed under the 1899 Advances to 
Settlers Act to tide them over the bad years at the turn of 
the century were already mortgaged and could not obtain 
more credit. Strong pressure from large and small land­
holders and from many members of the Labor party, who 
were backing their colleagues in the rabbit-ridden Lachlan, 
Macquarie and Cobar seats, could no longer be resisted, 
particularly at a time when the Lands Department was so 
publicly discredited.
Under the 1906 Pastures Protection Amendment
Act the state at last followed the Victorian example and
became directly involved in the purchase and distribution
18of wire netting. Advances could be made to individuals 
through the boards for terms of up to 20 years, without 
the consent of existing mortgage holders, and the cost of
15 Ibid., 1904, 17, 2250.
16 Ibid., 1905 (2 ser.), 18, 1958 (Throwes); 2279
(Waddell); 3718 (McLaurin); 4080 (Eden George).
17 Ibid., 1905, 20, 2383-95. Adjournment debate.
18 Ibid., 1906 (2 ser.), 24, 3225 ff.
288
7agreement but, as Larcombe has pointed out, the 
possibility of the growth of pastures protection board
gauthority had been severely limited. Although Carruthers
believed that local government would develop best if it
was treated as 'a growing child* and not overloaded with
difficult tasks from its inception, the broad delineation
of tax powers and areas of authority gave excellent scope
9for future development.
The boards did not put up a strong fight for 
the right to deal with noxious weeds, probably because of 
the known difficulties and expense, and because, as was 
said before, attention was currently focused on rabbit 
control.However, in the 1920s noxious weed policy was 
to become a point of friction and rivalry between the 
boards and local government bodies and it remains so to the 
present.^ Whereas in Victoria the one authority was 
responsible for the destruction of noxious animals and the 
weeds that often provide their harbour, New South Wales 
set up a divided system of control and has maintained it, 
despite seventy years of wrangling. The boards drew their 
strength from more than twenty years of existence and 
influential, fairly united sectional support; the new local
7 1906 Local Government Act, 6 Ed. VII No. 56.
8 Larcombe, Local Government, p. 242.
9 Ibid., p . 276 .
10 PR, 15 August 1906, p. 486.
11 Larcombe, p. 242.
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government authorities had behind them the weight of the 
government's determination to make local government a 
success, and the well-known rural desire for more decentral­
ized administration. As so often happens, the logical 
basis of the division of powers soon became far less 
important than the emotional preferences and vested 
interests of those involved in the two systems.
In 1906 Ashton assured the convention of the
pastures protection boards that it was not the government's
intention to hand over their work to the shires, and he
implied that an amendment to the Pastures Protection Act
would soon be introduced to extend some aspects of their 
12authority. Amid the controversy surrounding the royal 
commission into the administration of the Lands Department, 
and the Crick-Willis trial for extortion, an amendment act 
was passed.
Despite the promise made in the 1902 act about
state aid for fencing, it was not until 1906 that money
was allocated for this purpose. In 1904 Ashton said that
13the matter was being considered. Later the same year a
Labor member, G.A. Jones, was told by the minister that a
report 'not as exhaustive as I should like' had been
14received and was being studied. Two months later no
12 PR, 15 August 1906, p. 486.
13 NSWPD, 1904 (2 ser.), 15, 590.
14 Ibid., 1904, 16, 1395.
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the netting, plus six per cent interest, became a first
19charge on the land. Three-quarters of a group of small
landholders in a suitable fencing unit could compel the
unwilling remainder to agree to build a ring fence,
provided that the fence did not subdivide any individual's
holding. There were also a number of clauses which pleased
20the larger pastoralists. As Alison had hoped would happen, 
the Lands Department gave up its right to appoint a chair­
man to each board. Instead membership was enlarged to 
eight directors, who were also empowered to act as inspect­
ors, and repayment of the old sheep board debts to the 
Treasury was cancelled, on condition that the boards 
allocated that money to rabbit destruction. The act was 
well received. Within the Assembly the Labor members and 
those speaking for the small landholders approved of the 
fencing provisions and the pastoralists were pleased at the 
increased autonomy of the boards.
After 1905 all parties seemed committed to the
concept of direct government assistance for private fencing
but it is not easy to trace the financial details of the
policy. The vote was hidden away under unlikely headings
21in the estimates and most relevant departmental files have
19 Because of faulty drafting the legal situation was 
not altogether clear. This was one of the points 
clarified in the subsequent minor amendment acts 
eg 1918.
20 See Chapter 7, p.249, Pastures Protection Act 1902 
debate.
In 1906-7 it came under Public Works and other services 
to be provided out of The Public Works Fund. It wasnever listed under either the Lands or Agriculture Departmental votes.
21
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been lost or destroyed. Stead uncovered what he thought
were the total amounts allocated in the budgets between
1905 and 1926 .^ They came to £450,000. With this sum
the governments had purchased netting to the value of
£762,000. This sounds like very clever buying, and indeed
bulk purchasing was economical, but the enhanced value was
due to the re-advancement of money repaid from earlier 
23loans. However, when the budget estimates are compared
with the distribution of annual loan expenditure, certain
discrepancies appear. Either the loan allocations were
not fully taken up, or the accounting system was in some
24way incomplete. As the pastures protection boards had
22 Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, p. 104.
23 NSW Year Book, 1927-28, p. 648. By this time the value 
of netting supplied was put at £863,768.
Year Annual
Loan
Expenditure
Budget
Vote
Year Annual
Loan
Expenditure
Budget
Vote
£ £ £ £
1905 - 50,000 1918 2,452 -
1906 - 50,000 1919 7,206 10,000
1907 25,733 30,000 1920 26,187 50,000
1908 9,531 - 1921 43,568 20,000
1909 13,609 - 1922 6,307 200,000
1910 23,246 - 1923 39,514 -
1911 865 - 1924 62,179 -
1912 210 - 1925 60,000 30,000
1913 3,012 - 1926 40,000 -
1914 2,318 - 1927 10,000 -
1915 174 10,000 1928 37,500 -
1916 5,733 - 1929 30,500 -
1917 3,918 - 1930 - -
Sources: D. Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, p. 104;
Statistical Register of NSW.
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to be sure of adequate mortgage security before they
supplied netting, the former explanation is likely. It
is also supported by the criticism made by the state of
the 1923 commonwealth offer of fencing loans. The govern-
25ment said that there were funds already in hand. The 
tables of pastures protection board wire netting purchases, 
printed in the annual reports of the Lands Department, 
provide additional evidence. They are not completely 
reliable because they were based on returns from the boards, 
which were not always up to date and did not clearly 
distinguish between orders placed and netting received, but 
the value of annual purchases corresponds more nearly with 
the figures given in the loan allocation than in the 
estimates.
Some of the departmental wire netting registers 
have survived, but they are very muddled. Every letter 
from a board involved at least three entries in the ledger: 
application, title search, decision and often an appeal.
They are far more useful for revealing the extent to which 
rabbit afflicted boards differed in their attitudes toward 
fencing than for giving a clear picture of how much wire was
The differences between the budget estimates
25 See Chapter 10, p.384 ff.
26 NSWA, Wire netting registers and ledgers, 3/2950-6. 
An incomplete set 1906-1930.
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and the loan allocation figures are important. If the 
budget estimates alone are considered it appears that there 
was a substantial difference between the policies of the 
non-Labor governments to 1910 and the Labor and Nationalist 
governments 1910 to 1921. These differences largely 
disappear if the loan allocation figures are accepted as 
giving a more accurate indication of what was happening. 
Between 1907 and 1919 £150,000 had been set aside but only 
£98,000 had been taken up, and presumably loan repayments 
should be added to the sum available. Therefore there was 
no need for Labor to continue making large allowances for 
fencing in the estimates, and during the war years and for 
some time afterwards, wire netting was almost unprocurable, 
so again there was no point in making large grants, or 
even in relaxing the terms.
Opposition to the fencing provisions focused on
the administrative authority, the pastures protection
boards, not the principle of government aid. Initially it
was expressed in the familiar terms of large versus small
landholders. The loudest voices were in the Labor party.
William Dunn, who became Minister for Agriculture under
Storey in 1920, had many supporters when he described the
boards as 'an excrescence' and added that 'experience does
not bear out the contention that men are elected for their
27special knowledge'. The Pastoral Review published an
27 NSWPD, 1914 (2 ser.), 54, 991. Supply debate.
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article admitting that many newspapers considered that the
boards were 'bodies that meet to discuss who is the best
2 8man to down for not destroying noxious animals', and in
1909 the annual conference of the Farmers and Settlers'
Association passed a motion calling for the transfer of
functions from the boards to the shires, on the grounds
29of economy, efficiency and fairer treatment of all.
In the early 1890s the emerging Labor party
had a fairly close relationship with the new, small settlers'
organizations, but by the end of the decade divisions
between the Labor party and the Farmers and Settlers'
Association were clear. The Association rejected the Labor
land policy based on leasehold rather than freehold. More
generally, the Association disliked the idea of a party
pledge and labelled Labor's centralized style of administr-
30ation as 'socialism' and therefore undesirable. Many 
individual farmers continued to vote for Labor candidates 
although the Association sponsored its own, who, if elected, 
sat with the Liberals. After 1915 the Association joined 
with the Progressive party of the ex-Labor minister, George
n u  31Beeby.
28 PR, 15 July 1912, p. 462.
29 PR, 16 August 1909, p. 618. (Reprint from the 
Farmer and Settler).
30 Ü. Ellis, The Country Party - A Political and Social 
History of the Party in New South Wales, Melbourne, 
1958, p. 23.
31 Graham, The Australian Country Party, p. 61.
Ellis, The Country Party, p. 18.
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While the divisions between the small 
settlers' organizations and the Labor party were deepening, 
a more gradual change was taking place in the political 
relationship between the large and small landholders. This 
became apparent after the Labor party took office in 1910. 
John Trefld, Minister for Agriculture, who had been a 
member of the Farmers and Settlers' Association until in 
1905 he found it incompatible with his political convictions, 
made it clear that he intended to abolish the pastures
32protection boards and transfer their powers to the shires.
Whereas the Association had voted for just that thing in
1909, in 1911 opinion was no longer so definite. It was
decided to favour the move if a majority of stock-ratepayers
voted for it. The test was never made because, to Trefl£'s
surprise, the Shires opposed the transfer on the grounds
33that they were not ready to cope with the extra work.
Instead of abolishing the boards the Labor government 
actually strengthened them through the 1912 Pastures 
Protection Board Amendment Act. Although it was mainly 
a consolidating act it incorporated several important 
changes. Stock inspectors (who in most areas exercised 
rabbit control functions) remained responsible to the 
minister but their services were more observed by the local 
boards. The boards could also appoint rabbit inspectors 
who were completely under their control. The Farmers and 
Settlers' Association did not object and in 1919 the
32 Land, 3 May 1912.
33 Ibid., 17 May 1912.
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Graziers' Association, united with the Farmers and 
Settlers' Association while retaining its own administrative 
structure. Nevertheless, the divisions between large and 
small landholders were stronger than a brief examination 
of the political superstructure suggests. Shared anxiety 
about Labor policy provided some common ground but not a 
positive basis on which to build. A better unifying factor 
emerged during the war years when smaller graziers became 
more influential in the Pastoralists' Union (which became 
the Graziers' Association in 1916). However, the marriage 
remained an uneasy one, and vermin and weed policy struck 
at some of its most tender points.
Having won a second chance in 1902 to show what 
they could do against the rabbits, many pastures protection 
boards put considerable money and energy into the fight in 
the years leading up to the outbreak of war. This burst 
of renewed zeal no doubt helped to consolidate their 
position, but it was not always well directed. It found 
its main expression in the promotion of a new series of 
experiments into the spread of a rabbit disease. The 
investigation was a praiseworthy venture but the refusal of 
many landholders to accept the negative findings resulted 
in much bitterness and disillusionment. Faith in the 
miraculous scientific solution had not waned. On the 
contrary, the suspicion that Pasteur and his chicken 
cholera microbes had been shabbily, not to say improperly, 
treated by the government, had strengthened. Faced with
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need to show some positive achievements the pastoralists 
desperately wanted a cheap panacea, and once again they 
looked to foreign experts.
The sales representative of the Pasteur Vaccine 
Company, a commercial enterprise set up to market preparat­
ions discovered by the Institute Pasteur, spoke to R.G. 
Casey, of Goldsborough Mort, and A.W. Pearse of the 
Pastoral Review about the work of Dr Jean Danysz, a Polish 
scientist working for the institute, who had had success 
with the propagation of rat and mice viruses. Sorby
implied that his company might be interested in supplying
34similar microbes against rabbits. The Pasteur Vaccine
Company repudiated his action, because the organization
was purely interested in distribution, not development, but
the idea had been taken up by Ashton, the Minister for 
35Lands. He corresponded with Danysz without coming to 
any agreement. The Council of Advice, which represented 
the combined pastures protection boards, was not satisfied 
with the result. There was pastoral suspicion that the 
government was not whole-heartedly fostering the plan. In 
December 1905 the government allowed the Council of Advice 
to take up negotiation with Danysz, on condition that the 
pastoralists paid all expenses, abided by all safeguards 
suggested and conducted any tests on an island.
The Council of Advice estimated that it would
34 PR/ 15 June 1906, p. 285.
35 Ibid., 16 July 1906, p. 286.
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need f15,000. About £12,000 was raised by subscription in
3 6the first year. William Alison was the first chairman
of the organizing committee but he soon stood down and
John Gunn took over. The other members comprised two more
pastoralists, three representatives of rural finance
37houses, two businessmen and a solicitor. Because of his 
work on anthrax vaccine and his partnership with McGarvie 
Smith, Gunn was a good choice as organizer. As he explain­
ed to the editor of the Stock and Station Journal, he did 
not believe in miracles and he thought that Danysz' salary 
of £600 per month was 'preposterous' but he was prepared 
to work for the scheme because there was a chance of finding
a disease that would reduce the rabbit population even if
3 8it was most unlikely to eliminate it. He did not share 
the common prejudice against Australian scientists and 
welcomed the government decision that Danysz should conduct 
his experiments in collaboration with Dr F. Tidswell, the 
state government bacteriologist, who shortly afterwards 
accepted a similar post with the federal government.
While the negotiations were going on there was 
a flood of letters and articles opposing the move from 
those making money out of the rabbit trade and from a number
36 Ibid., 15 June 1906, p. 286.
37 Ibid., 15 February 1906, p. 961. Membership list:
W. Alison, J .A . Gunn, P. Oakden, F. Bacon, A.F. 
McKenzie, J. Kidd (AML&F), E.J. McKenzie (Goldsborough 
Mort), W.F. Laway (N.Z. Loan), F. Yarwood (Hon. Sec), 
Capt. A .W . Pearse.
38 ANUA, J .A . Gunn papers, 55/2. 3 May 1906.
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3 9of Labor leagues. In a vigorous counter-attack Gunn
created a flurry by claiming that poisoned rabbits and
rabbits infected with hydatids were being sold on the 
40Sydney market.* Pastoral suspicion of the government's
intentions was heightened when William Morris Hughes carried
a motion in federal parliament deploring the use of microbes
41against rabbits. He claimed that rabbits were the last
resort of the poor and unemployed. Gunn believed that
the adverse publicity might provoke federal authorities
to refuse permission for Danysz to bring into Australia
his pasteurella microbes, which produced a septicaemic
hemorrhage in rabbits. However, he was less worried about
this possibility than his colleagues because, as he wrote
to James Kidd, 'a straight out refusal we can meet by
42trying local diseases'. As he suspected, and Tidswell
was to confirm, Danysz' infection already existed among
Australian rabbits. He was almost disappointed when the
federal government permitted the experiments to take place
on Broughton Island. He foresaw that 'the big fight will
be to get him [Danysz ] on the mainland if successful on
Broughton Island', and he thought that this struggle might
4 3have been avoided had only local diseases been used.
39 Ibid., 55/1 Press cuttings; PR, 15 March 1906.
40 SMH, 18 July 1906; Argus, 16 July 1906; Daily 
Telegraph, 17 July, 1906.
41 CPD, 1906, 31, 206.
42 ANUA, J .A . Gunn papers, 55/2. 5 October 1906.
43 Ibid., 12 October 1906. Gunn to Kidd.
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The initial tests were conducted in cages on 
the island and then in 20 acres of 'natural conditions'.
Both the state and federal governments received a number
44of reports. The scientists tested not only Danysz'
*pasteurella but also the local Yalgogrin , Gundagai and 
Picton microbes. They discovered that the strength of 
the virus could be increased, and the more densely 
packed the rabbits, the more effective the disease. When 
the experiments were conducted in the large paddock the 
viruses did not appreciably diminish the rabbit population. 
Danysz claimed that different climatic factors and freedom 
from the antiseptic qualities of sea air might produce 
more promising results on the mainland. Tidswell made no 
such forecast.
The pastoralists were not willing to let the 
matter rest. They demanded that the experiments continue 
on the mainland. Because of the quarantine implications the 
Broughton Island investigation had been under the control 
of the federal government so the final decision lay with 
the commonwealth. The rabbit industry and many Labor 
supporters remained very hostile to the idea, and Deakin 
was dependent on Labor support. Partly to avoid a 
difficult decision a conference of state health authorities 
was called in 1908 to decide whether the Danysz microbe was
44 Dr Danysz 29 September 1906; 27 April 1907; Dr 
Tidswell 24 September 1906; 16 November 1907.
* Named after the property on which it was discovered. 
It was managed for Goldsborough Mort by J.A. Gunn.
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identical with the local varieties which had been isolated
and whether it was advisable to continue with the
experiments. The verdict was that rabbit pasteurella was
already present in Australia. It offered no threat to
health and no hope of rabbit eradication. If New South
Wales wished to continue with the experiments the conference
saw no objections to enclosed mainland tests of the
Yalgogrin microbe, but it also saw little point to such 
45work. The report was adopted and it was left to Wade 
and his Liberal-Reform government to decide what to do.
Gunn's 1908 presidential address to the Council 
of Advice began and ended with a plea for mainland experi­
ments. He emphasised that 'while it will not sweep the 
rabbits off the face of the earth, C it ] has proved, even 
amid the adverse conditions of Broughton Island, that it 
will destroy most of those that eat baits infected with it,
and incidentally will spread to a number that have not 
46taken baits'. Other benefits were that it was harmless 
to stock and, unlike phosphorous, could not cause bushfires. 
Danysz was willing to return for another year and the fund 
still held £3000. The Premier was faced with a dilemma.
He told a deputation of pastoralists and representatives 
of the Farmers and Settlers' Association that he was well 
aware of the ravages of rabbits but, judging by the reports,
45 A.A. Prime Minister's Department. General Correspondence 
files. Annual single number series. CRS AZ 08/998 
Rabbit Virus Conference Report.
46 ANUA, J.A . Gunn papers, 55/1, Chairman's Address 1908.
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the only possibility of mainland tests being more effective
than tests on the island lay in the impact of different
climatic factors. In this case the disease might also
47prove more dangerous to other creatures. Bearing in 
mind that the virus was known to exist already on the main­
land, this was a weak argument. The real point of anxiety 
was explained in an editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald. 
The deliberate spreading of disease could destroy the
rabbit trade while doing nothing to lessen the seriousness
48of the rabbit problem. The Age, the Argus, Adelaide 
Advertiser and Brisbane Courier took the same view. The 
Daily Telegraph was in favour of further enclosed experi-
49ments but did not express an opinion about broader tests.
According to the State Labour Bureau in 1906,
there were 16,000 people employed by the rabbit industry and
the trade was valued at about £1,000,000 p.a.~^ No records
were kept of domestic sales of fur and flesh and the
estimate was probably generous. Export sales for 1908 and
511909 were under £400,000 p.a. This was no compensation 
for the damage done to the multi-million pound pastoral 
industry but that was not the point at issue. The government
47 SMH, 26 February 1908.
48 SMH, 28 February 1908.
49 Age, 28 November 1907; Argus, 28 November 1907; 
Adelaide Advertiser, 22 February 1908; Brisbane 
Courier, 27 February 1908; Daily Telegraph, 26 
February 1908.
50 NSWPP, 1906, I, 1016, Annual Report Director of 
Labour.
51 PR, 15 May 1917, p. 273.
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had to balance the very unlikely prospect of diminishing 
the rabbit problem by releasing large numbers of infected 
rabbits and spreading microbe contaminated baits against 
the almost certain loss of domestic and foreign earnings 
and increased rural unemployment among a vocal, politically 
influential section of the community. No doubt local fear 
of eating diseased rabbits would have eventually subsided, 
just as had the fear of eating poisoned or hydatid infected 
rabbits, but a deliberate policy of spreading disease would 
probably end the export trade. As the commonwealth 
discovered at the same time, an economic definition of 
vermin necessitated some very hard political decisions.
Wade compromised. He banned mainland tests but set up an 
experimental facility on Milson Island in association with 
a Bureau of Microbiology. A chair of Veterinary Science 
was at last established at Sydney University.
Arguments about the commercial value of rabbits 
had figured in every rabbit debate in New South Wales and 
Victoria since 1880. The new factor was the increasingly 
well organized political backing of the trade. The dispute 
had always had its political overtones because the 
exploitation of rabbits was usually linked with hostility 
to squatters, but the advent of the Labor party had 
broadened the whole issue. The State Labour Bureau noted 
in 1906 that rabbiting had made a great difference to the 
rural work-force. According to the annual meeting of the 
Pastoralists' Union wages for fencing and tank digging had 
been forced up 25 per cent, carters were unwilling to 'waste
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time' bringing wood to rural towns and some families
52were earning £10 to £12 per week at the business. In
1910 a Rabbiters' Union was formed and it affiliated with
the Australian Workers' Union. The union petitioned the
first state Labor government in 1911 to ban the poisoning
53of rabbits within 15 miles of a railway, and the Carcoar
branch published a circular which told members that 'you
are at the mercy of avaricious landholders, who in many
instances demand an exorbitant payment for the right to
trap on their holdings, Land] you are at the mercy of a
54ring of buyers'.
Graziers were incensed that the social and 
economic arguments of supporters of the rabbit trade were 
frequently presented in parliament. Although he was a 
little more flowery than most, there were many Labor men 
who agreed with the former miner and lay-preacher, Alfred 
Edden:
52 Annual Report Director of Labour, 1906, p. 1016.
53 NSWPD, 1911 (2 ser.), 40, 30. The records of the 
Rabbiters' Union are held in the ANUA, but they are, 
at present, closed to researchers.
PR, 15 July 1911, pp. 503-4 - claimed the union wanted 
to prohibit the killing of young rabbits.
54 PR, 15 May 1911, p. 273.
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My opinion is that the rabbit has been a 
benefactor to many people in this country ... 
Divine Providence has provided us with a 
blessing in the shape of the rabbit to feed 
the poor people of this country ... The 
Almighty has blessed us with a commodity 
whereby a poor man without capital can go 
and get a good day's wages and go into 
Narrandera with a horse and buggy I The 
Minister put that before the House as if it 
was a serious calamity. 55
In 1911 a committee was set up to find out whether a
combine of large rabbit companies (probably headed by four
Victorian firms) was impeding the involvement of small men
in the export trade by refusing them freezer space. ^  The
committee never reported but pastoralists sensed a
campaign building up against the use of poison. Questions
were asked in the Assembly about the effect of poison on
bird life and the Pastoral Review printed indignant letters 
57in reply. In 1914 John Trefl£ the Labor Minister for 
Agriculture, told the House that he was taking steps to 
investigate the deleterious effects arising from rabbit 
poisoning and in the same session many stories were told of 
hardships inflicted on small farmers by pastures protection
boarcb insisting on the use of expensive poison carts rather
58 59than traps. The same charges were made again in 1916.
55 NSWPD, 1906 (2 ser.)
56 Ibid., 1911 (2 ser.)
57 Ibid., 1909 (2 ser.)
58 Ibid., 1914 (2 ser.)
59 Ibid., 1916 (2 ser.)
23, 1369.
41, 1203 ff.
33, 652, Fitzpatrick. 
54, 644, 1022.
60, 785.
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In 1915 the Labor government announced that it
intended to set up fish shops in some suburbs and country
towns. These shops would also sell rabbits. Despite the
wishes of large sections of the party, that rabbits should
only be bought direct from trappers, George Black, Minister
for Agriculture, explained that, in order to get skinned,
wrapped rabbits, the shops had to buy from the big freezer
companies. However, to the disgust of opponents of the
trade, he added that the government was investigating the
6 0possibility of setting up its own freezer works. The
worst fears of the graziers seemed to be confirmed when,
in the interests of supplying war-blockaded Britain with
cheap meat, and the armed forces with felt hats, the
federal government under Hughes commandeered the entire
rabbit catch and banned the use of poison within range of
freezer works. Neither New South Wales or Victoria
officially complied but local relaxation of eradication
procedures occurred. In 1919 New South Wales briefly
banned the export of skins in the interests of hat manufact- 
61urers.
Despite the common, long-held belief that the
development of a profitable rabbit industry was incompatible
6 2with the extermination of rabbits as vermin, many people
60 Ibid., 1915 (2ser.), 58, 423, 2674.
61 CPD, 1916-17, 61, 11487; PR, 16 April 1917, p. 311; 
ANUA, E256/85/5002, 31 October 1914. Letters of 
protest from the Graziers' Assoc. This was a common­
wealth, not a state decision but New South Wales did 
not object.
62 Australasian, 21 July 1883, p. 90, and Chapters 4 and 5.
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continued to hold the opinion that, while the rabbits
existed, it was only sensible to exploit them. Even
Stead's rabbit inquiry did not consider banning all trade
in rabbit products (later called 'decommercialization')
and although the investigation into fur farming pointed
out that income from rabbit sales sapped the will of small
farmers to get rid of them, it did not recommend an end to
all rabbit trading.^ Admittedly by the late 1920s
decommercialization would have been very difficult, not
just because of the strength of the rabbit lobby but also
for constitutional reasons. As Sawer has pointed out,
section 92 of the constitution, guaranteeing freedom of
trade between the states, does not necessarily preclude
the states from forbidding trade in rabbit products, but
it does raise some problems unless all states agree. On
the other hand, use could be made of health and animal
64cruelty laws to achieve much the same result. The matter 
was never tested in Australia. No organization campaigned 
for the idea and serious discussion did not take place 
until the late 1950s. By then myxomatosis had drastically 
affected the carcass trade, the slump in the hatting 
industry had begun, and, after ten years of gradually intro­
duced restrictions, New Zealand in 1957 had banned all
63 Committee of Investigation into Fur Farming, New South 
Wales Department of Agriculture 1929, NSWA 8/2018.
G. Sawer, 'Rabbits, the Law and The Constitution', A. 
Barnard (ed.), The Simple Fleece: Studies in the 
Australian Wool Industry, Melbourne, 1962, p. 256-7.
64
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6 5trade in rabbit products.
The Graziers' Association in the 1920s was
officially opposed to the rabbit trade but some boards still
supported it. In 1922 the Inverell Pastures Protection
Board asked the Minister to introduce a price stabilization
6 6scheme for rabbit skins. On the other hand, in the same
year the Young Board opposed the application of a group of
local residents to ban the use of poison because a freezers
works costing £6,000 and benefitting 300 people had been
6 7built in the town. As in earlier years the main division
was between large and small landholders. It was most
clearly expressed when the proposal to introduce commercial
fur farming of angora and chinchilla rabbits was under
consideration. The Bavin Nationalist-Country coalition
appointed a committee of investigation in February 1928.
6 8Five of the 12 members were pastoralists. The majority
65 B.V. Fennessy, 'Rabbits - Commercialisation and 
de-Commercialisation', Wildlife Survey Section, CSIRO, 
1957, (typescript).
66 Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, p. 639. The same point 
was raised in The Report of the Special Committee on 
Rabbit Destruction set up by The Graziers' Association 
in 1924, but it was not endorsed.
67 Stead, p. 627.
68 Fur Farming Report, Membership list taken from a 
Department of Agriculture Minute for Cabinet 27 February 
1929 .
F.B. Fleming (Sheep-breeders' Assoc.), A.F. Bassett- 
Hull (Taronga Park Zoo Trust), A.S. le Souef (Taronga 
Park Zoo Trust), E. Binnie (Stockowners' Assoc.), E. 
Killen (PPB Council of Advice), M.P. Dunlop (Primary 
Producers' Union), H.W. Johnston (Chief Secretary's 
Dept.), D.G. Stead (Chief Secretary's Dept.), E.E.
Martin (Graziers' Assoc.), M. Henry (Dept, of 
Agriculture), S. Smith jnr. (Dept, of Agriculture).
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report opposed fur farming. Several minority reports 
favouring the plan were signed by four non-pastoral 
members, including David Stead and the Ministry of 
Agriculture officials. On the basis of the minority report 
the government went ahead with its negotiations with the 
federal government. In October 1929 a combined delegation 
of primary producers' organizations waited on the common­
wealth Minister for Health, to oppose relaxation of
6 9quarantine restrictions on the importation of rabbits.
However, at its last general meeting the Farmers and Settlers' 
Association had voted 59 to 57 in favour of fur farming. No 
one spoke to the motion from Dubbo members opposing the 
introduction of fancy rabbits, perhaps because its supporters 
expected it to pass easily. Those in favour of fur farming 
spoke of the value of a labour intensive industry in rural 
areas and the advantages of providing small farmers with 
'a second string to their bow'.^ Although the graziers 
had maintained a united front throughout the investigation 
the committee evidence showed that general rural opinion was 
not so united.^
Because the whole issue hinged on the federal 
authorities permitting the importation of breeding stock, 
the matter is treated more fully in the next chapter, but 
it is interesting that, despite the strength of grazier
69 ANUA Graziers' Assoc., E 256/232/mm 38; Country Life, 
13 August 1929.
70 Ibid.
71 PR, 16 January 1928, p. 6; 16 April, p. 317; 16
August, p. 733; 15 September, p. 836.
310
opposition and the state rejection of the findings of the
majority report, the campaign against fur farming never
reached the emotional pitch of the fight to ban the Alsatian
72dog, which took place at the same time. Newspapers were 
flooded with stories culled from all around the world of 
ferocious attacks on humans and animals. Public meetings 
were organized and a degree of hysteria was whipped up 
which, judging by the prominence still given by newspapers 
to the attacks of this particular breed, has never completely 
subsided. Why the danger of a ding>Alsatian cross was seen 
as so much greater than the cross of a dingo with an airedale, 
greyhound, or any other large hunting dog was never 
explained. Obviously, the Alsatian's wolf-like look was 
against it, and possibly its German origins.
The rights and wrongs of the actual arguments
are of little importance. The campaign's significance lies
in its success. The matter was discussed at the Interstate
7 3Conference of Ministers of Agriculture in 1929. New 
South Wales dog shows bowed to the pressure and stopped 
judging the breed and in June future imports were banned 
and in rural areas the dogs had to be sterilized. Although 
the dingo problem was of immediate concern to few, the 
agitation had led to the passage of a new type of law that 
affected the whole state. There can be no direct comparison
72 ANUA Graziers' Assoc., E256/177/DC4; 222/DC4; 245/DC4 
(1928-1929).
73 Ibid., E256/220/DC4.
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with the opposition to the rabbit trade, or the breeding 
of fur-bearing rabbits, because the anti-Alsatian battle 
did not have to counter a strong financial interest group; 
but the energy, intensity and single-mindedness of the 
campaign make a striking contrast with the rather tired 
arguments used against the commercial utilization of 
rabbits. It is another indication of the blunting effect 
of over-familiarity with a long, drawn-out struggle. It 
also illustrates how difficult it was to arouse great public 
fervour when fur farming advocates could publish lovely 
pictures of big, white, fluffy rabbits, quite unlike their 
scruffy wild relatives. These pictures reinforced the 
traditional image of the rabbit as a delightful, harmless 
animal.
However, despite the general lack of success
experienced by those in New South Wales who opposed the
rabbit trade, the issue was still far more controversial
than in Victoria. The Argus published a long series of
74articles on the rabbit fur industry and the Age gave the 
matter similar publicity, but debate about the trade was 
not a regular feature in the Victorian press nor did it 
often figure in parliamentary debates, although the four 
biggest processing companies had their headquarters in 
Melbourne. In part these differences may reflect differences 
in scale, but given the much smaller size of Victoria this
74 Argus, 25 May 1929, p. 19; 28 May, p. 16; 14 June
p. 14; 21 June, p. 16; 24 June, p. 7; 23 August, 1929, 
p. 18; 11 September 1929, p. 12.
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is questionable. 75
It was also claimed that Victorian trappers 
could make a bigger impression on the rabbit population 
in an area because more properties were netted and the 
paddocks were smaller.
75 Value of the New South Wales and Victorian Rabbit 
export trade.
New South Wales Victoria
Year Skins Carcasses Skins Carcasses
1910 f 329,000 £407,000 £200,000 £ 69,000
1911 297,000 331,000 157,000 69,000
1912 319,000 252,000 222,000 57,000
1913 311,000 374,000 271,000 108,000
1914 156,000 393,000 69,000 128,000
1915 212,000 608,000 44,000 91,000
1916 392,000 760,000 35,000 112,000
1917 1,037,000 670,000 109,000 280,000
1918 1,104,000 222,000 135,000 87,000
1919 2,702,000 538,000 780,000 225,000
1920 609,000 302,000 327,000 131,000
1921 559,000 372,000 202,000 35,000
1922 1,702,000 309,000 238,000 10,000
1923 1,044,000 303,000 282,000 8,000
1924 2,112,000 300,000 350,000 5,000
1925 2,271,000 340,000 579,000 54,000
1926 2,437,000 258,000 381,000 45,000
1927 1,887,000 263,000 550,000 45,000
1928 1,949,000 193,000 605,000 136,000
1929 1,042,000 214,000 441,000 124,000
Source : L.J. Dunn . "The Rabbit Industry: an
Economic Survey 1904-1947" , Dept, of
Economics and Commerce, University of
Tasmania, 1948, Typescript , ANL,
Appendix A, Tables 2 and 4.
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The difficulties experienced by New South Wales
graziers with very large paddocks who tried to utilize
trappers to the best advantage are illustrated by the Peel
7 6River Company file of rabbit contracts. The contracts
\
ran to about 20 clauses and specified where the trappers 
were to operate, what supervision would be imposed, how the 
count would be conducted and what penalty clauses would be 
invoked in the event of unsatisfactory work. Under these 
conditions Messrs Bennett and Treacy killed 30,000 rabbits 
in a 1,200 acre paddock in 1929, and another 2,717 when 
they returned four months later to work over the same ground 
and another enclosure totalling 2,400 acres. Very few 
owners went to this much trouble.
Nevertheless, geographic differences between the 
states are not enough to explain the level of hostility 
directed at the New South Wales rabbit trade. Notice must 
be taken of the lesser amount of social tension in rural 
Victoria and the more even distribution of financial benefits 
from the rabbit trade. The heart of the Victorian trapping 
industry was the Western District. Well known grazing 
families permitted trapping as did their smaller neighbours. 
Although New South Wales had far more local canning and 
freezing works than Victoria, there were many parts of the 
state which were beyond the range of trappers for the meat 
trade. In Victoria the railways could bring most carcasses
76 ANUA, Peel River Company, Rabbit Contracts, 128/22/3.
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to Melbourne for freezing.
New South Wales graziers obviously also felt far 
more threatened than their Victorian counterparts and this 
was a product of the differing social and political develop­
ments in the two states. Large and small landholders were 
far more united in Victoria. The more rapid development of 
selection had forestalled much of the bitterness of the 
squatter-selector division and Victorian landholders were
more inclined to express resentment at the actions of city
77politicians than to attack each other. The Victorian
Labor party never achieved a rural foothold as the New South
Wales party did, and the Victorian Farmers' Union was a
powerful voice in government and a unifying force in rural
politics. Until 1930, apart from two very brief interludes,
Labor was in office in Victoria only between 20 May 1927
7 8and 22 November 1928. In New South Wales Labor was the 
dominant party between 1910 and 1928. Because of the long 
hostility between organized labour and the pastoralists, the 
relationship between the traditionally pastoral-dominated 
pastures protection boards and the successive Labor govern­
ments was, at the best uneasy, and generally antagonistic. 
Pastoral resentment of the rabbit trade as a parasitic 
industry, profiting at the expense of graziers and corrupt­
ing the rural work-force, was coupled with suspicion of the
77 B. Graham, Formation of The Australian Country Party, 
Canberra, 1966, pp. 66-8.
78 The other two periods were 9 December - 22 December,
1913 (Elmslie); 18 July - 18 November 1924 (Prendergast).
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intentions of Labor administrations, avowedly hostile 
to the interests of large landholders and sympathetic to 
the claims of rural workers. It was not a situation 
designed to promote a good working relationship between the 
central and local vermin control authorities.
While the connections between the main New South
Wales rural organizations were becoming closer, at least
on the official level, the pastures protection boards
remained the target of numerous political attacks. In 1916
John McGirr, Labor member for Yass, who had campaigned on
an anti-pastures protection board platform, launched an
adjournment debate urging abolition of the boards. He
claimed that 1 small and genuine farmers of New South Wales
were, as a whole totally opposed to these autocratic 
79bodies'. The local rabbit inspector was a particular 
source of grievance: 'He is either a broken-down bank
manager, who used to give them l squattocracy ] an overdraft, 
or someone who was a "boss" of the Liberal organization the 
year before... every man who does not vote the way his boss 
in the pastures protection board votes he sues for not 
destroying his rabbits'. Thrower, another Labor man, 
described the boards as 'the squatter protection boards' 
and said that 'this is simply an organization to keep people 
in fat billets '.^
It remains something of a mystery why the war-time
79 NSWPP, 1916 (2 ser.), 61, 779 ff.
80 Ibid., 781.
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Labor governments did not abolish the boards and hand
their functions over to the shires. The most likely
explanation is that the party was too deeply involved with
its internal problems, the 1914-16 drought and war-induced
shortages to give the necessary time to framing the
legislation. Any change would also mean wider general
taxation. In the eyes of all governments the boards at
least had the virtue of, within set limits, levying their
own taxes on a clearly defined section of the population.
The Minister for Agriculture in 1916, William Grahame, was
not ready to push for change. He said that McGirr had
exaggerated the abuses and that while most rural voters
favoured reconstitution of the boards any change would have
81to await a new Local Government Act.
For a while it seemed that the Lang Labor govern­
ment was going to take the final step. William Dunn, 
Minister for Agriculture, told the 1925 annual conference
of the pastures protection boards that the boards would
8 2either be abolished or drastically amended. A commission
of inquiry into the rabbit menace that had been set up by
the Fuller government in April 1924 under David Stead, an
experienced public servant and fisheries naturalist who
had conducted two earlier commissions, had its terms of
8 3reference extended. ' Stead took nearly two years to make
81 Ibid., 788.
82 PR, 16 October 1925, p. 857.
83 Daily Telegraph, 14 December 1926. (The Commission 
was proclaimed on 30 April 1925, NSWA).
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a thorough investigation. In November 1926, just before
Stead presented his findings, Dunn announced to the Labor
Caucus that he favoured abolition of the boards and he was
told to go ahead, although no recommendations were made
about what would replace them. The Graziers' Association
complained that if the work was handed over to the shires,
stockowners could be out-voted by those with no interest
in the industry; if the Department of Agriculture took over
it would create a bureaucratically top-heavy system that
84would be just as unsatisfactory to stockowners.
When Stead's report was received it pleased no 
one. It was long and detailed. Evidence had been taken 
from the badly kept, incomplete official records, general 
correspondence with interested parties, scientific literature, 
the replies and records of 49 of the 64 pastures protection 
boards and Stead's own extensive field trips. It added up 
to a general indictment of the work of governments, boards, 
settlers and rabbiters. He made 22 recommendations ranging 
from abolition of the boards, to long, interest-free loans 
for wire netting, compulsory cost sharing of fencing 
(including unoccupied crown lands held by various departments) 
and a levy on all skins and carcasses sold, in order to help 
pay for eradication. The Pastoral Review predicted that the 
report would be accepted by the government 'because its 
policy is to abolish the boards, and, because of its social­
istic tendencies, it is possessed of a mania for creating new
84 PR, 16 November 1926, p. 1007.
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8 5government departments'. However, both sides of the
House voted against printing the recommendations and only
extracts of the report were published. When Stead deposited
a complete typescript in the Mitchell Library he appended
a letter referring to the 'strong political pressure' that
was brought to bear by the rabbit industry and the boards to
8 6have the report suppressed. Whether Lang would have liked 
to follow the recommendation and appoint a Rabbit Menace 
Commissioner directly under the Minister of Agriculture, to 
oversee total rabbit policy, to employ and control inspectors, 
and to co-ordinate research, was never discussed. The com­
bined opposition was too strong and Treasury objected to 
the financial implications, particularly of the fencing 
recommendations. By 1927 Lang was also deep in internal 
party strife and in October of that year a Nationalist- 
country party coalition came to power.
In 1923 the Pastoral Review rejoiced that once
again there were non-Labor governments in New South Wales
and the commonwealth, but the practical effects on vermin
policy are hard to find. The budget allocation for wire
netting purchases jumped to £200,000, but in terms of
actual allocation of loan funds 1921 was a better year than 
8 81923. Commonwealth-state relationships were not
85 Ibid., 15 January 1927, p. 16.
86 Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, Q632.5S. NSWA Covering 
letter.
87 PR, 16 February 1923, editorial.
88 See footnote 24.
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appreciably improved either. During his premiership
Holman had proved difficult when the federal government
sought to become involved with the control of noxious weeds,
particularly prickly pear, but the Fuller ministry showed
it was just as jealous of its rights when the federal
government introduced a scheme for large-scale fencing
loans, and the Bavin ministry ultimately refused to have
8 9anything to do with it. The Graziers' Association had
hoped to find the new Country Party Treasurer, Earle Page
sympathetic to their grievances, but when they approached
him in July 1923 about sanctioning further mainland tests
of Yalgogrin disease he referred them back to the state
government, and despite long correspondence there was no
90change of policy. Nor did Fuller prove any more 
innovative or competent than Dooley or Lang when it came 
to dealing with the noxious weed problem.
The only hopeful sign in the gloomy saga of weed 
control in the years up to the depression came through the 
efforts of the federal government in combining and extending 
the research work of Queensland and New South Wales in the 
fight against prickly pear. This involved small expenditure 
on the part of the states and, significantly in the light 
of previous comments on the slight differences changes of 
government made on policy, the petty rivalries between the 
Departments of Lands and Agriculture and between both state
89 See Chapter 10, Section 2.
90 ANUA, Graziers' Association E 256/139/9166.
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bodies and the commonwealth, were just as apparent and 
just as frustrating under non-Labor administrations as 
under Holman.^
Some changes were made to the Prickly Pear Act 
in 1924 but these only concerned lease classifications and 
rent reductions. While the commonwealth conducted the 
biological control experiments, the New South Wales Depart­
ment of Agriculture Experiments Committee, under Dr G.
Darnell Smith, concentrated on the effects of poison on the 
pear. Various compounds of arsenic seemed promising. A 
typical mixture consisted of 40 pounds of arsenious oxide,
10 pounds of caustic soda and 100 pounds of water, at a 
total cost of 2s 6d per gallon. It was expensive, and as 
the Agricultural Gazette warned, almost as an after-thought 
at the end of the article, 'one disadvantage that applies 
to all pear treated with poison is that cattle must be
fenced off it for a considerable time ... so small an amount
92as 2\ grains of white arsenic to a man has caused death'.
Every Graziers' Association and Farmers and 
Settlers' Association conference in the 1920s passed resolut­
ions calling for action against noxious weeds. As in 
Victoria the growth of soldier settlement made the problem 
more urgent. A special conference was held in Sydney in 
May 1923. It was attended by representatives of the 
Departments of Agriculture, Lands and Railways and of all
91 See Chapter 10, pp. 360 ff.
92 NSW Agricultural Gazette, 1918, Vol. XXIX, p. 10.
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93the main rural organizations. The second resolution
of the meeting called for the creation of a state board or
94commission to co-ordinate destruction. An amendment 
seeking to place full responsibility for weed control in 
the hands of the pastures protection boards was rejected. 
Much of the discussion centred on the difficulties of 
defining a 'noxious weed'. Nobody spoke a good word for 
prickly pear or St John's Wort, but, as in Victoria, 
thistles were a different matter. There were also differ­
ences between the opinions of graziers and cultivators. No 
legislation resulted, despite the importance placed on the 
second motion. Shortly afterwards the Minister for Local 
Government wrote to the Graziers' Association that it was 
impracticable to pass any measure compelling the shires to 
destroy weeds.^
Over the next few years some councils did their 
best to deal with the worst of the weeds but, despite the 
work of state research projects operating on small budgets, 
little progress was made, and often good work was nullified 
by the proximity of careless neighbours. Although all 
Graziers' Association conferences passed motions urging
93 ANUA, Graziers' Association E/134/8593. Noxious Weed 
Conference Proceedings.
94 The motion was introduced by the Farmers and Settlers' 
Association representative, Thorby, later Minister 
for Agriculture.
95 ANUA, Graziers' Association E/256/226/DD8. Control 
of Noxious Weed, 1929 file. Summary.
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the transfer of weed control from the shires to the
boards, there was little discussion of the degree of
compulsion or co-ordination that the boards were prepared
to exercise if the change took place. One of the few
definite resolutions consisted of an attempt to lift all
protection on emus, 'although the total extermination of
this bird is not asked for', on the grounds that they
96spread prickly pear. The government sensibly replied 
that, if prickly pear was spread in bird droppings, then 
most birds and stock were probably guilty, and that the emu 
was at least a great destroyer of insect pests. Such 
resolutions from the boards do not suggest that they had 
learned much about weed control.
The boards had also been given the power under
the 1918 Pastures Protection Board Amendment Act to levy a
rate on travelling stock in the eastern and central divisions,
to pay for maintenance and weed control on the travelling
stock routes and reserves. The results had not been
encouraging. Some boards said that the money was so little
it was not worth spending, but there was no agitation to
97raise the levy or institute a broader tax. The Lang 
government voted £1,200 in 1925-26 and 1926-27 for distrib­
ution to the shires for assistance to small settlers unable
96 Ibid., E/256/177/DD3, 17 May 1927; Reply 25 May 1927.
97 Ibid., E/256/177/DD8. Summary; Bourke Pastures 
Protection Board Minute Books 1908-1919, ML, 2/1960 .
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9 8to control St John's Wort. Harold Thorby, Minister
for Agriculture in the Bavin government, promised to give
99consideration to continuing the scheme but I cannot find 
any allocation in the budget.
In 1928 Thorby outlined proposals to increase the 
powers of the pastures protection boards to deal with 
noxious weeds in conjunction with the shires. The Department 
of Agriculture would be the co-ordinating body and its work 
would be financed by a small levy on unimproved property 
values. In other amendments to the Pastures Protection Act 
the franchise would be broadened and it would be made easier 
for landholders to put up a satisfactory case against 
prosecution for failure to eradicate rabbits.'1'0  ^ Apparently 
no contradiction was seen between accepting the boards' 
arguments that they would be more effective enforcers of 
noxious weed control than the shires, and at the same time 
reducing the punitive force of their rabbit control authority. 
Delegates to the eleventh annual conference of the boards 
favoured the changes but several members strongly objected 
to co-operating with the shires: 'The question must be
very carefully handled, and should be entirely in the hands 
of the stockowners, particularly in view of the projected 
alteration in the franchise ' .
98 NSW Budget Estimates, Lands Department, 1925-26, 
1926-27 .
99 ANUA, Graziers' Association E/256/177/DD5, 14 December 
1927 .
100 SMH, 30 May 1928.
101 ANUA, Graziers' Association E/256/226/DD11. Newspaper 
cutting on the conference.
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A year later the proposed legislation was
explained to the Shires' Association. The bill implied a
much greater degree of centralization than had been
anticipated. The minister would be assisted by a board
representing local bodies. Both the minister and existing
local bodies could order weed destruction to take place,
and a penalty of up to £50 for a first offence could be
imposed. Subsequent fines could be as much as £100. The
movement of stock and equipment from infested areas could
be restricted. The minister would set a rate of unimproved
property value and augment it by a pound for pound subsidy.
All money would be remitted by the government to the shires
for approved work. The Shires' Association was not
favourably impressed. The Vice-President likened the scheme
102to the Victorian system, which he believed was very costly.
A conference of all interested parties was called for 30 May 
1929. The outcome was familiarly indecisive and the 
financial stringencies of the depression soon buried the 
whole plan.
Whether or not a system of divided local administr­
ation was as bad as its critics claimed is not relevant to 
the question of how successive governments-, went about 
developing vermin and weed policies. The arguments that 
those involved used, and the views that they expressed or 
implied, were important if they were accepted by their 
contemporaries, regardless of whether they were based on
102 SMH, 22 May 1929.
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verifiable facts. However, in terms of the frequently 
stated belief that effective vermin and weed control had 
to be co-ordinated over large areas, the New South Wales 
policy created a number of problems that were recognized 
at the time. Even the Pastoral Review admitted that 'some 
pastures protection boards do not adopt the stringent
103enforcement which the seriousness of the pest demands'.
The article went on to say that farmers and graziers should 
be forced to carry out their duty, but it did not say how. 
Examples of the difficulty of getting concerted action are 
provided by the minute books of the Bourke Pastures 
Protection Board.
From 1910 to 1915 there was a running debate within 
the board over whether it was worth spending any money on 
the travelling stock routes. Some said the funds were too 
small to do any good and others claimed that stock entering 
from neighbouring areas would cancel any positive results.
In the end they did nothing at all. In 1914 the Bomballa 
Board asked all the boards to support a strong protest 
against the Minister of Agriculture's suggestion that all 
poisoning should be banned within 25 miles of freezer 
works. Bourke had no freezer and so declined to give an 
an opinion.^4 In 1915 the casting vote of the chairman 
determined that the fox scalp bounty rose to £1, although
103 PR, 16 October 1918, p. 923.
104 Minute Book, Bourke Pastures Protection Board, 
3 November 1914.
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the bounty payments in adjacent districts had been lowered,
and in 1919 the board was unable to reach a decision about
the proposal from the Glen Innes Board that all primary
producer organizations should combine to finance a wire
106netting company. These were all important matters and,
except for the last point, they were the kind of problems 
about which Victorian landholders did not have to try to 
reach a concensus.
Neither state could point with pride to its work 
on vermin and weed control but, given efficient leadership 
and a return to economic prosperity, the Victorian system 
offered fewer barriers to the application of new or more 
rigorous counter-measures. Differences in the development 
of the two colonies before the introduction of the rabbit 
had proved to be more influential on vermin and weed 
policies than had their later shared experiences. This 
might suggest that the new federal government, coming fresh 
to the problems, would find its lack of precedents and 
experience an advantage. However, in politics no slate is 
ever absolutely clean, and when the federal authorities 
began to make vermin and weed control decisions they 
encountered many similar restraints as well as some that 
were a product of the constitutional situation.
105 Ibid., 2 November 1915.
106 Ibid., 28 May 1919.
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CHAPTER 10
The Federal Government 
Section 1 Reluctant Involvement
Many people outside the country were mystified
as to why Australia had so much trouble controlling
rabbits. As garbled rumours of large rewards filtered
abroad numerous gentlemen offered the Commonwealth the
benefit of their European, African and American knowledge
and awaited suitable remuneration.^ After writing to the
Prime Minister about the virtues of wire netting and
poison baits one Viennese correspondent was soon distressed
to learn that such measures were being used: ’That smacks
dreadfully of plagiarism, and if I were to follow the advice
of friends I should not write to you first but to the
League of Nations. But I think that perhaps you have
2mislaid my address'. If plagiarism it were, the accusation 
was somewhat late, for the states had been pursuing these 
measures since the 1880s. It was also a misdirected charge, 
for as Prime Ministers from Watson to Bruce were at times 
relieved to explain, vermin and weed eradication, indeed 
all practical agricultural matters, were in more than one 
sense a state preserve.
1 CSIROA, Correspondence file 81. Australian Archives,
CSR A 458/F384. Prime Minister's Department, 
Correspondence files, Multi-number series, Second System.
A.A. CRS A 458/F384/2. Prime Minister's Department.2
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Almost fifteen years went by before the federal 
government entered into direct participation with the 
states in even one, highly specialized areas of weed 
control, and for over twenty years there were no schemes 
for sharing the burden of vermin eradication. A generat­
ion or more of state experience with costly, inefficient, 
unpopular legislation, designed to rid the land of various 
pests, could be cited to justify the federal stance. 
Nevertheless, despite an aversion to the particular problem 
and an awareness of the sensitivity of the constitutional 
issues, there were influences at work forcing the nation's 
leaders to pay attention and eventually to dabble, if not 
plunge, into the snag-ridden legislative waters.
Australia owed its prosperity to its primary 
industries and although the Constitutional Conventions 
had not considered that the federal government would need 
powers in this field no government could afford to ignore 
the health of its tax base. Sir John Quick suggested the 
formation of a Department of Agriculture in 1901 but the 
proposal, along with the request for a quarantine act, was 
lost amid the demands of the long procedural debates and 
necessary legislative formulations of the first few years. 
In 1904 the House of Representatives formally approved a 
motion that 'to promote the primary industries of Australia 
a federal Department of Agriculture ought to be established
3at an early date'. This motion stood on the notice paper 
for three years and during this time no state raised any
3 CPD, 1904; 23, 6505.
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objection. Yet when it came to be debated every speaker
expressed anxiety over the possibility of antagonizing
the states by duplicating their efforts or appropriating
4their projects. This fear was to bedevil all bills and 
discussions through into the 1920s, when the advent of 
CSIR ended the proposal, except for the short-lived 
Department of Commerce and Agriculture in the 1940s. It 
needs to be understood for the light it throws on the 
problems inherent in the formation of any federal policy 
on agricultural matters and for the background information 
it provides on later commonwealth involvement in pest 
control.
Sir John Quick outlined the areas with which he
hoped a federal Department of Agriculture would concern
itself. These were the problems associated with the import
and export of animal and plant products, original research
into diseases affecting stock and crops and also water and
soil, and the development of foreign markets and intellig- 
5ence. Supporters of the motion took up long sections of 
the debates with speeches outlining the excellent work 
done by the Bureaux of Agriculture in the U.S.A. and Canada, 
but most were certain that the Australian counterpart would 
be more modest and economical. There was an understandable 
concern to steer between two extremes. On the one hand the
4 Ibid., 6499.
5 Ibid., 1904, 20, 3037.
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case for federal intervention had to be made sufficiently 
obvious to absolve the government from charges of unnecess­
ary bureaucratic proliferation: on the other hand it must
not look as if the states were being accused of incompetence. 
As a result the bill emphasised the need for centralized 
collation and dissemination of scientific findings rather 
than original research. With regrettable scepticism about 
the intellectual drive to be found in the new commonwealth 
one member said: 'I do not think that any science that is 
likely to be applied by an Australian Department of 
Agriculture would be likely to overcome difficulties which 
are at present engaging the best experts in the world'.^ 
There were no howls of protest. Although the motion was 
carried a Labor member summed it up by saying: 'I have
seldom listened to a debate which was carried on with less
7animation or listened to by so few members'.
After such a lack lustre preview it would not be 
surprising if the idea had quietly faded from the political 
stage. In fact little was heard of it till after the 
passage of the 1907 Quarantine Act, but then it was raised 
by representatives of all parties in all sessions till 1916. 
In 1907 the Age informed its readers that a Bureau of 
Agriculture bill was being prepared, whether the stategpremiers were in favour of it or not. Senator Best, a
6 Ibid., 3049.
7 Ibid., 3061.
8 Age, 3 February 1907.
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Victorian lawyer with wide experience of Victorian land 
policy confirmed this: 'concerning that determination
we do not find it necessary to consult the state govern­
ments in any way. But in determining the scope of the 
operation of the Bureau we shall be only too pleased to
seek the co-operation and cordial assistance of the
9state agriculture departments'. In 1908 the grand total 
of £500 was placed on the estimates towards the cost of 
a federal bureau and Groom, then Attorney-General in 
Deakin's protectionist ministry, presented a memorandum, 
setting forth the scope and justification of the proposed 
organization.^ In 1909 the bill was introduced into the 
Senate. It had initially been placed on the House notice 
paper but was transferred to furnish more werk for the 
Upper House.^ In essence the legislation provided for 
the dissemination of the results of scientific investigat­
ions into all aspects of primary industry, the carrying 
out of experiments into pests, and into animal and plant 
disease control, and the propagation and encouragement of 
new strains of plants.
Labor members were peeved. Their party had been 
accused frequently of having centralizing, aggrandizing 
tendencies, yet here was Deakin, newly returned to office
9 CPD, 1908; 4, 8506
10 Sir George Currie & John Graham, The Origins of CSIRQ - 
Science and the Commonwealth Government, Melbourne, 
1966, p. 2; CPD, 1908, 48, 2753.
11 CPD, 1909; 52, 4595.
with an uneasy coalition of non-Labor groups, pressing
for a major extension of commonwealth powers in an area
in which there were long established, active state
departments. A Labor Senator exclaimed: 'Had this
measure been introduced by the Labor party, I can imagine
the expressions of horror which would have fallen from
the so-called State Righters about federal interference
12with state functions'. According to the opposition
the bill was intended as a stop-gap measure to keep the
Senate occupied at the end of the session, after which it
13would lapse, and as an electoral appeal to the farmers.
However, as the government pointed out, Fisher had
suggested a similar organization in his policy speech at
14Gympie in 1908. It had not been mentioned during Labor' 
time in office but all parties had agreed in 1904 that 
there was a need in this direction. Groom's concern with 
agriculture was of long standing and it was at his 
invitation that the Scottish Agricultural Commissioners, 
a highly regarded body of men with extensive practical 
and theoretical knowledge of farming who had conducted 
surveys for the Canadian and Danish Governments, came to 
Australia. Groom was to persist with his advocacy of the 
application of science to primary industry till the 
formation of CSIR fulfilled his dream.
12 Ibid., 4615.
13 Ibid., 4616; 4617; 4596; 5099.
14 Ibid., 4595; 4602; 4613.
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If the bill was designed as an empty gesture 
to placate the rural sector it was ill-conceived. Although 
small farmers were ready to grasp at any proposal that 
appeared to offer the prospect of improved incomes, the 
more influential sectors of the industry, at least as 
represented by the Victorian Chamber of Agriculture, were 
wary of the political implications of the move and 
opposed the scheme.^ More importantly, the 1905 Premiers' 
Conference had been united in rejection of Deakin's tentat­
ive advances along the same lines. ^  A conference of
state Ministers of Agriculture in 1908 decided that a
17Federal Bureau of Agriculture would be redundant but the 
non-Labor parties presented their bill in 1909 and did so 
again in 1913, soon after their return to office. Their 
motives are unlikely to have been as opportunistic as 
their opponents claimed.
Undoubtedly there were features of primary 
production that warranted concern. The forty tons of 
fermenting, exploding Australian fruit pulp that had to be 
dumped in the English Channel was no advertisement for the 
expanding fruit industry; the arrival in London of rancid 
Victorian butter did nothing for the dairy industry; cargoes 
of badly tinned rabbits whose aroma drove passengers to
15 Ibid., 5099.
16 Ibid., 4739.
17 Ibid., 4595.
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demand the clearance of the holds were no way to make
money out of the pestiferous rodent, and failures of
freezing techniques did not inspire the confidence of
18English meat importers. These may be classed as minor, 
if annoying set-backs to the necessary drive for export 
earnings, but there were deeper reasons for concern. 
Australian wheat yields were low by world standards. Cattle 
tick posed serious problems for the beef industry. Blow­
flies still caused heavy losses of sheep. State Departments 
of Agriculture were confronted with ever growing lists of 
imported weeds that threatened to supplant more advantageous 
species, or like prickly pear and skeleton weed, to render 
whole areas worthless. The nation was ill-prepared to cope 
with major outbreaks of animal or plant diseases. Dry 
farming techniques were in their infancy and of course 
there was the perennial problem of the rabbits. As the 
Scottish Commissioners had clearly pointed out, many areas 
of primary production needed rigorous scientific investigat­
ion. The states were doing much excellent work, particularly 
when compared to Britain: 'Upwards of 30 stations or farms
Care] devoted to experiment and research, and if orchards,
vineyards and semi-permanent areas are added, the total is 
19over 80’. However, there was considerable over-lapping 
and wasteful repetition: 'Time and money would be saved by
18 Ibid., 1904, 20, 3038; 3039, 1904, 22, 6498.
19 Scottish Agricultural Commissioners, Australia, Its 
Land, Conditions and Prospects, the Observations and 
Experiences of the Scottish Agricultural Commissioners 
1910-1911, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 164.
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placing some of the work of research in the hands of a
20federal department'.
The major difference between the original 1904 
debates and the proposals of 1909 and 1913 was the change 
from a motion that was mainly concerned with the demands 
of the export trade to proposals for scientific research 
to enhance production itself. Perhaps in the intervening 
years the Liberal leaders had become more aware of the need 
to tackle basic problems, even though this meant federal 
intervention in areas of central concern to the state 
Agricultural Departments, or possibly they had become more 
confident of the potential of unified control to achieve 
specific goals. The 1913 bill was a bolder proposal than 
Quick had envisaged. It seemed that Cook, the new Liberal 
Prime Minister, was prepared to grasp the nettle and 
challenge the states' rights to undisputed control of 
agricultural matters.
Once again the Labor opposition concentrated on
the failure adequately to consult the states, let alone win
their approval, and on the open-ended nature of the funding 
21provisions. There was no doctrinaire division along 
party lines. Some Labor men praised particular features 
of the bill but objected to its form. A few were obviously 
only using the debates as a forum for airing well-known
20 Ibid., p. 172.
21 CPD, 1913; 70, 935.
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hobby horses, such as William Higgs, a Queensland printer 
and journalist who kept talking about the 'socialist nature' 
of the measure. Although the government blamed the 
opposition when the bill lapsed at the end of the session, 
the fault was hardly one-sided. There was a two-month 
hiatus during the second reading so that, without stone­
walling tactics, the bill did not reach the Senate till 
the last day of the session. It was asking a great deal 
of a Labor controlled states' House to pass this far from 
perfect piece of legislation without debate. The suspicion 
remains that the Liberal Cabinet was not sorry to avoid 
confrontation with the Premiers.
Until 1915 the initiative for federal involvement 
in agricultural matters had come from the non-Labor parties. 
The need for increased productivity in primary industries 
apparently weighed more heavily than any ideological commit­
ment to inviolate states' rights, but the problem of how to 
create an agency for commonwealth involvement remained 
unresolved. The awkward juxtaposition of conflicting 
principles also affected the incoming Labor Prime Minister 
in 1914. As in 1908 the Labor party referred to the 
advantages of the centralized application of scientific 
investigations, but in reply to an accusation by Groom that 
there were no plans for a suitable organization, Fisher 
asked, 'Does the Honourable Member see any way of effectively 
doing it without the full co-operation of the states, because
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that is my difficulty'.^
Fisher also had difficulties within his own
party. As the opposition pointed out, many Labor men
were more concerned about the evils of the land monopoly
or the virtues of land taxation than about applying science
23to primary production. Up to a point Fisher could avoid
the constitutional problems of involving the commonwealth
in agricultural research by funding individual experts to
work on existing state projects, such as the bitter-pip
disease in Victorian orchards or the worm nodules in
24Queensland beef, but once he committed the government
to heavy annual expenditure to aid primary producers in
general he was bound to arouse opposition from some of the
more egalitarian of his party. Dr William Maloney, for
instance, a Victorian radical, believed that many social
and economic problems could be solved by breaking up large
estates and he thought that vermin and noxious weeds were
doing their bit to facilitate this process. It was
sometimes argued that land hunger would lead to demands
for closer settlement which would push up the value of the
land and thus make it economical to rid it of pests like
25rabbits and prickly pear. Some backbenchers were worried
22 Ibid., 1915, 75, 472 .
23 Ibid., 1909, 52, 4518.
24 Ibid., 1913, 70, 936 .
25 Ibid., 1919, 89, 11546.
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about who was going to reap the financial benefits of
scientific discoveries if the federal government began
to sponsor a broad programme of basic research. There
were no guarantees that it would just be those concerned
2 6with the export trade or struggling small producers.
At this point world events began to intrude on 
what had been a somewhat limited debate. Following the 
outbreak of war the British Government realized with alarm 
that Germany had received enormous strategic advantages 
from its investments in scientific research. So it formed 
two permanent organizations under the general umbrella of 
Science and Industry Research, and circulated a white paper 
within Britain and the Dominions setting out the case for 
national scientific research institutes to tackle practical 
problems and to collaborate internationally. The Victorian 
Minister for Public Works in the Watt and Peacock Liberal 
Governments, Frederick Hagelthorn, urged his state to 
apply for inclusion in the scheme. Hagelthorn believed 
that not only the other states and the universities but 
also the federal government should be involved. In Hughes, 
then Attorney-General, he found a receptive listener. 
However, at the time, mid-1915, both men had more than 
enough on their plates with the formation of the Wheat 
Pool, under which the commonwealth undertook to finance, 
ship and market the excess wheat crop, ensuring that 
farmers got a fair price and Britain got an assured supply.
26 Ibid., 1919, 89, 11573-4.
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This sudden federal venture into what had been an area 
of state responsibility provoked great criticism. Yet 
though it abraded the sensitive nerve of states' rights 
it indirectly hastened broader federal involvement in 
agricultural matters. It was a resounding success and 
thus it enhanced Hagelthorn's reputation and strengthened 
his resolve to see more national effort in other problem 
areas of primary production. His enthusiasm, energy and 
reputation won the Premiers' approval of the idea, couched
in conveniently amorphous terms, of a national research
• *. 27project.
Then, in 1915 Hughes attended a luncheon at 
Melbourne University where a select audience of politicians 
and academics, chosen by the staff and Hagelthorn, listened 
to speakers supporting the general idea. They were 
followed by Hughes, who, apparently without consulting his 
Cabinet, pledged the government's support for up to half 
a million pounds. Talks were arranged almost immediately 
to set up an Advisory Council on Science, which was to be
27 Currie andGraham, CSIRO, pp. 13-55. Most of the
information in this paragraph and next is taken from 
this excellent book. Sir George Currie was Principal 
Research Officer for CSIRO from 1929 to 1939 and 
Graham is the Records Admin. Officer. The book has 
the strengths and weaknesses of most studies of 
institutions made by highly placed, very well-informed 
'insiders'. A new book is being written, with the 
full co-operation of CSIRO by K. Trace & B. Schedvin, 
so I saw no reason to try to do original research in 
this field.
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the precursor of an Institute of Science and Industry. 
Faith in the power of science was high and with this to 
motivate them a few forceful individuals, not otherwise 
united by party or temperament, had gone some distance 
towards achieving their goals, despite a lack of burning 
public concern. However, their zeal was channelled into 
long prepared fields. The example of Groom's endeavours 
allied to the impetus of the Scottish Commissioners forms 
a neat comparison with the work of Hagelthorn aided by 
the example of the British science organization. In the 
years between, threatened allied catastrophe had 
strengthened the case for a national science effort, and 
legislative experiences had provided the Cabinet with a 
clearer understanding of the problems of passing definite 
acts in this area.
Nevertheless, Hughes was too astute to place 
much reliance on the lasting quality of political 
enthusiasm and he was not prepared to test it with an 
immediate bill. The Advisory Council was set up by order 
of the Governor-General in Council. Sooner or later the 
bill for a permanent body would have to be presented to 
parliament but in the meantime there was a chance to 
establish the principle of federal leadership in the 
application of scientific research and to accustom the 
state departments to collaborative effort. Hughes' own 
devotion to the cause is also hard to assess accurately. 
The next few years were not easy ones for him and his 
main energies had to be directed towards the war and
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political survival. There are also some hints that his
zeal abated, although in 1919 and 1920 he worked hard
to achieve the passage of the necessary legislation.
The Advisory Council was poorly financed and had to fight
constantly to preserve the dominant role in its executive
structure for scientists. During its four and a half
years of existence it received only £66,200 for all 
2 8purposes. In April 1919, in anticipation of the
Institute of Science and Industry bill the Advisory
Council submitted an estimate of £43,300. At the minister's
request this was reduced to £27,500 ordinary and £5,250 on
loan account. Then followed a further reduction to £23,035
29and in October it was decided to provide £14,000.
The drawn-out series of events leading to the 
introduction of the bills in 1919 and 1920, followed by 
the period of stagnation till Bruce reorganized the 
structure in 1926, creating CSIR, are not strictly relevant 
to this thesis and are well described by Currie and Graham, 
but a few general points need to be made to illustrate the 
gulf between the conception of the idea of an organization 
and the legislative delivery of a healthy institution.
The politicians, industrialists and scientists
28 Ibid., 109.
29 CSIROA, Advisory Council Minutes, 14 April, 28 
July, 22 September, 14 October 1919.
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who drew up the draft for the interim Advisory Council
had diverse expectations of its role, and fortunately
for the new body these were not clarified or it would
have been smothered in conflict. A tentative list of
likely projects was suggested but it remained vague as to
whether the Council role would be that of publicist, co-
30ordinator or primary researcher. The working relation­
ship between the state committees and the central 
executive was similarly ill-defined. What became readily 
apparent was the continuing underlying hostility of 
established political and bureaucratic groups to the new 
authority.
The senior scientist within the public service,
responsible for the setting of standards, the Government
Analyst, made no secret of his opposition to commonwealth
research facilities outside the ambit of the Customs 
31Department. Similarly, when ministerial responsibility 
for the Council was transferred from the Prime Minister's 
Department to the Department of Trade and Customs in 1918 
there was great anxiety on the part of the executive until,
30 CurrieandGraham, CSIRO, p. 52. The list consisted of: 
blowflies, improved zinc extraction, brown coal 
utilization, mechanical cotton picking, prickly pear, 
aluminium and ferro alloy production, efficient 
potash production, indigenous grasses, manufacture
of fine chemicals, drugs and explosives.
31 CSIRCA, Drafting Committee of the Advisory Council, 
January 1916.
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after an exchange of minutes, ministerial clarification 
was received, restating the independence of the 
Institute.^
The same problem emerged again during 1923 when
once again the Department of Trade and Customs sought to
exercise its hegemony, at least over non-scientific staff
33working for the Institute. The Solicitor-General ruled 
in favour of the Institute's autonomy, but contact with 
the minister was still only possible through the filter 
of the Department of Trade and Customs.
Potentially far more serious was the continuing 
suspicious isolationism of the state governments. Because 
of lack of funds projects promoted by the Advisory Council 
and later by the Institute were mainly conducted on a 
part-time basis by scientists using their own university 
or state facilities. The 1918 Premiers' Conference 
circulated a memorandum on the encroachment of the 
commonwealth and its Advisory Council on state agriculture 
departments. Holman of New South Wales led the attack. 
Several Premiers, notably those of Victoria and South 
Australia, were not fully convinced by his argument that 
there was no need for a national organization, and after 
discussion with Gerald Lightfoot, the Advisory Council
32 Ibid., Advisory Council Minutes, 28 May 1918. 
3 3 Currie and Graham p. 123.
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secretary, David Oman, Victorian Minister for Agriculture,
told the Advisory Council that they had 'cleared the 
34air'. It was hoped that a discussion about ticks and 
prickly pear would prove similarly soothing to Holman, 
but it did not. The implications of this meeting can be 
seen in the stormy passage given to the bills of 1919 and 
1920 .
Another strand of the opposition to the 
establishment of the Institute was revealed by Hughes' 
arguments with David Masson, Professor of Chemistry at 
Melbourne University, the most eminent academic on the 
Advisory Council and the man Hughes had appointed Chair­
man. The disagreement was over the kind of director who 
should be appointed. This bears upon the contemporary 
attitude towards science and it has particular relevance 
to proposals on vermin and weed control. As previously 
mentioned, farmers 'knew' that there had to be a simple, 
cheap solution to massive problems, such as rabbits and 
prickly pear. This faith in science was a major element 
in nineteenth century thought and has persisted, under 
challenge since World War 11, to the present. However, 
if science was regarded as the true religion, scientists 
were often seen as its rather inadequate priests. Hughes
distrusted their administrative ability and favoured
35control by 'a man of affairs'. Parliament shared his
34 CSIROA, Advisory Council Minutes, 12 August 1918.
35 Currie and Graham pp. 68-9, 93.
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doubts. When at long last the bill to establish the
Institute was introduced in 1919 even some of its
supporters emphasised the need to have 'practical men'
3 6in control. It was withdrawn, revised and re-introduced
the following year. The changes were not discussed with
the members of the Advisory Council and Masson resigned in
protest. The point at issue was that control was to be
given to one man, not necessarily a scientist, instead of
37to three directors. According to the Minister it was
vital to reduce the fears of the House about expenditure:
' C He ] said straight out that the former bill was regarded
3 8as being top heavy'. However, there was more to it than 
that:
He I the Minister 1 did not say it in so 
many words but it was indicated that the 
Cabinet was dropping the Advisory Councils 
and the three directors out of the Bill 
for diplomatic reasons. Cabinet no doubt 
felt that it would have been a strange 
procedure to have consulted bodies whom 
they proposed to execute. 39
Those 'diplomatic reasons' were not just financial. 
Accusations had been made of 'injudicious' as well as
36 CPD, 1919, 89, 11542 (Best), 11565 (West), 11567 
(Spence).
37 CSIROA, Exec. Committee Minutes, 6 July 1920.
38 Ibid., Exec. Committee, 14 July 1920, Dr Cameron 
reporting.
Ibid., Exec. Committee.39
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inefficient management by the old board.^
The 1920 bill had a somewhat less torrid
reception, but the old cries of impractical scientists,
wasteful duplication and unnecessary assaults on states'
41rights were repeated. It was a non-party vote. Of
the 16 members who opposed the second reading three were
Nationalists, including Jowett, soon to become Deputy
42Leader of the new Country Party. He was also an 
executive member of the Graziers' Association of the 
Southern Riverina (which favoured the new institution), 
and he was opposed by Earle Page, his future leader. The 
parties had not yet adopted distinctive policy positions 
on this topic, and when presented with the estimates of 
the Institute's needs by the new Director, George Knibbs, 
there was general agreement to prune them severely. The 
Institute survived its formal delivery but during the 
next six years it received only just over £97,000 to
43cover all investigations, capital works and salaries.
It says a great deal for the dedication of the 
founding members that the Institute did not simply merge
40 CPD, 1919, 89, 11546.
41 Ibid., 1920, 92, 2565.
42 Ibid., 2890-1.
43 Currie and Graham p. 109ff. The Institute received:
1920-21 £15,000; 1921-22 £15,000; 1922-23 £20,907;
1923-24 £21,356; 1924-25 £24,755 (including £5,000
to the separate Engineering Standards Laboratory).
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into an existing department, but whether Knibbs, the first 
Commonwealth Statistician and founder of the very highly 
regarded Bureau of Census and Statistics, whose first 
love was still statistics, would have resisted the pressure 
much longer is uncertain. It was not just big controvers­
ies that beset the Director, but also continual pin-pricks, 
such as the Defence Department attempt to resume a major 
part of the Sherwood Laboratory site, Queensland, for a 
drill ground. As Knibbs pointed out, the laboratory needed 
strict quarantine facilities because it experimented with 
imported insects, and it represented a £40,000 investment,
44which was a major part of the Institute's total allocation.
There were a number of projects on which the
states would have welcomed federal assistance, and the
1922 Premiers' Conference gave general approval to the
principle of co-operative research, but because of shortage
45of money the Institute had to reject many requests.
Without an adequately financed, formalized structure the 
Institute could not grow. On the one hand the federal 
government would not vote it money simply to hand over to 
state investigations, but on the other hand it would 
not sanction the creation of a forceful organization with 
its own bureaucratic structure, capable of forging a new
44 CSIROA, Correspondence file 81, Noxious Weeds, 23 
March 1925, 14 April 1925.
45 CSIROA, Correspondence file 102A, Knibbs to Stewart, 
Minister for Works and Railways, Vic. 7 December 1923.
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relationship with the states. Structurally and financially 
the Institute could be compared to a very little boat, 
uncertainly navigated, in a very rough sea.
However, the organization did have some strong 
supporters among the newspapers, rural organizations and 
some parliamentarians, and in 1925 the imperial connection 
once again came to its aid. The British offer of 
£1,000,000 for Dominion research into new industries is 
unlikely to have been sufficient in itself to have turned an 
unwilling government towards a national scientific organ­
ization but Bruce had been sympathetic to the idea for some 
time.^  He had taken ministerial control for the Institute 
from the encroaching embrace of the Department of Trade and 
Customs and placed it in the more sympathetic hands of 
Senator Reginald Wilson, a farmer and businessman, soon to 
become head of the new Department of Markets and Migration. 
There had also been other imperial straws in the wind.
For instance, the primary research into the control of St 
John's Wort, a weed which was spreading rapidly in 
southern Australia, had been done, at the Institute's 
request, by the Bureau of Entomology in London. Predict­
ably, the British were requesting a larger financial
4 7contribution from the federal government. Australia
46 Currie and Graham, pp. 122-9.
47 CSIROA, Exec. Committee Minutes, 21 September 
1920 .
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could not rely on getting its research done 'on the 
cheap' overseas, and even existing collaboration between 
foreign institutions and Australian scientists would 
become more difficult if there were no comparable 
Australian scientific organization to co-ordinate 
exchanges and arrange finance.
In one tenuous form or another there had been 
a commonwealth scientific organization for ten years, and 
it had not sucked in enormous funds or adopted hare­
brained schemes, or even, in recent years, grossly 
offended the state Departments of Agriculture. Similar 
bodies in the U.S.A., Canada, Germany, Japan and Britain, 
had shown the worth of a national approach. Familiarity
may have bred a measure of acceptance because in 1926 an 
*act, which finally set up the Council of Scientific and 
Industrial Research, passed with little fuss, although 
a few members raised the same old objections. Perhaps the 
fact that the proposal was no longer associated with 
Hughes soothed some feelings. However, a more likely 
reason for its relatively placid passage was that, as in 
previous legislation, the most important feature of the 
relationship between CSIR and the state departments remained
Act to Amend the Institute of Science and Industry 
1920, (1926, No. 20).
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unclarified. As Currie and Graham have noted:
His EBruce's 1 words heavily favoured the 
notion that the commonwealth should co­
ordinate and subsidise scientific work 
to be done in the state laboratories and 
universities, but his deeds did not. 48
In a time of budgetary surplus CSIR was given £500,000
for a trust fund, which was to prove of inestimable value
49during the lean years of the 1930s.
Over the next few years some momentous decisions 
were taken, setting the lines of development for CSIR and 
ultimately for the present CSIRO. However, consideration 
of these matters is clearly beyond the scope of this 
thesis. In terms of an examination of the process of 
government policy formation it would be erroneous to 
argue that the development of CSIR policies necessarily 
reflected the policy determinations of the cabinet of the 
day. CSIR was an independent, statutory body, administered 
by a council of three federal appointees, the chairmen of 
the six state committees and co-opted scientists. Many 
of its early successes were due to the calibre of its 
leadership and the qualities of some of its state advisors. 
The prime example of this can be seen in the handling of 
the basic problem of whether CSIR would have its own
48 Sir George Currie and John Graham, 'CSIR 1926-1939', 
Public Administration, XXXlll (3), 1974, p. 232.
49 Ibid., pp. 230, 235. This was provided in two 
instalments of £250,000 in 1926 and 1928.
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research facilities and initiate policies or should 
operate through existing state projects and facilities. 
This matter was dealt with at the 1926 Agriculture 
Conference.
Early correspondence within CSIR reveals that 
the main aim was to win the goodwill and co-operation of 
the states:
I CRivett] would not put any cut and 
dried scheme before this conference.
If possible we want them Ithe States] 
to appear to be giving us a push towards 
the development of some super organiz­
ation in agriculture. 50
Yet this had to be done without allowing the CSIR to be­
come simply a catch-all for the most difficult, expensive 
problems. As Lightfoot, the very experienced secretary, 
warned his council:
Experience shows that it is very improbable 
that the State representatives would 
approach the whole matter in a national 
spirit. There is a danger that each state 
will desire to load onto the CSIR its own 
problems, regardless of their national 
importance, and especially those problems 
which are very difficult of solution. 51
The credit for the amicable formation of the Standing 
Committee on Agriculture, a joint commonwealth-state body
50 CSIROA, Correspondence file 209/26, Rivett to Julius 
and Newbegin, 25 January 1926.
51 Ibid., Lightfoot to Julius and Newbegin.
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responsible for the initial allocation of projects,
belongs to the men of the Executive Committee of the
CSIR and the Victorian State Director of Agriculture, Dr 
52Cameron. The other states were led to accept the plan
of a division of efforts between the central body and
the states along the general lines of pure research
versus applied research, or research versus extension
53work (the instruction of farmers). The balance would
shift over the next decade and various refinements were
introduced but, given the climate of opinion at the end
of the 1920s it proved adequate. It was a workable
policy decision, arrived at by the CSIR Executive and
the states, not a Cabinet formulation. The Minister
could interfere. When Victorian and South Australian
fruit growers demanded that their local CSIR officer show
them the correct method of dipping dried fruit, the
Minister for Markets and Migration urged CSIR to comply,
and despite South Australian objections it reluctantly 
54did so. However, although such pressure existed, it 
does not seem to have been applied in any consistent 
fashion to influence the overall pattern of the Organiz­
ation's actions. When looking for evidence of commonwealth 
policy on vermin and weed control it is far more relevant
52 Sir Frederick Currie and John Graham, The Origin of 
the Standing Committee on Agriculture', Public 
Administration, XXV11 (1), 1968, p. 29.
53 CSIROA, Correspondence file 209/26, 1926 Agriculture 
Conference.
Currie and Graham, 'Standing Committee on Agriculture', 
p. 29 .
54
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to study the very early years when financially and 
administratively the federal government was more directly 
involved.
Section 2: Particular Cases
What passes for commonwealth policy on vermin 
and noxious weeds had its origins within the shaky frame­
work of the Advisory Council and the Institute, and the 
problems that bedevilled those bodies in their efforts 
to establish a national scientific organization to assist 
primary industry are mirrored in the difficulties 
experienced in the more localized area. The plan for a 
joint Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland 
operation against prickly pear was raised when Hughes 
proposed the formation of the Institute of Science and 
Industry. There were excellent reasons for making prickly 
pear a prime target. The plant had spread slowly from 
its introduction to Scone in 1839 but by 1919 it covered
over 20 million acres in Queensland and over two million
55acres in New South Wales. In the whole of Australia 
there were just over 18% million acres under crops. The 
pear was spreading at the rate of about one million acres 
per annum. Botanists confessed that they could not see 
why it should not move further south, and there were
55 CSIROA, Correspondence file 81, Brief Statement 
Prepared for Institute of Science and Industry 
Bill, 1919.
354
already isolated pockets of infestation in Victoria.^
It was a highly visible problem and because of the 
grotesque nature of the plants it was easier to convince 
non-rural parliamentarians about the menace of prickly 
pear than about that of St John's Wort, which was the 
other prolific weed causing major concern.
Although Queensland had taken over 50 years to
realise that it had a potential disaster on its hands, in
the early twentieth century much valuable research on
chemical counter-measures had been done at Dulacca under
Dr Jean White. The results had not been promising.
Arsenic, either in the form of arsenious trichloride gas
or as the acid, arsenious chloride, was the cheapest and
most effective poison tested, but it often proved fatal
to the horses used to spread it, which did not augur well
for large scale application, and it was still too
57expensive to use to clear grazing land. A company 
called Cactus Estates had been created to try to destroy 
the pear by converting it to something useful, such as 
fodder, potash, paper pulp and power alcohol, but none 
of the processes had proved to be commercially viable 
because of expense. The Queensland Government station at 
Wallimbillah showed that the pear could be used as fodder, 
but it was calculated that, even if all the cattle in
56 CSIROA, Advisory Council Minutes, 9 December 1919.
57 Ibid., Correspondence file 81, Queensland 1916.
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Australia were fed on harvested pear, they would only
5 8be able to keep down the annual increase. Mechanical 
eradication had also failed, despite suggestions that 
tanks and flame-throwers could do the job. Several 
varieties, notably opuntia monacantha, had been attacked 
by various cochineal insects tested, but the well-named 
'pest pears', opuntia inermis and opuntia stricta were 
not as vulnerable as early tests suggested. Queensland 
was ready to agree with the travelling Prickly Pear 
Commission that the best prospects seemed to be offered 
by a biological solution, but the range of insects and 
parasites to be studied was very large and the consequences 
of error could be as bad as, or worse than, the original 
complaint.
As the commonwealth was responsible for quarantine
arrangements its wishes could not be ignored entirely and
after the outbreak of war chemical counter-measures became
scarce and even more expensive and German scientists were
59no longer employed at Dulacca. Queensland decided to 
close the station and offered it to the commonwealth.^
On the basis of the original discussion with Hughes the 
Advisory Council wrote to the New South Wales and Queensland 
Governments proposing a joint investigation that would cost
58 Ibid.
59 CPD, 1918; 86, 6518. (Judging by later comments this 
left the Queensland public service very short of 
biological scientists). See p. 359.
60 CSIROA, Correspondence file 81, New South Wales, Memo 
to Minister for Trade and Customs, 24 January 1919.
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£8,000 p.a. for five years. The commonwealth was 
prepared to vote £4,000 p.a. if each state would contrib­
ute £2,000 p.a.
The initial New South Wales support had come
from the Minister for Lands but when the formal proposal
61was made Holman rejected the offer. Queensland was
enthusiastic so the Advisory Council persisted in its
negotiations but with little success. In 1917 New South
Wales replied that its Experiments Supervision Committee
saw little justification for spending £8,000, and instead
of the state contributing £2,000 p.a. it would be better
if the commonwealth gave a £500 p.a. subsidy to an existing
6 2state research facility. Holman said his government was
expecting satisfactory results from the work of the
Department of Agriculture biologist, Dr George Darnell-
Smith. Darnell-Smith, who in 1924 became Director of the
Botanical Gardens and the most highly paid scientist in the
department, believed in chemical control of prickly pear
but, as the Advisory Council noted, the State Experiments
Committee had published no results and he was engaged in
work that went over the same ground as that covered by Dr 
6 3Jean White. In March 1918 Holman wrote to the Prime
61 Ibid., Memo to Piddington on behalf of Lightfoot, 
8 June 1918.
62 Ibid., Advisory Council Minutes, 30 October 1917.
63 Ibid., 30 October 1917, 22 November 1917, 13 
February 1918.
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Minister:
The better course would be for a 
Committee of experts representing the 
Commonwealth, New South Wales and 
Queensland to be formed for the purpose 
of carrying out the investigation. It 
is considered that for the first year a 
sum of £2,000 should be sufficient, and 
it is suggested that your government 
contribute £1,000 of this and New South 
Wales and Queensland £500 each. 64
Queensland informed the commonwealth that they would only 
participate in a joint scheme on the original terms.
As well as Holman’s well known resistance to any 
increase in federal powers there may well have been a certain 
amount of departmental obstreperousness influencing the New 
South Wales decision. The Secretary of the Advisory Council 
had an interview with the New South Wales Experiments Super­
vision Committee and reported that:
It appeared to him CLightfootl that the 
proposals had not been treated on their 
merits. The Under-Secretary for Agriculture 
appeared to have opposed the proposal for 
the reason that he had not approved of action 
taken in the past by the commonwealth 
government in offering salaries higher than 
those paid by the state government to certain 
officers, such as butter graders, etc. 65
Interdepartmental rivalries were apparently also used by 
Holman as a way of getting negative reports to buttress his 
aversion to increased direct participation by the common-
64 Ibid., Correspondence file 81, Premier to Prime 
Minister, 12 March 1918.
65 Ibid., Advisory Council Minutes, 21 May 1918.
358
wealth government:
... it was the Minister for Lands who 
originally promised the assistance of New 
South Wales in the scheme. Each time we 
have written to the Premier of New South 
Wales subsequently however, the matter has 
been referred to the Department of Agriculture. 
The problem as it affects the two Departments 
is, however, different. The Department of 
Agriculture is chiefly interested in clearing 
pear on good agricultural land where a 
chemical method may well prove possible. The 
Lands Department is more concerned with 
checking the spread of pear on unoccupied 
lands and is quite certain, in view of the 
Dulacca experiment, that no chemical will be 
cheap enough to justify its use for this 
purpose. 66
As the negotiations dragged on unproductively departmental 
pettiness also threatened Queensland participation. The 
Under-Secretary for Agriculture favoured joint action but 
it was reported to the Advisory Council by the Chairman of 
the State Committee that:
Some of the officers of his Department, two 
of whom were members of the Board of Advice 
on Prickly Pear Instruction, have taken a 
strongly antagonistic attitude to Dr Jean 
White's work and strongly favour the 
Agriculture Department taking up this work 
rather than leaving it to the Science and 
Industry Council. 67
This could have meant the end of all hope of collaboration, 
but the Chairman went on to point out that, 'now that Dr
66 Ibid., Correspondence file 81, to Piddington on 
behalf of Lightfoot, 8 June 1918.
Ibid., Chairman of Queensland State Committee to 
Advisory Council, 15 December 1917.
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*Jean White Haney has left the service of the Queensland 
Government there is really no one in the government service 
with a biological training qualified to deal with this 
problem as an expert'.
The Queensland situation was far more acute than
that in New South Wales, so pressure for innovation and
effective counter-measures was stronger there. However,
as the pear was still spreading at a fairly steady million
acres a year, many of those acres south of the border,
Holman was not immune to the arguments that extra-ordinary
measures were warranted. By May 1919 he was ready to
approve the general principle of collaboration but not the
6 8financial commitment. However, the following month his
Minister for Lands, Ashford, told the Advisory Council
confidentially that the work of his department in no way
constituted a solution to the pear infestation and he
promised that he would use his best offices to try to get
69the Premier to look to 'more scientific methods'. By 
the end of October formal agreement had been reached between 
the three participating governments and approaches were 
made to a very small group of scientists.
Once it was established and working the Prickly 
Pear Board acquired some strength through its statutory
68. Ibid., Advisory Council Minutes, 12 May 1919.
69 Ibid., 2 June 1919.
* She married and left the department. She later 
became one of the few female scientists in CSIR 
and did valuable work on Nagoora Burr and studies 
on sheep feeding preferences on New England pastures.
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status and assured annual funding for five years, but 
like its parent body it also suffered from the unresolved 
tensions of commonwealth and state relationships and from 
the predatory instincts of long established state depart­
ments. Three years after the Board began its work the 
Queensland Government Entomologist told the Commissioners
that it would have been better if all work had been left
70in state departmental hands. Dr Darnell-Smith had 
reported to his state government the previous year in a 
similar vein. After inspecting the Sherwood Laboratory he 
expressed anxiety at the reliance being placed on biological 
control research:
I saw no results in the Laboratory to 
justify such a statement Cthat prickly pear 
would be completely eradicated 1 and as I have 
already pointed out, there is no reason to 
suppose that Laboratory results can be 
reproduced in the field. 71
He recommended that the state's contribution of £2,000 p.a. 
as well as half the federal contribution, which also came 
to £2,000 p.a., should be devoted to chemical research and 
immediate field work checking the pear in New South Wales. 
Such work would naturally fall in the province of his own 
agriculture department committee.
The Prickly Pear Board does not seem to have been
70 Ibid., Correspondence file 81, 18 June 1923.
71 Ibid., Report of inspection of Prickly Pear Station 
at Sherwood, 7 December 1922.
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a happy group to work for. There was a great deal of
squabbling and personal animosity. Much of it could be
traced to financial stringencies which made the
Commissioners rigorous in their application of rulings
on leave entitlements, accrued holiday payments and
field work expenses, but some of it appears to have been
the result of state jealousies or the professional rivalry
72of state and commonwealth scientists. For instance,
Arthur Temple Clerk, who ran the nursery at the Westwood
Laboratory in Queensland and who had been involved in the
breeding of cochineal insects before the establishment of
the Board, and Henderson, the Queensland Government Analyst,
were very critical of the techniques and field trips
73abroad of the chief scientist, Dr Harvey Johnston.
Darnell-Smith1s continuing criticism of the project has
already been mentioned. Such disagreements may have been
inevitable and need not have been serious, but there were
suggestions that, tired of taking instructions from an
'outsider', the states' arrangements for the release of
a new batch of cochineal insects in 1923 were premature
and did not include strict measures to ensure that the
74insects were parasite free. Naturally state departments
72 Ibid., Correspondence file 81. Almost every scientist 
employed by the Board had trouble over one or more of 
these points. Filed by name.
73 Ibid., Temple Clerk to Froggatt, 14 July 1922.
74 Ibid., Professor Johnston, 14 April 1923.
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were anxious to see the acreage of pear diminish and the
utilization of state facilities and staff sometimes made
tight administration difficult for the Prickly Pear Board.
This was a serious problem because, as one of the Board's
experts, Alan Dodd, wrote later, the whole project might
have failed had any of 1cactoblastis cactorum's parasites
been introduced with it or if native parasites had proved
75more dangerous to it'.
By 1924 the Board was eager for any signs of 
ultimate victory to assure itself of further finance. It 
had not received unqualified support from any of the 
participating governments, and there were federal parlia­
mentarians who privately agreed with James Fenton, the
Labor Whip, that 'this Institute will not lead to the
7 6eradication of the prickly pear'. Although a variety
of bugs and parasites had made some nibbles at success,
there was a great deal of luck in the final achievement
of a biological control for the pear. In 1924 the Minister
for Trade and Customs listed 30 insects that had been
introduced and tested with varying degrees of success.
Against the name cactoblastis cactorum was the comment 'not 
77successful'. It had been introduced in 1914 by the
75 A.D. Dodd, Biological Campaign Against Prickly Pear, 
Brisbane, 1940, p. 17.
76 CPD, 1920, 92, 2890.
77 CPD, 1924, 108, 3629.
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Queensland Travelling Commission (an extensive eighteen
months overseas investigation of possible control measures)
but had died out. Alan Dodd, the field officer in
Paraguay, decided to try it again in 1924 and by 1926
7 8there were extremely encouraging laboratory results.
Given the extensive list of possible insects and the time 
needed for adequate testing and quarantine the re-testing 
of cactoblastis at that crucial stage of the Board's 
existence was providential. The stunningly successful 
results ensured that there was no trouble about getting 
extra funds for spreading the insects in 1926. The 
commonwealth contribution was raised to £6,000 p.a. for
79a further five years and the states each gave £3,000 p.a. 
The success of the Prickly Pear Board may also have in­
fluenced the passage of the Institute Amendment Act of 1926 
but as the dramatic collapse of the cactus plants had not 
begun when the Act was passed, although hopes were high, 
this is very debatable.
At the same time as the Prickly Pear Board was 
starting its work the Advisory Council was bowing out of 
another weed eradication programme. In 1917 the Executive 
Committee had announced it would concentrate on three areas 
of noxious weed research: prickly pear, St John's Wort,
78 CSIROA, Correspondence file 81. Note for file 1926 
concerning prickly pear.
79 Ibid., Executive Council Minutes, 21 October 1926.
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8 0and a survey of weed pests. Most of the search for a
biological control for St John's Wort was done by the
Imperial Entomology Bureau in London. As it was a British
weed it was hoped that a British insect would be found to
control it. It was also cheaper and safer to pay the
Bureau £200 p.a. than set up full quarantine, breeding
and testing facilities in Australia. By 1918 the Queensland
Government Entomologist, Tryon, and Professor Lefroy, the
Advisory Council expert, were eager to begin testing beetles
of the chrysomela family in Australia, but the other state
Directors of Agriculture objected that it was too hazard- 
81ous. The Advisory Council sounded out the Director of
Quarantine who decided that 'it would seem to be my obvious
8 2duty to act in the direction of safety'. In April of
the same year the Chief of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture expressed pessimism about the prospects of
safely introducing insects that would be injurious to weeds.
8 3He believed that prickly pear was probably an exception.
When the Imperial Entomological Bureau reported in 1921 
that they had only found one possible insect control, the
80 Ibid., Correspondence file 102/-/3, 1925 Summary of 
Weed Control. (The original minute was drawn up by 
the Executive Committee of the Advisory Council, not 
the Executive Council, which was not formed till 1920).
81 Ibid., 102/-/1918, Letters from State Directors, 
Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia.
82 Ibid., Director of Quarantine to Secretary of Advisory 
Council, 16 January 1919.
83 Ibid., 102/-/-, Weed Pests. Howard, Chief of Bureau 
of Agriculture to Lightfoot.
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beetle chrysomela varians, and that its appetite was too 
unpredictable for it to be safely introduced into a new 
environment, the Institute announced that it would take 
no further action.^
Various rural organizations continued to write to
the Institue and later to CSIR requesting a concerted
campaign against the spread of St John's Wort, but nothing
was done. When in 1924 the Victorian Premier requested a
co-operative campaign against blackberries, St John's Wort,
Californian thistle and ragwort the Institute described the
kind of Economic Botany Section it would like to form, but
then went on to say that it had to refuse all the suggest-
8 5ions on the grounds of lack of money.
Admittedly, until the 1920s the states had done
little to help themselves. In 1919 the Advisory Council
pointed out that 'not flOO has been spent on research and
8 6since 1902 not £1,000 on eradication'. However, in the
same year Victoria was proposing to spend £24,000 on noxious
8 7weed eradication, much of it on St John's Wort. Awareness 
of the danger was growing and the federal government could 
not claim to be in the vanguard. In 1925 Victorian
84 Ibid., 102/-, Correspondence with Imperial authorities.
85 Ibid., Executive Council Minutes, 15 July 1927,
Summary, noxious weeds.
86 Ibid., Advisory Council Minutes, 8 September 1919.
87 Ibid.
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expenditure on weed clearance was £85,000 and in 1926
8 8it was £100,000. As St John's Wort spread into the
soldier settlement area around Tumbarumba the New South
Wales government offered the commonwealth use of abandoned
89farms for research. The offer had to be refused.
There was no attempt to set up a St John's Wort
Board, despite the expectations of success surrounding the
Prickly Pear Board by 1926. The New South Wales Minister
for Lands, William Dunn, was rather rash when he told an
audience of soldier settlers that, 'If he were a farmer
and forced to choose between prickly pear and St John's
Wort, without a moment's hesitation he would say, "Give
9 0me prickly pear" '. Nevertheless, it was a serious, ever­
growing problem. The only known remedy was the application 
of salt. In Victoria it was estimated that badly infested
farms required six tons per acre, costing £2.7s.6d per ton,
91plus £1 for carting and spreading. Even prosperous 
farmers had to think twice before spending £18 per acre.
The Daily Telegraph calculated that it could cost up to
88 Leader, Melbourne, 26 January 1926.
89 CSIROA, Correspondence file 102/-, correspondence with 
New South Wales; Advisory Council Minutes, 9 
September 1918.
90 Ibid., 102/-, St John's Wort, press cuttings, Australian 
Farming, Richmond, 16 November 1925.
91 Argus, 23 January 1925.
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92£35 per acre in New South Wales. Even if this was an 
exaggeration obviously only good agricultural land 
warranted the outlay, but the worst hit areas were soldier 
settlements in the Ovens Valley and in southern New South- 
Wales.
The weed did not cover the enormous area 
occupied by prickly pear but the pear had taken over 50 
years to reach plague proportions and there was no reason 
to offer St John's Wort the same opportunity. It is a mark 
of the lack of a commonwealth policy on noxious weeds that 
the Institute was given so little encouragement to tackle 
this problem. The cynic might say that weeds counted for 
few votes. Probably more importantly, the auguries for 
cheap biological control in this case were soon recognised 
as unfavourable. It was going to be one of those expensive, 
intractable problems governments prefer to side-step.
Whereas the states, through their Departments of Land and 
Agriculture, had to wrestle with it, the commonwealth was, 
by the nature of the constitution, distanced from the 
immediate impact. Two Australian political scientists,
R. Smith and P. Weller have argued that the lack of formal 
constitutional responsibility for agriculture should be
92 Daily Telegraph, 25 May 1925.
A .H. Chesterman, Menace of St John's Wort, New South 
Wales Government Printer, 1925, p. 6. The New South 
Wales Lands Department estimated salting cost 20s per 
acre for lightly infested land and £20 for heavily 
infested.
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seen as a commonwealth resource. It may have operated 
as such in the case of the introduction of wheat quotas, 
which was the example they discussed, but its effects on 
pest control were less beneficial. The ultimate danger to 
the Australian economy had been grasped by some leading 
politicians but, as with so many of the difficulties 
confronting primary industry, the federal government was 
able to avoid specific policy decisions while it held in 
abeyance the whole matter of the federal role in scientific 
research. Once CSIR was formally established and adequately 
funded, such decisions passed within its ambit. Prickly 
pear was a special case. It was strikingly obvious and, 
thanks to the work of the Queensland Travelling Commission, 
it offered hope of a relatively cheap solution, given a 
concerted effort.
A further example of the ambiguous nature of the 
federal response to pest control can be seen in the handling 
of the rabbit question. This was not one of the matters 
suggested as a likely topic for the Advisory Council to 
take up. The Pasteur Institute in the 1880s and Danysz in 
the early twentieth century had conducted extensive tests 
with virus diseases, without success. In 1919 Dr Aragao of 
Brazil wrote to the Advisory Council about rabbit myxoma.
He had observed its lethal effects on his caged rabbits 
and considered it might solve Australia's problem. Sir
93
93 R.F. Smith and P. Weller, 'Public Servants, Interest 
Groups and Policy Making - Two Case Studies', 
Occasional Papers No. 12, Political Science, RSSS, 
ANU, 1976.
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Harry Allen examined the evidence for the Advisory Council
but, because Aragao could not supply more details on the
method by which the disease could be communicated to healthy
animals when over-crowding was not present, the investigat- 
94ion lapsed. The Advisory Council had no laboratories or 
quarantine facilities for the extensive testing that would 
be necessary, and on the basis of previous experience, it 
had no expectations of eventual success. In 1924 the 
Director of Veterinary Research in New South Wales made 
some unsuccessful tests with the virus but could not 
discover how to make it spread. It was not until the 1930s 
that Dr Jean Macnamara learned of Aragao1s work and took 
up the cause of myxomatosis. Her own field was paediatrics 
but she fought for the introduction of myxomatosis with 
the persistence of a fanatic. It took nearly twenty years 
before her battles with sceptical scientists, suspicious 
quarantine officials and an unpredictable virus and its 
carriers were successfully concluded.
Because of the extremely grave implications of 
introducing an inadequately studied disease the Institute's 
caution was laudable, but there were also other reasons 
for the procrastination. As the Institute's Journal 
observed in 1919, 'Another subject [apart from sun power 
energy] that is the cause of much controversy, and also
94 CSIROA, Advisory Council Minutes, 14 July 1919,
11 August 1919.
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of much opposition, is that of controlling the rabbit
95by the introduction of some specific disease'.
Anxiety about the threat to the sheep industry, not to
mention public health, was of deep concern to some
members of parliament and when rumours about rabbit
myxoma circulated there were a variety of hostile
responses. Senator Earle, Vice-President of Hughes'
Executive Council and son of a small farmer in Tasmania,
said that 'in consideration of the evident abominable
cruelty of such a disease and the possible risk to the
public, the government should take steps to emphatically
96forbid such introduction'. Another member of Hughes'
party, a New South Wales farmer and Director of a Rabbit
Board, John Lynch, asked 'will the Minister seriously
consider the advisability of making it a capital offence
97to introduce any fresh disease into Australia?'. The 
non-committal answer was that no such introduction was 
proposed.
Many leading newspapers were quite as suspicious. 
In 1907, at the time Danysz' experiments with chicken 
cholera had concluded unsuccessfully, the Sydney Morning 
Herald urged farmers to forget the idea of a miraculous 
disease and to reconsider the rabbit problem with fresh
95 Science and Industry, Journal of the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research, Vol. 1, 1919, p. 
205 .
96 CPD, 1919; 88, 11242.
97 CPD, 1919; 89, 12061.
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9 8minds. The Melbourne Age went much further:
The ghastly experiments made with killing 
rabbits by breeding a deadly infection amongst 
them have deservedly failed ... while it had 
no promise of clearing the land of the rabbit 
pest it may spread more or less unwholesome 
contagion, so that while leaving the lands 
almost as much infected as before, it may 
entirely destroy, not the rabbits, but the 
rabbit trapping business. 99
Understandably, it is a much more emotive step to introduce 
an animal disease than it is to introduce a plant disease. 
Human beings do not catch plant diseases. They can catch 
rabies, brucellosis, psittacosis, hydatids and tuberculosis 
from their animals, just to name an unpleasant few.
However, commerce rather than simple caution seems to under­
pin much of the reluctance towards further experimentation.
In a statement in 1917 which the Pastoral Review 
discussed in an editorial and never forgave, Hughes 
ordered the cessation of poisoning around all freezer works 
because 'rabbits now are no longer, as it were, a pest to 
be got rid of at all hazard, but a means of affording 
employment to large numbers of people, and a source of 
wealth to the community' . The rabbit industry lobby was 
strong, influencing all parties. Rabbiters, as members of 
a union affiliated with the Australian Workers' Union,
98 SMH, 24 December 1907.
99 Age, 28 November 1908.
100 CPD, 1917; 81, 11487; Pastoral Review, 1917, Vol. 
27, p. 311.
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naturally looked to the Labor party. Individual trappers 
wrote to the federal Labor party whenever a possible 
rabbit disease was mooted. 'Now why should a few persons 
be aloud to interduce a man (a forener at that) loaded up 
with Deseased Germs' wrote one group in 1905.^^ They 
demanded that Danysz should 'have his germs confiscated 
and destroyed as we know the Labour party can do more in 
the federal Parliament than in our local or States House'.
In 1919 the County Freezing Company, on behalf of 
the Rabbit Exporters of New South Wales, produced a type­
script defending the industry and arguing for assured 
freezer space in ships to Britain. They referred to the 
estimated £750,000 capital investment in their state alone 
and gave the export earnings from the frozen carcass trade 
in the years 1915-18 as £531,920, £734,624, £913,142 and 
£985,190 respectively."^2 In 1917 and 1918 Britain 
reserved the entire frozen carcass trade to provide cheap 
meat for the cities as the German blockade forced up prices. 
This contract was breached by Britain in 1918 but as the
U.S.A. was also in the market for cheap meat the price
103remained inflated. There were also the furriers to
consider. Diseased rabbits do not produce good pelts, even 
if skinners are prepared to handle them. During the same 
years, 1915-18, export of skins returned £231,000, £266,000
101 A.A., CRS A2 05/4877, Prime Minister's Department, 
Trappers from Young, 3 October 1905 (spelling as in 
original).
102 Ibid., CRS A2 19/277, Rabbit shipments misc.
103 Ibid.
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104£441/000 and £1,158,000. There are no official
figures on the value of rabbit skins used domestically,
but in the days when nearly all men and women wore felt
hats it must have been considerable. During the war
years Hughes used the War Precautions Act to set up a
scheme for the compulsory purchase of all pelts, supposedly
to ensure supplies and to prevent profiteering in the face
of the demands for military headgear and strap pads. The
government made a profit of £230,000 in less than one year
105out of the resale of skins to manufacturers.
Because of the employment aspect, as well as the
supply of cheap meat to the towns, the Labor Party was
more subject to pressure from the rabbit industry supporters
than its opponents, but the division was far from clear cut.
Small farmers tended to look to their rabbits for additional
cash income. In 1921 the Graziers' Association of New
South Wales noted how Darby's Falls' farmers near Carcoar
had invested in a freezer works, and some were even protect-
106ing their rabbits. One zealous farmer, who had
laboriously cleared rabbits off 700 acres by fencing and 
then burning 6,700 logs and digging in 645 burrows, while 
consoling himself that, 'every blow of.the pick is wool and 
grass', argued that 'Legislation should be introduced to
104 L.J. Dunn, The Rabbit Industry - An Economic Survey 
1904-1947, University of Tasmania, Department of 
Economics and Commerce, 1948. (Duplicated typed 
copy ANL), Appendices.
105 CPD, 1918; 83, 3018; 84 , 3339 .
106 ANUA, E256/109/6766 , Graziers' Association, Fourth 
Annual Conference.
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prevent the landholder or any member of his family
hunting, skinning or in any way making a profit from the
107sale of rabbits'. A rather confused letter from Lloyds
Freezing Company, Tenterfield, asking for reserved freezer 
space, summed up the conflict of interest among farmers:
You may not be aware that this company 
embraces many of the most prominent men 
of the Tenterfield District to which the 
Rabbit as a pest is of much more importance 
than the same as foodstuff, still there are 
other Members whose funds are invested and 
to whom the matter is of much importance. 108
The writer meant to claim that the freezer works served the 
interests of those who wanted to rid their properties of 
rabbits as well as those who wanted to make money from 
rabbits* but most rural organizations considered the two 
interests were incompatible. Those making money from 
dealing in rabbits were by no means all Labor supporters.
As I said in the introduction we tend to use 
language as though words had immutably fixed meanings but, 
in practice, changing social and emotional circumstances 
can lead to major shifts in interpretation. Lacking a 
feudal tradition Australia could not utilize the British 
definition of vermin; instead a vague economic criterion 
was developed. James Mathews, member for Melbourne Ports
107 Ibid., E256/133/8348. W. Moylan, Barraba, 11 
November 1922.
108 A.A., CRS A2 1918/2127.
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grasped this fact but drew the wrong implications:
If rabbits had the same commercial value 
as sheep they would not be regarded as a 
pest ... A pest ceases to be a pest when 
it is found to possess a commercial value. 
If there is a commercial value in anything 
in the vegetable world it is very quickly 
eradicated unless people take steps to 
perpetuate it instead of killing it right 
off. The discovery of commercial value 
in the prickly pear would be of immense 
benefit to the agriculturists and 
pastoralists of Australia. 109
The fallacy in his reasoning lay in the assumption that all 
economic interests can be truly and impartially weighted and 
that a group's political muscle grows in direct proportion 
to its economic value. Sometimes a small, vocal business 
group can exert great pressure. Luckily for the farmers of 
Queensland and New South Wales there was no market for 
cactus spines and no-one found a way of profitably utiliz­
ing cactus flesh. If they had then there would undoubtedly 
have been opposition to the introduction of a cactus 
predator which would not recognize boundary fences.
Despite the scepticism of scientists and 
politicians many farmers retained their faith in the 
possibilities of a devastating rabbit disease, but even the 
Country Party was not a believer in its imminent discovery. 
The Graziers' Association carried on a long correspondence 
with Earle Page in his capacity as leader of the Country 
Party over the possibility of conducting large scale field
109 CPD, 1919, 88, 11559.
376
tests with the so-called Yalgogrin disease, or indeed any 
likely disease, but they were informed any such move would 
have to come from the s t a t e s . T h e  1921 annual conference 
of the Graziers' Association had forwarded resolutions to 
the state Ministry of Public Health and Motherhood asking 
that an invitation be sent to the French Pasteur Institute 
to establish a branch in Australia and that the state and 
the commonwealth should co-operate in scientific investig­
ations into rabbit eradication. The communication was 
eventually passed on to the Institute. Knibbs replied that 
any such research establishment would be part of the
Institute or a proposed Bureau of Science, but that there
112were no funds for action in the foreseeable future. In
a direct reply to the minister about rabbit disease research
he pointed out that his vote made no provision for it and
that 'there does not appear to be any likelihood of an early
solution to the problem being reached and investigational
113work would be costly'.
It is against this background that the 1923 
Advances to Settlers Act has to be considered. This act 
provided the states with funds at reduced interest to enable 
them to make more loans to farmers for rabbit-proof netted 
f e n c e s . I t  was a most unexpected piece of legislation.
110 ANUA, E256/139/9166, Graziers' Association, 1923.
111 Ibid., E256/110/6853, 28 July 1921. This was yet 
another example of the tendency to favour the foreign 
expert over the local man.
112 Ibid., E256/128/8214, 3 October 1922.
113 A.A., CRS A458 F384/2 , 1921. Prime Minister's Dept.
Advances to Settlers Act, (1923, No. 19).114
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In 1922 there was a petition from the Mudgee Pastures
Protection Board, endorsed by most of the boards, asking
that the commonwealth set up a £3 million fund to finance
cheap fencing against rabbits. The government replied
that the proper agency to approach was the State Lands
Department, 'which is in close touch with settlers and both
economically and practically in a better position than
the commonwealth to carry out the proposal submitted
In 1922 a meeting of farmers at Delungra asked the New
South Wales Government to set up a £5 million fund for
the same purpose and the annual conference of the Graziers'
Association adopted the resolution. However, the Lands
Department replied that 'sufficient funds are available
for the purchase of netting and no difficulty is experienced
117in obtaining netting as required'. Early in 1923 Bruce
answered a similar question in parliament by simply saying
118that fencing was a state matter. By the middle of the
same year he had reversed his stand and introduced the 
Advances to Settlers Act.
Concern over rabbits was a familiar topic in 
federal parliament. Country members frequently raised it
115 A.A., CRS A 458F384/2
116 ANUA, E256/126/8035, 21 August 1922.
117 Ibid., E256/139/9107, 2 August 1923.
118 CPD, 1923, 102, 311.
378
in debates over rural hardships. Rural disaffection had 
also been building up over the National Government's war­
time rabbit policies. The Graziers' Association recorded 
numerous protests over the embargo on the export of rabbit
skins, and war-time shortages of wire netting and poison
119had exacerbated the chronic rabbit problem. There had
also been many requests to lift the tariff on imported
wire netting. Hughes complied but replaced it with a
120dumping duty which aroused equal hostility.
Why did Bruce reverse his position and introduce 
a bill to provide fencing assistance at the end of 1923? 
The gag was much used to get it through in just over a 
week as irate members kept saying Bruce was in a hurry to 
leave the country to attend the Imperial Conference; the 
state governments had not complained of inadequate funds 
for the purpose; constitutionally Bruce had admitted 
fencing was a state responsibility, and in the one area 
that was the undisputed prerogative of the federal govern­
ment, tariff protection, the commonwealth refused to act 
to reduce costs.
According to some Labor men Bruce saw the chance 
to direct a small budget surplus where it would do most
119 ANUA, E256/85/5002; CPD, 1920, 91, 279.
120 ANUA, E256/122/7654, 9 June 1922; E256/142/9358,
2 October 1923.
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121electoral good. Next year there might be too many
other calls on such a sum, which was, conveniently, about
the same as the profit the federal government had made
from the rabbit fur monopoly. Whereas the profit from the
control of wheat sacks had been returned to the wheat
growers' association, the government had declined to try
122to return the rabbit skin profit to the trappers. As
the new Country Party vote had risen from 9.26% in 1919 
to 12.56% in 1922, and many of the more radical farmers 
were not happy with a coalition government, it is reason­
able to assume Bruce was aware of the advisability of
123appearing sensitive to rural problems. A South
Australian Labor member, Joel Gabb, speculated along 
similar lines:
I wonder whether there is a political 
reason behind the introduction of the 
bill. Is it merely a sop to the Country 
Party? ... a quid pro quo for the 
reduction in postage rates which will 
favour the big city merchants. 124
The official reason was the need to aid small
settlers and there was ample evidence that their hardships 
125were genuine. Fencing was acknowledged to be one of
121 CPD, 1923, 105, Joel Gabb, 2631; Matthew Charlton, 
2681; Hubert Lazzarini, 2686.
122 CPD, 1919, 84, 3508; 1919; 88, 10551.
123 PR, 1923, Vol. 33, p. 103.
124 CPD, 1923, 105, 2631.
125 Ibid., 2843.
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the heaviest costs a farmer had to bear, and wire-netting 
fences were regarded as the most important step to protect 
a property against rabbits. The difficulties experienced 
by soldier settlers were a political embarrassment, but 
although the government said that the bill was designed to 
help the needy, no such qualifications were specifically 
included. It was left to the discretion of the states to 
deal with all applications and, as Labor men pointed out, 
there was no reason Sir Sydney Kidman himself, who was 
probably the largest landholder in Australia, could not 
receive assistance. Interestingly, at the time the bill 
was being debated there was considerable rural speculationtabout the imposition of a dumping duty on imported British 
126wire netting. Early in 1924 one was imposed, despite
127widespread opposition from farmers. It would be
inaccurate to assert that the government was giving with 
one hand in order to take away with the other, because 
imported wire accounted for only a fraction of the amount 
used in Australia; but Bruce knew that his tariff policies 
were unpopular with the rural electorate. Soon after he 
took office in February 1923 the Pastoral Review noted with 
disapproval that the Prime Minister had gone out of his way 
to deny rumours that he intended to tear up the tariffs, 
and farmers were sure that the interests of the wire
126 PR, 1923, Vol. 33, p. 211.
127 ANUA, E256/153/9635; E256/122/7654.
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industry and John Lysaght were close to the government's 
12 8heart. In all, 1923 was an expedient time for the
government to make an obvious and identifiable contribution 
to the war on rabbits. It might take decades before 
research funds invested in the Institute made valuable 
returns: money invested in fencing loans would be making
visible returns before the next elections.
The Advances to Settlers bill was a very sketchy
piece of legislation. It had seven brief clauses and no
administrative detail. Up to £250,000 was to be placed in
a trust fund to buy netting which the government would allot
to the states for distribution. Committees would be set up
in each state to administer the allocation and repayments
would be long term, and according to Austin Chapman,
Minister for Trade and Customs, who introduced the legislat-
129ion, 'practically interest free'. The basic Labor
objections were presented by the Leader of the Opposition, 
Charlton. He approved the principle but condemned the 
failure of the government to explain how recipients were 
to be selected, how the money would be divided, how much 
the states would be allowed to charge for administration, 
how the states could ensure that they were not left with 
massive debts, and how much of the wire would be locally 
manufactured. All these points were to be determined
128 PR, 1923, Vol. 33, p. 103; CPD, 1927; 996. By 1927 
£466,000 in bounties had been paid to the two 
Australian wire factories.
129 CPD, 1923, 105, 2612.
130 Ibid., 2613ff.
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by regulation or, in the case of the purchase of wire,
of the discretion of the Minister. As another Labor man
put it, the bill was 'a moderate but not a well considered
131measure of state socialism'. It actually went rather
too far for at least one Labor member. Albert Green of
Kalgoorlie denounced it as 'something more than socialism
and I cannot agree to go so far as this measure. I am
not a communist ... This is a proposal to lend money
132without interest'. Naturally this kind of socialism
did not alarm Country Party members like the industrial
variety, and Robert Cook, the member for Indi declared,
'If the proposal is a socialistic one it is socialism of
133the right sort'.
However, within Bruce's own party there was
some disquiet over the bill both for interference with
states' rights, particularly through the formation of
special committees and, more importantly, for interference
with private enterprise, through the bulk purchase of
netting. Two very influential members expressed their
anxiety in the House. John Latham, who became Attorney-
General in 1925 said the bill was unconstitutional and
argued that the government could only make cash grants,
not provide netting to the states, and Groom, the Attorney-
134General, reluctantly agreed that there might be a problem.
131 Ibid., 2623.
132 Ibid., 2638 .
133 Ibid., 2632 .
134 Ibid., 2634; 2689.
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At the end of the brief time allowed for the second
reading in the House, Groom submitted an amendment
changing the character of the bill. Instead of the
commonwealth advancing wire netting to the states it
would advance the money and let the states make their own 
135purchases. The change removed the financial advantage
that would have flowed from the single bulk purchase. It
had been forced on the government by a revolt of its own
 ^ 136supporters.
The extreme Labor position was epitomized by Dr
Maloney, who argued that rabbits were a source of food and
137employment and a cause of land redistribution, and by
Senator Albert Gardiner, who saw the grasping fist of
Kidman behind the proposal. He was only 56 and lived to
be 85, but he announced 'I am not youthful or active enough
to take on the task of worrying Ministers to secure a share
of these doles for my constituents and I want to kill this
138pernicious system in its infancy'. One South Australia
Nationalist, Richard Foster, who held the rural seat of 
Wakefield, admitted to the House that he was distressed at 
the failure of the government to inform its own supporters 
how the scheme would work, but he thought that it would be
135 Ibid., 2692.
136 Ibid., 3216.
137 See p. 337.
138 Ibid., 3203.
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a brave man who dared go back to his country electorate
139having voted against a measure to give money to farmers.
The debates were poorly attended as well as rushed. For 
much of the time there were only 19 Labor men, one Country 
Party man and six Nationalists present in the House of 
Representatives.
The state governments did not greet the act with
enthusiasm either. Eight months later only Western
Australia had submitted claims. Netting seemed to bring
out the worst in New South Wales' dealings with the
commonwealth. In 1907 the two governments had nearly come
to blows over the forcible removal of wire netting from
bond stores. The federal government wrote to New South
Wales that the Collector had been instructed 'to maintain
possession of the goods at all hazards and to call the
141necessary assistance'. In 1923 the exchanges were
more restrained. New South Wales was offered £62,000
but said that soldier settlers alone would take £70,000
in three months, and as there was £82,000 remaining in
their own fencing fund, to be lent at 5% p.a. there was
142little pressure to join the scheme. After protracted
139 Ibid., 2688.
140 CPD, 1923, 105, 2637, 2686.
141 A.A., CRS A2 3808/1907.
142 D. Stead, Rabbit Menace Inquiry, pp. 104, 112.
385
negotiations a settlement was reached. Applications were 
restricted to soldier settlers, to avoid too much 
competition with the state scheme, which was 1% p.a. more 
expensive, and although the commonwealth had said that it 
wanted the wire to go to the most needy, the state insisted 
on mortgage security and administered the Act through the 
pastures protection boards. The boards in this instance 
screened rigorously, to avoid being saddled with debts.
After twelve months only nine applications had been
, 143 approved.
It was not that New South Wales was indifferent 
to the demand for fencing. From 1905 to 1923 the state
144had voted £430,000 for fencing loans at 5% to 6% interest. 
Admittedly £200,000 for that was voted in 1922-23, when 
the Nationalists replaced Labor and when the federal scheme 
had been announced, but there had been little point in 
establishing large funds before the end of the war-time 
shortages of wire. Seeing that the state had never 
requested this form of aid and that it was prepared to act, 
if pushed hard enough, there were grounds for resenting 
commonwealth involvement, particularly when the latter's 
disregard for repayment guarantees is remembered. The 
act implied that the states would be responsible for de­
faulters because the money was loaned to them, not to 
individual farmers.
143 CPD, 1924, 109 , 5276 .
144 Stead, p. 104; state policy is discussed in Chapter 9.
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The Victorian reaction was similar, if a little
less overtly hostile. Victoria was deeply involved in
settling the Mallee and Wimmera. These farmers fitted
the vague federal criterion of 'needy settlers', and
both the state and commonwealth systems were administered
by the Closer Settlement Board. However, of the £40,000
voted for Victoria only £1,300 had been taken up by 
145December 1924. By mid-1925 £123,576 had been advanced
to all states, excluding South Australia, which never
joined. Victoria had taken up nearly one-third of its
146advance and New South Wales somewhat less. In 1925
£500,000 was placed on the estimates for further advances
but in 1926 negotiations were still taking place over
regulations to govern its handling. Following a letter
from the New South Wales government threatening to pull
out, the commonwealth yielded to widespread state demands
147and revised the act. Three million pounds were to be
provided to the states over six years at 1% less than 
the market borrowing rate of 5%. The states could then 
charge settlers up to 1% more (5%), plus £1 per mile, to 
cover costs and defaulters. Selection and security were 
left to the states. In other words, the commonwealth was 
simply adding to existing state funds. The scheme still
145 VPD, 1925; 111, 2274.
146 CPD, 1925, 111, 2274 .
147 CPD, 1926, 113, 2620; 114, 4457; A.A., CRS A2718/XM,
Bruce Page Cabinet Minutes, 19 October 1926.
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did not appeal to most Premiers. Although the amended 
act was passed in 1927 and backdated to July 1926, only 
two states, Queensland and Western Australia ever took 
advantage of it.^^
The Advances to Settlers Act was not a move 
towards the development of a commonwealth policy on 
vermin control. Although fencing was the recognized 
first step in the fight against the rabbit, a judgment 
only superseded by the advent of myxomatosis, 1080 poison 
and the prohibitive cost of such fencing today, it needs 
more than wire netting and good intentions to make a 
fence vermin proof. Netting had to be buried, stays had 
to be properly aligned inside the fences, undergrowth 
cleared away from the wire and, above all, gates had to 
be made secure. The New South Wales Rabbit Menace Inquiry, 
1925-26, presented a scathing indictment of the standard 
of vermin proof fencing in that state. Inspection, where 
it occurred, was the responsibility of the pastures 
protection boards, neighbours policing neighbours. In 
Victoria inspection may have been more rigorous, because 
the Closer Settlement Boards were more impersonally 
inquisitive about what was happening on the farms under 
their jurisdiction, but this is only speculation. The 
key point is that the commonwealth was simply providing 
loan facilities, not new initiatives or even more
148 CPD, 1932, 135, 216.
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rigorous application of known counter-measures.
Fencing was at best a palliative, not a cure.
Fires, floods, sand and natural decay meant that fences
had to be maintained and replaced. Because the loans had
to be repaid the commonwealth was not ultimately up for
a large outlay, even when it took over responsibility for
final repayments during the depression. The figures for
defaulters in 1938, the end of the era of hardship, show
that the federal government had written off a total of
149just over £6,000.
The states had begun large loan programmes long 
before the commonwealth became involved. Some dated back 
to the 1880s. Although some rural groups had demanded 
additional federal funds, security rather than the 
availability of money had been the limiting factor, and it 
remained so. Most of the federal fund was never taken up 
because of the depression. State governments had 
concentrated their requests for aid on cheaper wire and
149 A.A., CRS A609 90/60/1. Department of Commerce 
and Agriculture, Correspondence files, Multi­
number series.
VIC
Advances £59,948
Repayments 22,201
Written off 5,673
Arrears as of June 1931 
Victoria £7,384 (mainly in the Mallee)
N.S.W. 4,988
Tasmania 31
N.S.W. TOTAL
£51,154 £248,444
27,659 137,539
NIL 6,229
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federal funding for intensive research. Neither proposit­
ion was popular with the federal government. Returns on 
scientific research could not be backed with first 
mortgages and the rabbit industry lobby was influential.
The main virtues of the Advances to Settlers Act were that 
it took some of the heat out of the dumping bounty issue, 
and thus out of the tariff question as a whole, that it was 
a visible sign of federal concern, that it was electorally 
popular and that it freed the government from all 
administrative and debt collecting responsibilities. Amid 
debates over its consitutional correctness or socialistic 
tendencies few questioned the idea behind this approach 
to the vermin problem. Despite its faults in drafting 
and after 1926 the participation of only two states and 
the Northern Territory, the act survived a number of 
revisions until it was finally made redundant by myxomatosis 
and inflation.
The commonwealth chose to become involved in the 
provision of rabbit-proof fencing loans, despite the 
objections of the state leaders: it had no choice about
involvement in the matter of rabbit fur farming. However, 
this time it proved more responsive to the wishes of the 
states. In 1926 Cabinet discussed a request to permit the 
introduction of long-haired rabbits for breeding purposes.
On the recommendation of the Minister for Defence the 
application was rejected, 'in view of the losses due to
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the rabbit pest in Australia and to the stringent
legislation in force in all states on the keeping of 
150rabbits'. Nevertheless, in New South Wales and in
South Australia there was strong support for the project
from a section of small farmers and businessmen, so the
topic was again raised. New South Wales conducted an
inquiry in 1928-29. The majority report, signed by the
primary producers' representatives on the committee,
opposed the importation of angora and chinchilla rabbits,
but the minority report, written by public servants,
151favoured it. The Department of Agriculture endorsed
the minority report and in 1929 the Premier's Department
approved importation of specialty rabbits, under strict
152supervision and control. Although any state could
permit rabbit farming, the introduction of breeding stock
needed federal permission, so Cabinet was again consulted.
It concluded this time that 'there does not seem to be
any valid reason why the industry should not be encouraged,
and the importation of animals for this purpose under
153proper safeguards permitted'. A submission was prepared
for the Premiers' Conference and, within the year, the 
incoming Labor government lifted the quarantine
150 Ibid., A2718/XM, 9 February 1926. Bruce Page 
Cabinet Minutes.
151 Fur Farming in N.S.W., unpublished Committee 
Investigation, State Library of N.S.W., 8/2018.
152 Ibid., 8/2018, 10 June 1929, Premier's Department.
153 A.A., CRS A2718/XM, 26 April 1929.
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prohibition.
Whereas the fencing loans had been intended to
appeal to the rural organizations, regardless of state
government opinion, the fur farming decision was resented
by farmers' organizations but pleased the governments and
155some groups of farmers. Later experience has validated
the opinion of experts that any escape of the delicate, 
large, fine furred, hutched-reared rabbits would not lead 
to a plague of 'super rabbits'. However, federal leaders 
did not address themselves to one of the other main points 
of the majority report, which was that rabbit farming 
would have a bad moral effect on landholders, 'who require 
persistent keeping up to their obligations to free the 
land of rabbits'.-^6 supporters' expectations of fur 
farming profits were wildly exaggerated and when the world 
depression came, the bottom fell out of the luxury wool 
cloth trade and most of the ventures failed. The decision 
to allow the importation of rabbits is, in itself, 
insignificant but it does illustrate the ad hoc nature 
of the commonwealth approach to legislation on pests and, 
despite the strident note sounded by a few Labor members, 
the lack of distinctive party positions.
Although the quarantine regulations were relaxed
154 Government Gazette, 21 November 1929.
155 ANUA, E256/232/MM38. Graziers' Association.
156 Fur Farming Committee, Majority report, Appendix A.
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by a Labor government, traditionally more receptive to
the interests of small farmers and rural workers than to
the fears of graziers, the initial moves had begun under
the Bruce-Page Ministry. Just as concern for export
earnings and a healthy economy had led some men to see
the need for a national scientific research organization,
so the prospect of a new, labour intensive industry
dominated thinking in this minor field, to the exclusion
of any debate about the environmental implications of
157increased commercialization of rabbits.
It is tempting but futile to speculate what the 
results would have been if the money earmarked for the 
Advances to Settlers Act had been devoted to pest control 
work under the Insitute or under CSIR. Such a move would 
have meant the permanent investment of capital, not the 
setting up of a recouperable loan. The kind of long term 
economic considerations that directed attention to the need 
for centralized, scientific research into primary industries 
were not sufficiently acute to cause immediate action. 
Because of the nature of the constitution, problems touching 
primary industry tended to exercise a direct effect on state, 
not federal legislation. For the commonwealth there was 
what might be called a double institutional barrier to any 
sensitive appreciation of the problems associated with 
vermin and weed control. Direct contact with farmers was
157 This aspect has been discussed in another part of 
the thesis in relation to the influence of Section 
92 of the Constitution on state policy. See Chapter 9.
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through state officials and any legislation dealing with 
rural industries had to meet with state approval, even 
if it was constitutionally acceptable, or counter the 
kind of treatment meted out by most states to the Advances 
to Settlers Act. On the other hand, the areas in which the 
commonwealth was free to act without constitutional 
restraints, such as tariff reform, were not, on the whole, 
politically appealing. There was good co-operation between 
federal and state authorities over prickly pear research, 
but there was no commercial factor to complicate the picture 
and the Prickly Pear Board only cost the commonwealth 
£4,000 p.a. The commonwealth government was more isolated 
from the immediate environmental issue and thus even more 
subject to extraneous political pressures when legislation 
was proposed than were the states. The constitution was 
not an inevitable barrier to the development of an 
integrated policy but its restraints provided the excuse 
for failure to decide between conflicting interest groups 
and a reason for not spending large sums where a return 
was not assured. It also isolated politicians from the 
urgency of the situation.
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CHAPTER 11 
Conclusion
The development of vermin and weed policy from 
the first acts against the rabbits,until the depression 
of the 1930s disrupted most programmes(is almost a study 
in paradoxes. On the one hand the subordination of pest 
control measures to the dictates of land tenure policy 
created problems for Victoria and particularly for New 
South Wales. On the other hand, the desire to encourage 
viable intensification of settlement was one of the main 
reasons why governments were forced to continue trying to 
find effective, acceptable solutions. The commonwealth 
was not subject to the same direct pressure, despite the 
general economic factors which eventually made it impossible 
to completely ignore the issue, therefore successive govern­
ments were much freer than their state counterparts to avoid 
the really difficult and expensive problems. However, this 
in turn meant that the sense of overriding need was missing 
from most federal debates, and party politics and internal 
party disagreements assumed considerable importance.
Over the 50 year period attitudes underwent many 
changes, but paradoxes abound here as well. It took much 
longer for settlers to appreciate the seriousness of the 
rabbit problem than it took for that awareness to become 
blunted by over-familiarity. While landholders continued 
to bemoan the rabbit menace, a certain fatalistic acceptance
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rapidly developed. Perceptions of what was actually 
happening to the land were obscured by the scale of the 
problem. It was too big, too difficult and it dragged on 
for too long. The same comment is applicable to the weed 
problem. Whereas the individual landholder could success­
fully smite his dingoes and unfortunate wombats with a 
heavy hand, rabbits, like weeds, seemed to flourish anew 
every spring. Therefore it was more satisfying to put 
money and energy into the much lesser vermin problem of 
native animals. The authorities and the majority of settlers 
were not blind to the relative economic importance of 
different kinds of vermin, and they were not unaware of a 
relationship between dingo eradication and the growth in 
marsupial numbers, or between bird destruction and insect 
plagues, but although these environmental perceptions 
existed, they ran counter to strong emotional attitudes that 
constituted a far more powerful impetus to action.
The traditional European image of the rabbit 
proved almost as hard to eradicate as the animal itself.
This is shown not only by the speed with which the rabbit 
plagues have been largely forgotten and the casual attitude 
of many modern farmers towards dealing with the survivors 
of myxomatosis, but also by the willingness of many small 
farmers in the 1920s to consider the possibility of rabbit 
fur farming. Obviously the word 'rabbit' did not produce 
feelings of lasting revulsion or anxiety. The commercial 
utilization of the rabbit was one reason for the ambivalent 
attitude. At an intellectual level there was little rural
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disagreement with the proposition that rabbits were a 
curse. However, this did not mean that rabbits were not 
the main source of meat for many families or that the money 
from skins and carcasses was not a welcome sight to 
innumerable cash starved selectors.
The more people became accustomed to living with 
rabbit infestation the more sensitive they became to the 
nuances of policies designed to get rid of the pest.
Although most remained advocates of more effective legislat­
ion, when legislation was proposed it was often seen in 
terms of more taxation, more interfering inspectors or a 
reduced chance of acquiring more land, and therefore it was 
not readily acceptable. These other issues retained the 
capacity to arouse a greater degree of emotional commitment 
than the ever present rabbit problem. Conversely, familiar­
ity with a particular form of control method could eventually 
lead to it gaining a high degree of acceptance. This was the 
case with the simultaneous killing programmes arranged and 
enforced by the Victorian Lands Department. There had been 
arguments against such programmes in the 1880s but by the 
early twentieth century they were one of the measures for 
which the department was most praised. New South Wales 
settlers approved the principle but found so many objections 
to organizing the practice that it did not become a feature 
of their policy.
Probably because it had such deep roots in the
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intellectual tradition of nineteenth century English 
speaking people, faith in science remained a consistent 
strand in popular attitudes to vermin and weed control. 
Nevertheless, it never achieved the same hold on public 
opinion in Victoria that it did in New South Wales, despite 
the similarities of background. Once again there was a 
gulf between attitude and action. In one way later 
Australian pest control policy has been haunted by two 
fortuitous discoveries: cactoblastis and myxomatosis. With
the aid of these, two most serious introduced pests were 
eventually countered without recourse to extremely expensive 
innovations or major interference with individual property 
management. This reinforced the stubborn myth that there is 
always a cheap, 'natural solution', if only vested interests 
or government stupidity do not prevent its introduction. 
However, cactoblastis did not demolish the cactus until the 
end of the 1920s and myxomatosis was not successfully 
introduced until 1950. The strength of the attitudes 
produced by these events should not be read back into pre- 
1926 Victorian opinion, and although New South Wales rural 
opinion was always receptive to the claims of scientists 
and other experimenters, this was one area where governments 
tended to listen to their own experts and to exercise 
considerable caution. They were influenced by fears of the 
possible adverse consequences and the probability of the 
high cost of experiments; in Victoria attitudes were 
modified by the existence of alternative policies and the 
lack of strongly motivated, wealthy pressure groups.
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Attitudes and actions create a delicate interplay. 
Not only does changing experience modify attitudes but the 
process also works the other way, and sometimes the channels 
through which attitudes can be transformed into actions are 
disrupted. Despite the common heritage of their settlers 
and the initial similarity of their attitudes and responses 
to rabbits and noxious weeds, in New South Wales and 
Victoria policies took different courses. This was largely 
a result of the different stages reached in their land use 
policies and the social tension and economic problems this 
caused in New South Wales, but the particular directions 
adopted were markedly influenced by administrative factors.
Both governments initially opted for decentralized, 
locally controlled programmes, although only Victoria had a 
system of compulsory shire organization and New South Wales 
had to work through the narrowly sectional pastures and 
stock protection boards. It therefore seems contradictory 
that Victoria was pushed into an increasingly centralized 
scheme and New South Wales had to abandon the 1883 attempt 
to centralize its rabbit control policy. However, the 
original 1883 Rabbit Nuisance Act was tried for less than 
one year before it was turned into a straight bounty system. 
There were too few inspectors, too much paper work, too 
little support from landholders, and soon, too much resumed 
land for the administrative framework to cope with the 
original plan. From then on New South Wales governments were 
faced with the problem of selecting or creating an acceptable 
form of local administration and the whole matter became
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deeply entangled with rural interest groups and ultimately 
with party politics.
In Victoria the shires were composed of so many 
interest groups and were so wide ranging in their authority 
that they were soon only too willing to opt out of such a 
difficult matter as rabbit control, leaving little 
alternative to central administration. From then on it was 
a reluctant step by step progression to an intergrated, 
centralized system. The longer New South Wales delayed 
making decisive moves the more difficult they became.
Various groups developed their own ways of coping and 
conflicts of interest intensified.
There is no simple model that explains where the 
spurs to action originated. In the early 1880s the New 
South Wales government seemed to be ahead of public opinion, 
whereas the government of Victoria, the first state to feel 
the brunt of the rabbit advance, lagged behind. In the 
1890s New South Wales governments were clearly reluctant 
to tackle the difficulties of vermin and weed control and 
concentrated on a barrier fence policy of questionable 
worth but high visibility. However neither state could 
ignore the growing menace of vermin and weeds without 
sacrificing basic principles of land utilization. Even the 
commonwealth behind its constitutional shield was reluctant­
ly drawn in. Yet within all three spheres central 
bureaucratic structures themselves modified the intentions
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of policy makers. The jealousies of the departments that 
shared authority for various aspects of policy administrat­
ion, their slowness to develop research branches and the 
importance of the attitude of the permanent senior public 
servants, such as Francis Allan, were all factors to be 
reckoned with.
The states eventually arrived at different 
solutions to the problems of vermin and pest control for 
reasons that owed little to their original intentions or 
attitudes.
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APPENDIX
OFFICIAL MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
INTO SCHEMES FOR THE EXTERMINATION OF RABBITS
NEW SOUTH WALES
MacLaurin, Henry M.D. , 1835-1914. Physician 
and public man. Sat on a number of investigatory 
committees; eventually became Chancellor of 
Sydney University. (Mackerras, C.B. 'Sir Henry 
Normand MacLaurin', J .R .A .H .S ., 1968, pp. 265-8).
Wilkinson, William Camac M.D., 1856-1946, 
physician, educated at Sydney University and 
University of London. 1885-89 Alderman of Sydney. 
1888 President pathology section Intercolonial 
Medical Conference. Did much acclaimed work of 
tuberculosis in the colony and later in England. 
(ADB files).
Quin, Edward. MLA for Wentworth. Owner of Tarella 
Station, Deniliquin. One of the most active 
politicians on the rabbit question.
VICTORIA
Allen, Harry Brookes M.D., 1854-1926. Professor 
of Pathology and Anatomy Melbourne University 1882. 
President Royal Commission on the Sanitary State 
of Melbourne 1888. President Australian Medical
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Congress 1909. Visited Europe 1890 and obtained 
recognition of Melbourne medical degrees.
According to the British Medical Journal 2 March 
1935 he was a 'brilliant pathologist'.
Lacelles, Edward Harewood, 1847-1917. Pastoralist 
and businessman. In the 1870s he became involved 
in the Mallee area and experimented successfully 
with dry farming and rabbit eradication. Active 
encourager of sharefarming. Had the reputation 
of being a good man to work for. (ADB, V, 
pp. 66-7.)
Pearson, Alfred F.R. Met. Soc.; F.C.S.; A.L.C. 
1856-? Chemist and agriculturalist.
(ADB files) .
SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Stirling, Edward Charles M.D. 1848-1919. Surgeon, 
scientist and politician. First Professor 
Physiology University of Adelaide, Member 
University Council. Considerable exploration in 
search of specimens for the S.A. Museum, his life's 
work. Very active public career. F.R.S. London 
1893.
Paterson, Alexander Stuart, M.D.
Colonial Surgeon for S.A. from 1870.
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QUEENSLAND
Bancroft, Joseph, M.D. 1836-1904. Won many 
prizes Manchester Royal School of Medicine. Keen 
naturalist. Kept contact with eminent European 
and British scientists. Keenly interested in 
problems affecting stock and agriculture and 
conducted many practical experiments. Foundation 
member Royal Society of Queensland. Member of the 
Medical Board of Queensland 1876-94. Between 1866- 
1894 published 38 scientific papers, many of 
international note. (ADB, 3, 84).
TASMANIA
Tabart, Thomas. Chief inspector of Vermin. Had 
conducted experiments into the incidence of 
tuberculosis among rabbits.
NEW ZEALAND
Alfred Bell.
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